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Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160006-8
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THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Thursday, June 21, 1984
Ferment Seen in Soviet Policy
By DAVID IGNATIUS
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON-If Soviet policy seems
confused to Western observers these days,
there may be a simple reason: it is con-
fused.
Senior Reagan administration officials
believe the Soviet leadership is in the
midst of an unusual internal debate over
foreign and domestic policies, in which
some Soviet officials are privately criticiz-
ing their hard-line superiors. In the Ameri-
can view, this Soviet debate offers new op-
portunities and risks for the U.S. in a pe-
riod of frosty superpower relations.
The latest example of Soviet uncer-
tainty, U.S. officials argue, is the Krem-
lin's treatment of President Reagan's re-
cent remarks about a summit meeting
with Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko.
Moscow finally got around this week to re-
porting in the Soviet news media about Mr.
Reagan's offer last Thursday of a summit,
characterizing it as election-year rhetoric.
But administration officials say the Krem-
lin still hasn't taken a clear position on
whether it favors a summit and what
should be discussed.
"There seems to be a fascinating uncer-
tainty in the Soviet elite right now," says a
high-ranking administration official who
deals with Soviet affairs. He believes that,
on the summit issue, the Soviets "don't
want to close off any option" and are
"wary of denouncing" a meeting and thus
adding to their current international isola-
tion.
U.S. intelligence about what goes on in-
side the Kremlin is always murky at best.
But as administration officials read the ev-
idence, the current debate pits the hard-
line views of Soviet Foreign Minister An-
drey Gromyko against more pragmatic ar-
guments advanced by officials who deal
primarily with economic policy, such as
Politburo members Mikhail Gorbachev
and Nikolay Tikhanov.
The Gromyko group seems to be argu-
ing that the Reagan administration is fun-
damentally anti-Soviet and can't be trusted
under any circumstances. The other fac-
tion appears to be taking a more cautious
line, arguing that the Soviet Union needs
Western technology and modern manage-
ment for its economy, and that it makes
sense to keep channels open to the U.S .-
even to a propagandistic Reagan adminis-
tration.
There is a sharper de te over eco-
nomic policy. Some senio. Soviet econo-
mists, perhaps with suppor :rom Mr. Gor-
bachev, contend that the viet economy
cials, symbolized these days by Politburo
member Grigoriy Romanov, insist that re-
form will weaken the Communist Party's
political power and argue that the best eco-
nomic medicine is to crack the whip and
maintain discipline.
Presiding over this contentious collec-
tive leadership is Mr. Chernenko. U.S. offi-
cials describe him as a weak leader, a
"staff man" and "appointments secre-
tary," who succeeded Yuri Andropov this
year on the condition that he would allow
unusual autonomy to his fellow Politburo
members, such as Mr. Gromyko and Mr.
Gorbachev, in their areas of expertise.
The Reagan administration may be
overestimating the degree of friction in the
". . . the U.S.S.R. is
run by a gaggle, rather
than a tightly knit
body."
Kremlin and the extent of Moscow's for-
eign and domestic problems. U.S. officials
may also be mistaken if they assume the
Soviets will agree soon to real improve-
ments in superpower relations, such as a
summit meeting.
One Soviet expert at the State Depart-
ment argues, for example, that the roots of
the current hard-line policy go back to No-
vember 1982, when Leonid Brezhnev was
still the Soviet leader; the Kremlin isn't
likely to reverse this policy quickly, he
maintains. This official also contends that
policy conflict in the Kremlin is the rule,
rather than the exception.
But there are some intriguing signs of
uncertainty and friction in the Kremlin
these days. Administration officials cite
the following examples:
-Sniping and rumor-mongering. In re-
cent conversations with Westerners, So-
viets have criticized Mr. Gromyko and Mr.
Chernenko. Some of these comments seem
to reflect rumor-mongering by the KGB,
the Soviet security and intelligence force,
but U.S. officials believe they may signal a
real debate within the Soviet leadership.
"Russians all over the place-official and
semiofficial-are now talking about politics
in the Kremlin more openly than they have
in years," says one senior administration
official. He notes, for example, that some
officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry
have suggested that Mr. Gromyko may be
excessively hard-line.
-The March Switch. Many U.S. officials
believe something happened in March that
led to a hardening of Soviet policy toward,
head of the Soviet Olympic Committee,
was telling American officials early this
year that the Soviets would come to the
Olympics; suddenly, the policy switched.
Administration officials also note that the
Soviets seemed eager to discuss dead-
locked arms-control issues with former na-
tional security adviser Brent Scowcroft
and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
David Jones, but when they arrived in
Moscow last March for confidential discus-
sions, they were rebuffed by top Soviet of-
ficials.
-Politburo portfolios. Two younger Po-
litburo members who appear to be rivals
to succeed Mr. Chernenko, 53-year-old Mr.
Gorbachev and 61-year-old Mr. Romanov,
recently have gained added responsibility.
U.S. officials believe that Mr. Gorbachev,
as the senior member of the party secre-
tariat on the Politburo after Mr. Cher-
nenko, is now the No. 2 party leader, with
growing involvement in foreign affairs;
Mr. Romanov, meanwhile, appears to have
taken control of "administrative organs"-
such as the KGB, the police and the
courts-as well as defense industry. What's
intriguing, U.S. officials say, is that no sin-
gle member of the Politburo appears to
have taken control of the most important
portfolio of all-the responsibility for run-
ning the party's "organizational work,"
which
confers
enormous
patronage
power.
-Military. U.S. officials are studying
an interview by Soviet Chief of Staff Niko-
lai Ogarkov that appears last month in the
military newspaper Red Star. Marshall
[Ogarkov made some surprising comments,
Including a statement that a further
buildup of Soviet offensive nuclear forces
is becoming senseless." and a call for
greater
emphasis
on
high-technology i
'deep-strike" non-nuclear weapons. U.S.
officials believe he was suggesting the
need for reform in Soviet military doctrine
and lobbying for more spending on high-
tech weaponry.
Analysts in and out of the Reagan ad-
ministration disagree about how to read
these tea leaves, and about whether they
imply a gradual softening of Soviet policy
toward the U.S. But most Soviet experts
seem convinced that the Kremlin-after
months of strident bluster toward the
U.S .- is now on what one analyst calls "a
sticky wicket."
"You have a situation emerging where
the U.S.S.R. is run by a gaggle, rather
than a tightly-knit body, and what you're
getting is a more dissonant information
flow," says one State Department offi-
cial.
Adds a top Soviet expert for several re-
cent U.S. administrations, "Soviet policy is
bApproved ForaRelease 2000/08/08ey GIARDP96-00789R0001001-60006 8are seeing now is
agers greater authority. Br :: hard-line offi-
the tip of the iceberg."