CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160007-7

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Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160007-7
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1984
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What if the Soviets Are Driven by Fear?
What are the Russians up to? The Econ-
omist of London concludes that the Soviets
have gone into grumpy hibernation at least
through the Chernenko era, White House
aides say the Soviets are out to defeat
President Reagan and some alarmists of
both parties fear we are headed for war,
cold or hot.
The evidence that the Soviets are up to
something is overwhelming. In the past six
months they have walked out of Geneva
talks on strategic and intermediate-range
Viewpoint
by Morton M. Kondracke
missiles, pulled out of the Los Angeles
Olympics and canceled a high-level diplo-
matic mission to China.
They have carried out large-scale naval
maneuvers in the Caribbean and North At-
lantic and have launched a major new of-
·fensive in Afghanistan that included un-
precedented carpet-bombing of the Panj-
shir valley. They have installed new inter-
mediate-range missiles in Eastern Europe
and have moved more of their strategic-
missile submarines near American coast-
lines.
The Soviets have continued their rear-
mament of Syria, sent their defense minis-
ter and 66 senior generals and admirals to
conclude a multibillion-dollar arms deal
with India and have closed another sale,
reportedly valued at $2.5 billion, with
Irag.
A Soviet-built MiG fired at a U.S. heli-
copter that strayed over the Czech border.
The Soviets also have restricted civilian
air corridors into West Berlin. And on two
occasions, Soviet ships have bumped
against U.S. naval vessels.
Internally, the Soviets have cracked
down on dissidents, including physicist An-
drei Sakharov and his wife, reduced Jew-
ish emigration and restricted mail and
phone communications with the West.
All the while, they have taken every
possible opportunity to denounce the Rea-
gan administration and blame it for the
breakdown of East-West relations.
Konstantin Chernenko on April 8 specif-
ically denied that Soviet policy was di-
rected toward the U.S. presidential elec-
tion, but Soviet meddling in West German
elections last year provides a precedent for
disbelieving him.
If the Soviets are playing American pol-
itics, they are doing so just as badly as
they did in Germany, and they are likely to
help reelect President Reagan much as
they helped install the Christian Demo-
crats. Mr. Reagan will be only too happy
to wrap;himself in the flag, declare that
Moscow' (in addition to Havana, Managua
and the Ayatollah) is against him and ask,
the electorate whom they prefer-them or.
him.
The Democrats as well are playing into
Mr. Reagan's hands by implying that they
agree with the Soviets that the U.S. is prin-
cipally to blame for the chill in U.S .- Soviet
relations.
When House Democrats voted against
the MX missile and binary nerve gas-with
presidential candidates Gary Hart and
Walter Mondale urging them on-they also
gave Mr. Reagan the opportunity to charge
that his opposition was rewarding the Sovi-
ets for their refusal to take part in arms
talks.
The conventional wisdom among Ameri-
cans right now is that U.S .- Soviet relations
will improve after November regardless of
who wins. If a Democrat is elected, we'll
be back to detente. If Mr. Reagan is re-
elected, the Soviets will come back to ne-
gotiate because he is the only president
America has.
But another theory worth considering is
that internal crises in the Soviet Union
have more to do with Soviet behavior tha 1
with the U.S. elections. If that's so, U.S .-
Soviet relations may remain tense for
some time.
Recently published hearings of the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress entitled
"The Political Economy of the Soviet Un-
ion" suggest that the Soviet leadership
faces nothing but woe in the years ahead-
economic stagnation, the burgeoning of
non-Russian minorities, a declining stan-
dard of living and an increasing inability
to pay for the weaponry necessary to keep
up with the U.S.
American Sovietologists who testified at
the hearings-and also analysts at the
CIA-do not believe that the Soviet econ-
omy is about to collapse, but they agree
that Soviet growth rates are declining from
the 3%-4% range of the 1970s to 2% for the
1980s.
I'm neither an economist nor a Sovieto-
logist, but the experts' evidence suggests
that Soviet growth rates actually may be
flat or negative.
The CIA estimates that Soviet produc-
tivity has been declining at a rate of 0.8%
a year and that the country's labor force
will grow only 0.4% during the rest of this
decade.
There are other signs of decline. Ac-
cording to Prof. Marshall Goldman of
Wellesley College and Harvard, food is in
short supply outside of the Moscow-Lenin-
grad area and rationing has been imposed
in 12 cities.
According to Prof. Murray Feshbach of
Georgetown University, infant mortality in"
the Soviet Union is rising and life expec-
tancy is falling. He also cited Soviet publi-
cations to demonstrate that alcoholism and
abortion are rampant.
The Soviet Union has shown a seem-
ingly endless capacity to squeeze its civil-
ian sector to pay for military growth. If
defense spending accounts for 12% or 13%
of Soviet GNP, as most experts believe,
then there is still room to squeeze, even in
a declining economy.
Suppose, however, that the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency is right, and the mili-
tary actually accounts for 36% of GNP. In
a declining economy, the Soviet leadership
has to fear that in the long run it won't. be
able to maintain its most successful activi-
ties-building weapons and using them to
increase Soviet power and legitimacy.
If these hypotheses are correct, there
would seem to be four basic courses left to
the Soviets: (1) reform internally to -be-
come more productive; (2) seek true de-
tente with the U.S .; (3) continue the pres-
ent slow decline, and (4) strike quickly for
some strategic prize (oil, for example)
while their military position is still
strong.
Reform seems out of the question . as
long as party hack Chernenko is in power.
The Soviets seem to be in no mood for
detente except on their own terms, which
the U.S. specifically rejected after the Af-
ghanistan invasion. The two remaining
choices are most unpleasant, and the or-
deal of deciding whether to decline or risk
everything may account for Soviet surli-
ness.
No American can know for sure what is
going on inside the Kremlin, but if the So-
viets are acting out of desperation, what
should America do?
I think what we shouldn't do is scare
them, squeeze them and try to defeat
them, as President Reagan seems to. be
doing. We also shouldn't imply, as Demo-
crats sometimes do, that the Soviets can
hope for a return to the old style of detente
that led to Soviet adventurism and Ameri-
can reaction.
In dealing with a frightened, fractions
superpower, the best policy for the U.S. is
one that is firm, consistent and available
for fair bargaining. One of the best outlines
for such a policy available today is Rich-
ard Nixon's new book, "Real Peace." ;.
Mr: Kondracke is executive editor' of
the New Republic.
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