CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160005-9

THE WALL STREproved Far Release, 2004/08/25; CIA-RDP96-00789R0001001600059
.164mest
From Arms Control to Controlled Security
By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
The prospects for a comprehensive and
complex U.S .- Soviet arms-control agree-
ment, building on the foundations laid by
SALT I and SALT II, are increasingly
slim. Indeed, it is quite possible that arms
control as we have known it has come to
the end of the road. Once the great hope of
those who believed that the U.S .- Soviet ri-
valry could be limited by joint agree-
ment-with some even seeing in arms con-
trol the catalyst for a genuinely friendly
American-Soviet relationship-comprehen-
sive arms control (on the model of the
SALT agreements) is likely to be the vic-
tim of the bloody-mindedness of the pres-
ent Soviet leadership and of the dynamics
of the technological revolution.
The present Soviet leadership recently
has done something quite remarkable in
the history of the U.S .- Soviet competition.
It has publicly postulated that there will be
no arms-control talks unless the U.S. is
prepared to accept a public humiliation
and a political defeat: the dismantling of
the relatively few Pershing 2s and cruise
missiles so far deployed in Western Eu-
rope as a response to the hundreds of SS-
20s deployed by the Soviet Union over the
past several years. In effect, the Soviet
Union has made arms control a hostage to
the attainment of a truly major geopoliti-
cal objective: the severance of the U.S .-
European security connection.
A No-Win Situation
The Soviet demand is thus unaccepta-
ble. Even the accommodationists who to-
day dominate the discourse over foreign
affairs within a segment of the American
body politic reject the Soviet demand, and
the Reagan administration enjoys wide-
spread backing here and in Europe in re-
fusing to bow to it. The Soviets have thus
backed themselves into a no-win situation,
an act of unprecedented diplomatic stupid-
ity.
In order to extricate themselves, they
have lately proposed separate negotiations
in Vienna on an anti-satellite weapons
agreement. President Reagan was wise in
responding affirmatively to the proposal
for negotiations, but he is equally wise in
anticipating no real progress in them.
But in the meantime the hostage is dy-
ing. The primary victim of this situation is
arms control-not in its unrealistic utopian
version but as a modest and practical way
of somewhat controlling the spirals of de-
fense spending and weapons accumulation
on both sides. The Soviet refusal to negoti-
ate simply means precious. time is being
lost, and as a result it will be even more
difficult in the future to reach a truly am-
bitious and comprehensive agreement, a
better version of SALT II.
This is because the political paralysis in
the negotiations is being outpaced by the
dynamics of the weapons revolution. The
simple fact is that both the U.S. and the
Soviet Union are rapidly moving-while
the arms-control negotiations remain stale-
mated-to acquire increasingly sophisti-
cated weapons systems, making existing
ICBMs anachronistic. As pointed out in a
recent study in the Naval War College Re-
view by James Westwood: "The 1980s is a
time of rapid transition and readjustments
to technological changes in missilery. On
the horizon are stealth-type bombers
launching stealth cruise missiles (ALCM)
and precision-guided munitions (PGMs),
further obviating the role of ICBMs. Sclen-
tific and technological achievements in
guidance, navigation, aerodynamics, elec-
warhead yields-per-warhead-weight appear
to be leading rapidly to a downturn, per-
haps to an eventual demise of the once-as-
cendant and now dominant ICBMs of the
period 1960 to 1985. This trend holds both in
the United States and in the U.S.S.R."
Highly mobile and extraordinarily pre-
cise delivery systems are coming into be-
ing and are beginning to be deployed. By
way of example, the CEP (circular error
probabilities) of a Soviet SS-19 has been
approximately 1,200 feet; that of a Minute-
man III, 700 feet; of an MX, 450 feet; and
of a Pershing 2, with terminal guidance,
about 100 feet. The latest Soviet missiles
also involve similarly impressive opera-
tional improvements.
It will be increasingly difficult to im-
pose effective and verifiable limits on
these weapons. The verification problem is
becoming increasingly acute, given the
mobility of the new systems and the oppor-
tunities for rapid reloading and covert de-
ployment. The question of how to control
qualitative improvements plagued SALT II
negotiators and, at best, only a partially
satisfactory response was developed. Their
difficulties pale in comparison to the com-
plexities posed by the new systems. Ade-
quate verification of both qualitative and
quantitative limits would require access to
storage facilities and even perhaps to prod-
uction centers. As a consequence, it is real-
istic to conclude that for both political and
technological reasons, the chances of a
truly comprehensive agreement, which can
be reliably verified, are rapidly fading.
In that context, we are likely to see re-
newed attraction to war planners of a first-
strike scenario. Since the mid-1950s, acqui-
poses the greatest danger. It could in one
stroke create circumstances beyond our
capacity to foresee either its social or his-
torical consequences. Of course such a sud-
den-attack scenario remains unlikely, but
one can disregard it entirely only at the
greatest peril. Given the relative openness
of American society, the precise location of
key U.S. assets can be much more easily
ascertained and effectively targeted than
those of the Soviets. That makes the U.S.
more vulnerable to such. a strike, and it
would be escapist to assume that Soviet
planners would choose to ignore such an
option altogether.
Moreover, a bolt out of the blue could
create such initial disbelief among the U.S.
decision makers that they would be unable
to make a prompt response. Even without
a special Soviet effort to disrupt or destroy
U.S. decision makers, a sudden massive
attack would put the American leaders un-
der extraordinary psychological pressure,
capable of inducing erratic behavior and
hesitation. One can hardly imagine how ut-
terly dumbfounding would be the situation
in which the president would find himself
awakened in the middle of some night,
confronted with the following life-and-
death decision tree (as based on public
sources) :
Time (minutes)
0 Massive attack launched.
1 SLBMs detected.
2 ICBMs detected.
4-6 Confirmation of attack; uncer-
tainty over scale; U.S. decision process
begins.
6-10 First SLBMs detonate in High
Altitude EMP attack; SAC launched
The time has come to lay to rest the expectation
that arms control is the secret key to a more amicable
American-Soviet relationship.
sition by the Soviets of a respectable nu-
clear capability meant that a first strike-
inherently messy and unpredictable in its
consequences-was until recently not an
attractive option for either side. A messy
attack with large and relatively inaccurate
warheads (the only kind possible) would
still precipitate an almost equally messy
counterattack. But with the deployment of
extraordinarily accurate systems, a first
strike designed to paralyze the opponent's
capacity to respond through the pre-emp-
tive destruction of most of its forces and
through the decapitation of its command
structure can again become a viable plan-
ning option. From an offensive point of
view, a sudden attack by highly precise
and very numerous nuclear weapons is
more profitable than an exchange resulting
from a political crisis prompting both sides
to gear their forces to maximum alert.
In the years ahead, one can envisage
several ways in which nuclear weapons
might be used in anger and by delibera-
tion. Four basic variants summarize the
range of possibilities: (1) a massive sur-
prise attack; (2) through crisis escalation;
(3) by contagion from non-superpower con-
flicts; (4) by terrorist attack. Of those, in
the years ahead probably the fourth is the
most likely since it involves a relatively
simple operation, and it can be undertaken
by a limited group of individuals with little
concern for society and motivated by their
own peculiar brand of rationality.
But while the employment of a nuclear
device in a terrorist attack may be the
control, the enhanced c8
tronic circuitry and componentAy udved Fdl Release 2004/08/25: CIA- RER96-00789
preemptively; confirmation of scale of
attack; final U.S. decision process.
10-12 U.S. decision needed: Ride-out
or respond; first SLBMs detonate over
U.S. SLBM bases and National Com-
mand Authority.
12-14 Final window for initiating re-
sponse; launch under attack.
16-20 Delta SLBMs launched from
home ports hit SAC.
20-30 ICBM attack initiates possible
X-ray pin-down and begins impact on
targets.
How in these circumstances would the
president perform? How effective would be
the chain of command? How rational
would be the choices made in response to
initially unbelievable information? Could
incoming information regarding the nature
of the attack be rationally related to the
needed response? We are dealing here with
truly sensitive and disturbing operational
as well as psychological questions.
The advent of increasingly numerous
and accurate systems is making it possible
for planners of a strategic attack to envis-
age a first strike that leaves the opponent
strategically crippled, capable of only a
spasmodic, disorganized and strategically
aimless response-or none at all. This still
does not make a first strike attractive
from a moral or even political point of
view, given the stakes, but the point is that
gradually the military attractiveness of
this option is again increasing.
Accordingly, with the stalemate in arms
be offset by greater reliance on the part of
both sides on defensive strategic systems.
The Times of London put it correctly when
it stated editorially on June 13: "The So-
viet Union is now naturally worried about
the consequences of a burst in American
spending on missile defense. It casts doubt
on Soviet plans for offensive systems since
the possibility of any missile defense-even
an incomplete one-would radically alter
the cost calculation of offensive systems.
In the long run a defensive program would
enhance arms control by reducing the po-
tential gains from building offensive
weapons. . . . It is Ironic and paradoxical
that the age of deterrence has so confused
the strategic mentality of many commen-
tators that their reaction to a purely defen-
sive system is to suggest that it increases
danger."
The fact is that strategic defense has
become feasible not in the sense that it can
safeguard society but because it can in-
creasingly complicate the planning and ex-
ecution of an effective first strike. In other
words, strategic defense can somewhat ne-
gate the offensive advantages of increas-
ingly sophisticated strike systems, restor-
ing the element of deterrence simply by
creating again greater uncertainty as to
the consequences of a first strike.
Respective Vulnerability
For the U.S., it is an especially attrac-
tive option for it permits us to exploit the
advantages of high technology, an area of
U.S. superiority. This provides us with gen-
uine potential for offsetting the military
advantages gained in recent years by the
Soviet Union, and would put pressure on
the Soviet Union to return to serious arms-
control negotiations.
But even with such negotiations, the de-
velopment of some defensive strategic ca-
pability will remain desirable. It is often
said that an imbalance might arise when
one side sees the other side acquiring a
relatively invulnerable shield while itself
remaining vulnerable. Pre-emption might
therefore become tempting. In fact, that is
not likely to happen. The acquisition of a
defensive strategic capability is not like
purchasing an umbrella, which one can un-
fold against the rain upon leaving the
store. It is bound to be a protracted trial-
and-error piecemeal process, with both
sides experimenting, deploying partially,
and adjusting their capabilities, with nei-
ther one at any point in the next 15 to 20
years feeling it is truly invulnerable to the
other side, even though over time the re-
spective vulnerability of each side to a
first strike by the other will gradually be
declining.
Through such a process, a measure of
reciprocal stability will be acquired and
security of both sides will gradually be en-
hanced, though the process will not yield
the kind of restraint in defense expendi-
tures that many have associated with the
hoped-for arms control. But the time has
come to lay to rest the expectation that
arms control is the secret key to a more
amicable American-Soviet relationship or
even to the enhancement of mutual secu-
rity. The maintenance of such security will
remain an ambiguous and protracted pro-
cess requiring unilateral actions by both
sides, and increasingly so in the area of
strategic defense.
Mr. Brzezinski served as assistant to
D'f600gseglent for National Security Affairs
From 197-1981.

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Approved For Release 2004/08/25 : CIA-RDP96-00789R000100160005-9