CIA-RDP96-00792R000500620003-2

STU!
& WORLD REPORT
SGFOIA3
INSIDE THE COVERT MILITARY
OPERATIONS OF THE REAGAN ERA
BY STEVEN EMERSON
SGFOIA3
12
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140066'
EXCLUSIVE. ULVEN NYVALJUIN
PRIVATE NOTEBOOKS
CHT: GIA-RDP96-00792R000500620003-2

Approved For Release 2000/08/11 : CIA-RDP96-00792R000500620003-2
WARRIORS
military operations undertaken during
A forthcoming book on the secret
the Reagan era provides an unmatched account of
the nation's most classified intelligence and
counterterrorist units. The result of a yearlong
investigation into these Pentagon operations
shows how, after the failure of the
Iran rescue mission in 1980, covert
operations shifted from the Central
Intelligence Agency to the Pentagon, which,
in effect, established a "mini-CIA" in its basement
BY
STEVEN
EMERSON
Sonder Editor. U.S. News
Adapted from his book,
Secret Warriors: Inside the
Covert Military Operations
of the Reagan Era, to be
published by G. Putnam's :
Sons in April
24
or the soldiers and officers on the C-141
transport plane flying westward across
the ocean to Virginia, there was probably
no sadder moment. During the 14-hour
trip from Egypt back to the U.S., the
men, all members of an elite antiterrorist
force, sat in stunned silence. To be sure,
they were survivors. But what was that
worth? On April 24, 1980, they had conducted a
historic raid to free American hostages held in
Iran. The mission failed, men were killed. And
now, instead of a triumphal ride home alongside
the liberated hostages, the soldiers were flying
back in silence, disconsolate. and without the-
hostages.
As a result of the failure of the Iran hostage-
rescue mission at Desert One in 1980, the most
fundamental assumptions about American ef-
forts to combat terrorismabroad came into
question. Other countriesafter all, had mar
aged more difficult missions with aplomb. Why
couldn't the United States get its act together?
It was a gnawing question. And a small group
in the Pentagon quickly began wrestling with
an answer. The Desert One operation threw
together a hodgepodge of weapons and units
and chaos resulted. A Second, mission would
not make the same mistake. This was to be
called"Operation Snow Bird." And it would
be a model for the elite quick-strike units that
would evolve within the Pentagon in the ad-
ministration of Ronald Reagan. Indeed, the
man assigned to head Snow Bird in the waning
days of the Carter administration would be-
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 21, 1988
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scandal. How, for instance, had covert opera-
come nationally infamous in the waning days of
Reagan. He was an Air Force major general
named Richard Secord. And he wound up at
the very heart of the Iran-Contra arms-for-hos-
tages affair, the worst scandal of the Reagan
Presidency.
Even as some of the key players in that drama
await a grand jury's decision on criminal indict-
ments (which could come as early as this week),
it is clear now-despite more than a year of
inquiries by congressional panels, a presidential
review board and a special prosecutor- - that
much still is unknown about the origins of the
Marine Lt. Col Oliver North find it se remail.
this case to establish the Iran-Contra "Enter-
prise" -- flx "off-the-shelf, self-sustaining enti-
ty" dreamed of by the late director of central
intelligence, William Casey ?-
*
la search of hostages
In large measure, the answers to these and
other questions can be found in an examination
of the antiterror units developed in the inner-
most recesses of the Pentagon in the aftermath
of the Iran rescue mission. With the Central
Intelligence Agency constrained on many
fronts, the Pentagon units seemed especially ap-
pealing. And each new success fed the appetite
for more. But herein lies the central paradox of
covert military operations. On the one hand,
they are valuable and necessary instruments for
the United States in gathering intelligence and
fighting terrorism. On the other, covert actions
have demonstrated a historical propensity for
abuse, and there are decided limits facing those
inclined to action. Based on hundreds of inter-
views and thousands of pages of documents ob-
tained under the Freedom of Information Act
and from government sources, a yearlong inves-
tigation of the still classified Pentagon units
provides the most detailed portrait to date of the
successes and failures of the U.S. military's se-
cret warriors. Among the principal findings:
. In 1985, while Colonel North and others in
the administration were attempting to secure
the release of the hostages in Beirut, U.S. intelli-
gence had located the house in which five of the
six Americans were being held. A detailed mili-
tary rescue mission was planned in 1986, but it
was scrapped when the Iran-Contra affair began
to unfold (page 26).
· As far back as 1981, intelligence agents from
the Pentagon relied on psychics, first to help
determine the whereabouts of a kidnapped U.S.
general in Italy (page 28) and later to locate the
Beirut headquarters of the Iran-backed Hezbol-
lal. organization, believed to be the keepers of
the U.S. hostages.
· Following the terrorist bombing of the U.S.
Marine barracks in Beirut, in which 241 Amer-
icans died. the Pentagon dispatched an elite
tem. to Bedrer to investigate intelligence prob-
lems and arrange logistics for a possible retalia-
tory mission (page 31). The five-person team,
including a female agent named "Becky," spent
more than a month combing the back alleys of
Beirut, devising several methods of infiltrating
commandos should a decision be made to go
after the terrorists.m.
· Over several years, evidence shows, the
CIA -despite laws to the contrary-"exploited
the secret Pentagon units to carry out covert
operations in Central America to further the
cause of the Contra rebels fighting the Sandinis-
ta government in Nicaragua. One such unit,
known as "Yellow Fruit," was ultimately closed
PENTAGON
DIRECTORY
Delta Force: The Della
tary's quick-strik ..
antiterrorist force.
Intelligence and Securi-
ty Command: The
branch of the Army
traditionally responsi-
ble for its intelligence
operations and units.
Intelligence Support Ac-
tivity: The Pentagon's
most classified intelli-
gence-gathering and
counterterrorism unit.
Joint Special
Operations Command:
The umbrella military
command in charge of
all military counterter-
rorist forces.
Seaspray: The classi-
fied CIA-Army avia-
tion unit. Seaspray has
participated in opera-
tions in the Middle
East, Grenada, Cen-
tral America and
Southeast Asia.
Snow Bird: The classi-
fied second 1980 Iran
rescue-mission effort
led by Air Force Maj.
Gen. Richard Secord.
Special Operations Divi-
sion: The Army staff
organization responsi-
ble for coordinating
Army special opera-
tions and counterter-
rorist units.
Quici: Reaction Toata: . 4
small, clite Army
counterintelligence
unit.
Yellow Fruit: The
Army's classified oper-
ational-security/coun-
terintelligence project t.
designed to support
Pentagon covert opera-
tions. It became, how-
ever, part of an unau-
thorized CIA cell in':
the Army.
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 21, 1988
25
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specialists and a black-money expert. Longhofer | stone with a the roof
und adres com,then Goda esFor tod y sak
pr
nsuffing" firn
thought Col. Norman
-
by Seaspray carrying commando units on an exercise
of all the signal intelligence collected by the
United States between 1982 and 1984-there
were problems. And keeping the operation from
becoming exposed was getting increasingly diffi-
cult. So Longhofer and his aides decided to
create a top-secret program that would provide
additional operational security and counterintel-
ligence for the Central American mission, as
well as for other Army classified counterterror-
ism and special-intelligence operations. The new
program was code named Yellow Fruit.
Yellow Fruit was unlike anything the Army
had done before. It would operate under com-
mercial cover outside the Pentagon. Eventually,
it would grow to a staff of nine, including coun-
terintelligence agents, high-tech surveillance
security fo:
OverSEAS operations. In Tuttii.
1!
would engage in no private comoinicial business
whatsoever Amazingly, the top Army led 1-
ship was never fely briefed al : YAH !
operating as a commercial cutout. or outside. the
Pentagon. But in July, 1985, BSI openest in a
suite of commercial officer that rented dos
ute drive from the Pentagon. Yellow Fruit
members projected the appearance of a very
successful business, but the money was flowing
perhaps too easily. Indeed, maintaining cover
became a license to spend money extravagantly.
Too close for comfort
There were other complications as well. From
the low point it had reached during the Iran
rescue mission, the trust between the CIA and the
Defense Department had gradually been re-
stored. Through the successful covert operations
run by the Special Operations Division, the Army
demonstrated to the CIA its seemingly unlimited
amounts of money, skilled manpower, modern
equipment and ability to work under deep cover.
But with increasing pressure from the CIA to get
the secret units more deeply involved in Central
America, Secretary of the Army John Marsh
thought the relationship was becoming too close.
On March 9, 1983, Marsh sent an unusual
build it by the next morning-before
workers arrived.
Arriving in West Germany through
other countries to avoid being fol-
lowed, the QRT agents met their mili-
tary-intelligence colleagues who had
arranged for them to enter the Opel
plant at night by bribing security
For-5: A: Army agent had already
been working at the plant for some
time, posing as a Turkish worker. By
iscrrangement an almost finished
Sowie: cor had been left in the
RICARDO WATSON
was by destroying the car. By morn-
ing, the QRT had finished its job.
Soon thereafter, the Soviets took de-
livery. U.S. intelligence operatives
trailed it to monitor sensitive conver-
sations, and followed the Soviets as
they contacted local agents. The mis-
sion was so successful that a number
of Soviet agents were identified and
several Russian codes were broken.
Ultimately, more than a dozen Soviet
cers were secretly outfuicd with
trecking and bagging Giving
sze Die car rigcrousiy. even dis-
mentling it to find bugs. the devices had to be
embedded in the structure. Methodically, the
agents took the car apart and inserted the
transmitter into the chassis.
They carefully removed the car's headlining
and put tiny microphones in various si
such as above the clothes hook in the back e
is. however. In laname, the tests allempling
io bug the home of Gen. Manud Antonio Noi-
iega. fumbled badly. Two unarmed agents be-
gan making their way across the yard of a lux-
urious Noriega residence near Panama City
when suddenly a chorus of fierce barks from
attack dogs rasped through the air The agents
barel
bed over an8 foot Wall as armed's
The microphones v
vere then attached to :
transmitter in the A-frame through microthin
wires embedded in the chassis. The only way
the Soviets could have detected the transmitter
guards‹
hed firek Another att
mpt mot with
better results. ORT agents succeeded in plant-
ing a bug in a lavish Noriega apartment. But
six tapes, each 90 minutes long, failed to yield
any significant intelligence on Noriega.
General Dozier
tion. At night, a 500-man
battalion was dis-
patched to the area, and
soldiers quietly took up
positions around the
house. At dawn, the ca-
rabinieri launched an as-
sault on the home. They
found an Innocent Italian
family living there.
Dozier finally was res-
cued after U.S. Army
counterintelligence
agents, who had boon
traclithe ted's transmi !..
sions of Red Brigade
members, located an
apartment building In
! ..
fied a second -110:
apartmont that was us.
Ing far more electricity
than It had over the past
few months. At around
noon on January 28, 10
Italian antiterrorist com-
mandos raided the place.
Afterward, American au-
thorities enthusiastically
thanked the Italians.
Publicly, they main-
talned, no U.S. assis-
tance had been given.
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 21, 1988
29
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could apply to any ons 0:
17 milans horthere la'
Th. habe trestu"
this information very &
riously, and within days
has identified a hogst
.

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King Air few Jazy figure efgRis 95 7-500500620003-2
covered
darse tracts of territory At might they
ITALY
17. 10C. L ... . .....
Jari: Let bazie :. the
highest ranking U.S.
Arna officer in NATO :
mand. was relaxing. i.
his sixth-floor apartment
in Vorone. ftal. At 5:30
p.r .:.. he heard the dart-
Low ring. The two mb.
standing outside the
door Identified them-
selves as plumbers and
said that a leak from Do-
zier's bathroom was
causing water to seep
Into the apartment be-
low. Just after the gen-
eral let them in, two oth-
er "plumbers" appeared
carrying a trunk. Dozier
was put in it.
Several hours later,
the Red Brigades terror-
Ist organization claimed
credit for Dozier's abduc-
tion. Dozier was the first
American and first U.S.
military officer kid-
napped by terrorists.
And the Pentagon under-
took a massive opera-
tion, code named Winter
Harvest, to find the gen-
eral. It wouldn't be easy.
A detachment from
the Intelligence Support
Activity (ISA) was able to
lock onto the radio
transmissions between
the terrorists. And. wit !!
hat from to: Kationc'
Security Agency, ISA had
helped the Italians to lo
cate a series of Red Bri
gade hideouts. But they
I. its efforts to find
Dozier, the Pentagon:
even turned to psychics.
Many were interviewed
at the Pentagon, and a
half dozen were sent
over to italy. One psy- sz.
chic arrived in Vincenza
and described to military
officials his vision of
where Dozier was being
held captive: "I see a
small house, made of W
nicely furnished house in a well-to-do part of
no: The crew and then supposedly belonged
le a U.S. company doing destromagnets and
navigation surveys for the Honduran goverti-
ment. Had the plane been shot down, or had it
crashed- as would happen to a flight controlled
by Richard Secord in October. 1986-the Unit-
cd States would deny any connection. Happily
for the new division, there were no such foul-
ups. And though the officers involved did not
realize it at the time. their success in this task:
marked the beginning of the Reagan adminstra-
tion's covert operation to destabilize the Sandi-
nista regime and aid the Contras.
It was an impressive beginning. The CIA had
turned first to the supersecret National Security
Agency, which, coordinates and conducts elec-
tronic intelligence around the world. But the
NSA could not do the job, because any ground
stations it could set up would be ineffective in
monitoring constantly moving transmitters.
Enter the Special Operations Division. It
leased a Beechcraft King Air 100, a versatile
airplane with a range of 1,200 nautical miles,
and flew it to Nashua, N.H., where the division
paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to an
electronics firm to install state-of-the-art com-
munications, electronic eavesdropping and aeri-
al-reconnaissance equipment so sensitive that it
could pick up ground radio communications
even when flying at altitudes above 25,000 feet.
Seaspray then transported the plane to San Pe-
*
Quick Response: The custom Star Wars choppers
dro Sula, and the mission began. According to
NSA sources, the intelligence "take" was phe-
nomenal. Electronic recordings showing rebel
locations and their planned attacks were for-
warded to NSA for dispatch to the Salvadoran
government. Under the code name "Queens
Hunter," the mission lasted three years, moni-
toring suspected cross-border intrusions and
weapons-supply routes in addition to communi-
cations between Sandinista forces in Nicaragua
and leftist rebels in El Salvador and Honduras.
Yellow Fruit blossoms
Despite the spectacular success-the Army's
electronic-eavesdropping operation, according
to NSA sources, would account for 70 percent
Bugging Soviet cars
and Panamanian abodes
0
ne of the most impressive of the Penta-
gon's secret units was the Quick Reaction
Team. A small and elite team, QRT spe-
cialized in electronic surveillance. It scored
some stunning successes. One of the biggest in-
volved the Soviet military attachés stationed in
West Germany. Looking for new ways to spy
unobtrusively on the Soviets in 1981, Army in-
:: lligence agents decided to plast an undetect-
::. log in one of the Soviet mission's care. A
top official of the Soviet liaison team had or-
dered an American Chevrolet. Army agents in-
tercepted the car and outfitted it with eaves-
dropping transmitters built into the interior.
To wire other cars, Army intelligence de-
vised an ingenious scheme. Agents discovered
that.
the Soviets had orderedth fleet of custom
"ized diplomatic cats from the Opel plant in.
Rüsselsheimvts
miles front frankfurtsu
agents developed a plan to gain access to the
plant at night, take apart the car, install a so-
phisticated transmitter into its frame and re-
OPEL
SUSANNE ESCHE FOR USN&WR
The Opel plant In Rüsselsheim
28
U.S.NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 21, 1988
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