CIA-RDP96-00791R000200300006-8

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SUMMARY REPORT
STAR GATE OPERATIONAL TASKING AND EVALUATION
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
From 1986 to the first quarter of FY 1995, the DoD paranormal psychology program
received more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations requesting that
the program staff apply a paranormal psychological technique know as "remote
viewing" (RV) to attain information unavailable from other sources. The operational
tasking comprised "targets" identified with as little specificity as possible to avoid
"telegraphing" the desired response.
In 1994, the DIA Star Gate program office created a methodology for obtaining
numerical evaluations from the operational tasking organizations of the accuracy and
value of the products provided by the Star Gate program. By May 1, 1995, the three
remote viewers assigned to the program office had responded, i.e., provided RV
product, to 40 tasks from five operational organizations. Normally, RV product was
provided by at least two viewers for each task.
Ninety-nine accuracy scores and 100 value scores resulted from these product
evaluations by the operational users. On a 6-point basis where "1" is the most
accurate, accuracy scores cluster around "2's" and "3's" (55 of the entries) with 13
scores of "1". Value scores, on a 5-point basis with "1" the highest, cluster around "3's"
and "4's" (80 of the entries); there are no "1's" and 11 scores of "2".
After careful study of the RV products and detailed analysis of the resulting product
evaluations for the 40 operational tasks, we conclude that the utility of RV for
operational intelligence collection cannot be substantiated. The conclusion results
from the fact that the operational utility to the Intelligence Community of the information
provided by this paranormal RV process simply cannot be discerned. Furthermore,
this conclusion is supported by the results of interviews conducted with
representatives of the operational organizations that provided tasking to the program.
The ambiguous and subjective nature of the process actually creates a need for
additional efforts of questionable operational return on the part of the intelligence
analyst. Assuming that the subjective nature of the psychic process cannot be
eliminated, one must determine whether the information provided justifies the required
resource investment.
2.0 GENERIC DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONAL TASKING
Over the period from 1986 to first quarter of FY 1995, the Star Gate program received
more than 200 tasks from operational military organizations. These tasks requested
that the program staff apply their paranormal psychological technique know as "remote
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2
FIGURE 2-1
TASKING SHEET
SOURCE NO:
079
DATE:
18 Jul 94
SUSPENSE :
18 Jul 94
1600 Hrs
1.
PROJECT NUMBER:
94-252-0
2.
METHOD/TECHNIQUE:
Method of Choice
.
3. BACKGROUND:
4.
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION:
Access and describe target.
5. COMMENTS:
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Twenty-six (26) of the 40 operational tasks originated from DIA in support of two joint
Task Forces, Org. B and Org. C, (see Section 4.0). Typical tasking targets for these
organizations comprised the name of a person or thing (e.g., vessel) with a generic
request to describe the target, his/her/its activities, location, associations, etc. as
appropriate. No specific information (e.g., what is the height/weight/age of the target?)
was requested in the tasking. As noted above, the identity of the supported
organizations also was provided. For these tasks that identification provides the RV's
with knowledge regarding the specific operational interests of these organizations.
Thus, any information provided by the RV's which describes or relates to those
interests "could be" relevant; and, therefore, could be interpreted by the evaluators as
having some level of "accuracy" and "value" depending upon the information
described and the evaluator's interests and beliefs.
The tasking provided by the organization denoted as Org. A comprised targets that
were "places" visited by "beacons", i.e., an individual from Org. A who visited and
"viewed" the site of interest to assist the RV in "visualizing" and describing the site.
Targets could be a general vista in or around a particular location, a particular facility
at a selected location or, perhaps, a particular item at a location (in the one case
where this type of target was used, the item was a particular kind of boat). Usually, no
specifics regarding the type of target or its location were provided.
Tasking by Org. D comprised two generic types of targets that related to military
interests/concerns current at the time of the tasking, e.g., North Korean (NK)
capabilities and leadership. The first type of target focused upon then-current military
concerns while the second type required "precognitive" (predictive) capabilities since it
required a prognoses of future intentions and actions.3
The tasking from Org. E was similar in scope, albeit quite different in context, from the
tasks noted earlier for Org. B and Org. C , i.e., describe a person, his activities,
location, etc ..
SG1B
SG1B
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the descriptions noted above relate to
operational tasks that were numerically scored.
of the results from these tasks was in narrative form only; discussion regarding this
narration is presented at the end of Section 3.0.
3 Some operational tasks from the period Oct. 1990 to Jan 1991 regarding Middle East issues were of a
similar types, albeit these were not numerically evaluated. They would provide some data for an after-the-
fact check of the accuracy of the RV predictions - see Section 7.0 for a discussion of this possibility.
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3.0 EVALUATION MEASURES
The numerical evaluation measures that were given to the evaluators of the tasking
organizations to score the accuracy and value of the Star Gate inputs were extracted
from the Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM) 58-13. These measures are
shown in Table 3-1. Most of the stipulated measures include modifiers such as "may",
"possibly", "high", "low", etc. which are subjective and open to individual interpretation
by each evaluator. The DIAM 58-13 definitions for the ratings under "Value" are
presented in Table 3-2; whether the individual evaluators reviewed these definitions
prior to their scoring is unknown. There was no clarification of what was intended by
the generic headings of "Accuracy" and "Value", e.g., in the evaluator's estimation how
much of the RV's response to the tasking had to qualify for a particular measure, 1%,
10%, 90%, to be granted the related score?
Table 3-1 Numerical Evaluation Measures
Category
Score
Accuracy - Is the information accurate?
Yes (true)
1
May be true
2
Possibly true
3
1
No
4
Possibly not true4
5
Unsure
6
Value - what is the value of the sources' information?
Major significance
1
High value
2
Of value
3
Low value
4
1
No value
5
1
As noted in Section 2.0, one series of tasks were evaluated by a narrative discussion
only. While much of the final narrative evaluation for this series was complimentary, it
lacked any real specifics regarding the usefulness or relevance of the Star Gate inputs
and much of the narrative was replete with modifiers and other hedges. A sanitized
extract from the final evaluation report for these tasks is presented in Appendix A
illustrating the subjective, "uncertain" nature of the comments.
4 Note that Accuracy scores 5 and 6 actually rank "higher" than 4 since both imply that there may be
something accurate in the information. Changing the scoring order to accommodate this observation
causes insignificant changes to both the averages and the standard deviations shown on Table 4-1.
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Table 3-2 - Value Rating Definitions from DIAM 58-13
MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE - Intelligence Information Report (IIR) provided information which
will alter or significantly influence national policy, perceptions, or analysis; or provided
unique or timely indications and warning of impending significant foreign military or
political actions having a national impact.
HIGH VALUE - IIR(s) was best report to date or first report on this important topic, but
did not significantly influence policy or change analyses.
OF VALUE - IIR(s) provided information which supplements, updates, confirms, or aids
in the interpretation of information in data bases, intelligence production, policy research
and analysis, or military operations and plans; most DoD HUMINT System reporting falls
into this category.
LOW VALUE - IIR was not a good report because the information was not reported in a
timely manner, or was of poor quality/of little substance. Nevertheless, it satisfied some
of the consumer's informational needs.
NO VALUE - IIR provided no worthwhile information to support data base maintenance,
intelligence production, policy research and analysis, or military operations and planning;
or its information had no utility, was erroneous, or misleading.
4.0 EVALUATION SUMMARY AND COMMENTS
Thirty-nine (39) of the 40 numerically evaluated, operational tasks were performed in
1994 and one in 1995. The information provided by the Star Gate RV's for each task
was evaluated by staff of the tasking organization. The complete compilation of
evaluated scores is presented in Table 4-1 which includes a designation of the tasking
organization and, where known, a numerical designator for the individual from that
organization who signed the response to the evaluation request (in some instances,
this was also an evaluator). Also presented are the individual and collective scores for
Accuracy (A) and Value (V) for each of the three RV's and the related average and
standard deviations for the compiled scores. (Note that the total number of scoring
entries for either Accuracy or Value is not equal to the maximum of 120, i.e., 3x40,
since all three RV's did not participated in all tasks). Table 4-2 presents the same
scoring data by tasking organization.
Histograms of the scores from Table 4-1 are shown below. Note that "Accuracy"
scores tend to cluster around 2's and 3's (55 of the 99 entries) while "Value" scores
cluster around 3's and 4's (80 of the 100 entries). This is not too surprising as the
nonspecific, nebulous nature of the individual task/target requests permits the RV to
"free associate" and permits the evaluator to pick and choose from the RV commentary
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ApprovedOPERATORE TASKS THAY 12009200300006-8
NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
1
Doc.
Date
Tasking Evaluator Remote Viewer & Scores
Totals
2
Org.
No.
1A
1V
2A
2V
3A
3V
A
V
3
250
7/13/94
Org. A
1
3.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
4
264
9/6/94
Org. A
2
2.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
5
270
11/3/94
Org. B
3
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
6
271
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
7
273
11/3/94
Org. B
3
4.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
8
267
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
4.0
3.0
4.0
9
268
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
10
269
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
11
272
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
12
258
8/3/94
Org. C
4
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
13
257
8/1/94
Org. C
4
3.0
5.0
3.0
5.0
14
256
7/28/94
Org. C
4
2.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
15
249
7/11/94
Org. D
5
1.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
16
248
7/6/94
Org. D
5
3.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
4.0
17
245
6/24/94
Org. D
5
3.0
3.0
1.0
4.0
18
252
7/18/94
Org. C
4
4.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
19
251
7/15/94
Org. C
4
2.0
3.0
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
20
243
5/31/94
Org. C
4
3.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
21
242
5/25/94
Org. C
4
1.5
3.0
1.5
3.0
22
244
6/6/94
Org. A
1
4.0
5.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
2.0
23
239
6/12/94
Org. A
6
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
24
230
4/1/94
Org. A
7
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
25
240
5/17/94
Org. C
2.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
26
235
4/18/94
Org. C
8
3.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
27
234
4/14/94
Org. C
8
2.0
3.0
5.0
3.0
6.0
5.0
28
233
4/11/94
Org. C
8
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
29
229
3/29/94
Org. C
4
2.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
30
228
3/28/94
Org. C
4
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
31
227
3/24/94
Org. C
4
3.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
3.0
3.0
32
226
3/22/94
Org. C
4
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
33
225
3/21/94
Org. C
4
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
34
232
4/11/94
Org. E
9
2.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
35
236
4/26/94
Org. E
9
6.0
4.0
6.0
2.0
wwwwwwwWwww
36
237
4/26/94
Org. E
9
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
37
241
4/27/94
Org. E
9
3.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
38
247
6/29/94
Org. D
10/11
1.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
39
265
7/6/94
Org. D
10/11
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
40
259
7/15/94
Org. C
4
5.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
41
262
8/23/94
Org. C
4(?)
6.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
42
287
4/3/95
Org. C
12
2.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
43
Score sums =
106.5
130
76.0
83.0
113.5
135.0
296
348
44
Number of enlies =
37
37
25
26
37
37
99
100
45
Avg score =
2.9
3.5
2.9
3.2
3.1
3.6
3.0
3.5
46
Std.Deviation =
1.4
0.8
1.3
0.7
1.6
0.9
1.4
0.8
TABLE 4-1
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ApprovedOPERAMORAL TASKS THAT HAVE
NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
1
Doc.
Date
Tasker|
Org.
No.
1A
1V
2A
2V
3A
3V
A
V
3
By Tasking Organization
5
Org. C
6
258
8/3/94
Org. C
4
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
7
257
8/1/94
Org. C
4
3.0
5.0
3.0
5.0
8
256
7/28/94
Org. C
4
2.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
9
252
7/18/94
Org. C
4
4.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
10
251
7/15/94
Org. C
4
2.0
3.0
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
11
243
5/31/94
Org. C
4
3.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
12
242
5/25/94
Org. C
4
1.5
3.0
1.5
3.0
13
240
5/17/94
Org. C
2.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
14
235
4/18/94
Org. C
8
3.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.0
15
234
4/14/94
Org. C
8
2.0
3.0
5.0
3.0
6.0
5.0
16
233
4/11/94
Org. C
8
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
17
229
3/29/94
Org. C
4
2.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
18
228
3/28/94
Org, C
4
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
3.0
3.0
19
227
3/24/94
Org. C
4
3.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
3.0
3.0
20
226
3/22/94
Org. C
4
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
21
225
3/21/94
Org. C
4
2.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
22
259
7/15/94
Org. C
4
5.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
23
262
8/23/94
Org. C
4(?)
6.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
24
287
4/3/95
Org. C
12
2.0
4.0
1.0
4.0
25
Score sums=
52.5
65.0
36.0
39.0
51.5
65.0
140
169
26
No. of entries=
19
19
11
11
18
18
48
48
27
Avg score=
2.8
3.4
3.3
3.5
2.9
3.6
2.9
3.5
28
Org. B
29
270
11/3/94
Org. B
3
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
30
27
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
31
273
11/3/94
Org. B
3
4.0
5.0
5.0
4.0
4.0
5.0
32
267
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
4.0
3.0
4.0
33
268
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
4.0
4.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
34
269
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
3.0
5.0
5.0
35
272
11/3/94
Org. B
3
3.0
36
Score sums=
18.0
21.0
12.0
13.0
27.0
26.0
57
60
37
No. of entries=
5
5
3
4
6
6
14
15
38
Avg score=
3.6
4.2
4.0
3.2
4.5
4.3
4.1
4.0
Table 4-2
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Evaluator Remote Viewer & Scores
Totals
2
4

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IONAL TASKS THAT HAVE
NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
1
Doc.
Date
Tasker
Org.
No.
1A
1V
2A
2V
3A
3V
A
V
3
By Tasking Organization
5
Org. D
6
249
7/11/94
Org. D
5
1.0
4.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
4.0
7
248
7/6/94
Org. D
5
3.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
4.0
8
245
6/24/94
Org. D
5
3.0
3.0
1.0
4.0
9
247
6/29/94
Org. D
10/11
1.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
3.0
10
265
7/6/94
Org. D
10/11
1.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
4.0
11
Score sums=
9.0
16.0
9.0
10.0
9.0
19.0
27
45
12
No. of entries=
5
5
4
4
5
5
14
14
13
Avg score=
1.8
3.2
2.2
2.5
1.8
3.8
1.9
3.2
14
Org. A
16
102
7/13/94
Org. A
1
3.0
3.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
17
101
9/6/94
Org. A
2
2.0
3.0
5.0
4.0
18
82
6/6/94
Org. A
1
4.0
5.0
2.0
3.0
1.0
2.0
19
81
6/12/94
Org. A
6
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
20
79
4/1/94
Org. A
7
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
21
Score sums=
11.0
12.0
9.0
13.0
13.0
15.0
33
40
22
No. of entries=
4
4
5
5
5
5
14
14
23
Avg score=
2.8
3.0
1.8
2.6
2.6
3.0
2.4
2.9
24
Org. E
26
232
4/11/94
Org. E
9
2.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
27
236
4/26/94
Org. E
9
6.0
4.0
6.0
2.0
28
237
4/26/94
Org. E
9
5.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
29
241
4/27/94
Org. E
9
3.0
4.0
2.0
4.0
30
Score sums=
16.0
16.0
10.0
8.0
13.0
10.0
39
34
31
No. of entries=
4
4
2
2
3
3
9
9
32
Avg score=
4.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
4.3
3.3
4.3
3.8
33
34
35
Comparison - Average Scores by Organization
Organization
Average Scores
38
Org. C
2.8
3.4
3.3
3.5
2.9
3.6
39
Org. B
3.6
4.2
4.0
3.2
4.5
4.3
40
Org. D
1.8
3.2
2.2
2.5
1.8
3.8
41
Org. A
2.8
3.0
1.8
2.6
2.6
3.0
42
Org. E
4.0
4.0
5.0
4.0
4.3
3.3
VWwww
Evaluator Remote Viewer & Scores
Totals
2
4
15
25
36
37
Table 4-2
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between the RV(s) and the evaluator:
- has a very narrow information bandwidth, i.e., the RV-derived information
cannot be embellished by a dialogue with the evaluator without substantially
telegraphing the evaluator's needs and interests, thereby biasing any
RV information subsequently derived ,
and
- is extremely "noisy" as a result of the unidentifiable beliefs, intentions,
knowledge, biases, etc. that reside in the subconsciousness of the RV(s)
and/or the evaluator .
As a result, the potential for self-deception on the part of the evaluator exists, i.e,
he/she "reads" into the RV information a degree of validity that in truth is based upon
fragmentary, generalized information and which may have little real applicability to
his/her problem. The relevant question in the overall evaluation process is who and
what is being evaluated, i.e., is the score a measure of the RV's paranormal
capabilities or of the evaluators views, beliefs and concepts?
One of the RV's expressed a concern to the author that the protocols that were
followed in conducting the RV process in response to the operational tasking were not
consistent with those that are generally specified for the study of paranormal
phenomena. Whether the claimed discrepancy was detrimental to the information
derived by the RV's,or to its subsequent evaluation or use cannot be determined from
the available data.
SG1B
required precognitive abilities on the part of the RV's provides an opportunity for a
post-analysis by comparing the RV predictions against subsequent realities.
Additional comparative data of this type is available from operational tasking during
the period 11/90 through 1/91 regarding the Middle East situation (this tasking was not
numerically evaluated).
6.0 SUMMARY FROM USER INTERVIEWS (U)
Subsequent to the review and analysis of the numerically scored tasking described in
the previous sections of this report, the author participated in interviews with
representatives of all of the tasking organizations presented in Table 4-1 except Org.
D. Only a brief summary of the results from those interviews is presented here; more
detailed synopses are presented in Appendix B. In all cases except for Org. C, the
interviewees were the actual personnel who had participated directly in the tasking
and evaluation of the Star Gate program. For Org. C, the sole interviewee was the
Chief of the Analysis Branch; the staff who defined the tasking and performed the
evaluations was comprised of his lead analysts.
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A brief summary of the salient points which appeared consistently throughout these
interviews follows:
. the principal motivation for using Star Gate services was the hope that
something useful might result; the problems being addressed were very
difficult and the users were justifiably (and admittedly) "grasping at straws" for
anything that might be beneficial.
. the information provided by the Star Gate program was never specific enough
to cause any operational user to task other intelligence assets to specifically
corroborate the Star Gate information.
· while information that was provided did occasionally contain portions that
were accurate, albeit general, it was - without exception - never specific
enough to offer substantial intelligence value for the problem at hand.
. two of the operational user organizations would be willing to pay for this
service if that was required and if it was not too expensive (although one user
noted that his organization head would not agree). However, the fact that Star
Gate service was free acted as an incentive to obtain "it might be useful - who
knows" support for the program from the user organizations.
The reader is referred to Appendix B for additional information resulting from these
interviews. However, two inconsistencies noted during the discussion of the numerical
evaluations in Section 4.0 were supported by information obtained from the interviews.
On the average, the Org. C evaluators scored higher that those of Org. B. One cause
for this discrepancy may be due to the fact that the Org. B evaluators were, in general,
skeptical of the process while the lead person at Org. C claimed to be a believer in
parapsychology and, in addition, had the last say in any evaluations that were
promulgated back to the Star Gate PM. This comment is in no way intended to impugn
the honesty or motivation of any of these personnel, merely to point out that this
difference in the belief-structure of the staff at these two organizations may have
resulted in the perceived scoring bias. As noted above, the subjectivity inherent in the
entire process is impossible to eliminate or to account for in the results.
The higher average scoring, especially Accuracy scores, from the Org. A evaluators
appears to be explained by the procedure they used to task and evaluate the
experiments they were performing with the Star Gate program. Namely, they used a
staff member as a "beacon" to "assist" the RV's in "viewing" the beacon's location.
Subsequently, the same Org. A staff member evaluated the RV inputs. However, since
he/she had been at the site, he/she could interpret anything the appeared to be related
to the actual site as accurate. When asked if the information from the multiple RV's
was sufficiently accurate and consistent such that a "blind" evaluator, i.e., one who did
not know the characteristics of the site, would have been able to identify information
from the RV inputs that they could interpret to be accurate, they all answered in the
negative and agreed that the score would have been lower. Again the subjectivity of
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the process appears - the evaluator could interpret the admittedly general comments
from any RV that seemed to relate to the actual site as "accurate", e.g., consider an RV
input "there is water nearby", the evaluator knows this it true of almost anyplace
especially if one does not or cannot define what kind of water, i.e., is it a lake, a water
line, a commode, a puddle?
7.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1 Conclusions
The single conclusion that can be drawn from an evaluation of the 40 operational
tasks is that the value and utility to the Intelligence Community of the information
provided by the process cannot be readily discerned. This conclusion was initially
based solely upon the analysis of the numerical evaluations presented in Section 4.0,
but strong confirmation was provided by the results of the subsequent interviews with
the tasking organizations (Ref. Section 6.0 and Appendix B). While, if one believes the
validity of parapsychological phenomena, the potential for value exists in principal,
there is, none-the-less, an alternative view of the phenomenology that would disavow
any such value and, in fact, could claim that the ambiguous and subjective nature of
the process actually creates a need for additional efforts with questionable operational
return on the part of the intelligence analyst.
Normally, much of the data provided by the RV(s) is either wrong or irrelevant although
one cannot always tell which is which without further investigation. Whether this reality
reduces or eliminates the overall value of the totality of the information can only be
assessed by the intelligence analyst. It clearly complicates his/her problem in two
ways: 1) it adds to the overburden of unrelated data which every analyst already
receives on a daily basis, i.e., the receipt of information of dubious authenticity and
accuracy is not an uncommon occurrence for intelligence analysts, and 2) since the
analyst does not normally know which information is wrong or irrelevant, some of it is
actually "disinformation" and can result in wasted effort as the analyst attempts to verify
or discount those data from other sources.
The review of the operational tasking and its subsequent evaluation does not provide
any succinct conclusions regarding the validity of the process (or the information
provided by it). First and foremost, as discussed in Section 5.0, the entire process,
from beginning to end, is highly subjective. Further, as noted in Section 3.0, the
degree of consistency in applying the scoring measures, any guidance or training
provided to the evaluators by any of the tasking organizations and/or the motivation of
the evaluators are either unknown or, in the case of the latter, may be highly polarized
(see Appendix B) The lack of information regarding these items could account for
some of the variability in the scores across organizations noted in Table 4-2, but this
cannot be certified and is, at most, a suspicion.
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Whether the information provided by the Star Gate source is of sufficient value to
overcome the obvious detriment of accommodating the irrelevant information included
therein is an open question? More precisely, whether the Star Gate information is of
sufficient value to continue this program - vis-a-vis other sources of information and
other uses of resources - is an important question for the Intelligence Community to
address, irrespective of one's personal views and/or beliefs regarding this field of
endeavor, i.e., does the information provided justify the required resource investment?
One method that might assist this evaluation is to develop a means for scoring the
complete input from the RV process, i.e., evaluate all information and determine how
much is truly relevant, how much is of undeterminable value and how much is
completely irrelevant. One could then analyze how much information is being handled
to achieve the relevant information (along with some measure of the relevancy) and
make judgments on its value vis-a-vis the investment in time and money. Other, less
technical methods, for adjudicating this issue also exist.
7.2 Recommendations
Considering the statements above, the only sensible recommendation in this author's
mind is to bring some "scientific method" into this process (if it is continued). As
evidenced by more than 20 years of research into paranormal psychology, much of it
done by institutions of higher education or others with excellent credentials in related
fields, validation of parapsychological phenomena may never be accredited in the
sense that is understood in other scientific and technical fields of endeavor . Control in
any rigorous scientific sense of the multitude of human and physical variables which
could, and probably do, influence this process is difficult - perhaps impossible - for any
except the most mundane types of experiments, e.g., blind "reading" of playing cards.
Even these restricted experiments have led to controversy among those schooled in
the related arts.
One of the foundation precepts of scientific endeavor is the ability to obtain repeatable
data from independent researchers. Given the subjective nature of RV activities, it is
difficult to believe that this aspect of parapsychology will ever be achieved. As an
admitted neophyte in this area of endeavor, I categorize the field as a kind of religion,
i.e., you either have "faith" that it indeed is something real, albeit fleeting and unique,
or you "disbelieve" and attribute all positive results to either chicanery or pure
chance10.
Thus, one must recognize at the start that any attempt to bring scientific method into
the operational tasking aspects of this project may not succeed. Others with serious
10 Practitioners in the field, including those funded under government contracts, would argue with these
observations, perhaps vehemently; some would argue further that the phenomenology has been verified
beyond question already. This reviewer disagrees; albeit, these observations are not intended to discard
the possibility of such phenomena.
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motives and intentions have attempted to do this with the results noted above.
However, as a minimum, one could try to assure that the scoring measures are
succinctly defined and promulgated such that different organizations and evaluators
would have a better understanding of what is intended and, perhaps could be more
consistent in their scoring. The use of independent, multiple evaluators on each task
could aid in reducing some of the effects of the subjective nature of the evaluation
process and the possible personal biases (intentional or otherwise) of the evaluators.
Since, according to some parapsychologists, the time of the remote viewing is not
relevant to the attainment of the desired information, controlled "blind tests" could be
run by requesting tasking for which the accurate and valuable information is already
known to determine statistics on RV performance (clearly one key issue in such tests is
what information is given to the RV in the task description to avoid any semblance of
compromise, not a casual problem). Controlled laboratory experiments of
parapsychology have done this type of testing and the results, usually expressed in
terms of probability numbers that claim to validate the parapsychological results, have
done little to quell the controversy that surrounds this field. Thus it may be naive and
optimistic to believe that such additional testing would help resolve the question of
the"value of the process" (or its utility for operational intelligence applications), but it
might assist in either developing "faith" in those who use it, or conversely "disbelief".
Before additional operational tasks are conceived, some thought could be given to
how and what one defines as a "target". Broad generic target descriptions permit
unstructured discourse by the RV which - especially if there is a knowledge (or even a
hint) of the general area of interest - leads to data open to very subjective, perhaps
illusionary, interpretation regarding both accuracy and value. If some specificity
regarding the target could be defined such that the relevance and accuracy of the RV-
derived data could be evaluated more readily, some of the uncertainties might be
eliminated. In this context, note that the cases where targets were more specific, e.g.,
the North Korean targets , the resulting scores were generally higher.
Finally, it was noted in Section 5.0 that some of the RV information obtained from
operational tasks regarding North Korea (and others concerning the Middle East)
depended upon the precognitive ability of the RV's in predicting events yet to occur.
These data provide an opportunity for a post-analysis of the accuracy of these
predictions by making a comparison with subsequent information regarding actual
events (some data for this comparison might require access to classified information
from other sources). Such a post-analysis would provide data for evaluating the ability
of the RV's to perform precognitive tasks and of the related operational value of the
predictions. Performance of this post-analysis lies beyond the scope of this paper, but
is a topic for a subsequent study if any sponsor is interested.
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