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AN ANALYSIS OF A REMOTE-VIEWING
EXPERIMENT OF URDF-3
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SG11
ANALYSIS BY:
TYPED BY:
€
DECEMBER 4, 1975
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CONFIDENTIAL

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CANDIDEN" T
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SUMMARY
The remote-viewing experiment of URDF-3 by Pat Price proved to be unsuc-
cessful. This conclusion was reached only after a careful review of the tape
recordings, tape transcripts, and sketches that were generated during the four-
day experiment.
During the first day's session, Price:
1)
accurately described the location and type of
target (that information had been given to him
by the experimenters) but failed on the layout
and types of buildings,
2)
saw a gantry crane for heavy lifting,
3)
tended to spend too much time on specifics only
to say, "I'll come back to that," but seldom
did, and
4)
successfully evaded drawing a perimeter of the
area even though he was asked to do this twice.
Therefore, nothing positive to validate remote viewing resulted from the first
day's session.
Price was contacted by phone that evening by one of the experimenters
and was told to concentrate on the crane and its relationship to the dominant
three-story building (Building 1) that he had seen during that day's session.
He was also told that they wanted a drawing of the perimeter fence.
On the second day, Price supplied the most positive evidence yet for
the remote-viewing experiment with his sketch of the rail-mounted gantry crane.
It seems inconceivable to imagine how he could have drawn such a likeness to
the actual crane at URDF-3 unless:
1) he actually saw it through remote viewing, or
2) he was informed of what to draw by someone
knowledgeable of URDF-3.
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The second possibility is mentioned only because the experiment was not controlled
to discount the possibility that Price could talk to other people.
Price commented that he was seeing a lot of things this second day that
he hadn't seen the previous day. In fact, he mentioned seeing several landmark-
type objects that simply did not exist at URDF-3. One explanation of this dis-
crepancy could be that if he mentioned enough specific objects, he would surely
hit on one object that is actually present. This could explain the inconsistency
between:
1) his most positive evidence of the experiment - a
sketch of a rail-mounted gantry crane, and
2)
the large number of objects he sees that, in
reality, are simply not present at URDF-3.
This discrepancy between what Price sees and what is really there certainly
would make it difficult for the eventual user of his remote-viewing data since
he would not know how to differentiate the fact from the fiction. At this
stage of the experiment, the data is inconclusive to validate Price's capability
of remote viewing.
Price was shown a sketch of a perspective of the Operations Area at
URDF-3 on the third day and was told that this was a sketch of the actual
target. Price said he recognized the area but claimed that only one of the
four headframes was present now. That was wrong, but his most damaging state-
ments had to do with his interpretation of Building 1 (the underground build-
ing) at URDF-3. With the sketch as a reference, he "saw" the four main surface
protrusions of Building 1 as four separate above-ground buildings sitting atop
a concrete apron. He was asked specifically whether these four buildings he
saw might really be the surface elements of an underground building. He failed
either to pick up the lead or to remotely view correctly because he said, "No,
that's a concrete apron, and there's nothing subterranean right in that particular
area." This statement was his most negative evidence yet and tends to discredit
his ability to remotely view URDF-3.
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Price's comments on the fourth day were very specific regarding his
concept of the overall operation at URDF-3, however no new evidence (that could
' be checked) was disclosed toward establishing validity for his remote-viewing
capability.
After careful analysis of all the data presented, I have concluded that
Price's remote-viewing experiment of URDF-3 was unsuccessful.
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CONFIDENTIAL
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INTRODUCTION
I was asked to analyze and then judge the validity of the remote-viewing
experiment performed on URDF-3 by Pat Price.
The data to be analyzed included
two cassette tapes covering the first two days, 79 pages of transcribed tapes
regarding the third and fourth days, and 30 sketches; I also reviewed the July
5, 1974
of URDF-3.
I am quite familiar with the chronology and layout of URDF-3, as well as
the surrounding terrain and technical areas within 40 miles. I tried to keep
an open mind while performing this analysis, but if I had any bias at all, it
was that I wanted to believe remote viewing could help us establish the true
purpose of URDF-3.
Throughout this analysis, I paid particular attention to all information
about URDF-3 that was supplied to Pat Price. This was necessary in order to
evaluate his originality in remote viewing. This study was done in four seg-
ments corresponding to the four days of the experiment. Judgment of the prog-
ress and validity of the experiment was evaluated at the end of each day.
FIRST DAY
The experiment started at 11 a.m. on July 9, 1974 at Stanford Research
Institute (SRI). The experimenters (Russ Targ and Hal Puthoff) told Pat Price
that the target was a geographical target selected from the Times of London
World Atlas. The coordinates of the target were given as 50°9'59"N and 78°22'22"E;
Price wrote these coordinates down. It was emphasized that this was a "real
target" as opposed to a sample target. Using several maps, the experimenters
showed Price the target location at 60 miles WSW of Semipalatinsk. The target
was described as a scientific military research and test area. To help orient
Price, he was told that the target was 25 to 30 miles SW of "this river," pre-
sumably labeled correctly on the maps as the Irtysh River. Price was told to
start with a view of the general area as seen from 50,000 ft. and get the layout
of any complexes or buildings, or whatever.
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The burners about the pool is not to clean cut. There
is a recevoir for emergency waste demping a few hundred moters
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When the coordinates were given, Price said he was getting a picture that
they (the Soviets) have done a lot of rocket launching and recovery out of that
area. As he starts viewing, he says it's dark over there at the present time,
quite a cloud cover, and a full moon. He immediately sees the river and heads
SW from the river to the institute (as he calls it). He says the area he's look-
ing at has low one-story buildings that are partially dug into the ground giving
the effect (as seen at ground level) of very short, squatty buildings, whereas
they are actually fairly roomy on the inside. This description could very well
describe a first look at the Operations Area at URDF-3.
He then finds that he is looking at "a guy in a very peculiar type of
helmet." He tends to get bogged down in the specifics of the purpose of this
helmet and shifts his attention to look at the cosmonauts (that were currently
in orbit) to compare helmets. He says they (the Soviets) are running some tests
on some equipment that currently has to do with their space program. Then he
backs off from this specific subject and says, "I'll look around and come back
to that" - but he never does.
Price was then asked to describe the general terrain and perhaps the
building layout. He drew a sketch (Fig. 1) in which he correctly identifies
the complex as being about 30 miles south of the Irtysh River (this information
had been given to him earlier). However, he incorrectly says the road from the
river passes through a gorge. The layout of the buildings and area they cover
as shown in his sketch are incorrect for URDF-3. Although there are some an-
tennas at URDF-3, none are as tall as the 500-ft. antenna he described.
' He pondered over the dimensions of the outdoor pool he saw because "that's
in meters - they have it." He then translates it to feet (60' x 150'). He said
they use the pool for underwater testing and orientation studies but in reality
there is no outdoor pool at URDF-3.
In Fig, 2, he drew a military complex three-eighths of a mile NE of the
scientific complex shown in Fig. 1. Actually there is a military complex at
URDF-3, located about 2 1/2 miles NW of the Operations Area, but this data was
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MIL COMPLEX
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STORY
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given to him earlier when the target was described as a scientific military
research and test area. He said the military complex looked like it had been
there for two to three years, when in fact it's been there for over a decade.
Also in Fig. 2, he described a radar/communications building north of the
scientific complex. The description of the building and its location relative
to the military complex fits the description of the probable laboratory-admini-
stration building located about 2 1/2 miles northwest of the Operations Area at
URDF-3. When he is specific about what he sees inside the building, one of the
experimenters asks whether one of the specifics he mentioned might well be some-
thing else. He takes another look and changes his mind saying, "You may be
right," giving the impression that he could be led to see what the experimenter
suggests. The experimenter quickly informed Price that "we really don't know
what this thing is," and Price replies with, "I'll come back to that," but
again never does.
Price saw an array of telephone poles about 400 yards SE of the scientific
complex (see Fig. 2), but there is no such array of poles at or near URDF-3.
He was then asked to go up to 50,000 ft. to look again and describe the
layout. Centering himself over the scientific complex, he scanned in a clock-
wise direction; the view he saw is sketched in Fig. 3. Nothing in this figure
is correct except that the area is arid and has low hills to the south. Speci-
fically, he is incorrect in his locations of a small village, an airstrip, a
cluster of pine trees, and a city 60 miles to the SW. There is, however, an
airfield at the Main Support Complex 30 miles north of URDF-3.
Price was asked if he saw a railroad anywhere. The closest railroad to
the target that he could see was about 60 miles north running roughly NW and
SE and he didn't see any spur tracks in a direction toward the target. In
reality, there is a railway in the Main Support Complex (about 30 miles north
of URDF-3) with a railway spur under construction down to URDF-3. There is also
. grading for a railway spur near the military complex at URDF-3.
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AIRSTRIP
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PINES
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Price became specific in looking at a scope trace at the airstrip and
claimed it made him nauseated. At this time the experimenters and Price decided
to have lunch so Price said he would come back to this later, but as he randomly
elevated himself, he noted the area was under high security and had a cyclone
fence. He could read the troop markings and buttons on a Colonel and then said
he could come back to the security and military designations. In reality, the
Operations Area of URDF-3 has 4 security fences, not just one cyclone fence. They
stopped for lunch at about 12:14 p.m.
After lunch, at 2:22 p.m., Price picks up with the scope trace at the
airstrip. He concludes that the trace indicates the pulse of someone who is
nauseated - that's why it caused nausea in him.
He was asked to indicate again where the telephone poles were and to map
out the perimeter of the area. He drew in the telephone-pole grid with a circle
of trees around the grid (see Fig. 2). There is no telephone-pole grid like
this at or near URDF-3.
Upon spotting several low-boy trucks and a gantry crane ( for very heavy
lifting) in the vehicle area (Fig. 1), Price was asked if he could tell where
they took the heavy things from the low-boy trucks. This question led him to
a look at the area near Building 1 in Fig. 1. He saw a sign in front of the
building that said something to do with Zone 4. He said he would get back to
that but never did.
When describing Building 1, he said it had three stories above-ground
plus a basement with meteorological equipment on the flat roof and then looked
inside the building at the top floor. He started to get too specific as to what
he saw inside the building and was reminded that the type of thing the experi-
menters could best check him on was the outside appearance of the buildings.
They asked him the dimensions of Building 1 and he had a very difficult time
establishing them when he finally settled on 80' x 160'. He then described
the other buildings in the scientific complex. He said Building 1 was the
dominant building due to its height and central location; everything seemed to.
pivot off of it. There is no building at URDF-3 that matches the above descrip-
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They decided to stop the experiment for the day but asked Price to look
at the target at different intervals that evening. (Due to the difference in
time, all of his viewing during this formalized part of the experiment - on
this first day - had been at nighttime locally at URDF-3).
Price said he was beginning to labor anyway and, "if you start laboring
at it, you start mocking-up things." He was then reminded that he was going
to draw a perimeter, or would he rather save that for tomorrow. He said he
would rather save that since he's starting to labor a bit. It was unfortunate
that they didn't pursue the perimeter earlier in the day because it certainly
has a unique shape. They quit at 3 p.m.
Summary of the First Day
The controlled session taped at SRI lasted a total of about 1 hour
and 52 minutes. It consisted of the experimenters defining the target as a
"real target" as opposed to a sample target. With the use of several maps, Pat
Price was given coordinates of the target and told that it was a scientific
military research and test area about 25 to 30 miles SW of the Irtysh River.
When the coordinates were given, Price immediately biased his
thinking that this area was related to the Soviets' space-launching and recov-
ery areas. Since this is not true, he may have inadvertantly and unknowingly
biased himself into an incorrect target relationship.
Price described the target as a military and scientific complex
about 30 miles SW of the Irtysh River but there is nothing in this description
that wasn't already given to him. He then gives what is almost a perfect de-
scription of someone's first look at the Operations Area of URDF-3. He describes
it as low one-story buildings that are partially dug into the ground giving the
effect (as seen at ground level) of very short, squatty buildings, whereas they
are actually fairly roomy on the inside. Unfortunately, as he later describes
the specifics of buildings in the scientific complex, he never again mentions
earth-covering of partially-buried buildings .. It seemed he had the perfect
description of URDF-3, but never came back to that again. In fact, his later
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description of the most dominant building (a large three-story building) doesn't
match any building at URDF-3.
Price tends to get bogged down in specifics and then says something
like, "I'll come back to that," but seldom does. He said the military complex
looks like it's been there for two to three years when in fact it's been there
for over a decade. At one point when describing the specifics of the "radar/
communications building," he demonstrates that he could possibly be led to see
what the experimenter wants him to see.
He sees some landmark-type items that simply don't appear at or
near URDF-3. They are:
1)
the road from the river to the target area
passes through a gorge,
2) a 500-ft. tall antenna,
3) an outdoor pool (60' x 150'),
4) an array of telephone poles surrounded by trees
about 500 yards .SE of the scientific complex,
5) an airstrip on a plateau 12 miles NW of URDF-3,
6) a small village NE of URDF-3,
7) a city 60 miles SW of URDF-3,
8) a cluster of pine trees west of URDF-3, and
9) a three-story building (with a basement) as
the dominant building in the scientific complex.
It doesn't seem fair to grade him on landmark-type objects he failed to see at
the target because his attention may not have been directed on them. However,
it does seem fair to question the existence of those objects he claims to have
seen.
The most positive evidence of valid remote viewing for the first day (1
hour and 52 minutes) was his initial view of the target as "low .one-story build-
ings that are partially dug into the ground ... " Unfortunately, he never con-
sidered that description again. The only other piece of positive evidence that
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To summarize the first day's session, Price accurately described
the location and type of target (but that was given) but failed on the layout
and type of buildings. He tended to spend too much time on specifics only to
say, "I'll come back to that," but seldom did. He successfully evaded drawing
a perimeter of the area even though he was asked to do this twice. This was
unfortunate because the shape of the perimeter is unique. My conclusion is
that nothing positive to validate remote viewing resulted from this first day's
session.
Additional Contact on the First Day
Hal Puthoff talked to Pat Price by telephone that evening at 5:25 p.m.
to give him further instructions for his scanning that night. He was told that
there were some specific areas he had mentioned that the experimenters were most
interested in. Specifically he was asked "for an exact, as possible, drawing
of the crane ( that was in the rear of Building 1) and exactly what its relation-
ship is to Building 1." Further, they wanted to know "anything about Building 1
in relation to the surrounding buildings, like whatever forms of connection or
communication or transportation that exists between Building 1 (the main building)
and the ones that are nearby." They especially wanted "as much detail as possible
on the gantry crane and its relation to Building 1."
He was told that the second thing they were most interested in was
the security fence around the perimeter. They wanted any detail on that - even
a drawing of exactly what the fence looked like. It was emphasized that the
crane was really top priority, especially what it looked like in relation to
the main building (Building 1).
SECOND DAY
The remote-viewing experiment resumed at 11 a.m. on July 10, 1974.
It
was mentioned that the previous night Price had turned in drawings of a fence
and a crane. Price's first comments had to do with an observation of the immense
size of the gantry crane. He said he didn't realize how large the gantry crane
was until he saw a man walking by one of the crane. wheels. Assuming the height of
the man as 6 ft., he realized that the dimensional data he had derived the day be-
fore was underestimated by at least a factor of 3.
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He commented on the security fence as being electrified, but never men-
tioned the unique shape of the perimeter fence or the fact that there are
really four perimeter fences at URDF-3. Figure 4 is his sketch of a small sec-
tion of the fence.
Price was again told that the experimeters wanted more information on
exactly what the relationship was between the crane and the major building
(Building 1); specifically, how did the crane interact with Building 1 or any-
thing surrounding the building. Price said the gantry crane interacted with
Building 1, the outdoor pool and the telephone pole array. He drew a sketch
showing the relative locations of buildings as he saw them that day (Fig. 5).
He said the crane was so heavy that it left tracks in the ground and that,
"the crane tracks go to the building and where this sunken building is." Un-
fortunately, the experimenters did not ask him to identify the "sunken building."
This was important because in reality the gantry crane at URDF-3 operates on
rails over a sunken building (designated as Building 1 by NPIC).
As Price continued to look at the area, he said, "I'm seeing a lot of
things today I didn't see yesterday ... I can see some very heavy ... looks like
railroad track, but they're spread much too wide so it looks like a riding gan-
try." That description compares quite closely with one of the most distinctive
observables at URDF-3 - the gantry crane that operates on rails over the three-
story underground building (Building 1 at URDF-3).
However, his description of the interaction between the crane and Building
1 is incorrect. He describes two gantry cranes that enter into his above-ground
Building 1 whereas the single gantry crane at URDF-3 operates on rails above the
underground Building 1. His description of this building is also wrong in
several respects as compared to the actual Building 1 at URDF-3. The major dif-
ference is that Building 1 at URDF-3 is an underground building rather than above
ground as Price described it. He was asked, "Are there any windows in the build-
ing at all?" At this time, he realizes for the first time that the building is
actually five-stories tall rather than three-stories as he had originally thought.
He saw windows on the second, third and fourth stories on the north side of the
building and said there were no windows on the other three sides. The session
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continued with discussions of the length of the gantry rails. Price saw weld-
ing operations taking place south of Building 1 and also saw an electrical sub-
station east of the building (see Fig. 5). In reality there is no substation
near the gantry crane or Building 1 at URDF-3. The session ended at noon.
The session resumed at 3:01 p.m. with what appears to be a telephone con-
versation between Price and one of the experimenters. Although it's possible
to hear only the experimeter's side of the conversation, the discussion appeared
to be related to the dimensions of the gantry crane. Price had said earlier
that day that:
1)
the distance between the rails was about 50 ft.,
2)
the height of Building 1 was about 50 ft.,
3)
the height of the gantry crane was about 150 ft.,
and
4)
the crane ran on the rails that entered into
Building 1.
The above dimensions lead to a discrepancy in dimensions because the gantry
crane is too tall (150 ft.) to enter the 50 ft .- tall Building 1. This discre-
pancy is resolved by Price telling the experimeters that the tall gantry crane
does not enter Building 1 but that there are two shorter gantry cranes inside
Building 1 that also run on the 50 ft. - wide ralls - one running east-west on
rails and one running north-south to meet the tall gantry crane outside the
building on the same rail. This complicated relationship of three gantry
cranes does not exist at URDF-3.
.
Price is then contacted by phone again and asked to scan the area across
the road west of Building 1 (see Fig. 5). He is told that in that region
there's something else which is on the order of being as large or as unique
as the crane. (The experimeter is obviously trying to see if Price can see
the four headframes that exist at URDF-3). Note: there is an azimuthal shift
of. 90° in comparing the north-south motion of Price's tall rail-mounted gantry
crane as opposed to the actual east-west motion of the rail-mounted gantry crane'
at URDF-3. For the time being, if one accepts this. rotation of 90°, the
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experimenter was correct in asking Price to look in the region west of Building
1 as shown in Fig. 5. Price was also reminded at the end of this phone conver-
sation to continue working on a picture (sketch) of the tall rail-mounted crane
that runs up to Building 1.
The tape resumes with yet another telephone conversation between Russ
Targ and Pat Price with only the voice of Russ Targ being heard. Price appar-
ently reported that he saw a dome-shaped building (about 55' tall x 160' diam-
eter) with its center located about 200 ft. west of the SW corner of Building 1.
He also saw a 65-to-75 ft .- tall cement silo-like building south of the dome-
shaped building that consisted of three 25 ft. - diameter vertical silos tangent
to each other (see Fig. 6 for their relative locations). He confirmed that
the swimming pool was west of both Building 1 and the sllo-like building.
Russ Targ then concluded the phone conversation with a request for a
sketch of the crane that runs on rails; specifically, "What does the crane
look like when it's outside of Building 1?" Since Price had seen two types of
gantry cranes (one about 150 ft. tall and the other about 50 ft. tall), he
sketched both of them (see Figs. 7 and 8).
Discussion of Sketches Drawn by Pat Price on the Second Day
The detail shown in Fig. 7, the sketch of the taller gantry crane,
is remarkably close in detail to the actual gantry crane at URDF-3. This sketch
provides the most positive evidence yet to support the validity of Price's re-
mote viewing of URDF-3.
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the cement silo-like building and the
dome-shaped building. Figure 6 shows their relative locations to Building 1;
however, there is nothing at URDF-3 that looks like the dome-shaped building
or the silo-like building. In Fig. 6, these buildings are shown in the general
location where, at URDF-3, a partially earth-covered tank and tall cylindrical-
shaped tanks or towers appear. The swimming pool (in Fig. 6) is in the general
location of the headframes at URDF-3.
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24
Assuming the relationship of the gantry crane to Building 1 in
Fig. 6 is the same as the relationship of the gantry crane to Building 1 at
URDF-3, it must be concluded that Price is oriented 90° in error in the scien-
tific complex. His north direction for the scientific complex only would cor-
respond to what is actually east at URDF-3. His relationship of scientific
complex to military complex to the Irtysh River is still correct though.
Unfortunately, the experimenters failed again to get a drawing of
the perimeter fence for the scientific complex. In Fig. 5, I have taken the
liberty of drawing a perimeter fence around the scientific complex and come
very close to the actual shape of the perimeter fence of the Operations Area
(scientific complex) at URDF-3. Price had been asked twice the day before to
draw a perimeter of the area, but it wasn't followed up by the experimenters.
Summary of the Second Day
The controlled session at SRI lasted for one hour (11 a.m. until
noon). The rest of the session was conducted over the telephone with only the
voice of the experimenter recorded on tape. Price commented that he was see-
ing a lot of things that he hadn't seen the previous day and supplied the most
positive evidence yet for remote viewing with his sketch of the rail-mounted
gantry crane. It seems inconceivable to imagine how he could draw such a like-
ness to the actual crane at URDF-3 unless:
1) he actually saw it through remote viewing, or
2) he was informed of what to draw by someone
knowledgeable of URDF-3.
I only mention this second possibility because the experiment was not controlled
to discount the possibility that Price could talk to other people - such as the
Disinformation Section of the KGB.
That may sound ridiculous to the reader, but
I have to consider all possibilities in the spectrum from his being capable to
view remotely to his being supplied data for disinformation purposes by the KGB.
Discounting item 2 for the time being, because it seems distasteful .
and unpopular, Price did much better the second day toward establishing his
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credibility in remote viewing. Unfortunately, the experimenters did not follow
up on a couple of key items - a sketch of the perimeter of the scientific complex,
and pursuing the "sunken building" comment that Price made. After studying only
his sketch of the gantry crane, it's easy to believe that he can view remotely.
I can understand how he might not see some landmark-type objects (like the four
headframes) but I find it difficult to understand the other landmark-type ob-
jects he sees that simply do not exist at URDF-3, like his incorrect description
of Building 1. One explanation could be that if Price mentions enough specific
objects (such as three different types of gantry cranes when there is really only
one), he will surely hit on one object that is actually present. If the user of
Price's remote-viewing talents had no way of checking, how could he differentiate
the fact from the fiction? At this stage of the experiment, the data is incon-
clusive to validate Price's capability of remote viewing.
THIRD DAY
Summary
The experiment began again at 11:43 a.m. on July 11, 1974. The
data included 67 pages of transcribed tapes along with 6 sketches drawn that
day by Pat Price. It was difficult to follow the discussion of Price and the
experimenters when they were obviously looking at a sketch and saying things
like, "What about this object over here?" I had no way of guessing which object
and at which location and on which sketch.
The experiment started with Price describing the specifics of the
pool. At one time during this discussion I thought the pool he was looking at
might well be the underground building (Building 1) at UROF-3.
*
He incorrectly recalled the nearest railroad as being 300 miles
to the north even though on the first day, he had said the closest railroad
was about 60 miles north.
During the early afternoon, the experimenters showed Price a sketch
of a perspective of the southern part of the Operations Area at URDF-3 (see Fig.
11). The sketch included the rail-mounted gantry crane, the underground building
(Building 1), the partially earth-covered tank, Building 4, and the four headframes.
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27
They told him that this was a sketch of a perspective of the actual place and
asked him whether he could now "see" the four headframes as shown in the sketch.
He said he recognized the area as the one he had been seeing but claimed that
only one of the four headframes was present now. That proved to be untrue,
since all four headframes are still there.
As seen in Fig. 11, the sketch of Building 1 is deceiving in that
it looks like there are really four buildings (A, B, C, and D as marked in Fig.
11) sitting atop a concrete slab rather than there being a 50-ft. deep under-
ground building with four sections (A, B, C, and D) extending above the ground.
Price "looked" into the four "separate" buildings (A, B, C, and D) and described
their contents in great detail but never suggested that this was all one large
underground building. Finally, much later in the afternoon, it was requested
that he investigate whether "Buildings A, B, C, and D" were really the surface
elements of an underground building. He looked underground and said, "No, that's
a concrete apron, and there's nothing subterranean right in that particular area."
This description is the most negative evidence yet and tends to discredit Price's
ability to remotely view URDF-3.
FOURTH DAY
Summary
The discussion on the fourth day (July 15, 1974) involved only
Hal Puthoff and Pat Price. Price was very specific regarding his concept of
the overall operation at URDF-3. He recognized that from the beginning, he had
been trying to force-fit a space-oriented situation to the target location, but
now realized this "feeling" was incorrect.
This day, the discussions did nothing toward supplying any new
evidence (that could be checked) to establish validity for Price's remote-
viewing capability.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The experiment to determine the validity of Pat Price's remote
viewing of URDF-3 appears to be a failure. He described a scientific and
military complex about 30 miles SW of the Irtysh River, but this information
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had been given to him earlier. He got very specific about details only to sum-
marize with a comment like "I'll come back to that," but seldom did he ever
"come back to that." He successfully evaded drawing a perimeter of the area
even though he was asked to do this several times throughout the experiment;
this was unfortunate because the shape of the perimeter is unique.
I can understand how he might not have seen some of the landmark-type
objects at URDF-3, but it's difficult to understand how he "saw" the other
landmark-type objects that simply do not exist at URDF-3, One explanation could
be that if he mentioned enough specific items, he would surely hit on one ob-
ject that is present which could explain the most positive evidence to support
remote viewing for this experiment - a sketch of a rail-mounted gantry crane.
He was completely wrong in his description of how this crane was related
to any building. Even after he was shown an actual sketch of the scientific
complex, he failed to see the underground building (Building 1 at URDF-3) but
"saw it" as four separate above-ground buildings sitting atop a concrete apron.
In trying to determine the validity of this remote-viewing experiment,
the worth of the data to the eventual user has to be considered. If the user
had no way of checking, how could he differentiate the fact from the fiction?
In the case of URDF-3, the only positive evidence of the rail-mounted gantry
crane was far outweighed by the large amount of negative evidence noted in the
body of this analysis.
4
It's unfortunate that so much of the experiment was done over the phone.
If this should happen in the future, both sides of the phone conversation should
be recorded rather than just the experimenter's voice, as was done during this
experiment. Also, the experimenters did not pursue some important details when
they had a chance. This may have been a result of their unfamiliarity with
.the target. This was obvious when the experimenters didn't know which direction
was north in the actual perspective of URDF-3. I suggest that in the future,
at least one of the experimenters be. totally familiar with the target. I also
suggest that future experiments be more tightly controlled to discount the pos-'
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After careful analysis of the data presented to me, I consider Price's
remote-viewing experiment of URDF-3 to be unsuccessful. I recommend that the
tapes be considered for use with the psychological stress evaluator (PSE) de-
scribed in Appendix I; I am not competent to judge the reliability of the PSE
as an aid to lie detection, but I think the tapes should be subjected to such
a test.
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CPYRGHT
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APPENDIX I
from Science, Volume 190, No. 4212
dated October 24, 1975
CPYRGHT
Lie Detectors: PSE Gains Audience
Despite Critics' Doubts
ily dispelled or adulterated that they set-
tled on the voice. They discovered that all
muscles, including those controlling the
vocal cords, vibrate slightly when in use, a
phenomenon that is believed to be an in-
voluntary function of the central nervous
system. This is called the muscle micro-
tremor and had already been identified, al-
Ultimately, the PSE could affect human communication the way the development of the
atomic bomb affected warfare .- International Moneyline, a newsletter.
The above agitated observation reflects
the fascination felt in some quarters over a
recently developed instrument called the
psychological stress evaluator, or PSE.
The PSE has become the first competi-
tion of the polygraph (or lie detector) since
the latter was developed in the 1920's.
Whereas a polygraph tests a subject's
psychophysiological responses to question-
ing by measuring his or her respiration,
blood pressure, and skin conductivity, the
PSE registers stress by measuring certain
inaudible modulations in the voice. Be-
cause it can be operated simply with the
tape recording of a voice, "it is the first
lie detector that can be used on a dead
man," notes its inventor, Allan D. Bell.
The PSE has been the object of consid-
erable attention and controversy and the
subject of articles in Playboy and Pent-
house, as well as publications aimed at law
enforcement and security personnel. Its re-
liability as an aid to lie detection has come
under attack-notably in a study commis-
sioned in 1973 by the Army-and its versa-
tility and simplicity have aroused ethical
24 OCTOBER 1975
concerns because they give it a real edge
. over the polygraph when it comes to in-
vading privacy.
The PSE was introduced a few years ago
by Dektor Counterintelligence and Secu-
rity, an adventurous little electronics com-
pany run by ex-Army sleuths who believe a
man's reach should exceed his gracp. (Dok-
tor was in the news last year, it may be re-
called, for coming up with an ingenious
counterexplanation for the 18' 2-minute
gap in Rose Mary Woods' tape. See Sci-
ence, 22 February 1974 and 21 June 1974.)
The PSE was born in Allan Bell's base-
ment. Bell, a retired Army intelligence of-
ficer who quit 5 years ago to form Dektor,
says the search for a new way to measure
stress was triggered by a market research
assignment to come up with a way to
measure the emotionality with which
people answer questions by pollsters. Bell
and the PSE's coinventors, Charles
McQuiston and Bill Ford, set out to seek
"identifiable emissions from the human
body." Odors and voice were the best pros-
pects, but odors are so numerous and eas-
though the inventors didn't know it at the
time-"we reinvented the wheel," says
Bell. What was not known was that this
tremor, which is transmitted to vocal
cords, is suppressed by activity of the auto-
nornic nervous system when the speaker is
under stress. It is analogous, and may be
directly related, to the suppression of the
brain's alpha waves (which are associated
with a relaxed waking state) when a per-
son is making a conscious effort to think.
The PSE is more versatile than the poly-
graph because the subject is not required to
be hooked up, immobile, to a machine,
and, in fact, doesn't even need to be pres-
ent; the analysis is made from a tape
recording, and can be done on a tape made
from a telephone conversation or a broad-
cast. In a lie detection situation the sub-
ject is asked the same carefully designed
set of questions (innocuous "control"
questions interspersed with significant
ones) that are asked in a polygraph exam.
The tape is then played back through
the PSE-a portable affair ensconced
in an inconspicuous black suitcase -- at
a speed four times slower than that
at which it was recorded, and a needle
on a moving graph chart plots the stress.
If the waveform travels up and down er-
ratically. the frequency modulation of the
359
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In an unstressed utterance, at left, the overall configuration resembles a wave, produced by the
microtremor that oscillates at 8 to 14 cycles a second. The other chart shows heavy stress as the
tremor is obliterated.
microtremor is being registered. This indi-
cates no stress. When the speaker is under
stress, however, the tremor is suppressed
and tracings become more uniform.
Best known of the early PSE experi-
ments is Dektor's run-through of con-
testants on the television show "To Tell the
Truth." By taping each person when he
said "My name is ... ," they claimed 95
percent accuracy in spotting the real John
Does. The PSE made its forensic debut in
Howard County, Maryland, where a police
lieutenant named Michael Kradz, who sub-
sequently joined Dektor, reported a num-
ber of successes using the PSE, most of
which contributed to clearing suspects of
offenses ranging from shoplifting to
murder.
Dektor has sold more than 700 of the in-
struments (now priced at $4200), mostly to
retail and industrial firms who want to
catch sticky-fingered employees, to private
investigative firms, and to local law en-
forcement agencies. And sales are going
up, says Bell, despite cold water thrown on
the PSE by a report produced for the
Army in 1973. The Department of Defense
bought five of the machines and turned
three of them over to the Army whose
Land Warfare Laboratory paid Joseph
Kubis, a psychologist and polygraph re-
searcher at Fordham University, $27,500
to conduct a comparative study of the
worth of the polygraph, the PSE. and an-
other machine similar to the PSE called
the voice stress analyzer. Kubis, using lab-
oratory subjects; gave the polygraph a 76.
percent accuracy rating and the PSE 33
percent. or about the same as chance (he
did a "triad" study, testing people in three .
roles-perpetrator, lookout, and innocent
bystander).
The Kubis report has gotten a good deal
of attention, and is cited by all the PSE's
critics. Bell, of course, dismisses the study
as a slipshod piece of work and says no
other research has confirmed the Kubis
with. his conclusions, and that research
with "live" cases, which Dektor favors,
yield very poor results. The Army, while
declining to give the Kubis report official
endorsement, has nonetheless acted on its
findings. It allocated one of the machines
for use in research not related to lie detec-
tion, and "destroyed" the other two, ac-
cording to an Army spokesman, who was
as emphatic about disassociating the mili-
tary from the PSE as if he had been
asked about plans to deploy a new nerve
gas.
The government is clearly in no hurry to
attract more attacks on its surveillance
habits, and Bell doesn't mind having this
market closed to him, as he thinks the gov-
ernment is a nuisance to do business with
anyway and not too bright.
Reliability aside, there has been consid-
erable concern over the potential for un-
ethical use of the PSE. The main problem
is created by the fact that it can be used
without the subject's knowledge. Robert
Smith, formerly of the American Civil
Liberties Union, points out that job inter-
views can be taped and run through the in-
strument without the person's knowledge
and he can be denied employment on the
basis of stressed-looking squiggles. He also
says that the PSE, again unlike the poly-
graph. can be used in conjunction with
Dektor counters these objections by
attacking the motives of the APA. Bell
says the two instruments are about equally
.
reliable when used by skilled examiners .
with well-constructed tests; as for train-
ing. well, it's much easier to. use a PSE.
Bell says the obvious reason for APA
hostility is that the PSE poses a threat to
the tight-knit fraternity of polygraph
operators. Many companies would nat-
urally turn to the PSE because it's cheap-
er to have an in-house truth specialist,
and it' costs a lot to farm out .an em-
ployee for polygraph training.
wiretapping. And, he says, "people's ca-
reers can ride on other people going
around analyzing their voice tapes." That
comment is in reference to the fact that
some PSE operators and journalists have
been having fun analyzing the public utter-
ances of various interesting people. Indeed,
one free-lance writer, ex-CIA computer
specialist George O'Toole. has written a'
whole book explaining why Lee Harvey
Oswald didn't kill anyone-based in large
part on a PSE analysis of Oswald's state-
ments after he was captured. ("I didn't
shoot anybody. no sir." said Oswald with
no stress.) Other colorful PSE uses have and security market because that's where" .
Dektor went after the law enforcement
findings. KApproved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA RDP96-0079TR00020058nas willing to spend . .
other well-controlled experiment agrees
and John Mitchell (stress) at the Water-
were48 be found. Rotten
a adventuroush
SCIENCE, VOL. 190, .
360
TETLOONT
nied ever having heard of Clifford Irving
tor claims to have known before any-
their analysis of Hughes' PSE chart
showed him to be sincere).
Allan Bell does not suffer moral di-
lemmas about any of this. First of all. he
emphasizes, anyone who buys a PSE must
take a 3-day training course in its use, and
if the customer flunks there is no sale, or he
can pay for more training until he passes.
As for surreptitious use, Bell says that in
uncontrolled conditions-such as taping a
presidential press conference or a phone
conversation-there is no way of telling
whether a person is lying, only whether he
is "stressing." No stress is a reliable in-
dicator that a person thinks he is speaking
truth, but stress can arise from a variety of
causes that can only te weeded out in a
carefully controlled situation. As for
broader ethical considerations, Bell an-
swers with a question: "Which is immoral
-for a person to lie, or for a lie to be un-
covered?" Bell suspects that some busi-
nessmen have bought the PSE to deter-
mine whether associates are squaring with
them in business dealings, but that doesn't
bother him-Dektor did the same thing,
and canceled a deal because they believed
they were being lied to about the promised
delivery of some money.
Least enamored of the PSE is the 1200-
member American Polygraph Association
(APA), which in 1973 passed a resolution
saying none of its members would be al-
lowed to operate a PSE unless it were used
in conjunction with a polygraph test. Kirk
Barefoot of the APA says the PSE quite
simply doesn't meet the organization's
standards because a lie-detecting machine
should be tuned into a minimum of two
physiological responses, and the PSE
measures only one. The APA also looks
askance at PSE training requirements, as
polygraph operators must go to school for
6 weeks followed by a 6-month internship.

CPYRGHT
CONFIDENTIAL
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Fre atyanew moon found Bell believes,
though, that the most interesting appli-
cations of the machine will be in psycho-
logical research, diagnosis, and testing.
The PSE can do several other things the
polygraph can't. It can chart whole sen-
tences in addition to simple yes-no an-
swers to which the polygraph is limited.
The PSE picks up stress instantaneously
because the microtremor is the result of an
electrical signal and does not have to wait
for the flow and ebb of body chemicals as
conservative almosttomat
does the polygraph, says Bell. it can also Miimobile" --- but some researchers have
register changes of stress levels within a
single syllable. It can be used with more
people in more situations because the sub-
ject is free to roam about, and intoxication
with drugs or alcohol does not, it is
claimed, distort the microtremor.
The academic community has not dis-
played much interest in the instrument to
date-Bell explains that this community is
been fooling around with it. One has done
a study proving that stage fright increases
in proportion to the number of people in an
audience: another has analyzed stress
among dental patients. One researcher,
says Bell, has done psychological diag-
noses of alcoholics using an "emotion-pro-
ducing word test." By charting stress reac-
tions to lists of words, the researcher can
determine the shape of the circumstances
that have gotten the subject in his present
fix. The success of tests such as this leads
Bell to boast, "We can do 6 months worth
of psychoanalysis in 10 minutes."
The psychological stress evaluator has
an interestingiy ambivalent status as both
a forensic and a clinical instrument. As the:
Michigan attorney general wrote in re-
sponse to a request for clarification of the
PSE status under Michigan's polygraph
examiners law: " ... a very narrow line
separates the use of mechanical devices for
the purpose of measuring stress and the
use of such device to determine truthful-
ness." (He decided that the act did apply
to the PSE in the latter case.) Forensically
speaking, the PSE is in a kind of limbo.
Nineteen states have laws licensing or
regulating polygraph use, and presumably
in those states where other instruments
are not banned, forensic use of the PSE
would be decided on a case-by-case basis.
One state, North Carolina, licenses PSE
operators (80 hours of training is re-
quired); elsewhere, a person armed with
'nothing but a Dektor training certificate
can call himself a PSE operator. The other
states. including New York and California,
have no laws because of strenuous opposi-
tion by labor unions to legislation they
think will legitimize the use of lie detectors
in employment (six states now ban com-
pulsory preemployment polygraph testing).
.
One individual who is determined that
the PSE shall gain full respectability in the
eyes of the law is John W. Heisse, a Bur-
lington, Vermont, otolaryngologist. Heisse
is the head of the International Society
of Stress Analysts (ISSA), a fledgling
organization of 200 PSE, polygraph, and
voice analyzer users from the fields of law
enforcement, industrial security, business,
law, and health. Heisse is perhaps the
PSE's most fervidi partisan. He has rerun
the Kubis study, using the contract's "al-
ternate specifications," and claims the PSE
came out with 97 percent reliability. He
has used the instrument to prove that
people with laryngectomies still register
muscle microtremor; he has tested the ef-
fects of dozens of drugs on PSE subjects.
He has a "death test" to see how anxious
people are about death, and a suicide
test-five questions relating to death that
can be asked over the phone. If the subject
shows no stress in answering, it means he is
definitely preparing to kill himself. Heisse
says in seven cases the test unfortunately
proved correct. He has also tried the PSE
with hypnotized subjects and discovered
that they show no muscle microtremor-
not because of stress but because they are
unusually relaxed. He says the same find-
ing applies to persons who have been
brainwashed. (Quick to see an applica-
tion here, Heisse went off to San Francis-
co to chart Patty Hearst's tapes, but he
. won't tell what he found.)
In addition to these activities, Heisse
says he has been doing all the lie-detecting.
work for the city of Burlington -- that is,
until Vermont passed a law saying only po-
lygraphers can do truthfulness verification
work. Heisse believes this law was passed
just to protect the jobs of Vermont's three
polygraphers. He has raised $100,000,
gathered 300 pages of evidence, and is
suing the state of Vermont. The outcome
of this case could set a significant prece-
dent if and when PSE's proliferate enough
to attract the attention of other law-
makers.
Meanwhile Allen Bell wants to go back
to the drawing board. "The PSE is to
stress analysis of the voice what the Mode!
T is to locomotion," he declares. More
work needs to be done on waveform analy-
sis, on quantitative measures of mind-body
interaction, and on "flesh mechanics." The
stress evaluator, he points out, is measur-
ing something no one has been able to de-
fine, so it would be nice to really pin it
down, perhaps by locating the specific arca
of the brain where stress originates. One of
the possible "end product configurations"
envisaged by Bell's agile mind would be a
machine that supplied a continuous meter
readout of stress levels to a psychiatrist
while his patient lay chatting on the couch.
Some might find this a distressing symp-
tom of human willingness to defer to ma-
chines. But fortunately, unlike the atom
bomb. the PSE is only as effective as he
who operates it. -- CONSTANCE HOLDEN
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