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Parapsychology: Science of the
anomalous or search for the soul?
James E. Alcock
Department of Psychology, Glendon College, York University, Toronto,
Ontario, Canada M4N 3M6
Abstract: Although there has been over a century of formal empirical inquiry, parapsychologists have clearly failed to produce a
single reliable demonstration of "paranormal," or "psi," phenomena. Although many parapsychological research projects have been
carried out under what have been described as well-controlled conditions, this does not by itself make a science, for unless and until it
can be demonstrated that paranormal phenomena really exist, there is no subject matter around which a science can develop. Indeed,
parapsychologists have not even succeeded in developing a reasonable definition of paranormal phenomena that does not involve, or
imply, some aspect of mind-body dualism. Moreover, parapsychology has developed several principles (such as the experimenter
effect) which can be used to explain away failures, and the use of these principles contributes to making the psi-hypothesis
unfalsifiable.
The "anything goes" attitude in parapsychology, which seems to lend credence to virtually any "paranormal" claim, serves to
weaken the credibility of parapsychological endeavors in the eyes of critics. This general willingness to suspend doubt is another
indication that parapsychology is more than the quest to explain anomalous experiences, as is claimed. It is argued in this paper that
parapsychological inquiry reflects the attempt to establish the reality of a nonmaterial aspect of human existence, rather than a search
for explanations for anomalous phenomena.
Keywords: anomaly; causality; dualism; ESP; experimental method; explanation; methodology; parapsychology; philosophy of
science; replication
0. Introduction
It is curious that, in this age of unprecedented literacy
and unceasing scientific and technological progress,
many people are prepared to accept that spoons can be
bent by the power of the mind alone, that disease can be
cured by the laying on of hands, that water can be located
by means of a forked willow stick, or that the mind can
influence the decay of radioactive substances. It is even
more curious when such claims are put forth and de-
fended by people trained in the ways of science.
Most BBS readers, I would imagine, have little diffi-
culty dismissing popular occult beliefs in astrology,
palmistry, the tarot, or biorhythms. However, those
same readers may not be nearly so cavalier about dis-
regarding such supposed "paranormal" (also syn-
onymously referred to as "parapsychological" or "psi")
phenomena as extrasensory perception ("ESP") or psy-
chokinesis ("PK"). ESP refers to the supposed ability to
obtain knowledge of a target object or of another per-
son's mental activity in the absence of sensory contact,
and PK is the putative ability of the mind to influence
matter directly. Belief in such phenomena is actually
very widespread, not only among members of the gener-
al public but also among university students (e.g., Al-
cock 1981; Gray 1984; Otis & Alcock 1982).
Such belief is no doubt tied, at least in part, to the fact
that many people, perhaps even most, have from time to
time had direct personal experiences that seemed to be
"telepathic" or "precognitive" or "psychokinetic." In-
cdeed, a numberpfroveayf df.Re Alcock 1981; Evans
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1973; Irwin 1985a; McConnell 1977; Sheils & Berg 1977)
have found personal experience to be the major reason
given by respondents for their belief in paranormal phe-
nomena. This is not surprising: Given their often power-
ful emotional impact, combined with a lack of under-
standing about the myriad "normal" ways in which these
experiences can come about (e.g., see Alcock 1981; Marks
& Kammann 1980; Neher 1980; Reed 1972; Zusne &
Jones 1982), it is easy to ascribe paranormal explanations
to odd experiences that one cannot readily explain
otherwise.
"Parapsychology" is defined as the scientific study of
paranormal phenomena (Thalbourne 1982). The study of
the paranormal was historically associated with the so-
called occult sciences such as astrology and numerology; a
more direct progenitor was the spiritualism craze of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However,
parapsychology stands well apart from these belief sys-
tems in a number of ways:
0.1. Scientific orientation. For over a century, there has
been careful and deliberate investigation of psi phe-
nomena by people trained in the methods of science. In
the past 50 years, much of this research has been labora-
tory-based and carried out in university settings. Cur-
rently, parapsychological research is being conducted at
such prestigious academic institutions as the University
of Edinburgh and Princeton University.
Throughout the last century and continuing to the
present, a number of very prominent natural and social
scientists have been proponents and supporters of para-
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psychological research (see Hyman 1985a; Rogo 1986),
including physicists Sir William Crookes, Lord Rayleigh
(Nobel Prize, 1904), Wolfgang Pauli (Nobel Prize, 1945),
Brian Josephson (Nobel Prize, 1973), and David Bohm;
naturalist Alfred Russell Wallace; chemist Robert Hare;
physiologist Charles Richet (Nobel Prize, 1913); psychol-
ogists William James, William McDougall, Carl Jung, Sir
Cyril Burt, and Hans Eysenck; anthropologist Margaret
Mead; mathematician John Taylor (who became con-
vinced of the reality of psi phenomena on the basis of Uri
Geller's purported feats [Taylor 1975], only subsequently
to repudiate his belief in such phenomena [Taylor &
Balanovski 1979]); and Robert Jahn of the Engineering
Department at Princeton University.
There has also been a history of professional interaction
between conventional science and parapsychology at sci-
entific conferences, through symposia on the paranormal
and invited addresses by parapsychologists (e.g., Ameri-
can Association for the Advancement of Science, 1975,
1978, 1984; American Physical Society, 1979; American
Psychological Association, 1966, 1967, 1975, 1984, 1985),
although admittedly such opportunities for para-
psychologists to present their ideas and evidence have
been limited.
0.2. Organization. As a research discipline, parapsycholo-
"gy is organized very much the way various disciplines of
mainstream science are. There are professional bodies
that emphasize empirical enquiry using scientific meth-
odology and that encourage high research standards.
(One of these, the Parapsychological Association, over
half of whose 300 or so members hold doctorates in
science, engineering, or medicine [McConnell 1983], has
been affiliated with the American Association for the
Advancement of Science since 1969.) Annual research
conferences are held. Research grants are awarded.
There is substantial empirical literature in the field -
including several research journals and many books,
some of which have been published by leading scientific
publishers (e.g., the Handbook of parapsychology
[Wolman 1977a], the Foundations of parapsychology
[Edge et al. 1986], and the series Advances in para-
psychological research [Krippner 1977; 1978a; 1982a;
1984]).
0.3. Academic involvement. Courses in parapsychology
are offered for academic credit at about 50 colleges and
universities in the United States (McConnell 1983); a few
even grant degrees in the subject (see Stanford 1978).
Ph. D.'s have been awarded for parapsychological re-
search at Cambridge University, the University of Edin-
burgh, Surrey University, Purdue University, the Uni-
versity of the Witwatersrand, and the City University of
New York, among others. The University of Edinburgh
has recently established the Koestler Chair in Parapsy-
chology, which is endowed by a bequest from the late
Arthur Koestler, a long-time supporter of parapsy-
chology.
How do members of academia view claims about psi?
In one survey of humanities and science professors at two
large universities (University of Michigan and University
of Toronto; response rate 53%), only about one-third of
the respondents indicated believing in paranormal phe-
nomena (Otis & Alcock 1982); there was no clear dif-
ference between representatives of the sciences and the
humanities. This is consistent with the results of a smaller
survey conducted at two other Canadian universities
(Alcock 1981). Yet, Wagner and Monnet (1979), in a much
larger survey of professors at 120 colleges and universities
in the United States (response rate 49.5%), found that
73% of the respondents from the humanities, arts, and
education indicated they believed ESP to be either an
established fact or a likely possibility, whereas only 55%
of the respondents from the natural sciences and 34% of
the psychologists did likewise. Whether the differences
between the results of the two surveys reflect differences
in the questions asked or differences in the groups
sampled (the former study was limited to respondents
from two large and prestigious universities) is not clear.
(It should be noted in any case that such surveys are
always subject to a response bias, in that there is likely to
be a differential response rate as a function of attitude
toward the subject matter being addressed.)
Although all of this might suggest that parapsychology
is a serious and professional research discipline that is
viewed with respect within university settings, at best
parapsychology struggles to maintain a toe-hold at the
fringes of academia; mainstream science continues vir-
tually to ignore its subject matter or even to reject and
ridicule it. One finds no mention of psi phenomena in
textbooks of physics or chemistry or biology. Lecturers do
not address the paranormal in undergraduate or graduate
science programs. Psychology students are rarely taught
anything about the subject. Parapsychological research
papers are only very infrequently published in the jour-
nals of "normal" science, and parapsychologists have
criticized leading scientific publications such as Science,
The American Journal of Physics, and American Psychol-
ogist for suppressing the dissemination of para-
psychological research findings (Honorton 1978a; Mc-
Connell 1983). Funds for parapsychological research are
usually generated within parapsychology itself or come
from private donors; the agencies that fund normal sci-
ence turn a blind, or even hostile, eye toward para-
psychological research proposals. The United States gov-
ernment, however, has provided multi-million-dollar
support for psi research into remote viewing at SRI
International in California [Targ & Harary 1984].)
What accounts for the disparity between what would
seem to be a substantial degree of professionalism in
parapsychology on the one hand, and the continuing
relegation of parapsychology to the fringes of science on
the other? For one thing, parapsychology continually
encounters opposition from mainstream psychology; psy-
chologists appear to constitute the most skeptical group
concerning whether psi is likely to exist (Alcock 1981;
Wagner & Monnet 1979). Second, people who may serve
as the "gatekeepers" of science, in that they are very
influential in determining what is and is not the proper
subject matter of science, are skeptical about psi. A
recent survey of "elite" scientists (Council members and
selected section committee members of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science) revealed the
highest level of skepticism regarding ESP of any group
surveyed in the last 20 years (McClenon 1982): Fewer
than 4% of the 339 respondents (the response rate was
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) viewed ESP as scientifically established. (However,
her 25% considered it to be a likely possibility,
cating about the same proportion of favourableness as
rted by Otis and Alcock [1982], cited above.) Fifty
cent considered ESP to be impossible or a remote
sibility.
n McClenon's (1982) view, this negativity is based on
threat that paranormal phenomena, were they to
it, would pose to the prevailing scientific worldview. A
ter different viewpoint, which is part of the thesis of
; paper, is that parapsychology, over its century or so of
stence as an empirical research endeavor, has simply
ed to produce evidence worthy of scientific status. Of
irse, both these views could be correct.
To facilitate the discussion of this issue, I shall proceed
posing a number of questions I consider to be impor-
it concerning psi and parapsychology:
1. What is psi; how is it defined?
2. Is psi "possible"?
3. If psi exists, how can it be detected?
4. What is the evidence that psi exists?
5. Does parapsychology follow the rules of science?
6. Are the critics fair?
7. Is rapprochement possible between psychology and
trapsychology?
et us consider each of these questions in turn.
. What is psi?
Ithough it may at first seem straightforward to define or
atalogue paranormal phenomena, it turns out to be a
ifficult task indeed, for there is a considerable spectrum
f opinion even within parapsychology as to which osten-
ible phenomena are likely to be genuinely paranormal
nd which are probably based on error and self-delusion.
For example, although many parapsychologists might
coff at such claims, some believe that "psychic healers,"
hrough the laying on of hands, can speed the healing of
vounds and slow the growth of fungi (Krippner 1982b);
thers believe that some gifted persons can project im-
ges onto photographic film (Eisenbud 1977), that water
ources, or even lost treasure, can be located by "dows-
ng" with a willow stick (Bird 1977; Schmeidler 1977), that
eincarnation warrants serious investigation (Child 1984;
Stevenson 1977), that one's personality can leave and
return to the body at will and may even be able to travel
through outer space (Targ & Puthoff 1977), and that
deathbed visions may be indicative of survival after death
(Otis & Haraldsson 1978).
Because there is no general agreement on what psi is,
or at least how it manifests itself, parapsychologists have
found it easier to define it in terms of what it is not. The
term "psi" itself was introduced by Thouless (1942) as a
neutral label in order to avoid the many associations that
terms such as "psychic phenomena" and "extrasensory
perception" have developed over the years, and psi is
defined simply as "interactions between organisms and
their environment (including other organisms) which are
not mediated by recognized sensorimotor functions"
(Krippner 1977, p. 2; my italics). Psi phenomena, then,
are explicitly defined in a negative manner: To demon-
strate that psi has occurred, one must first eliminate all
normal sensorimotor explanations.
Although only a few parapsychologists appear to share
his conservatism, Palmer (1985a; 1986a) argues that until
parapsychologists have produced a positive theory of psi
which describes the properties that must be present in
order to claim that psi has occurred, all they can claim to
have demonstrated is the occurrence of a number of
anomalies which themselves constitute the subject mat-
ter of psi. Seemingly paranormal events might be explica-
ble in terms of conventional science or science as it will be
understood in the future, he says, or, indeed, such events
might be due to errors in interpretation or measurement
or statistical analysis. He recommends that the term
"paranormal phenomena" be supplanted by a much less
committed term such as "ostensible psychic events."
Palmer's circumspection is commendable and would
find favour with most critics of parapsychology. However,
it is rare to find parapsychological research reports or
other kinds of literature treating apparent anomalies in
such a noncommittal fashion. Most, in fact, treat psi not as
a description of an anomaly but as a causative agent.
There is a second and more important sense in which
psi is negatively defined, albeit implicitly, and that is in
terms of its incompatibility with the prevailing scientific
worldview (Boring 1966; Flew 1980; Mackenzie & Mac-
kenzie 1980): In some way or another, psi phenomena, to
be considered as such, are impossible if the current
worldview is correct. There are two different camps
within modern parapsychology regarding this incom-
patibility (Beloff 1977):
1.1. Incompleteness of current science. Just as the scien-
tific worldview changed to accept the extraterrestrial
source of meteorites and the constancy of the speed of
light, so too, according to this viewpoint, it must ulti-
mately accommodate psi. Thus, "paranormal" phe-
nomena are part of the natural order, but a part of that
order which is not yet understood; as soon as scientific
knowledge advances to the point that the paranormal is
comprehensible, then the latter will become part of an
expanded normal science (Truzzi 1982).
This process has been manifested already in several
instances: Bat navigation was taken to involve psi until the
echo-sounding apparatus of bats was discovered, at which
time it became part of the normal scientific domain and of
no further interest to parapsychologists (Boring 1966).
Bird navigation (Pratt 1953; 1956) and hypnosis (see
McConnell 1983; Spanos 1986) are other examples of
phenomena that have passed from the realm of the
paranormal to the normal.
1.2. A nonphysical dimension of existence. According to
this perspective, paranormal phenomena mark the outer
limits of the scientific worldview, and beyond those limits
"lies the domain of mind liberated from its dependence
on the brain. On this view, parapsychology, using the
methods of science, becomes a vindication of the essen-
tially spiritual nature of man which must forever defy
strict scientific analysis" (Beloff 1977, p. 21).
Of these two perspectives, the incompleteness ap-
proach would no doubt be more acceptable to most
scientists. Yet, it does not really capture the flavour of the
paranormal. Whereas anomaly is, it would seem, a neces-
sary condition for paranormality, it is not a sufficient one.
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Were it sufficient, then all anomalies throughout the
history of science would have to have been considered
"paranormal," whereas it is clear that they have not been
considered as such (Braude 1978).
Braude (1978) suggests that a definition of the paranor-
mal must go beyond anomaly to include the notion that it
"thwarts our familiar expectations about what sorts of
things can happen to the sorts of objects involved" (p.
241). Yet, as Mabbett (1982) points out in response to
Braude, experimental parapsychological studies that are
taken to demonstrate the reality of psi typically produce
scoring rates that are only slightly above chance; these
hardly thwart peoples' expectations, and "even the
thoughtful layman would be unwilling to regard such
results as evidence of anything but luck without a little
assurance or instruction from the expert statistician" (p.
340).
On the other hand, the bizarre and paradoxical proper-
ties of light, as described by relativity theory, would no
doubt have been unexpected by laymen as well as by
scientists prior to Einstein, Mabbett says, yet most peo-
ple would not have regarded these properties as paranor-
mal. Mabbett argues that paranormal phenomena are
psychological in the sense that they involve mind or
consciousness, whatever these may be, and that they
reflect a relationship between the mental and physical
worlds that is radically different from that conceived of by
science.
What is being struggled with here by Braude and
Mabbett is that, more than being simple anomalies,
paranormal phenomena have a special and particular
relationship to the human mind. Indeed, as I have dis-
cussed in greater detail elsewhere (Alcock 1985), it is hard
to escape the conclusion that the concept of paranor-
mality implicitly involves mind-body dualism (see
Wolman 1977b), the idea that mental processes cannot be
reduced to physical processes and that the mind, or part
of it, is nonphysical in nature.
The late Gardner Murphy (1961), once president of the
American Psychological Association and one of parapsy-
chology's most erudite and persuasive proponents, ar-
gued that even if the paranormal were to be defined only
in terms of anomaly, this would still lead to a dualism of
some sort because of its independence from considera-
tions of time and space. Indeed, parapsychologists have at
times insisted that psi phenomena are distinguished from
the other phenomena of psychology by virtue of the fact
that they are of a nonphysical nature (e.g., Rhine, J. B. &
Pratt 1957). Although the boldness of such a declaration
might well raise the hackles of some modern para-
psychologists, most of them do seem to accept such
dualism (Thalbourne 1984). The influence of dualistic
thinking creates a deep schism between parapsychology
and modern science.
In summary, then, although some modern para-
psychologists prefer to speak only of anomalies, these
anomalies, if they are to be of continuing interest to
parapsychology, must ultimately involve some radically
different relationship between consciousness and the
physical world than that held to be possible by contempo-
rary science. Some parapsychologists might deny being
mind-body dualists, but they would do well to consider
without some reference to the independence of the mind
from the materialistic realm (Rhine, L. E. 1967).
2. Is psi "possible"?
Psi phenomena are defined implicitly in terms of their
incompatibility with the contemporary scientific world-
view. Although many parapsychologists (e.g., Rao 1983)
believe that only a major revolution in scientific thought
could lead to the accommodation of psi, there have been
attempts to reconcile such phenomena with modern
science. For example, although it would seem that psi
cannot occur without violating well-tested laws of physics
- such as the law of conservation of matter and energy and
the inverse square law of energy propagation (signal
strength is proportional to the inverse square of the
distance) - or violating the logical principle that an effect
cannot precede its cause, ad hoc explanations of how psi
might occur without such violation have been proposed
(Collins & Pinch 1982). As an example, with regard to the
presumed impossibility of seeing into the future, one
could posit that what appears to be precognition is really
psychokinesis: The individual uses PK to bring about the
events he believes have been foreseen precognitively. In
a similar fashion, one may be able to construct other ad
hoc explanations to overcome all the various incom-
patibilities that appear to exist between physical science
and parapsychology, although such contrived mecha-
nisms are not likely to satisfy most scientists.
A more direct attempt to render psi compatible with
contemporary science has been made through efforts to
show that such phenomena are not inconsistent with
quantum mechanics. In recent years, there has been
considerable discussion in parapsychology, led by para-
physicists (parapsychologically oriented physicists) and
philosophers, about some of the paradoxes of quantum
mechanics and about how it is possible to suggest solu-
tions to these paradoxes that imply the direct influence of
the mind on matter, allowing for - or even demanding -
psi (e.g., Oteri 1975; Schmidt 1975; Walker 1974; 1975).
This has generated negative reaction even within para-
psychology (e.g., Braude 1979a), with some para-
physicists such as Phillips (1979; 1984) arguing that the
orthodox view of quantum mechanics does not lead to
paradoxes that necessitate the introduction of mental
influences. Phillips describes the difficulty and the ar-
bitrariness of interpreting the mathematical picture
served up by quantum theory: "The predictions of quan-
tum mechanics have been verified, and there is little
doubt that the mathematical formalism is correct. Con-
structing a physical picture to correspond to the mathe-
matics is much more difficult, and authors differ in what
they find intuitively appealing and philosophically satis-
factory" (1984, p. 298).
Even if quantum mechanics did allow for psi - a notion
few mainstream scientists would be likely to accept at
present - that would not in itself make the reality of psi
any more likely. Flying cows are not inconsistent with
quantum mechanical notions, but as far as we know, they
do not exist. What is missing in such discussions of psi is
the phenomenon itself. Until there is clear evidence that
psi exists, it is surely premature to try to bend quantum

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If psi exists, how can it be detected?
here are three major sources of evidence for psi: (a)
lecdotes of spontaneous personal experiences, (b) dem-
Istrations by "gifted" psychics, and (c) laboratory ex-
eriments. The early studies of psi examined anecdotal
·ports in great detail, but gradually the realization grew
lat such evidence is just too unreliable to serve as data
r science (Hövelmann & Krippner 1986; Rhine, L. E.
977; Rush 1986a).
"Gifted" psychics have provided the most spectacular
si claims, both in the early days of psi research and more
cently (Rush 1986b). For some parapsychologists (e. g.,
ieloff 1985), such demonstrations still stand as strong
estimony to the reality of the paranormal. Yet, once
gain, this evidence is unsatisfactory in the extreme,
because of both the history of fraud involving reputedly
;ifted psychics (e.g., see Girden 1978) and, more impor-
ant, the fact that such psychics have as yet been unable to
perform their feats under controlled conditions for neu-
ral or skeptical investigators. For example, Uri Geller
vas taken by a number of parapsychologists (e.g., Beloff
.975; Cox 1976; Eisenbud 1976; Hasted 1976; Moss 1976;
Puthoff & Targ 1974) to have genuine paranormal powers
until a conjurer's investigations (Randi 1975) showed to
Tlust people's satisfaction that Geller was using trickery.
Some parapsychologists (e.g., Schmeidler 1984) insist
that the fact that a psychic is caught cheating does not
weaken the evidential value of those demonstrations
during which the same psychic was not caught cheating.
Given the rarity of such supposedly gifted individuals, it
is not surprising that investigators are loath to terminate
their research with an individual just because fraud has
been detected on some occasions. However, it is no easy
task to guard against fraud if a subject is determined to
cheat, and what better indication is there of such deter-
mination than the subject's being caught at it?
It was because of dissatisfaction with both anecdotal
evidence and uncontrolled demonstrations that Joseph
Banks Rhine, in the 1930s, set up an experimental labora-
tory for the study of psi. The hope was that through
rigorous application of the methodology of science, psi
would soon be put on a solid empirical footing. Rather
than simply relying on the ability of self-proclaimed
psychics to demonstrate their skills, Rhine began the
systematic study of both gifted and ordinary individuals in
a number of "guessing" tasks in which probabilities of
success could be calculated. If one makes a prediction,
based on a probability model, as to how well a subject
should score in a guessing task, or if one predicts the
distribution of events whose occurrence depends on a
random process (in Rhine's day, dice-throwing; nowa-
days, subatomic particle emission) which the subject
attempts to influence mentally, then if all known normal
forces have been ruled out, statistically significant depar-
tures from the prediction are taken to indicate the in-
volvement of a psi process. Thus, experimental parapsy-
chology, just as conventional psychology had done before
it, took on a pronounced statistical flavour.
If one could reliably demonstrate departures from
some statistical model, this would call out for explica-
tions. There would be no justification, however, for.
beginning with an explanation based on para-
psychological concepts. If there were unobserved weak-
nesses in the controls, if some unknown process were
involved (e.g., the use of some code based on silent
counting, or the use of "silent" dog whistles that children,
but not adults, can hear [Scott & Goldney 1960]), if there
were equipment problems or biases in the random gener-
ator, if the statistical model were inappropriate, or if
errors were made in the recording or analysis of the data,
the paranormal explanation would be erroneous. Just as
important, in the absence of a positive theory of psi, even
if an observed effect is not due to artifact, one is left only
with an anomaly. The availability of the psi hypothesis can
distract the researcher from other, normal, explanations
and thus impede the development of the understanding
of anomalies (Blackmore 1983a).
What would constitute "solid" evidence of psi? Ob-
viously, no evidence is ever 100% solid, because we can
never be sure how new discoveries will change our
understanding of processes that we currently think we
understand. Furthermore, evidence that seems uncon-
vincing or unimportant in the light of one theoretical
worldview may be viewed as much more important if the
prevailing theory changes.
An extraordinary degree of evidence is often de-
manded in support of extraordinary claims. We are gen-
erally less demanding of evidence in the case of claims
that "fit" with existing theory or knowledge. When one is
weighing evidence in law, the distinction is made be-
tween "beyond all reasonable doubt" and "on the balance
of probabilities." The former, applied in criminal cases,
demands virtual certainty of guilt; the latter, used in civil
litigation, refers to the notion that the defendant is more
likely than not to be guilty. Because psi is a concept that
would probably revolutionize science (Rao 1983), most
skeptics implicitly use the criterion of beyond all reason-
able doubt, while accepting conclusions made on the
balance of probabilities where only "normal" and non-
controversial phenomena are involved. However, al-
though the controversial nature of psi may justify the use
of tougher criteria, this view has been attacked as being
another tactic for denying legitimacy to controversial
claims (McClenon 1984).
Before we accept that psi (even in the simplest sense as
an anomaly) has been demonstrated in the laboratory,
three important factors must be considered:
3.1. Internal validity. Psychologists use the term "internal
validity" to refer to the degree to which experiments are
free of the influence of extraneous variables that might
introduce alternative explanations for the observed re-
sults (Berkowitz 1986). Most criticisms of experimental
studies of psi concern internal validity: Randomization
may be inadequate, sensory leakage (i.e., communication
of information by normal sensory means) may have oc-
curred, and so forth.
McClenon (1984) argues that such methodological crit-
icisms of psi experiments are often unfair. By refusing to
accept the shared assumptions that are implicit in any
experiment, he says, the critic will sooner or later "ask for
information that is no longer available, or for a degree of
experimental control and exactitude that is desirable in
principle but impossible in practice" (p. 89). Thus, the
'perfect" ESP experiment is an impossibility, McClenon
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contends, for one can always suggest that the experiment-
er was incompetent or that trickery was involved (see also
Honorton 1981). Despite McClenon's concerns, there is a
considerable difference between making unsubstantiated
charges of incompetence or trickery and pointing to
methodological flaws. If the flaws are there, para-
psychologists should run the experiments again - without
the flaws - rather than argue about the motivation of the
person who pointed them out.
Rather than rerunning the experiments correctly, a
more usual response is to attack the critic. For example,
critics have been chastised for pointing to flaws without
demonstrating that these flaws are capable of generating
the observed departures from chance (Honorton 1975;
1979; Palmer 1986a). This criticism does not stand up, for
two reasons. First, critics are usually not advocating the
acceptance of an alternate hypothesis but asking only that
claims of psi be suspended until properly controlled
studies are carried out (Akers 1984; Hyman 1981). Sec-
ond, such flaws need not be the cause of the statistical
deviations, but they are symptomatic of lax research
standards (Hyman 1985b). One should hardly have confi-
dence in the experimental controls if one is faced with
evidence of violations of proper procedure. Akers (1984)
uses the "dirty test-tube" analogy: A chemist would have
little confidence in a colleague's findings if it were ob-
served that a test tube used in the experiment was
contaminated.
It is not so difficult to design and execute an experiment
that is methodologically and statistically sound. Psycho-
logical experiments published in the better psychology
journals stand in evidence of this.
3.2. Consistency. Before accepting the reality of a phe-
nomenon, one generally looks for signs that there is a
consistent pattern of results across experiments. The lack
of any consistent pattern in the research findings is one of
the most serious weaknesses in the evidence offered for
psi (Blackmore 1983a). Unfortunately, it is standard prac-
tice in parapsychology to take one pattern of data as
evidence for psi in one experiment, then to disregard its
absence and take some other pattern as evidence for psi in
another experiment.
3.3. Repeatability. Not only should there be consistency
in the pattern of data across experiments, but individual
experiments should be repeatable by others. Repeat-
ability is an important safeguard, albeit only a partial one,
against error or fraud (Sommer & Sommer 1984). Ob-
viously, however, replication by itself is not enough. If
someone is dishonest in the actual reporting of the re-
search, reports of replication by the same author will not
eliminate the dishonesty (Casrud 1984).
has no clear rationality, its only chance of demanding
scientific attention is replication" (p. 4).
On this basis, repeatability is, in general, less impor-
tant in psychology than in parapsychology. Even so,
psychologists pay far too little attention to the importance
of repeatability (Epstein 1980; Fishman & Neigher 1982;
Furchtgott 1984; Heskin 1984; Sommer & Sommer 1983;
1984); replication studies account for a very small per-
centage (3% or less) in leading psychology journals
(Bozarth & Roberts 1972; Sterling 1959). This has led on
occasion to the widespread dissemination of information
that is subsequently found to be unreplicable (see, for
example, Marshall & Zimbardo 1979; Maslach 1979;
Schachter & Singer 1979).
Even when replication is attempted, its importance
often depends on who conducts it. We are not likely to
accept a wild claim supported by the research of only one
person, whether that research has been replicated by that
person or not (Hyman 1977a). Similarly, a failure to
replicate by a student in a high-school science class will
carry little or no weight, whereas a failure to replicate by a
well-respected scientist will be much more seriously
viewed (Collins 1976). It is also difficult to know just what
constitutes a replication (Edge & Morris 1986); there are
in fact several different kinds of replication that one can
provide (Alcock 1981; Lykken 1968). Beloff (1984) differ-
entiates between "weak" and "strong" replicability,
where the former term refers to a situation in which an
experiment or phenomenon has been independently con-
firmed by at least one other investigator, and the latter
refers to a situation in which any competent researcher,
following the prescribed procedure, can obtain the re-
ported effect. Although parapsychologists have present-
ed, as evidence for psi, studies that have been replicated
by other parapsychologists, there has never been a psi
demonstration that is replicable in the strong sense (Be-
loff 1973; 1984; Palmer 1985b). Indeed, para-
psychologist/psychologist Susan Blackmore (1983a) re-
cently referred to unrepeatability as parapsychology's
only finding.
Of course, even if a psi experiment is replicated, that
by itself does not mean the effect has a paranormal cause.
On the other hand, the inability to repeat an experiment
or a demonstration cannot by itself rule out the truth of
the psi claim. Poor repeatability could conceivably stem
from factors other than the nonexistence of psi (Palmer
1986b). It is possible that certain conditions are necessary
for the production of psi, and given that no one knows just
what these conditions are, it could be that an essential
element is missing when an experiment fails to replicate.
It has also been suggested that psi could turn out to be
inherently unlawful (Palmer 1986b; Rao 1982), although
this position is difficult to defend (Hövelmann & Kripp-
ner 1986). From this viewpoint, it has been argued that
the quest for repeatability should be abandoned (Pratt
1974).
Yet, as Rao (1985) points out, repeatability is not a
matter of primary concern in normal science. Only if
some important and controversial finding is made is
replication likely to be attempted, and this will often be
Despite the arguments about the relative unimpor-
tance of repeatability, the history of science demonstrates
that unrepeatable experiments or demonstrations should
be viewed with a very cautious eye. Most para-
psychologists probably would not dispute this point.
Indeed, the claim is made that the level of repeatability
undertaken by others who have competing theories that
would not accommodate the finding. When observations
are consistent with theory, replication is less important.
However, as Murphy (1971) commented: "If the event is
unclassifiable, then it is doubly important that it have a
rational interpretation, that is, one that fits with the
thought pattApproved For Release 2000 08/08 : CA-RDP56-807%JR00220820004.marapsychology exceeds
typical replicability rates in the social sciences; the

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ongest claim in thiPregaYa donee.Releass 2000/08108 : GIA-RDRAG-QA789R000200126004 were seriously
ect, for which replicability is said to be in the area of
% (Honorton 1976; 1978b). This research is discussed
the next section.
flawed, and even the 8 that were conducted with reason-
able care were not methodologically ideal. The problems
fell into several categories, including randomization
In summary, then, although one cannot set precise
undards that evidence of psi must meet, judgment
ould be suspended until there is at least some con-
itency among research findings from a body of meth-
lologically irreproachable experiments, at least some of
nich are repeatable in Beloff's (1984) strong sense.
failures, sensory leakage, inadequate safeguards against
subject cheating, the possibility of errors in the recording
of the data, errors in statistical analysis, and failures to
report important procedural details. Akers concluded
that these 54 experiments taken together were too weak
to establish the existence of a paranormal phenomenon.
Is there any substantive evidence that psi
exists?
'ithin parapsychology itself, there are arguments about
e strength of the evidence adduced for psi. Some argue
at no substantive evidence has yet been found (e.g.,
urker 1978), whereas others consider the laboratory
idence for psi convincing (e.g., Schmeidler 1984); still
hers believe that psi can even now be harnessed - for
‹ample, to guide stock market investments (Targ &
arary 1984). On the whole, it would appear that most
arapsychologists believe that psi has already been dem-
nstrated. Schmeidler (1971) reported that almost 90% of
er small sample of members of the Parapsychological
ssociation indicated they believed that ESP had been
stablished so firmly that any further research aimed only
t demonstrating its existence would be uninteresting.
ubsequently, in a survey of all 241 members and associ-
tes of the Parapsychological Association (which yielded a
esponse rate of 84%), 68% indicated complete belief in
he reality of psi (McConnell & Clark 1980). The average.
trength of belief across all respondents was 93%.
Many studies have been carried out and published that
urport to provide statistical evidence for paranormal
processes. However, even if we were willing to treat
ertain statistical deviations as evidence of psi, such
·vidence has been unsatisfactory: A number of recent
nalyses have demonstrated a serious problem with the
uality of the methodology used in parapsychological
search. For example, Akers (1984) cites a survey of 214
K experiments (May et al. 1980), in which the authors
included that none had been properly designed and
:ported.
In order to explore in more detail the state of the
vidence in parapsychology, five major areas of contem-
porary parapsychological research will be discussed
below.
4.1. Out-of-body experiences. Blackmore (1982; 1984),
after carefully studying both the anecdotal and research
literature on out-of-body experiences (experiences in
which the individual believes that the physical body has
been left behind and that travel through physical space is
therefore unencumbered by limitations imposed by the
flesh) and after conducting her own research, came to the
conclusion that normal psychological theories are capable
of accounting for such experiences and that nothing
paranormal is likely to be going on.
4.2. Personality/attitudinal variables and psi. Akers (1984)
evaluated 54 experiments that studied the influence of
altered states and of personality/attitudinal variables on
psi and that had been cited as significant confirmations of
4.3. The psi ganzfeld effect. As mentioned earlier, studies
of ESP in a ganzfeld (a condition of reduced sensory
stimulation typically produced by covering a subject's
eyes with halved Ping-Pong balls and shining a white light
onto them while playing white noise into the subject's
earphones) have been very promising in that they have
appeared to demonstrate a replication rate of 50% or
higher (Blackmore 1980; Honorton 1978b).
Hyman (1985b) has completed an exhaustive analysis of
virtually all psi ganzfeld research, using a data base of 42
studies conducted between 1974 and 1981. Hyman's
analysis leads him to conclude that the replication rate
exhibited in this collection of studies is probably very
close to what would be expected by chance. Several flaws
of procedure - including less than adequate randomiza-
tion, the possibility of sensory leakage, and erroneous
statistical analysis - plagued these studies; not a single
study was flawless, he reported. He suspects that most of
these studies were not well planned, and he concludes
that this data base is too weak to support any assertions
about the existence of psi. However, Honorton (1985)
disputes Hyman's conclusions, arguing that his assign-
ment of flaws is itself seriously flawed, and he maintains
that these studies do indeed indicate a significant psi
ganzfeld effect.
Hyman and Honorton (1986) prepared a joint paper as a
follow-up to the two papers discussed above. With refer-
ence to the data base discussed earlier, they agree that
the experiments as a group departed from ideal stan-
dards on aspects such as multiple testing, randomiza-
tion of targets, controlling for sensory leakage, applica-
tion of statistical tests, and documentation. Although
we probably still differ about the extent and serious-
ness of these departures, we agree that future psi
ganzfeld experiments should be conducted in accor-
dance with these ideals. (p. 353)
They go on to say that
whereas we continue to differ over the degree to which
the current ganzfeld data base contributes evidence for
psi, we agree that the final verdict awaits the outcome
of future psi ganzfeld experiments - ones conducted by
a broader range of investigators and according to more
stringent standards. (pp. 352-53)
Thus, although the ganzfeld studies have been offered
as the strongest evidence for a repeatable psi effect, any
conclusion about a psi ganzfeld effect must await future
research carried out more carefully than these studies
were.
4.4. Remote-viewing studies. In 1974 Nature carried an
article by two physicists (Targ & Puthoff 1974) in which
they described their successful demonstrations of "re-
mote viewing," a talent by means of which subjects are
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able to describe geographical locations being visited by
other people without having any normal form of commu-
nication with them. This putative skill is said to be within
everyone's capability (Targ & Puthoff 1977). For a period
of time, this research seemed to promise a breakthrough
in the search for a demonstrable psi effect. However,
Marks and Kammann (1978; 1980), unable to replicate the
remote-viewing effect themselves, discovered serious
flaws in the remote-viewing procedure - flaws that they
argued accounted for the observed effects.
The principal flaw concerned the judging procedure:
Judges were asked to match up a series of responses
against a set of targets. Marks and Kammann argue that
because the transcripts of the subjects' reports were not
edited to remove cues that would assist the judges in
identifying the targets, the judging procedure itself - and
not any psi effect - produced above-chance matching of
transcripts with targets. Tart et al. (1980) responded to
this criticism by first having the transcripts edited to
remove any possible extraneous cues, and then having
them rejudged. They reported that this did not eliminate
the remote-viewing effect. However, Marks and Scott
(1986), after obtaining access to the relevant findings
(they had until recently been denied access to the raw
data), report that the editing of the transcripts had failed
to eliminate all the extraneous cues and that enough cues
remained to account for the above-chance scoring rate.
There have been other criticisms of the remote-
viewing studies as well, including concerns about statis-
tical problems that could give rise to above-chance scor-
ing rates (Hyman 1977b), and about the lack of adequate
controls and control groups (Caulkins 1980). A number of
replications and extensions have been reported (e.g.,
Bisaha & Dunne 1979; Dunne & Bisaha 1979; Schlitz &
Gruber 1981; Schlitz & Haight 1984); only the Schlitz and
Haight (1984) study appears to avoid the weaknesses of
the Targ-Puthoff series, but even here, there was no
control condition to allow proper assessment of the back-
ground "coincidental" scoring rate.
Thus, the Targ-Puthoff series is too flawed to be of
evidential value, and none of the subsequent published
studies have been carefully enough controlled to bear
testimony about psi.
4.5. Schmidt's random-event generator (REG) studies.
For almost 20 years, Helmut Schmidt has been conduct-
ing research into the ability of subjects to predict or
influence the radioactive emission of subatomic particles.
His research enjoys generally high regard from other
parapsychologists: Beloff (1980), for example, views some
of Schmidt's research as being among the most evidential
in all of parapsychology, despite his own inability to
replicate Schmidt's findings.
Schmidt has published a considerable number of stud-
ies. Unfortunately, this investigator typically completes a
study and then - rather than focusing on a given research
question, or refining his measurements, or examining the
effects of various parameters in that particular situation,
or working with one type of generator over a period of
time so that he and others can come to appreciate its
idiosyncrasies - he moves on to a totally different situa-
tion altogether (Hansel 1980), changing the design and
components of his generator as he goes along (Hyman
1981). This APRESVed Hor las - 2999/08/08
reading his research reports to learn the limitations of his
generator or his procedures.
Little of Schmidt's research is free from serious meth-
odological shortcomings (Hansel 1980; 1981; Hyman
1981). Consider, for example, one of his initial studies
(Schmidt 1969b), which has been favorably cited many
times in the parapsychological literature. The situation
was as follows: A subject was seated before a panel of four
lights and four corresponding buttons. On each trial, the
subject would press one of the buttons to predict which
light would next illuminate, something that would be
determined by particle emission from a strontium-90
source. The light would then illuminate, giving immedi-
ate feedback. If the light corresponded to the depressed
button, it was a "hit.'
In the first experiment in this report, Schmidt com-
bined the results from his three subjects and obtained a
hit rate significantly higher than would be expected by
chance: 0.261 as compared to 0.250 (p < 2 × 10-9). In the
second experiment, subjects were allowed to choose to
try to make a high or a low number of hits. Here, the
combined scoring rate of three subjects was 27%, again
significantly higher than chance expectation (p < 10-10).
Both experiments suffered from less than optimal ex-
perimental control; as in most of Schmidt's studies, sub-
jects were usually unsupervised, and there was a general
lack of rigour in the control of experimental conditions.
Hansel (1980) objected to the fact that the exact numbers
and types of trials undertaken by each subject were not
specified in advance, and also to the fact that the equip-
ment, although partially automated, did not rule out
cheating during data classification.
There is a more fundamental concern about these
experiments: the target series (Hyman 1981). Schmidt
compared the subjects' hit rates to chance expectation,
but this assumed that the target series was random.
(Particle emission is presumably random; the output of
his generator was not necessarily so.) Schmidt's ran-
domization checks were carried out on target strings
much longer than those used in the experiments, and
therefore did not allow the detection of possible short-
term biases in the generator which could give rise to
nonrandom target strings. Because immediate feedback
was provided throughout the experiment, and because
subjects were free to "play" with the equipment and to
decide when to start and stop a given session, any un-
detected short-term bias in the generator might give the
subject the impression of being "hot" and therefore lead
him to initiate a session, which he would probably end
once he seemed to turn "cold." This, of course, could
produce above-chance scoring rates.
It would therefore be important and appropriate to
analyze the actual target sequence in terms of how well it
conformed to what would be expected by chance. How-
ever, were one to find that the target sequence was
nonrandom, this could, after the fact, be taken as evi-
dence of PK. Indeed, Schmidt reported that after the
testing one subject said he had tried to affect the outcome
rather than just predict it; he had tried to produce more
illuminations of lamp no. 4, he said. It was found for this
subject that there was indeed an excess of 4s in his target
series. No indication is given in the report as to whether
this analysis of targets was carried out for other subjects,
29091-4
YURv GIA-RDP96-00789R002200120091-4Schmidt subsequently
and if not,
hot.
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d this same piece of apparatus in a PK experiment
midt & Pantas 1972) in which the only task was to try
influence the machine to produce an excess of 4s!
ve-chance scoring rates were reported in that in-
ice as well, which led Schmidt again to conclude that
was operating. The skeptic is left wondering whether
t apparatus simply produces an excess of 4s from time
ime. Certainly, nothing can be concluded from such
vorts until more is known about the target series
›duced by the generator.
Thus, a study that seems at first to offer considerable
dence of an anomalous process is found to be badly
wed. It would make sense for Schmidt to redo the
dy, taking steps to make these criticisms unnecessary.
nerally lacking in Schmidt's studies is a proper control
ndition: One should generate pairs of runs, with one
n designated, on the basis of some random procedure
ch as the toss of a coin, as the experimental and the
her as the control for each trial (Hansel 1981).
The problems in this study recur over and over in
hmidt's research (Hansel 1980; 1981; Hyman 1981).
aly one of his studies appears well designed (Schmidt et
1986). However, we must wait to see whether the psi
fect apparently obtained in this very recent study stands
› to replication. There have been many psi studies (e. g.,
irg & Puthoff 1974) in the past that at first appeared
yond reproach, only to be found later to be seriously
awed.
In summary, these various areas of research are
lagued by methodological and statistical flaws of one sort
another. Until research is undertaken that is meth-
dologically well planned and well executed - as Hyman
ad Honorton (1986) recommend with regard to the
anzfeld - there is little point in debating whether or not
ne existing evidence establishes a case for psi.
. Does parapsychology follow the rules of
science?
of course, by using the term "rules of science," one could
Den up all manner of dispute because of the difficulty
lat exists in listing those rules or in demarcating science
om pseudoscience (e.g., see Bunge 1984; Edge & Mor-
s 1986). Rather than tackle that conundrum, it is more
rofitable to examine several aspects of parapsychological
ndeavor that appear to run counter to the spirit of
icientific inquiry; each is discussed below:
5.1. Unfalsifiability. There are a number of principles in
parapsychology that can be used to explain away failures
to find empirical support for a hypothesis, thus creating a
situation of unfalsifiability:
1. Perhaps the subject did significantly worse than
expected by chance. If so, this may be taken as evidence
of psi, because it seems to be psi-missing, something
which occurs so often that it is now taken to be a man-
ifestation of psi (e.g., Crandall & Hite 1983).
2. If outstanding subjects subsequently lose their psi
ability, or if subjects do more poorly toward the end of a
session or of a series of trials, this is labeled the decline
effect (e.g., see Beloff 1982). Rather than being taken as a
possible consequence of either statistical regression or
the tightening up of controls (when that has occurred),
the decline effect often takes on the power of an explana-
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For example, the decline effect in one experiment was
interpreted as a "sign of psi" that was taken to strengthen
the claim of a genuine psi effect (Bierman & Weiner
1980).
3. In a related vein, Schmeidler (1984) reports that PK
effects are often strongest just after a session has termi-
nated or during a subject's rest period. Rather than
ignoring data accumulated after the session is over, this is
taken to reflect another psi phenomenon, and has been
given two names - the "linger effect" and the "release of
effort effect." If this is to be taken seriously, then all
researchers should report not only the presence of such
an effect, but its absence as well: were this done, the
frequency of the effect may well turn out to be within the
bounds of normal statistical expectation.
4. Some parapsychologists seem consistently to obtain
the results they desire whereas others are unable to find
significant departures from chance (Palmer 1985b). The
failure of one researcher to obtain significant results using
the same procedure that yielded significant results for
another researcher, rather than being taken as a failure to
replicate or as a hint that extraneous variables may be
producing artifactual results, is often interpreted in terms
of the experimenter effect. This effect is so common in psi
research that it has even been described by one para-
psychologist as parapsychology's one and only finding
(Parker 1978)! To describe the fact that two researchers
obtained different results by calling it an experimenter
effect is quite appropriate. After all, the experimenter
effect as such is by no means unique to parapsychology,
and a great deal has been written on the subject with
regard to research in psychology and other domains (see
Rosenthal & Rubin 1978). However, in psi research the
term is all too often used more as an explanation than as a
description, and that is because it is considered that the
effect may result not only from experimenter error (in
that one experimenter may be more successful in obtain-
ing psi effects than another because he unwittingly allows
more artifacts to contaminate his procedure), or from
differences in personalities (in that some experimenters
may put their subjects into a more comfortable and psi-
conductive frame of mind than others), but also from the
psi influence of the experimenter himself (Krippner
1978a; Palmer 1985b; 1986b). If psi exists, of course, it
would only make sense that the experimenter, who natu-
rally wants his experiment to succeed, might un-
knowingly bring his psi influence to bear, whereas a
skeptical or neutral experimenter might not use psi at all,
or might use it to prevent the appearance of a subject psi
effect. This whole problem leads Palmer (1985b) to de-
scribe the experimenter effect as the most important
challenge facing parapsychology today. It is hard to imag-
ine scientific inquiry of any sort if the results of the
investigation are determined by the psychic influence of
the investigator (Alcock 1985; see also Krippner 1978b).
The experimenter effect (or the experimenter psi ver-
sion of it) provides a powerful method for undermining
failures to replicate, and is sometimes resorted to for just
that purpose. For example, when Blackmore (1985), a
devoted parapsychologist for many years, found herself
becoming increasingly skeptical about psi as a conse-
quence of her inability to produce experimental evidence
for it, she noted that "many parapsychologists suggested
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· that the reason I didn't get results was quite simple - me.
Perhaps I did not sufficiently believe in the possibility of
psi" (p. 428).
In summary, it is the way such "effects" are used - and
not, in principle, the research procedures - that vitiates
the scientific respectability of parapsychology, for they
make the psi hypothesis unfalsifiable by providing ways to
explain away null results and nonreplications. These
descriptive terms have mistakenly come to be taken as
properties of psi, which leads to the circularity of explain-
ing an observation by means of the label given to it.
Moreover, as important properties of psi, their nonap-
pearance in a psi experiment should weigh against any
conclusion that psi has occurred; this never happens in
the parapsychological literature.
5.2. All things are possible. Another aspect of parapsy-
chology that makes critics uncomfortable is what seems to
be almost an "anything goes" attitude, with no specula-
tion seeming too wild. For example, so-called observa-
tional theory based on paraphysical interpretations of
quantum mechanics, predicts that random events can be
affected simply by being observed, even if the observa-
tion occurs at some time in the future (see Bierman &
Weiner 1980). In line with this notion, studies have been
done which claim to show that subjects can exercise an
influence backwards in time ("retroactive PK") so as to
affect the choice of stimulus materials preselected for the
study in which they are participating (e.g., Schmidt
1976). This also means, of course, that the present is
possibly being influenced by future events (Martin 1983).
A "checker effect" has also been postulated, in which ESP
scores may be retroactively and psychokinetically influ-
enced by the individual who checks or analyzes the data
(Palmer 1978; Weiner & Zingrone 1986). Schmidt (1970c)
reported that cockroaches were able to influence a
random-event generator in such a way as to cause them to
be shocked more often than would be expected by
chance. He suggested that perhaps his own psi, fueled by
his dislike of cockroaches, accounted for the increase,
rather than a decrease, in shocks.
Not only can psi apparently transcend temporal bound-
aries, it also seems that no effort, no training, and no
particular knowledge are required to use it. Indeed,
modern PK studies appear to indicate that psi is an
unconscious process, but a goal-oriented one in that it
helps the individual attain desired objectives: Success in a
PK experiment does not require knowing anything about
the target, or even knowing that one is in a PK study
(Stanford 1977). Thus, psi appears to operate very much
like wishful thinking. For example, going back to the
Schmidt (1969b) study, all that was needed, it seems, was
for that one subject to wish for a particular light to come
on and it would light up statistically more frequently than
the others. (Of course, when subjects do score above
chance, neither they nor anyone else can say which hits
were brought about by psi and which were the conse-
quence of chance.)
miles, between humans and objects, between humans
and animals, or even between animals and objects),
serves to weaken the a priori likelihood that psi, as any
sort of force or ability, exists. After all, most psi experi-
ments are very similar, in that all that is typically done is
to examine two sets of numbers, representing targets and
responses in an ESP experiment or outcomes and aims in
a PK experiment, for evidence of a nonchance associa-
tion. It may simply be that the enterprise of parapsychol-
ogy generates, from time to time, significant statistical
deviations - be they the result of artifact, selective
reporting, or whatever - which are then independent of
the research hypothesis, so that no matter what the
researcher is examining - the effects of healing on fungus,
PK with cockroaches, ESP across a continent, or retroac-
tive psi effects - the likelihood of obtaining significant
deviations remains the same. (For example, if an REG
produces an excess of 4s on a short-term basis, and if the
procedure allows subjects to tap into this, then it should
make no difference in principle whether the targets are
generated on-line or were recorded a week earlier: If the
subject aims for more 4s, he will obtain them.) Difficulty
in replication by other researchers using their own equip-
ment or slightly different procedures would, of course,
follow from such a state of affairs, as would the experi-
& menter effect.
This psi-as-artifact notion is not offered as an em-
pirically testable hypothesis. I only mean to show that the
lack of constraints on the appearance of psi undermines
rather than strengthens its credibility. It would be hard
enough to accept that a philosopher's stone can turn base
metals into gold, as alchemists believed. It would be
harder still to believe that it can turn anything into gold
and that anyone can use it without any training.
5.3. Lack of rapport with other areas of science. Parapsy-
chology, despite its efforts to find common areas of
interest with other research fields (see the Handbook of
Parapsychology [Wolman 1977a]), has failed to establish
any genuine overlap with other disciplines, because, so
far at least, other disciplines do not seem to need psi. If
"normal" explanations for strange physical or psychologi-
cal phenomena were exhausted, and/or if the influence of
the researcher's consciousness appeared to have an effect
on the way matter behaved in "normal" experiments,
then a much greater number of scientists might be more
open to the possibility of psi. Indeed, if parapsychologists
are right about psi, then the well-tested theories of
physicists and neurologists are wrong (Hebb 1978). It is
perhaps noteworthy that the claims that psi can influence
radioactive decay do not come from particle physicists in
the course of their everyday work.
6. Are the critics fair?
Some parapsychological proponents, such as Child
(1985), argue that few in "normal" science bother to
immerse themselves in the details of parapsychology, and
instead gain a false or misleading impression from the
accounts given by their colleagues who serve as critics of
the field. Such critics are accused of unfair tactics, such as
(a) arguing that unless fraud can be ruled out, it is the
most parsimonious explanation of psi claims; (b) setting
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As I have argued earlier (Alcock 1984), the fact that no
physical variable has ever been shown to influence the
scoring rate in psi experiments (Rush 1986c), combined
with the apparent total lack of constraints on the condi-
tions under which psi can be manifested (whether for-
ward in time, Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RPR26500789R99239013090logical research than for
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urch in the realm of normal science; and (c) simply
ting the possibility of psi out-of-hand (see Collins &
h 1979).
harles Tart (1982; 1984), a former president of the
psychological Association, suggests that there is an
tional basis for critics' unwillingness to welcome
psychology into the scientific fold, an argument that
been repeated by Schmeidler (1985) and Irwin
5b), among others. Tart posits that a widespread and
onscious fear of psi has developed either because
ng psi ability would disrupt social functioning (be-
je we would have access to one another's true feelings
thoughts) or because of what he calls "primal conflict
cession": A mother often feels angry toward her child
keeps her cool and speaks to the child in a positive,
portive way. The child, if psi is already operating, is
'd with a frightening conflict of messages and learns to
ress psi altogether so as to avoid the information
nnel creating such conflict. Targ and Harary (1984), on
other hand, argue that skeptics base their opposition
on rationality but on religious conviction.
suggestions about fear and religious conviction are too
ak and ad hoc to require rebuttal. Collins & Pinch's
79) concerns, on the other hand, are important. How-
er, they could be equally relevant to any controversial
im, and thus nothing abnormal seems to be going on in
; critical reactions to parapsychology. The scientific
:na is a tough one; many ideas march in to do battle;
ne survive, but just as many perish. Numerous other
atroversial claims have faced hostility and even deri-
n from scientists; some of these have won out (e.g.,
ntinental drift - see Hallam 1975); others (e.g., poly-
iter - see Franks 1981) have not. Psychologists were at
st unwilling to believe in the notion of biological pre-
redness with regard to learning (i.e., the idea that
ganisms, including humans, are biologically prepared
learn certain kinds of aversions more rapidly than
hers), and the leading journals refused to publish re-
irch reports on the subject, reports that are now
wed as being among the most important in their field
·ligman & Hager 1972). This concept is now part of
instream psychology. Many psychologists also refused
believe in biological constraints on intelligence (or, at
st, racially determined ones); and as a result of such
gged refusal to believe, the fundamental studies in this
ea - reported by Sir Cyril Burt - were eventually
‹posed as fraudulent (Kamin 1974). When, in the late
960s, Neal Miller announced that he and L. Dicara had
emonstrated operant conditioning of heart rate in rats
Miller & Dicara 1967), many experimental psychologists
efused to believe it, despite Miller's high reputation as
n experimental psychologist. Ultimately, Miller him-
elf, when subsequently unable to replicate his own
tudies, publicly withdrew his claims (e.g., Miller 1978).
cience refused to publish, on the grounds that it was
rroneous, the initial research of Solomon Berson and
Rosalyn Yalow (Yalow subsequently won the Nobel Prize)
n the insulin-binding antibody, research that was funda-
ental to the development of the radioimmunoassay
echnique (Garfield 1986; Yalow 1978). Albert Einstein
bsolutely refused to believe that "God plays dice,"
espite the implications of quantum mechanics; he chose
believe the theory to be in error due to incomplete-
ess. Science is full AppudvernoleRelease 2000/08/08 PerALAS ByB their backs on psychical research.
This process, although sometimes seemingly cruel and
dogmatic, is perhaps necessary to allow scientists to focus
on claims that appear most promising, rather than being
distracted by others that appear to have little to recom-
mend them. Sooner or later in science, it seems, the truth
will out, and error falls by the wayside. Even acu-
puncture, long regarded as being nothing short of super-
stition, is now regarded as capable of producing limited
pain relief (Zusne & Jones 1982).
If the insulin-binding antibody, biological prepared-
ness, and acupuncture analgesia won accommodation in
science, it is because the evidence for them became so
strong that they had to be accommodated. A century of
parapsychological research has gone by, and the evi-
dence for psi is no more convincing now than it was a
century ago.
It seems accordingly that parapsychologists who attack
scientists and critics for their refusal to recognize the
importance of psi and of psi research are attacking the
messengers because they cannot accept the messages
they bear. Suppose that instead of psi, parapsychologists
were promoting a cure for baldness, but that the amount
of hair produced by the treatment was tiny and detectable
only by some researchers, sometimes. If the effect is
unreliable and unrepeatable, if it also contradicts all that
is known about hair growth and alopecia, and if there is no
theoretical mechanism put forth for the putative effect,
then one would hardly expect the scientific community to
cheer the end of baldness. Science will never take para-
psychologists simply at their word; they must offer a
clear, replicable demonstration of a basic phenomenon in
order to gain acceptance in science.
Moreover, one can seriously challenge the claim that
practitioners of normal science do not give, or have not
given, parapsychology its day in court. As was mentioned
at the outset, a number of professional scientific organiza-
tions have invited parapsychologists to address them or
have set up symposia on the subject. True, para-
psychological ideas have hardly been embraced with
open arms, but that does not mean that scientists are
motivated by fear or blind prejudice or ignorance or
distorted interpretations purveyed by unreliable
skeptics.
Indeed, when parapsychology began to take shape as a
serious research field, a good number of psychologists
and others immediately took up the challenge of investi-
gating claims of spiritualistic communication, telepathy,
clairvoyance, and so on. All that was lacking to make
parapsychology part of mainstream psychology was evi-
dence that there was a phenomenon to investigate. At the
Fourth International Congress of Psychology, held in
Paris in 1900, an entire section was devoted to psychical
research and spiritualism, and the president, Ribot, an-
nounced the founding of a psychical research institute in
Paris (L'Institut Général Psychique) (McGuire 1984).
Membership in this institute included a number of prom-
inent psychologists such as Janet, Richet, James, and
Tarde. In 1895 Binet published some case studies of
telepathy. However, as McGuire (1984) points out, psy-
chologists were already becoming very uneasy about the
growing link between psychical research and spir-
itualism; this mistrust began to show itself at the Fourth
Congress, and subsequently many French psychologists
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Alcock: Parapsychology critique
Psychologists Pieron, Janet, and Dumas conducted a
number of seances in which they reexamined mediums
who had produced positive outcomes in earlier studies at
the Institut Métapsychique. One medium was caught
flagrantly cheating, and these psychologists concluded
that no psychical phenomena had been observed under
the carefully controlled conditions. LeBon offered a large
reward to anyone who could produce the mediumistic
effects in his laboratory, but once informed of the strin-
gent controls, no one ever underwent the test (McGuire
1984).
The American Society for Psychical Research was set
up in 1885 to examine apparent psychical phenomena
(Moore 1977). Its officers included prominent psychol-
ogists such as Prince, Hall, Jastrow (later to become an
outspoken critic), and James. When they failed to find any
evidential basis for mediumistic claims, most members
lost interest; the group was disbanded, and its remnants
merged with the British Society for Psychical Research
(SPR). James continued to support and believe in psychi-
cal research, and later became president of the SPR.
In the 1930s, parapsychology had another opportunity
to persuade mainstream science about the importance of
psi research. A poll conducted in 1938 found that 89% of
psychologists felt the study of ESP was a legitimate
scientific enterprise and 79% felt such research was a
proper subject for psychologists (Moore 1977). In that
same year, a round-table discussion of parapsychology
was sponsored by the American Psychological Associa-
tion. Parapsychologists did not succeed in their attempts
to gain the psychologists' support for the study of psi.
The 1970s provided another period when mainstream
science seemed ready to give parapsychology a chance.
As mentioned at the beginning of this article, the Para-
psychology Association had gained affiliation with the
American Association for the Advancement of Science in
1969. In 1974 one of the world's leading scientific jour-
nals, Nature, published an article by paraphysicists Targ
and Puthoff in which they detailed their claims about
scientific evidence for the paranormal, based largely on
research with Uri Geller (Targ & Puthoff 1974); true, the
journal did precede the article with an editorial dis-
claimer, but the research nonetheless appeared. Al-
though some parapsychologists were irked by the edi-
torial "inoculation" Nature provided for its readers, such
a disclaimer proved to have been prudent, because, as
discussed earlier, Uri Geller was subsequently exposed
as a fraud (e.g., Randi 1975).
Although mainstream psychological journals continue
to be reluctant to publish parapsychological research,
that is not to say that these journals are totally closed to
parapsychologists; occasionally articles do appear (e.g.,
Layton & Turnbull 1975). American Psychologist re-
cently published an article (Child 1985) that presented,
along with his criticisms of skeptics' interpretations of
If parapsychology is not primarily motivated to explore
anomalies in an open-minded fashion, what is its moti-
vation? Why does parapsychology persist after a century
of failing to produce compelling evidence of psi? Why
does the psi hypothesis survive? To be fair, of course,
normal science does not reject working hypotheses just
because they fail to be confirmed empirically - although
they rarely, if ever, show such longevity. For example,
parapsychological research, the results of a meta-analysis
of the classic Maimonides dream studies. Child con-
cluded that something important is going on, although, in
my view, his analysis is unlikely to impress many psychol-
ogists. Parapsychology was discussed in an open-minded
fashion, albeit very briefly, in a recent issue of the Annual
Review of Psychology (Tyler 1981). Since 1950, more than
1,500 pappprevodog fear Releasevedo0/08/0&raCIA-iRDP96a00789002200120001lation of the blood depended
Psychological Abstracts, which is published by the Amer-
ican Psychological Association (McConnell 1983).
What more should parapsychologists expect, given the
track record they have produced? I am of the strong
opinion that rejection of, or dissatisfaction with, paranor-
mal claims is not based on narrow, dogmatic prejudice,
but on the fact that after a century of research, there is still
nothing substantive to show!
7. Is rapprochement between psychology and
parapsychology possible?
In 1982 psychologists Zusne and Jones's Anomalistic
Psychology was published. This book constituted a
milestone in the course of interaction between psychol-
ogy and parapsychology by virtue of its attempts to
establish a framework for the psychological study of the
phenomena taken by parapsychologists to be paranormal.
Blackmore (1983a), coming from the parapsychological
side, and just as she was renouncing her belief in the psi
hypothesis, also called for the study - within psychology
- of the experiences that appear to people to be paranor-
mal. Palmer (1986a) calls for a collective focus by skeptics
and parapsychologists on finding explanations for anoma-
lous experiences and phenomena, whether the explana-
tions prove to be mundane or not. These actions may
reflect what Truzzi (1985) views as a movement toward
rapprochement between psychology and parapsy-
chology.
Unfortunately, I doubt that such a rapprochement will
ever occur, for I believe that those in parapsychology who
move closer to the skeptical side will fail to draw the rest
of parapsychology along with them. That is not to say that
there will not be cooperation between psychologists and
parapsychologists in the study of anomalistic experiences,
something which should be strongly encouraged; nor is it
to deny whatever movement there has been toward
better mutual understanding and respect.
However, finding explanations for ostensible anoma-
lies is not what parapsychology is really about for most
parapsychologists. If it were, much more effort would be
made to try to find psychological and neuropsychological
explanations for such experiences before even con-
templating the radical psi hypothesis. (Indeed, one must
wonder why parapsychologists seem not to concern
themselves with the actual experience, or with how such
experiences are generated, or with how the supposed
phenomena work [Scott 1985]. Why, for example, do
they not set out to try to produce in subjects the subjec-
tive impression of telepathy, instead of merely conclud-
ing that subjects in a guessing task must have experienced
telepathy on some of the trials? Studying guess rates is not
the study of the telepathic experience.)

1
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the existence of capillaries, and such capillaries
not be observed with the naked eye; but the failure
erve them did not lead to rejection of the theory.
.igators continued to seek them until, with the aid of
scopes, they were at last discovered (Gregory
Yet, there is a difference between, on the one
not giving up a preferred hypothesis when that
hesis seems to promise more explanatory power
visting theories about a range of observations and,
ne other hand, the discounting of failure to find
ted statistical deviations in a psi experiment. In the
case, one is trying to establish the existence of a
omenon that is not required by the existing body of
tific data, nor is it predicted by theory, nor would it
lify or clear up current anomalies in physics or
hology or biology.
w dispute about psi reflects the clash of two funda-
tally different views of reality. The first of these is the
rialistic, monistic view that the human mind is some
of emergent manifestation of brain processes, where-
second is the dualistic position that maintains that
human mind/personality is something beyond the
of atoms and molecules. Parapsychology grew out of
second of these; it developed directly from attempts,
1 in Europe and the United States, to put the post-
tem survival of the human personality on a sound
nt:fc footing (Cerullo 1982; Mauskopf & McVaugh
0. Moore 1977). It is the search for the soul - not the
il as it is described by various religions, and perhaps
even the secularized soul sought by the psychical
varchers of the late nineteenth century during the
day of spiritualism (Cerullo 1982), but a soul all the
w. Because, if the mind can operate separately from
· physical brain, as the psi hypothesis would suggest,
'11 it possesses much of what has been ascribed to the
il.
Most religions teach that the Soul survives death in
ne form. The question of survival of the parapsycho-
;ists' "soul" or "mind" or "personality" after death is,
en many leading parapsychologists agree, an important
estion for parapsychology to consider (e.g., Krippner
$3: Palmer 1983; Roll 1982). Blackmore (1983b) sus-
cts that just as it was the fundamental question to many
the early psychical researchers, it is still so for many of
r fellow researchers today.
Thus, it is important in any debate about parapsycholo-
to make clear just what is being debated. Is the debate
wout whether or not there exist "natural" phenomena
lat science has so far failed to recognize, or is the debate
out whether or not dualism, as opposed to materialistic
ionism, is the correct view of nature and of mankind's
lace in nature? Or, is the first question very often the
irface issue, while the hidden agenda is the question of
ualism?
. Conclusion
Either parapsychology is a harvest of false illusion, or the
eat and fibre of biology, the focus of psychology, and
ven the material conception of physics on which all
cience stands" (Walker 1984, p. 9). These words by a
araphysicist should remind us that the existence of psi is
no trivial matter. Yet, to accept the reality of psi, we must
accept that some force or process exists which cannot at
this time be described in terms of positive properties, but
only in terms of what it is not; a force which is capable of
allowing for direct communication between two brains,
regardless of the distance between them; and which
allows the mind directly and often unconsciously to influ-
ence matter in such a way as to gain some desired goal,
again without any effect of distance, physical barriers, or
even time. To accept the reality of psi, we must discount a
hundred years of failure to find substantive evidence;
there is not a single demonstration that is repeatable in
Beloff's "strong sense." We must also accept that there
are fundamental problems with well-tested physical and
neurophysiological theories. We must accept all this in
the face of the inability of parapsychologists to sort out
whether, in a given experiment, a statistical deviation is
due to PK or to ESP, whether it is due to the subject or to
the experimenter, and whether the source of psi is acting
in the past, the present, or the future. Furthermore, we
must overlook the fact that even the best research pro-
grams in parapsychology are seriously beset by meth-
odological weaknesses. We must ignore history as well,
for as Hyman (1981) points out, each generation of para-
psychologists has put forth its current candidates as pro-
viders of proof of psi - experiments that supposedly
should have convinced any rational person were he to
examine the evidence fairly. Yet, these candidates keep
changing, and if prior history is a reliable guide, today's
most promising research programs in parapsychology
may well be passé in a generation or two.
If parapsychologists really are dedicated to the study of
anomalous experience, then it should make more sense to
follow Blackmore's (1983a) lead and focus on the anoma-
lies while putting the concept of psi aside until, if ever, it
is needed. This is unlikely to happen, however. Psi has
been postulated not because normal psychology is incapa-
ble of accounting for people's apparently psychic experi-
ences, nor because of inexplicable findings in physics or
chemistry; nor is it the logical outgrowth of some compel-
ling scientific theory. Rather, the search for psi is now, as
it has been since the formal beginning of empirical para-
psychology over a century ago, the quest to establish the
reality of a nonmaterial aspect of human existence - some
form of secularized soul.
All that is needed to turn the attitude of the scientific
establishment from doubt to serious interest with regard
to psi is to produce some clear, substantive evidence of a
psychic phenomenon. Without it, parapsychology can
never become a science.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I sincerely wish to thank both Professor Graham Reed and the
BBS reviewers for their careful reading of the first version of this
manuscript and for their thoughtful comments and suggestions,
most of which have been heeded in this final version of the
paper.
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