CIA STARGATE release
CIA-RDP96-00789R002100130001-4
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SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002100130001-4 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT memorandum DATE: 8 April 1985 REPLY TO ATTN OF: SUBJECT: Operational Readiness of the SUN STREAK Prototype Operational Group (C) TO: DT 1. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The recommended strength of 12 personnel for the DIA SUN STREAK Project (DSSP) Prototype Operational Group as contained in the FY 86 CBJB (identified as DRAGOON ABSORB) is the minimum strength necessary to collect quality intelligence information using psychoenergetics (Remote Viewing). This figure is the result of a review of INSCOM's psychoenergetic activity (CENTER LANE) operational experiences since 1979 and lengthy discussions on individual and unit operational readiness. SG1J SG1J 2. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) and I have discussed the concept of operational readiness several times over the past nine months. Those discussions, along with the need to provide written rationale for the number of spaces requested, prompted me to formalize earlier thought processes. and SG1J prepared a concept paper that discusses operational readiness and provides rationale for the recommended minimum manning level of the DSSP Prototype Operational Group (encl 1). 3. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The concept paper is not intended to be an operational plan, but will serve as the basis for that section of the operational plan which will discuss capabilities. This paper also provides rationale for acceptance of limited tasking in response to intelligence requirements /problems. Brian Buzby 1 Encl *- Concept Paper BRIAN BUZBY LTC, USA CF: DT-5A SG1J CLASSIFIED BY : DIA/DT DECLAS : OADR A SG1J HOR ARLEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE HTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND HETHORA INVOLVED OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 (REV. 1-80) PROVIDED A & JACK 85 d For Release 2000/08/06 /CIA RDP96-00789R00210013000+-4-FR) 101-11.4 SEOKEI * GPO : 1984 0 - 461-275 (272) -
1 A Approved For Release 2000/08/08: 01 -RPP96-00789R002100130001-4 SUN STREAK OPERATIONAL READINESS April 1985 SUMMARY (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Individual readiness, which is the individual training in structured perception and accurate, foundation for unit/organizational readiness, has at its core reliable reporting. Modifying this training aspect are the elements of practice, personal motivation, and physical/mental conditioning. Training is most important, but because remote viewers function as "equipment and operator" fused in one, the impact of other factors and personal inclemencies must be dealt with as well. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Since individual readiness is the lowest common denominator of unit readiness, it is evident that a lack of individual readiness coupled with a lower-than-acceptable manning level would significantly decrease the unit's capability. In an intelligence collection activity where operative personnel are the fundamental means of collection (SUN STREAK), a basic organizational "critical mass" must be maintained to mitigate the effects of incomplete training, personal inclemency, etc., and provide a viable viewer/interviewer mix to allow a satisfactory complement of both discrete and joint collection operations. Sufficient operational manning is necessary, further, to provide for independent verification and corroboration of remote viewing accuracy in highly volatile or nebulous collection situations. Ultimately, the proposed 12-person organization is the minimum acceptable to insure reliable and uninterrupted operational readiness and timely, accurate intelligence production. Classified by : DIA/DT Declass : OADR WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE Approved For Release 2060/08/08 FIA RDP96-00789R002400130009-4AND METHODS INVOLVED SECIERASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIOZIES
SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002100130001-4 SUN STREAK OPERATIONAL READINESS April 1985 (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Though application of the aspect of psychoenergetics known as remote viewing (RV) as an intelligence collection tool poses unique challenges that have no analogues in other intelligence disciplines, many elements of the field can be illumined by comparison with other, longer established programs. The matter of operational readiness is one such topic. But, as with other concerns in the various applications of RV, guidelines, judgmental and evaluation criteria, and effectiveness standards must be determined in order to define the parameters of what readiness is. Before these can be established, however, certain understandings must be arrived at concerning the nature of RV operations and how they do and do not differ from standard collection disciplines. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Regarding the above, two areas must be considered : individual operational readiness of remote viewers and unit operational readiness. These two areas are interdependent but are also significantly different one from another. Since the readiness of any unit or organization follows directly from the readiness of the individuals who make it up, individual readiness will be the first topic discussed below. Individual Readiness (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In any collection operation training of individual operatives is extremely important. SIGINT personnel must be trained in any of a number of skills and concepts, such as language, radio propagation, equipment operation, equipment repair, analysis, pattern recognition, etc. HUMINT personnel have their training requirements as well, i.e., agent-handling, language, tradecraft, clandestine communications, tech-services, recruitment, etc. Personnel involved in IMINT require training in optics, photography, shape and pattern recognition, OB, etc. In the intelligence discipline which has informally been designated PSIINT, PE operatives and analysts must variously be trained in geo-orientation, signal recognition, noise suppression, structure execution, interview techniques, session analysis, alternative target acquisition, etc. Many of these trained skills overlap with those of other disciplines. For example, PE intelligence analysis involves principles identical to analysis in SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT; signal recognition and noise suppression are very similar in principle to those involved in radio propagation; and much of the interviewing and 1 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789RD02100130001-4 3
SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002100130001-4 reporting techniques rely heavily on similar skills used in HUMINT. One major difference exists, however. Unlike other fields where the collector exists separate from his means of collection (for example, a radio intercept operator uses a radio receiver and other equipment to accomplish his mission), a remote viewer is both the operator and the equipment. Therefore, defining individual operational readiness in this situation must involve criteria modified to take into account aspects both of personnel and equipment preparedness. Specific categories that have direct bearing on individual readiness are as follows: a. Proper training b. Self discipline Factors that effect the "equipment" aspects of readiness are: a. Geomagnetism b. Extremely low frequency (ELF) electromagnetic radiation c. Solar fluctuations d. Physical/health concerns (sickness, injury convalescence, metabolism, "biorhythin") e. Mental preparation (attitude, degree of distraction, over-training/over-tasking) F. Outside pressures (family, financial, professional, social) Several of these categories are inter-related. Self discipline may, for example, have direct bearing on how well one copes with outside pressures and physical/health concerns; proper training can have major impact on mental preparation and self discipline. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The single most important factor in developing the highest possible level of individual readiness is, of course, proper training. PE training provides development in both the "personnel" and "equipment" aspects of the discipline. Properly executed, the training program presently in use is designed not only to acquire the site and develop information of intelligence interest from it, but to significantly increase the accuracy and reliability of this information by raising the threshold of distraction and providing a means to channel extraneous noise, confusion, and the negative effects of personal inclemency out of the "system." (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The first component of individual 2 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA RDP96-00789R002100130001-4 SECRET
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readiness, then,
is successful completion of
the training
program.
However,
as
in many other fields,
an
individual
actually has limited ability or effectiveness some time before
any given training program is completed.
A linguist, for
example, often is able to communicate at least rudimentarily in
his target language long before conclusion of the training.
So
it
is
with
the
remote viewing component of
PSIINT.
Site-relevant information with potential
intelligence value
begins to be acquired long before actual completion of the
training protocol.
Nevertheless, as with any other acquired
"hard" skill, continued practice and further training can only
enhance the quality of remote viewing. Experience over the past
decade has shown that the more practice a given individual has
in remote viewing, the more precise and controlled is the
information he produces .
However, limited readiness is achieved
at some point before final matriculation from the formal portion
of the training program.
(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)
As mentioned above, training is not the
only factor impinging on individual readiness.
Since we must
consider the individual operative in this situation to be
functioning somewhat as a "biological machine," we must remember
that factors effecting the emotions, mentality, or physical
status quo of the individual must be taken into account in
evaluating that individual's readiness posture, much as one
would evaluate the physical/electronic condition of a MLQ-24 or
AN/TSQ-112 ("Trailblazer") emitter
locator to determine
readiness of a tactical SIGINT system.
As noted, appropriate
training can serve to mitigate individual systemic factors,
allowing normal RV functioning to take place in spite of various
personal inclemencies.
When such problems are either severe or
complicated by a combination of factors, accuracy may be
affected and satisfactory functioning may be degraded or
altogether precluded. In effect, the human collector's "system"
is "down," and the session must be terminated at the discretion
of either the interviewer or the viewer himself.
UNIT READINESS
(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)
At this point it becomes appropriate to
discuss unit readiness criteria.
As with any other intelligence
organization, readiness of
a PSIINT collection unit must
ultimately be based on the readiness
of
the individuals
assigned. Obviously, though readiness
of the collectors
is
highly important, all the other individuals that contribute to
the unit mission must be ready as well.
In a SIGINT unit the
intercept operators are central to making the unit mission
capable.
But traffic and OB analysts, transcribers, and
command, control, logistics and repair personnel must all be
prepared as well or the unit readiness can be severely degraded
or even altogether destroyed.
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SECRETApproved For Release 2000/08/08\ CIA RDP96-00789R002100130001-4 (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) In PSIINT, the remote viewer functions of course as the collector. But there must exist as well a supporting infrastructure to provide command and control, a logistical base, and tasking, evaluation, formulation and dissemination of the data received. In the DIA SUN STREAK Project (DSSP), this has taken the form of a proposed 12-person organization which can be subdivided into two elements : managerial and operational. Directing the administrative element is the group commander /manager, whose duties differ very little from those in any other intelligence organization at the same echelon. Supporting the commander is the admin specialist, who provides essential secretarial and administrative expertise and assistance. Finally, the technical assistant /admin specialist provides filing, transcription, data base management, and other support for training and operations. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) Core of the operational element are three three-person collection and analysis teams, consisting of two remote viewers and one interviewer/analyst (who also directs in-house training for his viewers) per team. Successful execution of a remote viewing session requires a two-person effort. In the nature of remote viewing, the viewer necessarily must suppress as much as possible the linear, analytic functionings of the "left brain," and rely almost exclusively on the global, gestaltic processes associated with right-brain activity. The task of the interviewer /analyst is to provide targeting data as required by the viewer, assist the viewer in assuring session structure integrity, and provide necessary analytic direction in determining session flow. Experience has shown that one monitor/interviewer is able to optimally support two to three viewers. The three-team concept and current physical plant allow up to three two-person sessions to be conducted simultaneously. These sessions may be conducted as a joint effort on a critical large-scale collection project, or they may be conducted independently to satisfy individual collection tasks. Additionally, a six-viewer, three-interviewer pool allows intelligence collection operations to continue at an acceptable level even in the face of illness, annual leave, family emergency, or other personal inclemency, as well as TDY for advanced training for either viewer or interviewer. In the event of an intense or extended collection operation, it also allows an interviewer to alternate between viewers to allow for viewer recuperation/recovery time. (S/NOFORN/WNINTEL) The three-team concept is further important operationally for several reasons. First, it allows verification and cross-checking of viewer accuracy. In . those collection efforts in which little directive feedback is available (a large percentage of all taskings), several independent sessions must be run to provide independent confirmation of the accuracy and dependability of session 4 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00789R002100130001-4 SECRET
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results. A second advantage of this organizational approach is
that, just as
traditional HUMINT collectors
have long
recognized, different observers have a natural tendency to
report on different aspects of a target site or event, i.e.
witnesses each give a different version according to their
perspective. Each perspective may be correct, but it is
necessary to correlate information to form a clear and complete
picture of the site or event.
Thirdly, as with HUMINT sources,
PSIINT operatives have differing talents and abilities; one
viewer may have affinity for a particular style of targeting
methodology or is perhaps especially accurate in collecting
against certain types of intelligence, i.e. complex technology,
structural layout, spatial and/or temporal location ("search"
mode), etc .; a second viewer may be strong in other areas than
those of the first, while a third may be proficient in areas
that are difficult for either of the first two to deal with, and
so
forth.
In
the concept of "all-source intelligence,"
traditional
intelligence disciplines are used together to
complement each other and cover each others' weaknesses.
In
remote viewing the same idea exists, if presently on a smaller
scale.
(S/NOFORN/WNINTEL)
Ultimately, unit readiness would be
significantly degraded by either a smaller organization or lower
manning
levels.
Though on-hand personnel
are presently
approaching operational effectiveness in their training program,
even when they are fully trained the project could expect
intermittent interruptions in operational capability. Simply
because the six-viewer/three-interviewer threshold has not yet
been achieved periods will inevitably occur when either no
viewers or no interviewers are available.
When all factors are
considered, it is apparent that
the proposed
12-person
organization is the minimum acceptable in insuring effective,
uninterrupted operational readiness
for
a PSIINT collection
project.
For
the sake of dependable, quality operational
capability it is recommended that the organization be approved
at this minimum acceptable level. In the interim, DSSP will
continue to function as an intelligence collection effort using
available resources.
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