CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001-8

1/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001-8
5239
The carrier MINSK, " highly capable unit
contributing to Soviet military power
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001-8

Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001-8
·
89
1
1
SECRET/NOFORN
PROJECT SUN STREAK
WARNING NOTICE:
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
PROJECT NUMBER:
5239
SESSION NUMBER:
02
DATE OF SESSION:
11
JAN 89
DATE OF REPORT:
11
JAN 89
START:
0830
END:
0930
METHODOLOGY:
ERV
VIEWER IDENTIFIER:
025
1.
(S/NF/SK)
MISSION:
TO ACCESS AND DESCRIBE THE SOVIET
UNION'S CARRIER CALLED THE MINSK.
2.
(S/NF/SK)
VIEWER TASKING:
TO ACCESS AND DESCRIBE THE OBJECT
AT COORDINATES
918212/871423.
3.
(S/NF/SK)
COMMENTS:
NO INCLEMCENCIES NOTED.
VIEWER WAS
ABLE TO DESCRIBE THE WEAPONS DOWN UNDER THE CARRIER.
VIEWER WAS
ABLE TO DESCRIBE THE DECK.
VIEWER KNEW THAT THE OBJECT WAS
NAVIGATIONAL IN NATURE.
REPORTING WAS GOOD.
OVERALL, A
SUCCESSFUL SESSION.
4.
(S/NF/SK) EVALUATION:
3
HANDLE VIA SKEET CHANNELS ONLY
SECRET/NOFORN
CLASSIFIED BY:
DIA
(DT)
DECLASSIFY:
OADR
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001-8

Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP96-00789R001401430001-8
. Moscow has further maintained that the Sovi-
et interceptors issued all the proper warnings
prior to the destruction of the aircraft. Yet the
transcript of the Soviet pilots' communica-
tions with their ground controllers clearly
contradict this claim. KAL Flight 007 was in-
tercepted and destroyed for having entered
Soviet Airspace. The Soviet explanation has
not been accepted by either the United Na-
tions or the International Civil Aviation
Organization.
The Response
Soviet Military Power 1984 has reported the
continuing expansion and improvement of the
Soviet Union's military capabilities across
the entire range of potential conflict:
. the modernization, increased capa-
bilities and increased survivability of
Soviet intercontinental and theater
nuclear forces,
. the continuing development of new
generations of ICBMs specifically
. designed to destroy US missile silos
and the bases of US manned bomber
deterrent forces,
. the continuing deployment of mobile
SS-20 LRINF missiles,
· the swift advances in nuclear and
conventional cruise missile capabilities,
. the introduction of new land, sea
and air weapons systems, and the
parallel improvements in combined
arms capabilities,
. the continuing modernization and
growth of a logistics system designed to
sustain Soviet forces in the field for
60 to 90 days,
· the continuing high priority for
military research, development and in-
dustry, and the exploitation of Western
technology, and
. the increasing evidence of Soviet
willingness to project and use military
power, as reflected in the preceding case
studies.
In light of this threat to the United States
and its Allies, the challenge is clear. We must
maintain military capabilities sufficient to
convince the Soviets that the costs of aggres-
sion would be far greater than any possible
benefit. These capabilities are the cornerstone
of our defense policy. US policy toward the
Soviet Union, however, is not merely based on
deterrence of Soviet aggression. As the
United States has stressed, we are firmly com-
mitted, as well, to the pursuit of a compre-
hensive dialogue with the Soviet Union aimed
at minimizing the risk of war and solving
some of the real problems in our relationship.
Reducing arms and ensuring a more stable
military balance stand at the top of our
agenda.
The United States' strategic and conven-
tional deterrent has been effective in keeping
the peace for more than a generation. In the 38
years since World War II-years marked by
periods of major tension and crisis-there has
been no nuclear conflict. There has been no
military conflict between East-West in Euro-
pe, nor any direct combat between the forces
of the NATO and Warsaw Pact nations in any
corner of the globe.
Over the past two decades, the Soviet Union
has expanded and modernized its military
forces despite US restraint in weapons pro-
grams and efforts to achieve meaningful
negotiated arms reductions. It is because we
recognize the reality of the Soviet threat that
we are taking the necessary steps to maintain
a truly credible deterrent capability and, thus,
to preserve peace and freedom, while continu-
ing to work for significant, equitable and veri-
fiable arms reductions.
We harbor no illusions about the conse-
quences of any nuclear war between ourselves
and the Soviet Union. We believe that neither
side could win such a war, but this belief alone
is not sufficient to assure prevention of a
nuclear war or coercion. We seek to maintain a
stable strategic deterrent through a range of
strategic retaliatory forces-a Triad of land-
based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic
missiles and manned strategic bombers. This
combination of retaliatory options is designed
to complicate Soviet planning for any execu-
tion of a successful attack against all three
force components, while at the same time de-
fending against Soviet technological break-
throughs against any single leg of the Triad.
In addition to the multiplicity and flexibility
provided in the Triad, strategic nuclear deter-
rence requires an effective command, control
and communications system. Our goal, our
strategy and our defense programs are design-
ed to ensure that the Soviet leadership under-
stands as well that there can be no winner in a
nuclear war and that the West has the confi-
dence to resist Soviet intimidation.
Soviet advances put at risk the elements of
133
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Chapter VII The Global Challenge
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our retaliatory forces and demand that we im-
prove these elements. We have made the hard
decisions required to maintain our nuclear de-
terrent, and we have begun to redress defi-
ciencies in strategic systems. Our programs
introducing the PEACEKEEPER (MX)
ICBM, B-1B strategic bomber, TRIDENT II
D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile and
upgraded command, control and communica-
tions systems to our forces are examples.
In addition to our strategic nuclear forces,
the United States maintains nuclear forces in
Europe to deter Soviet attacks against our
NATO Allies. These forces are linked with our
conventional and strategic nuclear forces un-
der a single, coherent policy of deterrence.
Soviet deployment of SS-20 LRINF missiles
in recent years, however, has called into ques-
tion the NATO deterrent posture. The 1979
NATO dual-track decision-deployment of US
GLCM and PERSHING II missiles to Eu-
rope, while pursuing an equitable, verifiable
arms reduction agreement-reaffirms the
credibility of NATO's deterrent. In the face of
the USSR's unwillingness thus far to nego-
tiate such an agreement, we have initiated
deployment of the GLCMs and PERSHING
IIs. Nevertheless, we still hope for, and active-
ly seek, resumption of negotiations to reduce
or eliminate all US and Soviet LRINF
missiles.
Looking to the continuing challenge, we are
examining the possibility of a defense against
ballistic missiles. The United States has em-
barked on the analysis required to define a
technically feasible research program in this
area and to assess implications of defensive
technologies for the prevention of nuclear
war, the deterrence of aggression and the
prospects for arms reductions.
The composition and role of the United
States' conventional forces and those of our
Allies are defensive in nature to support a de-
fensive policy. We seek no territorial gain and
employ our forces only to defend against
threats to our interests and security. This pol-
icy allows a potential aggressor the advantage
of being able to select the time, place and
method of any planned attack to maximize his
strength and exploit our weaknesses. To com-
pensate for this, the United States must have
effective and reliable command, control, com-
munications and intelligence systems and
flexible and mobile: conventional land, sea
and air warfare forces that can respond rapid-
ly and fight effectively in any contingency.
We have undertaken programs to enhance
the capabilities of our central command au-
thorities and military force commanders to
obtain more extensive and timely information
and to communicate effectively with their
forces. At the same time, we are improving the
readiness of our forces to respond quickly to
attack, and we are upgrading Reserve compo-
nent forces, enabling them to mobilize rapidly
and deploy to battle areas early enough to in-
fluence a conflict. We are improving force mo-
bility through procurement of airlift and sea-
lift forces, and we are prepositioning equip-
ment and supplies in key theaters to enable
rapid response in areas of conflict.
To redress deficiencies in our ability to sus-
tain any conflict, we are investing in muni-
tions, spares and other materiel. We are conti-
nuing with programs to modernize our forces
with upgraded weaponry to give them a quali-
tative edge so essential should combat be re-
quired against superior numbers. We are ex-
panding the size of selected types of forces,
where past neglect has resulted in shortfalls.
We are also improving, domestically and in-
ternationally, our export control system to
halt Soviet exploitation of militarily-signifi-
cant Western equipment and technology.
The defense programs we and our Allies are
pursuing are redressing critical deficiencies
in the military balance. These programs are
designed to maintain the deterrent element of
our defense policy. This task is not an easy
one, nor can it be realized over a short period
of time. If our deterrent is to remain effective,
we and our Allies must maintain a commit-
ment to the completion of these programs and
to taking whatever additional steps are neces-
sary to deny the Soviets political advantage
through the use or the potential use of their
Armed Forces. Only through demonstrated
commitment on our part to denying the Sovi-
ets such advantage may we hope to bring
them to the negotiating table for serious arms
reductions. Consistency in our resolve to
maintain the security of all free nations is es-
sential if we are to realize the much more
desirable goal-greatly reduced levels of arm-
aments of all types in a world at peace.
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