CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250018-5

Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250018-5
RECOMMENDED AGENGA ITEMS
1. Committee Composition:
Regularize
Cama ..
By position, rather than by name.
b.
Include observers outside DoD.
(By name in this case; e.g., Dr Davis.
Note:
Several months ago she suggested the possibility of including individuals
from the NSC and perhaps Congress. )
2.
Meeting Frequency: Essentially a clerical problem, but needs to be
resolved. Possibility of semiannual or quarterly. Should be fixed; e.g.,
second Thursday of each quarter.
3. Should Committee receive detailed updates from the DoD players? Be
briefed only by the Chairman of the Working Group? (Note: Recommend
our position be selected briefings by players on rotational basis.
Chairman has shown little inclination to stay on top of developments,
or to get out and give briefings. )
4. Designate the Steering Committee leader once and for all (most
important issue). Two basic factors at play:
a. What is nature of evolving program -- looking out next few years?
If essentially R&D, logic calls for that line of leadership, starting
with Dr LaBerge .**
**** If it is in fact a proven case of utility, intelligence
should lead.
If it is policy, it is up for grabs. (Note: Strongly
recommend that for next few years we bow to R&D leadership, as they tend
to pursue this issue in a more scientific, less cumbersome, vigorous
way. We should content ourselves to adding "soft" issues as needed;
e.g., potential security problems, bad publicity, etc. Intelligence
involvement should be constrained to compact, discreet pursuit of utility
value.)
b. At present who has shown significant committment? Again, in
terms of the major factor, scarce resources, it has been the R&D community.
Their levels, rightly so, are many times greater than anyone else.
Intelligence has been self-contrained (rightly so) and policy organizations
(if any exist) zero. Basic fact is that RED seems to have charter -- plus
extraordinary amount of raw power in terms of money, times to spend it,
personnel, etc.
5. Individual members of steering Committee should take special,
specific responsibilitetegarding the program. One person, probably the
chosen leader, should keep SECDEF up to date. Another principal should
do same for Congress. Other suitable responsibilitetshould be identified.
6. In the near future, depending upon how the Steering Committee feels
about the total analysis, including the scientific, some thought might
be given to developing a national, coordinated project. Application
research could remain discreet, under control of individual agencies;
Utility could remain discreet, under control of intelligence organizations;
Basic research -- looking for the "mechanism" -- might be openly conducted
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Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250018-5
Foundation.
The latter would lend credibility to the project because it
would allow for levels of peer review, criticism, etc, not presently
possible.
7. As now consitituted, do we really have a coordinated venture, whereby
equal resolve, if not committment of resources, is evident? At what point
will the Steering Committee decide whether or not the project should be
pursued with true vigor, or be dropped. Another basic fact is that the
current approach is of the "nickel and dime" variety. Army, almost alone,
has carried the ball and Army staff has been the essential driving force.
We need to seriously consider handling the affair as a bona fide R&D
program -- appoint a manager, etc, etc -- at the OSD level. It should
not be balooned out of proportion insofar as management goes. Fact is,
we are taking two steps back for each one forward by having DIA as
focus for leadership.
They have no resources -- like us on the Staff ==
to drive the project.
They are policy makers.
8. When would Steering Committee like to hear from Gale? The plan now
is to have him and a representative group brief and discuss science
findings. (Note: I think Dr Davis and Dr LaBerge informally discussed
last summer, the question of when to give the findings to DCI, NSC and
Congress. We cannot avoid doing so, as each is knowledgeable that the
evaluation is taking place. )
Add:
* CROSS SECTION OF THE
Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R002000250018-5