CIA-RDP96-00788R001900440001-4

Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001900440001-4
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Mell-AP
Musavi with Shiite militiamen in Baalbek: 'I bow before the souls of the martyrs'
How to Strike Back?
The evidence suggests that Iranian-backed fanatics
carried out the attack, but retaliation will be difficult.
T
hose who directed this atrocity must be
dealt justice, and they will be," Ronald
Reagan swore last week, but there was a
problem: the United States still lacked hard
evidence on just who carried out the truck-
bomb attack in Beirut. At best, the adminis-
tration had a strong circumstantial case
suggesting an Iranian-and possibly Syr-
ian-connection in the simultaneous as-
saults against the Marines and French
peacekeepers. In particular, U.S. and
French intelligence analysts focused their
investigation on a small group of Shiite
Muslim extremists with close ties to Iranian
militants in Baalbek, in eastern Lebanon.
The thirst for vengeance was palpable. At
the White House, the Pentagon and State
Department, officials were considering a
number of possible retaliatory measures,
including a surgical air strike against the
Muslim extremists in Baalbek and retali-
ation "in kind" by counterterrorist hit
teams. But any method of retaliation car-
ried risks. Some administration officials
feared that an air strike could cause civilian
casualties-and an anti-American outcry.
U.S. intelligence agents have pinpointed an
Iranian military headquarters in the Syrian
village of Zebdani, near the Lebanese bor-
der. But even if Iranian officers were in-
volved in the attack on the Marines, an air
strike against their outpost in Syrian terri-
tory could have major international reper-
cussions. Antiterrorist operations-"hav-
ing a building collapse mysteriously in the
middle of the night," as one official put it-
would carry a clear message to the other
side while avoiding a conspicuous use of
U.S. military might. But if Washington re-
taliated before positively identifying the
perpetrators and ordered a counterblow
that killed the wrong people, the resulting
political furor would further damage U.S.
interests in the area.
Prime Suspect: Some intelligence sources
consider Hussein Musavi-a 40-year-old.
former teacher who heads a pro-Iranian
organization called Islamic Amal-to be a
prime suspect in the bombing. Musavi and
his small band of fundamentalist followers
split off two years ago from Amal, the main
militia group of Lebanon's Shiite Muslims.
Musavi set up his headquarters in Baalbek,
50 miles east of Beirut, where he established
SPECIAL REPORT
close links with some 350 Iranian Revoh
tionary Guards who came to Lebanon i
1982 as volunteers in the war against Israe
One intelligence source suggested that ML
savi may have supplied the suicide driver.
Musavi denied any role in the bombings, bu
he said: "I bow before the souls of the mai
tyrs who carried out this operation."
The fact that the operation was a suicid
mission strongly suggested Iranian influ
ence. The airport attack and the car bomb
ing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut last Apri
were starkly reminiscent of the yearning fo
martyrdom displayed by Iranians in the wa
against Iraq. Furthermore, American anc
French troops were the targets in last week's
kamikaze raids, while Italian and British
members of the multinational peacekeeping
force were not. Iran considers America the
"Great Satan." And it denounces France as
"demonic" for having pledged to supply
Iraq with Super Etendard jets capable of
firing Exocet missiles.
No Trace: Two organizations-Islamic
Jihad and Free Islamic Revolutionary
Movement-claimed they had carried out
the bombing attacks, though intelligence
officials were not convinced. Whoever they
were, the Marines' attackers covered their
tracks. "This operation was carried out by
maybe five, six or seven people, entirely in
Beirut, with only two or three people who
knew the target," said a Washington intelli-
gence source. Investigators at the sites of the
two bombings were frustrated. The explo-
sions were so powerful that they left no trace
of the drivers and destroyed all but a few
small shreds of the suicide vehicles. Many of
the witnesses are dead or severely injured,
"This may have been the perfect crime,""
said Lt. Col. Hisham Jaaber, a Lebanese
Army liaison officer with the Marine peace-
keeping contingent. "There is no evidence."
Syria's possible role in the bombings of
the American and French peacekeepers
may largely have been a matter of looking
the other way. Insofar as the bombings were
intended to drive the peacekeepers out of
Lebanon and to humiliate the United
States, the attack served Syria's interests.
American and Israeli intelligence sources
note that Baalbek and its environs are under
Syrian Army control, and that both Musa-
vi's Islamic Amal militants and the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards maintain close con-
tacts with Syrian intelligence headquarters
in the Bekaa Valley. Some sources believed
that the trucks packed with TNT must have
made their way to Beirut over roads that are.
under Syrian control. Syria may not have
organized or supervised the assault-the
view of U.S. intelligence officials-but that
bellicose country may bear ultimate respon-
sibility. If so, Reagan's problem only deep-
ens: what is the appropriate retaliation for a
remote-control attack?
ANGUS DEMING with JOHN WALCOTT,
KIM WILLENSON and NICHOLAS M. HORROCK
in Washington and THEODORE STANGER in Beirut
90 Approved For Release 2000/08/08 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001900440001-4
NEWSWEEK/NOVEMBER - 1983