CIA-RDP96-00788R001000340001-4

IRAN
Approved For Release 2001/04/02 ; CIA-RDP96-00788R001000340001-4
SECRET
16 March 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: COLONEL CHAD B. WHITE, ADCSOPS-HUMINT
SUBJECT: GRILL FLAME Evaluation in Support of Iranian Hostage Situation (U)
1. (S/NOFORN)
We have now received the final evaluation report (see TAB A)
from LTC Roderick Lenahan, OJCS/J3/SOD, concerning our work in support of the
Iranian hostage situation. The evaluation covers the period 23 November 1979
through 13 January 1981. TABs B through F are earlier interim evaluation reports
submitted by LTC Lenahan concerning our reports.
1
S
2.
(S/NOFORN) TABLE ONE shows the breakdown by Report Evaluation Category as
provided by LTC Lenahan and a comparison by this office of what we feel is a
better appraisal of the individual reports. I realize that it is "very dangerous"
for this office to be involved in the evaluation process of our own work. However,
the very nature of this particular project, the immense amount of time and manpower
utilized, and the difficult, if not impossible, task of evaluating all the infor-
mation provided to JCS makes it essential that decision makers receive comments
from the user agency as well as the source of the data.
It is interesting to note
that JCS rates 37% of the reports as having some correlation/use while we raise
that percentage to only 45%. The increase is not that great; however the number
of inconclusive and negative reports does change drastically. Our evaluation is
arrived at by studying comments prepared by LTC Lenahan on individual reports.
Therefore, we are not reappraising the individual reports and giving them a
separate evaluation, but rather we just studied his comments pertaining to the
individual report and then assessed their value. An example to illustrate this
is provided: in several cases our reports clearly stated that hostages were in
specific buildings at specific times. LTC Lenahan, after reviewing the debrief
reports concerning the hostages, stated that the condition described is in error
and hence the report is negative. We concur!
On the other hand, we provided
several reports that clearly indicated that specific buildings were empty and
contained no hostages. Although LTC Lenahan has stated this data was correct, he
did not rate the report as positive. Instead, he gave either inconclusive or
partial ratings to them. We disagree! If the question was to find out if hostages
were in a specific building, and we provided the user with sufficient data to make
a realistic judgment (even if after the fact) then he must be consistent in his
evaluation of the reports.
3. (S/NOFORN) This specific project created numerous personal as well as
psychological problems for individual members. Basically, we did not have the
experience to handle such a long-range requirement nor did we know how to handle
the numerous problems created by the extensive media coverage of the situation.
All of our personnel tried to isolate themselves from outside sources concerning
the hostages, but this was an impossible condition to live up to. Several
sources became very tired working the "same problem" over and over, always without
any proper feedback. The following statements reflect some of Lessons Learned
from the hostage situation as regards GRILL FLAME type activity:
CLASSIFIED BY MSG DAMI-ISH
SECRET
-DTG 0516303 JUL 78
OR
REVIEW ON MARCH 2001
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REASON
GRILL FLAME

CECRE
Approved For Release 2001/04/02 . CIA RDP96-00788R001000340001-4
a.
(C/NOFORN) Long term projects will require more than one analyst
familiar with GRILL FLAME concepts
Comment: Amount of data that will be collected during a long term project
will overwhelm a single analyst and thereby lead to faulty or incomplete analysis
of the project. Information collected, in many cases, will be time sensitive
and needs to be thoroughly studied in that context. Analysts need to understand
the collection process, how to properly target the source, and how to extract
the essential elements of information that may be contained in the report.
b.
(C/NOFORN)
The collection element (INSCOM GRILL FLAME personnel) must
insure that users can readily identify separate sources.
c.
(C/NOFORN) If at all possible, there should be known physical reference
points at each target site in order to provide some means of verification as to
source's actual location.
Comment: Many requirements levied by JCS required data concerning physical
conditions within a building. As it turns out, no one could assess the data
collected because there were no details available concerning the given target.
This led to a stalemate of sorts since no one could determine the accuracy of the
information.
d.
(S/NOFORN) Extreme or protracted duration of a project will generally
lead to negative results being produced by source(s).
Comment: Long, drawn out projects result in a build up of overlay
(accumulation of information concerning the target) thereby creating problems of
differentiating from imagination, real world situation, or actual remote viewing.
e.
(C/NOFORN)
Lack of feedback, or inaccurate feedback will result in a
negative effect.
Comment:
Analyst must insure that when he provides feedback/evaluation
of individual sessions that he knows what he is talking about and not just pro-
viding evaluation because he knows "one is due." Inaccurate feedback leads to
compounding the overlay problem. On the other hand, feedback is essential
whenever possible so that source and management personnel can measure more
accurately the procedures utilized and plan for future requirement. The source
also needs the psychological encouragement that comes with the feedback .... he knows
whether or not he is providing help or just wasting his time.
f.
(S/NOFORN) For targets about which little is known, remote viewing
information must only be used for guiding other intelligence collection efforts.
g.
(S/NOFORN)
Data accuracy and analytic usability must be evaluated
separately.
Comment: Measuring accuracy helps to gauge the methodology utilized
while usability is the end result obtained. An accurate report, in terms of remote
viewing data presented, might not obtain any information of value to an analyst,
but might aid management in selecting a new targeting method.
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SECRET

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h. (C/NOFORN) Users must address problems encountered in utilizing data
on a continuing basis.
Comment :
If problems are addressed as they arise, then users and
project management personnel can establish new or change old methods of operation
if necessary.
i.
(S/NOFORN)
All participants in a project utilizing remote viewing must
continually pursue and protect project integrity.
j. (S/NOFORN) Keying of other collection resources because of data
received from remote viewing sources must be evaluated and reported.
k.
(S/NOFORN) Remote viewing reports which cannot be evaluated due to
insufficient data can be expected and should carry neither negative or positive
weight in a final analysis.
1.
(C/NOFORN)
Information provided which lacks a transcript must be very
carefully assessed.
Such action should be avoided if possible.
4. (S/NOFORN) Summary: Despite the numerous problems encountered with this
complex project, we feel that the experience gained will have tremendous impact
on future endeavors. However, I do recommend that whenever possible that for
future projects of this complexity that we assign an analyst from this office to
work directly with the user agency. This analyst would be able to provide
on-the-spot guidance concerning the reports and methods used and help provide
future targeting methods. This individual would not be involved in the project
in any other capacity.
One must keep in mind the relative low cost of this project versus the information
gained. The data/information provided to the user apparently was information
that could not be obtained through normal intelligence collection channels. The
degree of success appears to at least equal, if not surpass, other collection
methods.
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7 Incl
as
Ustury B. Ward
MURRAY B. WATT
LTC, MI
INSCOM GRILL FLAME
.
Project Manager
3
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RET
D

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SG11
List of inclosures:
Tab A - Memorandum for Commander USA INSCOM, Subject: Grill Flame Evaluation
dated 11 Feb 81, signed by LTC Lenahan. Classified Secret
Tab B - Memorandum for Record, Subject Grill Flame Reporting, dated 15 Sep 80,
(memo prepared at request of
classified
Top Secret.
Tab C - Memorandum for LTG. Pustay, Subject: Grill Flame Evaluation, dated
15 Jul 80, signed by LTC Lenahan. Classified Top Secret
Tab D - Memorandum for LTG Pustay, Subject: Interim Evaluation, Grill Flame
Project, 11 Jul 80, signed by LTC Lenahan, classified secret
Tab E - Note to LTG Pustay re: Grill Flame, dated 14 May 80, classified secret
Tab F - Memorandum for LTC Watt, Subject: Interim Evaluation, Grill Flame
Project, 10 Mar 80 signed by LTC Lenahan , classified secret
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Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001000340001-4
REPORT EVALUATION CATEGORY
EVALUATION CATEGORY
JCS
INSCOM
POSITIVE
7
4
26
19
POSSIBLE/PARTIAL
59
33
37
26
INCONCLUSIVE
16*
8
61*
30
NEGATIVE
112
63
76
55
ADMIN ABORT
8*
4
2*
1
TOTAL
202
202
*These figures were not included in arriving at % of Positive,
Possible/Partial or Negative Reports. However, they do
reflect total % of complete effort.
TABLE
ONE
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