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FEATURE SECTION
U.S. TO FORTIFY PERSIAN GULF EMBASSIES (Wall St Jrnl) Eduardo
Lachica
1
ONE REASON U.S. OFFICIALS ARE RELUCTANT ... (U.S. News & Wrld Rept)
1
7 SUMMIT NATIONS EXPRESS RESOLVE ON TERRORISM, DEALINGS WITH SOVIETS
(Wash Post) Lou Cannon
2
U.S. BUILDS 3RD WORLD ARMS AID (Wash Post) Fred Hiatt
2
U.S. MILITARY CREATES SECRET UNITS FOR USE IN SENSITIVE TASKS
ABROAD (NY Times) Jeff Gerth and Philip Taubman
5
ITALY OPENS AN INQUIRY INTO A REPORT ON POPE (NY Times)
6
ADMINISTRATION DEBATING ANTITERRORIST MEASURES (NY Times) Leslie H.
Gelb
7
TERRORIST BILL CALLED 'MCCARTHY THROWBACK' (Wash Post)
00
8
REAGAN EXPECTED TO BID ALLIES ACT AGAINST TERRORISM (NY Times)
Steven R. Weisman
9
U.S. SEEKS ALLIED ACCORD ON TERRORISM, MISSILES (Wash Post) Lou
Cannon
10
GRADUATES TOLD OF 'NEW STRATEGY' FOR TERRORISM (Balt Sun) Michael
J. Clark
11
U.S. FOUND ILL PREPARED FOR TERRORISM (Wash Times) Bob Poos
11
WHERE WILL TERRORISTS STRIKE NEXT? (The Washingtonian) Bob Reiss
12
SECURITY A FACT OF LIFE IN WASHINGTON (Toronto Globe & Mail)
William Johnson
18
CAPITOL SECURELY GREETING TOURISTS (Wash Post) Alison Muscatine
19
EXERCISE IN TERROR GOES WELL (Dallas Mng News) Mark Edgar
20
BOMB SCARE INTERRUPTS DRILL AT NUCLEAR PLANT IN WASH. (Phil Ing)
20
POLICE HQ A TERRORIST PUSHOVER -- RICE (Chi Sun Times) Art Petacque &
Hugh Hough
21
THE TERRORIST THREAT TO AMERICA (Rev of the News)
21
U.S. ACTS TO COMBAT TERRORISM AIMED AT OLYMPICS, BIG EVENTS (NY
Trib) James T. Hackett
22
HARD LINE URGED ON GLOBAL TERRORISM (San Fran Chron) Kevin Leary
23
SOVIETS HAD CHANCE TO HELP PLAN SECURITY (San Jose Merc) Maline
Hazle
24
INS CITES TERRORISM FEAR IN PROBE OF YUGOSLAV SMUGGLING (LA Times)
Laurie Becklund
25
WHETHER FOREIGN NATIONS LIKE IT OR NOT, ... (U.S. News & Wrld Rept)
25
FEAR OF TERRORISM ... (Wall St Jrnl)
25
KILLING FOR THE GOLD (Soldier of Fortune) Kevin E. Steele
26
TOOLS OF TERROR (Soldier of Fortune) Bill Guthrie
30
DEATH IN THE AFTERNOON (Soldier of Fortune) Adrian Wecer
31
Helen Young, Chief, Current News Branch, 697-8765
RDP96-90788RQ00 1oui3ddedmen, Assistant Chief
For spedes posewed FioriRelaafarbofon talPHarry Zubkoff, Chief, News Clipping & Analysis Service, 695-2884
NS
26 JUNE 1984
Terrorism
No. 1167
ENT

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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
U.S. - MEXICO BORDER WON'T BE TERRORISTS' ESCAPE ROUTE (LA Times)
Marjorie Miller
33
ISRAELI INQUIRY FOR BENEFIT OF TERRORISTS, NOT MORALISTS (Wall
St Jrnl) Eric M. Breindel
34
PROFESSOR LINKED TO TERRORISM JAILED (Balt Sun)
34
VIOLENT LEFTISTS AIM TO TERRORIZE OLYMPIC GAMES (Wash Post) Jack
Anderson
35
TERRORISM COMMON: KAPLAN (Toronto Globe & Mail) Jeff Sallot
AN INTERVIEW IN MEXICAN JAIL WITH A TERRORIST (Wash Post) Jack
Anderson
36
35
'JOURNALIST' IS LINKED TO COSTA RICAN BLAST (Balt Sun)
36
DIPLOMATS & TERRORISM (For Svc Jrnl)
37
PLAYING EMBASSY CHESS (San Antonio Express-News) Glen W. Martin
38
U.S. ON ALERT FOR IRAN TERROR WAVE (NY Post) Niles Lathem & Uri Dan
39
BRITS BOOT KHOMEINI HIT SQUAD (NY Post)
39
LIBYAN ALLEGEDLY SOUGHT HIT MAN FROM FBI AGENT (Wash Post) Joe
Pichirallo
40
TERRORISM CONTROLS ENDORSED (Wash Times)
40
CAN'T CLOSE BORDERS TO LIBYANS: U.S. (NY News) Joseph Volz and
Barbara Rehm
40
QADHAFI'S NOT ALWAYS TO BLAME (Wall St Jrnl) Jerrold D. Green and
Augustus Richard Norton
41
LIBYAN THREAT TO BRITISH EXPATS (Manchester Guardian)
41
LIBYA MAY RESUME KILLINGS OF DISSIDENTS OVERSEAS (Wall St Jrnl)
Youssef M. Ibrahim
42
AMERICANS IN BEIRUT THREATENED (Phil Inq)
43
EDITORIAL CARTOON (Omaha World-Herald)
43
THE TEN LESSONS OF LEBANON (R.O.A. Nat Sec Rept) O. H. Rechtschaffen 44
MOVING AGAINST IRAN (Middle East Policy Survey)
46
25 INDICTED IN ISRAELI PROBE OF JEWISH TERRORIST GROUP (LA Times)
Norman Kempster
47
ISRAELI GUILTY IN BOMB PLOT (Phil Inq)
48
JEWISH TERRORISTS USE ARMS STOLEN FROM ISRAELI ARMY (Louisville
Courier-Jrnl) Michael Widlanski
48
A CASE OF TERROR FOR TERROR (Newsweek) Angus Deming w/Milan J. Kubic 49
UNCERTAINTY IS THE BEST WAY TO TERRORIZE THE TERRORIST (Balt News-
American) Marvin Leibstone
50
WHY IS THE WEST COVERING UP FOR AGCA? (Human Events) Exclusive In-
terview with Claire Sterling
51
FROM THE HOPPER (Rev of the News)
55
VICTIMS OF THE 'DIRTY WAR' (New Statesman) Duncan Campbell
56
BOOBY TRAPS AND BANK RAIDS (New Statesman) Duncan Campbell
59
TERROR TACTICS (New Statesman) Duncan Campbell
61
PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1982 (Def & Econ)
63
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
TERRORIST INCIDENTS
21 BOMBS TRIGGER FEARS OF MORE TO COME IN MIDWEST (Chi Trib) Douglas
Frantz and Philip Wattley
75
THE MIDWEST HUNTS A BOMBER (Newsweek)
76
ANOTHER BOMB JOLTS VEGAS STRIP (Phil Inq)
76
U.S. SUSPECTS SOVIETS ORDERED ENVOY BEATEN (LA Times) Robert
Gillette
77
U.S. ASSAILS SOVIET ON ENVOY ASSAULT (NY Times) Stephen Engelberg
77
ISRAELI ATTACHE SHOT BY GUNMEN FROM CAR IN SUBURB OF CAIRO (Wash
Post)
78
NINE BOMBS EXPLODE IN TWO COLOMBIAN CITIES (Wash Post)
78
COPS PROBING BOMB FACTORY (NY Post)
78
2 TERRORIZE CONSULATE (NY News)
78
-NEW PERIL FOR BEIRUT YANKS- (NY Post)
78
BOOKS
TERRORISM OF WORDS (Wash Post) Oliver Banks
79
THE COMPLEXITIES OF TERRORISM (RUSI) Peter Janke
79
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM (For Svc Jrnl) Michael F. Speers
80
BOOK ON COUNTERTERRORISTS DRAWS FLAK (USA Today)
81
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE
STRATEGY (Air Univ Rev) Lt Col Richard Porter, USAF
81
EDITORIALS
COMPUTER ON GUARD (Ft. Worth Star-Tele)
82
ANOTHER VIEW: SUBVERSIVES (Albany, NY Knickerbocker News)
82
TO TELL THE TRUTH (Wall St Jrnl)
83
TERRORISM 138 (The Nation)
84
AGAINST REAGAN TERRORISM BILLS (Phil Inq)
85
ISRAEL VS. THE GANGS (Wash Post)
85
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WALL STREET JOURNAL
12 June 1984
Pg. 38
U.S. to Fortify Persian Gulf Embassies
U.S. Embassy at Abu Dhabi.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
18 June 1984 (12)
Pg. 16
One reason U.S. officials are reluctant
to send more Stinger antiaircraft mis-
siles to Persian Gulf nations threat-
ened by the Iran-Iraq War: They fear
security is so lax in some areas that the
sophisticated weapons may fall into
the hands of terrorists who would use
them to shoot down civilian airliners.
By EDUARDO LACHICA
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON-The State Department
is asking the Office of Management and
Budget for $165 million over the next two
fiscal years to redesign or build anew six
or seven embassies in the Persian Gulf,
where U.S. diplomats are exposed to maxi-
mum terrorist danger.
The new security program began even
before the latest tensions in the gulf from
the Iran-Iraq war. In December 1983, the
U.S .- Embassy in Kuwait was wrecked by a
terrorist who drove a dynamite-laden truck
through the gates, killing three Kuwaiti
employees and injuring 35 other persons.
Around the world, the department has
counted 45 separate acts of violence
against its facilities and personnel since
January.
Urgently needed security measures
have turned some of the remaining gulf
missions into veritable fortresses. The one
in Abu Dhabi looks like something out of
"Beau Geste," with armed sentries in
parapets. Pillboxes guard the wall corners.
"Dragon's teeth," or concrete barriers,
keep motor traffic a safe distance away.
But this siege setting isn't how the U.S.
government likes its overseas missions to
look. "Ideally, our embassies should physi-
cally express the openness of American so-
ciety," says Robert Lamb, assistant secre-
tary of state for administration. "We can't
conduct our business hiding behind sand-
bags and concertina wire. I'd hate to see
us go the way of the Russians who build
their embassies to keep their people in and
other people out."
The department is inviting U.S. archi-
tects to submit designs that can accom-
plish the twin objectives of keeping its dip-
lomats safe while maintaining certain aes-
thetic standards that the U.S. has set for
its official buildings overseas.
Some architects,
though, wonder
whether this is possible. "The two aims
are terribly irreconcilable. You can't have
it both ways," says Edward Bassett, a se-
nior partner of Skidmore, Owings & Mer-
rill. The architectural profession is digging
deep into its bag of design tricks but
there's almost no stopping the trend to-
wards "building bunkers," he says.
Mr. Bassett, who has been advising the
U.S. government on building design since
1947, says it's almost impossible to protect
consulates that draw hundreds of visa
seekers every day. What makes the prob-
lem more challenging is the extent of the
threat. "Even our diplomats in friendly
countries aren't safe anymore." he adds.
"With all the insanity afoot in the
world, architects are resigned to building
castles again," he says. But even if he
were to build a strongbox surrounded by
20-foot walls, that still couldn't protect
against "a nut carrying a bomb in a sec-
ond-hand Cessna."
Some ideas that have been passed on to
Mr. Lamb's office, however, could improve
the security of embassies while retaining
an illusion of openness. These include:
-Constructing the buildings on ground
higher than street level if climate and the
need for public access require an open lay-
out. The higher elevation could prevent
truck-bombers from crashing into the
walls.
-Raising grassy mounds around the
buildings to provide similar protection
while giving the grounds a neat landscaped
look.
-Planting shade trees with dense fo-
liage to block the view of important offices
from the street.
-Fencing the property with iron grill-
work and firethorn shrubs. The layout is
decorative but the thorny bush and the
high fence could slow down an intruder
long enough for security personnel to re-
act.
The State Department is also experi-
menting with new ballistics-proof building
material and high-technology surveillance.
Much of this work is still secret.
Stuart Knoop, a vice president of Ou-
dens & Knoop Architects, notes that de-
signers are increasingly attuned to secu-
rity needs. "We've a rich market in the
corporate world," he confides. "Some
buildings designed for the oil and auto in-
dastries are made to keep out industrial
spies."
Mr. Knoop is advising the State Depart-
ment on finding new embassy sites. For
reasons of economy and convenience, the
department uses many rented properties
overseas. But the security threat is giving
the department a new incentive to acquire
its own sites and build on them. The Beirut
Embassy that was blown up in April 1983
with the loss of 47 lives was ill-suited for
security. It was originally an apartment
building.
Little can be done about the historic
buildings that U.S. diplomats occupy in
London, Paris and Ottawa. "They are just
too valuable to be ripped apart and re-
built," Mr. Knoop says.
Mr. Lamb says the department can't af-
ford to relax. "The kind of threat keeps
changing," he explains. In the late 1960s,
terrorists targeted ambassadors and other
principal officers. The Foreign Service re-
acted by armoring ambassadors' cars and
providing them with bodyguards. In the
early 1970s, America's enemies switched
tactics and started mailing letter bombs to
embassies. That threat was curbed, but
later in the decade mob violence became
the major threat. U.S. missions in Tripoli,
Islamabad and Tehran were overrun and
illegally occupied.
U.S. embassies now are easier to defend
against mob attack. Some 1,200 Marines
help guard overseas missions, and the de-
partment is negotiating with the corps to
augment this force. To prevent the capture
of diplomatic secrets, paper files are being
converted to computer memories that can
be easily destroyed in the event of an em-
bassy seizure.
But with the early 1980s came the truck-
bombing threat. The Beirut and Kuwait
embassies were the major casualties.
"We can counter each threat as it
emerges but we can't tell what our ene-
mies will think of next," Mr. Lamb ad-
mits.
Security doesn't come cheap. "We're al-
ready spending nearly 12% of our entire
administrative budget for security," Mr.
Lamb says. The department already is au-
thorized to spend $175 million for that pur-
pose for the next fiscal year starting Oct.
1. That's 25% more than similar provisions
for the current year, Mr. Lamb adds.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WASHINGTON POST 10 June 1984
Pg. 26
7 Summit Nations Express Resolve
On Terrorism, Dealings With Soviets
By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer
LONDON, June 9-The western
democracies patched up their polit-
ical differences today and issued
declarations opposing international
terrorism and expressing "solidarity
and resolve" in dealing with the So-
viet Union.
But both statements were blandly
worded, and some diplomatic
sources said they represented a mild
setback for host Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher on terrorism and
for President Reagan, who had
pushed for a firmer statement on
East-West relations.
On terrorism, the six industrial-
ized western nations and Japan
meeting here at their annual eco-
nomic summit accepted U.S. and
British contentions that state-sup-
ported terrorism is an increasing
problem. The declaration said the
assembled nations "viewed with se-
rious concern the increasing involve-
ments of states and governments in
acts of terrorism, including the abuse
of diplomatic immunity."
This abuse has been a special
British concern since April 27, when
a British policewoman was killed by
shots fired from the Libyan Embas-
sy. Britain and Libya subsequently
broke off diplomatic relations.
But objections from the French,
and to some degree from the Ital-
ians, apparently blocked British pro-
posals to exchange intelligence and
technical information about terror-
ists, pass new legislation dealing with
international terrorism and agree to
expel or exclude known terrorists,
"including persons of diplomatic sta-
tus involved in terrorism."
All of these ideas were included in
the seven-point declaration on ter-
rorism issued today but the state-
ment referred to these points not as
agreements, but as "proposals which
found support in the discussion."
The international leaders also dis-
cussed preemptive acts to prevent
acts of terrorism, sources said, but is-
sued no declaration because the is-
sue is considered too sensitive for
public discussion.
The French, who receive signifi-
cant amounts of oil from Libya, re-
portedly expressed the view that any
public statement could serve as an
invitation to acts of terrorism. But
they agreed to the compromise state-
ment announced today by Thatcher,
in which the seven nations "ex-
pressed their resolve to combat this
threat by every possible means,
strengthening existing measures and
developing effective new ones."
On East-West relations, the Unit-
ed States salvaged portions of a pro-
posal that it had unsuccessfully
sought to append to a British-spon-
sored Declaration of Democratic Val-
ues approved yesterday.
The single-page statement today
said that the aim of the allied na-
tions was "security and the lowest
possible level of forces."
"We wish to see early and positive
results in the various arms-control
negotiations and the speedy resump-
tion of those now suspended," the
statement said. "The United States
has offered to restart nuclear arms
control talks, anywhere, at any time,
without preconditions. We hope that
the Soviet Union will act in a con-
structive and positive way."
A senior U.S. official said today
that West German Chancellor Hel-
mut Kohl and Thatcher had been
supportive of Reagan in private dis-
cussions when the U.S. president
said that continued deployment of
the missiles was necessary unless the
Soviets were willing to negotiate
their removal or reduction.
At a news conference following re-
lease of the statement, Thatcher
said, "It is the anticipation that we
will complete the two-track decision
on NATO [for negotiation and de-
ployment] and deploy the missiles
we agreed to deploy."
The East-West statement also
contained a phrase proposed by Ca-
nadian Prime Minister Pierre Tru-
deau saying, "We believe that East
and West have important common
interests in preserving peace . . . " It
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WASHINGTON POST
10 June 84 (11) Pg.1
U.S. Builds
3rd World
Arms Aid
Defense Planners
Emphasize Role
Of 'Special Forces'
By Fred Hiatt
Washington Post Staff Writer
The Reagan administration is sys-
tematically laying the foundation
within the Pentagon for increasing
military involvement in Third World
conflicts, according to budget doc-
uments and interviews with current
and former officials.
The new emphasis in many ways
recalls the early 1960s, when Pres-
ident John F. Kennedy commis-
sioned the Green Berets to stop
what he called "the Communist tide"
in poor countries in Asia, Africa and
Latin America. Once again, the De-
fense Department is: beefing up its
Green Berets and. other . "special
forces," troops trained to kill guer-
rillas and to teach other armies to do
the same.
The increased U.S. role in what
the Pentagon calls "counterinsurgen-
cy," which has been advocated since
1982 in classified defense docu-
ments, also is reflected in the types
of ships and weapons being pur-
chased, the network of overseas
bases and military facilities being
formed, the increase in U.S. military
training overseas, the administra-
tion's legislative proposals to lift re-
strictions on such training and the
record U.S. share in the Third
World arms market.
Fueling the new emphasis is the
Reagan administration's conviction
that President Jimmy Carter con-
centrated too heavily on European
and South Korean defense while ne-
glecting what one former top official
called "the nibbling and erosion at
the edges." Fred C. Ikle, undersec-
retary of defense for policy, said in a
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
ARMS AID. .. Continued
recent interview that the current
administration took office amid
"growing concern in this country
with the spread of the communist
empire into various outposts."
Top officials agreed that their pol-
icies echo those of the Kennedy ad-
ministration in many ways, but they
said they have placed more emphasis
on training others to resist guerrilla
movements than on using U.S.
forces. But if U.S. troops are needed,
they said, the lessons of Vietnam will
influence the troops' deployment.
"The military as well as the civil-
ian side in the administration rec-
ognize the importance of having a
coherent strategy of first, if at all
possible, avoiding the possibility of
US. combat forces being involved
... and second, should it be neces-
sary, to make sure that an interven-
tion should succeed," Ikle said.
The emphasis on counterinsurgen-
cy has created some unease within
the Pentagon, where generals who
came of age in Vietnam question the
usefulness of U.S. power in what
they call "low-intensity" conflicts.
Few seem to dispute the administra-
tion's characterization of Soviet
aims-"to put the West's access to
petroleum and other strategic raw
materials at risk," one official said
recently. But many ask how much
the U.S. military can do in places
like El Salvador.
Noel Koch, Defense Secretary
Caspar W. Weinberger's top aide for
special forces, said in a recent inter-
view that there is a "shortfall ... in
doctrinal development" for guerrilla
wars. The newly formed Joint Spe-
cial Operations Agency-which will
report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff-
is moving to correct that problem, he
said.
In the meantime, the administra-
tion is not waiting to demonstrate its
resolve to be more active in the
Third World:
The Pentagon requested $6.4
billion in foreign military aid this
year, as against $2.4 billion in 1980,
according to Pentagon officials.
Among the major recipients of U.S.
assistance are countries such as Pak-
istan, which the Carter administra-
tion held at arm's length because of
concerns about nuclear proliferation
WASHINGTON POST
ll June 1984 Pg. 2
Correction
A report yesterday on mil-
itary aid to the Third World
should have said that, ac-
cording to Congressional Re-
search Service analyst Rich-
ard F. Grimmett, the United
States concluded a record
$14.9 billion in arms-transfer
agreements to developing
countries in 1982.
and human rights.
To ease the burden on poor coun-
tries seeking arms, the administra-
tion has offered grants instead of
loans or has sought to ease lending
terms. In 1982, it created the Special
Defense Acquisition Fund, which
stockpiles arms and equipment to
allow quicker transfers, and in each
succeeding year it has sought to in-
crease the fund's size.
In 1982, the United States
transferred a record $14.9 billion
worth of arms to Third World coun-
tries, according to Congressional Re-
search Service analyst Richard F.
Grimmett. Last year the total fell to
$9.5 billion, but the U.S. share of the
Third World market nonetheless
rose from 32 percent to 39 percent.
"Carter believed that arms sales
are basically immoral, and he dis-
couraged official support," said re-
tired Air Force Lt. Gen. James
Ahmann, a Northrup Corp. execu-
tive who until 1982 headed the De-
fense Security Assistance Agency.
"That negativism on trying to help
our friends and allies has disap-
peared."
. To permit more U.S. military
training, the administration has pe-
titioned Congress with mixed success
to scrape away what Ikle called "the
barnacles that restrict our ability to
help our friends in the post-Vietnam
period."
The administration has sought
permission to train foreign police
and maritime forces; to send more
than the current legal maximum of
six military advisers to Tunisia, Leb+
anon, Yemen, Pakistan, Sudan, Hon-
duras, Venezuela and elsewhere; to
lower the amount it must charge for
military training; and to send train-
SUMMIT. . . Continued
went on to endorse the "confidence-
building" measures proposed by the
United States that would improve
communications between the super-
powers and among their allies to re-
duce the risk of surprise attack and
accidental war.
Thatcher issued a statement from
the chair about the Iran-Iraq war
that she said the other nations had
agreed to, expressing the "hope and
desire ... that both sides will cease
their attack on each other and on
the shipping of other states," and
urging respect for the "principle of
freedom of navigation."
The statement voiced "deep con-
cern at the mounting toll in human
suffering, physical damage and bit-
terness." The formal communique
pledged coordination of oil resources
to deal with any shortages arising
from the Persian Gulf war.
The communique also endorsed
an international manned space sta-
tion, which is planned by the United
States, and took note of the "gener-
ous and thoughtful invitation" by
Reagan to the other summit nations
that would allow them to use the re-
sources of this station.
"President Reagan's vision is a
long-term partnership in the peace-
ful use of space-a permanent, fully
international space station built by
the United States together with its
friends and allies, and used by all
nations as an operating environment
in which to work and learn," said a
U.S. official.
ers to dictatorial countries like Uru-
guay that have been off limits.
"It's precisely by bringing these
people into the United States and
letting them see how a democracy
manages its military ... that you
have a certain hope of affecting the
political life in these countries," Ikle
said.
· The Reagan administration has
expanded previous plans to establish
a network of bases and facilities
around the world. The overseas mil-
itary construction budget increased
from $1.79 billion in fiscal year 1981
to a proposed $2.14 billion in fiscal
1985, with more increases forecast.
The increase partly reflects imple-
mentation of two Carter administra-
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
ARMS AID. .. Continued
tion plans, one for the Persian Gulf
and one for stationing medium-range
nuclear cruise missiles in Europe.
But the Pentagon under Reagan has
done more than Carter planned at
the island of Diego Garcia in the
Indian Ocean and in Oman, Moroc-
co, Iceland, Japan, Honduras, Tur-
key and elsewhere.
. The Army late last year won
permission to create a new "light"
division, designed for quick deploy-
ment to Third World hot spots. The
Marines, the original Third World
intervention
force, have been
strengthened and modernized. And
the expansion of the Navy, partic-
ularly the reactivation of four World
War II battleships that would be of
little use in a major conflict with the
Soviet Union, is intended to increase
U.S. "power projection" beyond U.S.
bases.
. The Navy's enthusiastic em-
brace of the cruise missile program
under the Reagan administration
similarly will expand the military's
reach into relatively undefended
countries. The Navy intends to buy
more than 4,000 of the long-range.
slow-flying cruise missiles at more
than $3 million each by 1992, includ.
ing 3,200 in a non-nuclear versior.
that would be of little use against
the Soviet Union.
The missiles will "permit a limit.
ed, measured response as an expres-
sion of U.S. will and determination
without jeopardizing aircraft or pi-
lots," Rear Adm. Stephen J. Hostet-
tler, director of the joint cruise mis-
siles project, testified recently in
Congress.
· The administration has rein-
forced its buildup with action: send-
ing AWACS (Airborne Warning and
Control System aircraft) to Africa to
respond to crises in Chad and
Sudan, shooting down Libyan jets in
the Gulf of Sidra, stationing Marines
in Lebanon, rotating thousands of
troops through Honduras, invading
Grenada.
During the first three years of
Reagan's term, the number of troops
overseas increased by about 5 per-
cent-from about 475,000 to almost
500,000.
. The administration has favored
covert action in Third World coun-
tries, unsuccessfully seeking to re-
peal congressional restrictions on
U.S. support for Angolan rebels and
successfully seeking to finance Ni-
caraguan insurgents bent on over-
throwing that country's leftist San-
dinista government.
"The administration has tried to
reduce the asymmetry, the extent to
which the Soviet Union can use all
means-terrorist, covert, arms ship-
ments, what have you-to topple
governments or support govern-
ments that are opposed by the peo-
ple-while the Unied States would
be left with a choice between vacat-
ing the field, abandoning the friends
of democracy, or getting into an all-
out conflict," Ikle said.
He was referring to covert war,
but his comment also could be ap-
plied to the most dramatic aspect of
the administration's preparations for
the Third World: the revitalization
of the Green Berets and other spe-
cial forces that went into a decline
after Vietnam. Koch, principal dep-
uty assistant secretary for interna-
tional security affairs, has been
charged with strengthening the spe-
cial forces to combat what he sees as
Soviet-inspired insurgencies.
"I think Kennedy properly recog-
nized that we were confronted with
this kind of problem all over the
world," he said recently. "Then the
thing slid into what became Vietnam
and sort of went to hell in a hand-
basket, but it doesn't follow that the
essential motive was faulty or the
rationale behind it was faulty."
In the two years ending next Oct.
1, the number of special operating
forces in the Army will have grown
by almost 50 percent, from a little
more than 4,000 to almost 6,000,
according to Army officials. The
Army is adding a third Ranger com-
mando battalion this year and a new
Green Beret unit with a forward-de-
ployed battalion in Okinawa, similar
to those already stationed in Pana-
ma and West Germany.
The Navy formed a new team of
commandos, known as Seals, and
now is modernizing the Seals' equip-
ment and buying them "special war-
fare infiltration craft," Koch said
recently. The Air Force agreed to
buy 12 new MC130 Combat Talon
airplanes, which can fly low at night
and drop troops and equipment with
pinpoint accuracy. It was then told
by Weinberger to buy nine more.
The potential use of these special
forces is not limited to guerrilla wars.
The forces also are trained to defeat
terrorists and to infiltrate enemy
lines in conventional wars, blowing
up radio stations, organizing fifth-
column resistance groups and sab-
otaging command centers.
But they are being touted above
all for their usefulness in fighting
guerrilla wars and in teaching armies
in Central America and elsewhere
how to defeat guerrilla movements.
"If we send in the 82nd Airborne
or the Marines, we have taken over
the war," Ahmann said. "In low-level
conflicts, whether that will be really
effective is questionable .. . . You
need to help the indigenous forces
do the job better and win the pop-
ulation over, and for that you need
guys trained to think about the three
guys or seven guys creeping around
at night trying to kill each other."
Koch has urged Congress, the
public and skeptics within the Pen-
tagon to support more special forces.
He frequently cites Soviet "Spet-
snaz" special forces to make his case.
"The threat posed by these forces-
including the threat to the continen-
tal United States-is real, grave and
itoo slowly being recognized," he tes-
tified in Congress recently.
In response to prodding from the
top, the Army in 1982 formed the
1st Special Operations Command to
coordinate its special forces activi-
ties. The Air Force followed suit
with its 23rd Air Force last year.
Then, at the beginning of 1984, the
Joint Chiefs created the Joint Spe-
icial Operations Agency to coordinate
all special forces activities and, re-
portedly, to manage the top-secret
commando unit that draws people
from all four services.
Despite the new structure, many
generals would prefer to plan for
larger, World War II-style conflicts
"which tend to be cleaner," Ahmann
said. Koch has complained in testi-
mony that the services are stingy
with promotions for special-forces
operators.
"It's a small constituency, and the
conventional military is somewhat
suspicious of it, in many cases for
very good cause," Koch said in a re-
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
NEW YORK TIMES 8 June 1984 Pg. 1
U.S. Military Creates Secret Units
For Use in Sensitive Tasks Abroad
The following article is based on reporting by Jeff Gerth and Philip Taub-
man and was written by Mr. Gerth.
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 7 - The De-
fense Department has created several
secret commando units in recent
years, and they have tried to rescue
missing Americans in danger spots
abroad, participated in the invasion of
Grenada and supported Central Intelli-
gence Agency covert operations in Cen-
tral America, according to Administra-
tion officials and members of Con-
gress.
The development of the elite units,
which has extended the military's
traditional concept of special forces,
has raised concern in Congress, some
lawmakers say. They say the worry is
that the units might become a uni-
formed version of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and be used to circum-
vent Congressional restrictions and re-
porting requirements on intelligence
activities and the use of American
forces in combat operations.
But a senior intelligence official
denied that such a risk existed. He said
that although the new special opera-
tions forces constituted a resource for
intelligence operations, any such. use of
them would be directed by the C.I.A.
and properly reported to Congress.
Some of the units were created to
fight terrorism but have acquired
broadened mandates and training for
missions against insurgencies in devel-
oping countries in Central America, Af-
rica and Asia, according to the Admin-
istration officials and members of Con-
gress. The training and activities of the
units are highly classified.
The growth of the units, Administra-
tion officials said, stemmed from a
general concern at senior levels in the
Government that the United States
needed to improve its ability to use spe-
cialized forms of force in situations in
which the open exercise of power and
the deployment of large numbers of
men and weapons would be politically
unacceptable.
In a few instances, including opera-
tions in Central America, these new
units have worked in conjunction with
C.I.A. covert activities, but they are
not officially considered intelligence
organizations.
Some of the Congressional commit-
tees that have jurisdiction over intelli-
gence and military matters, including
the Armed Services and Intelligence
committees in the House and Senate,
are seeking clarification from the De-
fense Department about the role of the-
new units and their relationship to laws
and regulations governing intelligence
activities.
Maj. Gen. Wesley H. Rice, the direc-
tor of the Joint Special Operations
Agency, which provides high-level
Pentagon planning and coordination
for the units, told a House subcommit-
tee in April that he did not view his or-
ganization "as an agency of interest to
the intelligence oversight committee."
His remarks disturbed some of the
members and staff of the intelligence
committee, which has been trying to
look into some of the organization's ac-
tivities.
'Trying to Learn More'
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Democrat
of Delaware, a member of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, said
in an interview: "We are aware of the
existence of the special operations
units but not sufficiently informed
about their activities or their connec-
tion to intelligence operations. We are
trying to learn more."
Much about the units remains secret.
The Defense Department refused to
provide information about the organi-
zation, training or activities of the
groups, and the military officers who
direct them declined to be interviewed.
But interviews with current and for-
mer Defense Department and intelli-
gence officials, members of Congress
and staff members of key Congres-
sional committees, disclosed these de-
tails about the new units:
" They operate under the direction of
the Joint Special Operations Com-
mand, centered at Fort Bragg in Fay-
etteville, N.C. The command was
created to coordinate United States
counterterrorist activities in the wake
of the failed 1980 mission to rescue
Americans held hostage in Iran. The
command, which is headed by Brig.
Gen. Richard A. Scholtes, has a sepa-
rate budget for the development and
procurement of special assault weap-
ons. It has a core force of elite troops
who can be quickly supplemented with
more traditional commando units from
the military services, including the
Army Special Forces, better known as
the Green Berets,
"The special operations units and the
command structure above them have
provided limited resources, both equip-
ment and personnel, to the C.I.A. for its
covert operations in Central America,
according to an American official
ARMS AID ... Continued
cent interview. "It basically conflicts
with standard doctrine, and there's a
certain amount of discomfort that
goes with that."
But retired Adm. Robert L.J.
Long, who headed the Pentagon in-
vestigation of the Marine headquar-
ters bombing in Beirut last October,
said the military will have to adjust
to "low-level" conflicts.
"The United States as a super-
power has become increasingly in-
capable and impotent at this low
end of the spectrum," Long said in a
recent address. "This administration
recognized that our problem is some-
thing more than countering the So-
viets on the plains of Germany.
"It's only been recently that the
true meaning of regional confronta-
tion has been understood," he added.
"This is an area we're going to hear
more of. The interests of the United
States and the free world are clearly
at stake."
familiar with the operations. Under the
terms of a secret 1983 memo to Presi-
dent Reagan from Defense Secretary
Caspar W. Weinberger, the Pentagon
pledged to provide a wide range of
logistical support and manpower to as-
sist C.I.A. covert operations in Central
America, including support of Nicara-
guan rebels. The Senate and House in-
telligence committees are investigat-
ing whether this Pentagon support al-
lowed the C.I.A. to circumvent restric-
tions, including a $24 million ceiling, on
support for the rebels this year.
"Some of the special operations com-
mand units played a key but still
largely secret role in the American in-
vasion of Grenada last fall, according
to American officials. The units, in-
cluding Navy Sea Air and Land teams,
known as SEAL's, infiltrated Grenada
during the predawn hours before the
landing of Marines and Army Rangers.
They successfully carried out one ac-
tion, safeguarding Grenada's Governor
General, Sir Paul Scoon, but failed in
two others, including an effort to knock
the Grenada radio off the air, accord-
ing to a Congressional report. At least
four men were killed in these opera-
tions, which remain officially classi-
fied.
"The command's units tried to find
missing or captured Americans in
Lebanon in the last 18 months and as-
sisted in the 1982 search for Brig. Gen.
James L. Dozier, who was held hostage
by Italian terrorists. As the Govern-
ment's. primary counterterrorist strike
force, the units under the special opera-
tions command have been deployed in
other unspecified situations around the
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
SECRET UNITS. .. Cont 'd
world when American citizens were in-
volved in airplane hijackings and at-
tacks on American embassies or diplo-
mats and will be involved in protecting
against terrorist attacks at the Los An-
geles Olympics.
COne unit, identified as Navy SEAL
Team Six, based at the Little Creek
Naval Amphibious Base outside Nor-
folk, Va., operates amid extraordinary
secrecy. Its members dress in civilian
clothes, are permitted to have long hair
and beards, and train at civilian instal-
lations, including the Pinal County Air
Park near Tucson, Ariz., which was a
C.I.A. air base in the 1970's, according
to former intelligence officials. When
one team member was killed in a
skydiving accident at the air park last
year, his colleagues initially ordered
doctors and nurses at St. Mary's Hospi-
tal in Tucson not to turn over the body
to the country medical examiner for
"national security reasons," hospital
authorities said in a recent interview.
Civilian skydivers at the air park were
told not to take pictures of the team
members, and employees were in-
structed not to record their names.
Pentagon Wanted Its Own Units
Intelligence officials said the De-
fense Department, impatient with the
C.I.A.'s leading role in conducting cov-
ert operations, particularly paramili-
tary activities, has pressed in recent
years to establish its own units capable
of directing and carrying out such
operations.
Starting in 1980, after the failure of
the mission to rescue American hos-
tages in Iran, the Army, under the di-
rection of Gen. Edward C. Meyer, then
chief of staff, created a small, secret
intelligence organization called the In-
telligence Support Activity.
The group was formed without the
knowledge of the Secretary of Defense,
the Director of Central Intelligence or
Congress, according to intelligence of-
ficials.
Group's Original Mission
Its original mission, according to for-
mer Army officers familiar with its
origin, was to collect intelligence to
plan for special military operations
such as the Iran rescue attempt.
Eventually, however, the unit devel-
oped the ability to conduct special
operations and became involved in sup-
porting C.I.A. covert activities in Cen-
tral America, including aid to Nicara-
guan rebels, according to intelligence
officials.
In the last few years, the Joint Spe-
cial Operations Command has evolved
beyond its original mandate of counter-
ing terrorism to other kinds of special
operations, according to American offi-
cials familiar with its operations. As
one official described it, the command
"has become mostly a nighttime
operation, with its own weapons pro-
curement and research, as well as
communications."
Congress has carefully prescribed,
through legislation and practice, the
NEW YORK TIMES 12 June 1984
Pg. 9
Italy Opens an Inquiry
Into a Report on Pope
ROME, June 11 (UPI) - The Rome
state prosecutor's office opened an in-
quiry today into how an American jour-
nalist obtained a confidential prosecu-
tor's'report on the purported Bulgarian
connection to the 1981 attack on the
Pope, the Italian news agency ANSA
reported.
The journalist, Claire Sterling, cited
the report in an article in The New
York Times on Sunday.
The decision to conduct the inquiry
followed formal protests today by Ital-
ian lawyers acting on behalf of Sergei
Ivanov Antonov, a Bulgarian airline of-
ficial being held in Italy on suspicion of
complicity in the assassination at-
tempt.
The New York Times said Bulgaria
recruited Mehmet Ali Agca for the at-
tempt on the Pope's life as part of a plot
to weaken Poland's Solidarity union
movement. The same charge was re-
ported earlier by NBC News.
WASHINGTON, June 11 (AP) - The
State Department refused comment
today on reports that the Italian state
prosecutor had concluded that the as-
sassination attempt on Pope John Paul
II in 1961 was part of a plot in which the
Bulgarian secret service played a key
role .;
reporting and oversight responsibilties
for covert operations conducted by the
C.I.A. The Intelligence Oversight Act
of 1980 requires the executive branch to
keep Congress "currently and fully in-
formed" about intelligence activities.
In addition, a 1981 executive order on
intelligence issued by President Rea-
gan required agencies engaged in intel-
ligence activities to cooperate with
Congress.
Limit on 'Special Activities'
The executive order also limited
"special activities," a synonym for
covert activities, to the C.I.A. unless
the President determined that another
agency was better able to conduct such
activities.
The order, however, did not fully
spell out the definition of "special ac-
tivities." National security experts and
Congressional officials say there is
some ambiguity over whether some
types of commando operations carried
out by the Pentagon would fall within
the definition of special activities.
The staffs of the House Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, Armed Services
Committee and the Appropriations
subcommittee on defense have been
seeking clarification about these issues
from the Defense Department. Law-
makers and staff members said they
were concerned about the somewhat
ambiguous area - one staff member
called it a "gray zone" - between mili-
tary and intelligence operations.
These sources also say they worry
about a situation in which secret com-
mando operations unknown to Con-
gress might lead to open combat, draw-
ing United States forces into a wider
conflict. Under the War Powers Act.
Congress must be informed about, and
in some cases ultimately approve, the
use of American troops overseas in
combat situations. It is unclear how the
law applies to commando operations.
The Defense Department has re-
.sponded to oversight inquiries by the
Intelligence Committee, but officials
say the Pentagon is less cooperative
than the C.I.A. in discussing its opera-
tions.
Representative Joseph P. Addabbo,
Democrat of Queens, chairman of the
House Appropriations subcommittee
on defense, said he hoped the existing
Presidential directives, coupled with
assurancesgiven to his subcommittee
by Pentagon officials would provide
guidelines for proper oversight. Mr.
Addabbo and other officials said the as-
surances were contained in classified
responses by General Rice, the direc-
tor of the Joint Special Operations
Agency, and other Pentagon officials to
questions posed during and after the
April hearing.
"Hopefully, we have the apparatus to
know what they're up to," Mr. Ad-
dabbo said. He added that he opposed
the creation of a uniformed C.f.A. "I
think we have too much covert opera-
tions already, as it is," he said.
In a prepared statement in April be-
fore the defense subcommittee, Gen-
eral Rice said the Joint Special Opera-
tions Agency was organized to allow
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to better man-
age special operations forces. The
agency's organizational structure in-
cludes a research and development
division to provide items for use in anti-
terrorism, unconventional warfare,
psychological operations and direct ac-
tion activities, General Rice's state-
ment said.
The organizational structure also in-
cludes a support activities branch
which provides "sensitive support" to
other governmental agencies, includ-
ing personnel, training, logistics,
operational services, cover and opera-
tional intelligence support, according
to the written testimony.
The Pentagon's current budget re-
quest for special operations forces is
about $500 million, according to data
introduced at the hearing.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
NEW YORK TIMES
6 June 1984 Pg. 6
Administration Debating Antiterrorist Measures
By LESLIE H. GELB
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, June 5 - Three and
a half years after announcing that com-
batting terrorism would be President
Reagan's first national-security pnori-
ty, officials say a debate on the subject
is still going on in the Administration
and that it will be taken up at the eco-
nomic summit conference this week.
The British are said to have drafted a
tough statement designed to show that
the seven leaders at the meeting that
opens Thursday in London are deter-
mined to do something about state-
sponsored terrorism. Another reason
the statement was drafted, according
to a key Administration official, is that
"They think we're serious about pre-
emptive military attacks against coun-
tries supporting terrorism and they
want to try to head this off."
Two months ago, President Reagan
signed a two-and-a-half-page decision
memorandum that officials called a
foundation for a policy but not specific
guidelines for action or specific com-
mitments of new resources.
As described by a range of Admin-
stration officials, the document ap-
proved on April 3 lists general princi-
ples - including efforts to "dissuade"
countries from sponsoring terrorism
and the right "to defend ourselves" if
victimized. But there is no discussion
of how to do this, and no definition of
state-sponsored terrorism.
The Diplomatic Alternative
Nor did the document discuss diplo-
matic efforts to organize countries
against state-sponsored terrorism, as
was done a decade ago against hijack-
ings, beyond calling for working "as
closely as possible" with other nations.
Officials said an obstacle to such ef-
forts is the fact that many nations are
reluctant to jeapordize economic ties
with Iran, Syria, Libya and other na-
tions, yet want to combat terrorism.
Instead, according to the officials,
the President's memorandum raises a
whole series of questions for further
study - principally, what additional
resources are needed to gather intelli-
gence on terrorist activities and how
the United States should respond to dif-
ferent kinds of terrorist attacks.
At the conference discussion on the
subject, officials said the British are
expected to take the lead. Officials de-
scribed the French as hesitant about is-
suing a policy statement and the Ital-
ians as reluctant to get too deeply in-
volved given their important trade
relationship with Libya.
A senior official, commenting on
some Administration-inspired news re-
ports that there was now a new policy
of taking pre-emptive and punitive ac-
tion against terrorists, stated that the
policy was essentially not new at all.
Cooperation With Other Nations
He said all it meant was that known
terrorists would be arrested and that
Washington should cooperate more
with countries that have intelligence on
terrorists, such as Britain, West Ger-
many and Israel.
Officials said the memorandum also
stressed doing eveything "legally."
This word was added to the final docu-
ment, according to the sources, even
after virtually all those involved in the
interdepartmental study rejected a
recommenda jon by senior 'Pentagon
officials to authorize "hit squads" to
kill terrorists and after the Central In-
telligence Agency succeeded in remov-
ing any language that might be con-
strued as involving it in domestic
spying.
Robert C. McFarlane, the national
security adviser; Vice Adm. John
Poindexter, his deputy, and other sen-
ior White House officials were said by
knowledgeable officials to have fash-
ioned the language of the document so
that Mr. Reagan could be portrayed as
taking strong action without his being
committed to anything, especially any-
thing that the Democrats in an election
year could portray as recklessness.
'Crossing the Line'
The result, in the view of some in the
State Department and the Central In-
telligence Agency, is a document that
means either "essentially doing better
at what we've already been doing for
several years now," as one said, "or
crossing the line at some point with
pre-emptive counterforce and military
retaliation where hard evidence may
be lacking."
The potential for just such actions in
a second Reagan Administration is
precisely what makes the document at-
tractive to a number of high-ranking
Pentagon civilians and several senior
officials as well.
In a recent magazine interview, Wil-
liam J. Casey, Director of Central In-
telligence, cited Israeli action in strik-
ing back at countries that aid terrorist
attacks and continued, "I think you will
see more of that - retaliation against
facilities connected with the country
sponsoring the terrorists or retaliation
that just hurts the interests of countries
which sponsor terrorism."
Issues of Conscience
A close associate of Secretary of
State George P. Shultz said the Secre-
tary was "grappling with his con-
science." The source said Mr. Shultz
was in favor of using force, but was
against what he said was the Israeli
model of retaliating against the inno-
cent along with the guilty.
This official said Mr. Shultz's think-
ing and that of the Administration
would evolve in response to specific
provocations in the future. "Some ter-
rorist action will spark an Administra-
tion reaction," the official said.
To many officials connected with
this issue, the President's decision
document represents at least a tempo-
rary halt to three years of bureaucratic
drift and high-level inattention to a
problem the Administration leaders
initially called their highest priority.
Bombings in Lebanon
By all accounts, the twin shocks that
energized senior officials were the
bombings of the American Embassy
and the marine compound in Lebanon.
The latter was followed by a spate of
alarming intelligence reports to the ef-
fect that terrorist groups - along with
Iranian, Libyan and Syrian leaders --
had come to the conclusion that terror-
ism was working, that it was the way to
break American will.
Before a terrorist drove an explo-
sive-laden truck into the Marine head-
quarters at Beirut's airport, killing 241
American servicemen, Congress and
the American public were uneasy with
the American presence in Lebanon. Af-
terward, as officials saw it, the politi-
cal pressure to withdraw the marines
became irresistible.
It was at this point that senior offi-
cials focussed on the interdepartmen-
tal studies that had been languishing
for some time.
Achievements Listed
Since then, Administration officials
maintained that three things have been
'accomplished: reorganization and new
personnel that they hope will
strengthen policy formulation and ac-
tion; the reaching of an uneasy consen-
sus about what is known and not known
about the phenomenon of government-
supported terrorism, and agreement
on a series of small steps to improve
coordination against terrorists within
the United States and with other coun-
tries.
Officials said Mr. Shultz would soon
name a new Director of the Office for
Combatting Terrorism. Robert Oakley,
a career diplomat and currently Am-
bassador to Somalia, will replace Am-
bassador Robert M. Sayre, another ca-
reer Foreign Service officer. Mr.
Shultz is said to hope that Mr. Oakley
will energize what has been for many
years a bureaucratic backwater.
The office was established about 12
years ago as a response to a series of
international aircraft hijackings and is
responsible for coordinating the activi-
ties of 26 different Government depart-
ments and agencies.
In January, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
quietly established a new agency to
coordinate special forces operations
and war plans against terrorists.
Called the Joint Special Operations
Agency, it is headed by Maj. Gen. Wes-
ley H. Rice of the Marine Corps.
The C.I.A.'s main unit is called the
Global Issues Staff. Created about 12
years ago as part of the Administra-
tion's response to hijackings, it is a
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WASHINGTON POST
6 June 1984
Pg. 19
Terrorist Bill Called 'McCarthy Throwback'
Associated Press
Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) yesterday said
a Reagan administration bill to combat terrorist groups
would "trample on our human rights," and called the
measure "a throwback to the McCarthy era."
While Metzenbaum told a Senate hearing that the bill
was unconstitutional and unnecessary, even conservative
Sens. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) and Jeremiah Denton
(R-Ala.), both supporters of the legislation, expressed
concerns about its sweeping language.
The controversy was over one bill in a four-measure
anti-terrorism package. It would allow the secretary of
state to designate a list of international terrorist groups
or countries, and subject Americans to prosecution if
they provide active support.
In a provision that upset Metzenbaum the most, the
bill would prohibit any defendant prosecuted under the
measure to challenge, as part of his defense, the govern-
ment's inclusion of a particular group or nation.
Hatch told two Justice Department witnesses that the
bill lacks criteria for the secretary of state to use when
designating the terrorist groups.
"You would not be averse to putting standards in?"
Hatch asked Mark Richard, deputy assistant attorney
general.
"That's correct," Richard said.
Denton, chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommit-
tee on security and terrorism, repeatedly assured Met-
zenbaum, "The chairman has no interest in trampling on
the Bill of Rights."
Denton said the bill "needs some further polish,"
pointing out that it contains no requirement that the
secretary consult with Congress before making his des-
ignations.
"We have no problem with consulting with Congress,"
Richard said.
An angry Metzenbaum said, "It's a throwback to the
McCarthy era," referring to the late senator Joseph Mc-
Carthy's 1950s hunt for communists at the expense of
Americans' civil liberties.
ANTITERRORIST MEASURES
... Continued
counter-terrorist unit today that serves
as the focal point for agency intelli-
gence collection, analysis and covert
action.
Following the instructions of the new
presidential directive, the interdepart-
mental group led by the State Depart-
ment is now reviewing whether addi-
tional resources are needed.
In the course of the recent policy re-
view, the officials said, members of the
intelligence
community
generally
shared the view that government-sup-
ported terrorism was now a clear and
established fact that required special
treatment apart from group or individ-
ual terrorism and that Moscow was at
least indirectly involved.
View of Soviet Role
Few of the intelligence and policy-
level officials interviewed argued that
Moscow was actively controlling, di-
recting or directly supplying terrorist
activities. The prevailing judgment
was that Moscow does not like to under-
take high-risk ventures that it cannot
control, and that such are the hall-
marks of terrorism and terrorists.
Robert H. Kupperman, an expert on
terrorism at the Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
summed up the view often heard inside
the Administration: "The Soviets sup-
port a general destabilization program
through terrorists, but they're not
going to get very close" to actual ter-
rorist operations.
In 1983, officials said there were 71
major terrorist incidents probably
sponsored and supported by govern-
ments. The principal ones were said to
be Iran, Syria, Libya, North Korea,
and possibly Cuba and Iraq.
The evidence, which comes from a
wide net of intelligence agents and paid
informants and varies greatly in qual-
ity, is almost entirely circumstantial,
but officials say they believe it is sub-
tantial and convincing nonetheless.
Four Bills Sent to Congress
The Administration's major move so
far was to send four bills to Congress in
April that are designed to help detect
and prosecute those involved in inter-
national terrorism. The legislative
package embraced prison terms and
fines for people assisting terrorists, re-
wards for information, and language
that would broaden existing laws
against kidnapping, hijacking and
sabotage. This was a direct outgrowth
of the President's decision memoran-
dum of early April.
The memorandum also directed a
continuation and expansion of meas-
ures to protect American missions and
people overseas and at home.
Intelligence operatives reported con-
tinuing efforts to coordinate activities
with anti-terrorist organizations in
other governments.
Consideration is also being given to
amending the Vienna Convention of
1961. This set out procedures for diplo-
matic immunity. The idea would be to
check presently immune diplomatic
baggage for arms and explosives and
to withdraw diplomatic privileges from
countries supporting terrorism.
Practical and Moral Problems
Officials said that these represented
all the specific ideas being discussed,
and that further actions raise troubling
practical and moral problems.
Some officials, for example, say they
see real difficulties in the fact that the
decision memorandum does not define
terrorism, yet calls for condemning it
in all its forms. These officials said it
could be argued that Administration
support for the rebels fighting the Nica-
raguan Government or Afghan guerril-
las could be construed as a form of ter-
rorism. "One man's freedom fighter is
another's terrorist," an official said.
Other officials took strong exception
to this, arguing that there was an im-
portant difference between terrorism
and insurgency. In general, they said
that insurgent groups supported co-
vertly by the United States did not en-
gage in indiscriminate acts of violence,
and that these groups posed an alter-
nate leadership for a country.
To skeptical officials, this definition
of insurgency could apply to guerrillas
fighting the American-backed Govern-
ment of El Salvador as well.
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SPECIAL EDITION
-- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
NEW YORK TIMES 6 June 1984 Pg. 1
REAGAN EXPECTED
TO BID ALLIES ACT
AGAINST TERRORISM
President Reported Prepared
to Join Mrs. Thatcher in
Plea at Summit Talks
By STEVEN R. WEISMAN
Special to The New York Times
LONDON, June 5 - President Rea-
gan and Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher conferred today amid indica-
tions that they would press other West-
ern leaders this week for a commit-
ment to improve efforts to combat ter-
rorism.
American and British officials said
political issues in general could over-
shadow economic matters on the offi-
cial agenda.
They said that during mealtime dis-
cussions the leaders would pay particu-
lar attention to relations with the
Soviet Union and the crisis in the Per-
sian Gulf resulting from air attacks in
the war between Iran and Iraq.
Cooperation Is Sought
Mrs. Thatcher, the host of the eco-
nomic conference of major industrial
democracies, has been interested in a
public statement condemning terror-
ism ever since a British police officer
was killed in April by gunfire from in-
side the Libyan Embassy.
A senior Reagan Administration offi-
cial said today that Mr. Reagan would
join Mrs. Thatcher in trying to per-
suade other leaders at the conference
that more can be done to share intelli-
gence information on the whereabouts
of known terrorists. He said there was
also a need for Western countries to in-
crese the resources used to combat ter-
rorism.
Mr. Reagan, who arrived here from
Dublin last night, spent the fifth day of
his 10-day European trip largely out of
public view.
He and his wife, Nancy, had lunch
with Queen Elizabeth II and the Duke
of Edinburgh at Buckingham Palace
and dinner with Mrs. Thatcher.
Frustration in Washington
An Administration official, discuss-
ing terrorism, said today that there
was frustration in Washington about
the lack of cooperation among Western
allies even as terrorist acts have in-
creased.
American allies, he said, are reluc-
tant to share information with the
United States because they prefer to
act alone and because they fear that in-
formation given to Washington might
be disclosed.
Because of objections from France
and other countries, the official said,
participants at the conference may
well not say anything significant about
terrorism even if informal agreements
are reached. But he said Mr. Reagan
hoped something concrete could be de-
cided, even if it is not disclosed.
"We really want to get on with a pro-
cess that leads to results," the official
said, asking not to be identified. But he
added there would be "no U.S .- or Brit-
ish-led harangue" on the subject.
French officials have belittled the
idea of addressing terrorism in the
elaborate surroundings of a summit
conference and are considered likely to
oppose any sort of public statement on
the subject.
Mrs. Thatcher, meanwhile, was said
by British officials to be interested in
establishing a "diplomatic blacklist"
prohibiting diplomats charged with
harboring terrorists or other abuses
from being allowed into other coun-
tries.
British officials said Mrs. Thatcher,
who will determine the conference
agenda, expects relations with the
Soviet Union will also be reviewed by
the leaders. She was said to have wel-
comed Mr. Reagan's conciliatory com-
ments toward Moscow in his speech to
the Irish Parliament Monday.
Presidential aides said Mr. Reagan
was also pleased at the reaction to the
speech. In it, he reiterated that he was
ready to negotiate with the Soviet
Union and suggested a new willingness
to discuss the Soviet demand for a re-
nunciation of the use of force by West-
ern allies.
The initial reaction from Moscow to
Mr. Reagan's speech has been nega-
tive. The Administration official who
asked not to be identified said today
that Mr. Reagan was disappointed but
not surprised by the reaction. "It's con-
sistent with what they've been saying
for three or four months," he said, add-
ing that the reaction was not "alarm-
ing."
In general, the official said, the West-
ern allies have come to feel that the
Soviet Union is in a state of leadership
transition and introspection as it strug-
gles over how to deal with the West.
The Russians are also thought to be un-
certain because of the American elec -.
tion, he said.
Soviet internal politics are expected
to be discussed at the London meeting,
the official said. But he added that he
expected no change in the consensus
that the West should not try bold initia-
tives now to revive the nuclear arms
control negotiations that have been
deadlocked and cut off.
Relations With Soviet Discussed
An American official said tonight
after the dinner between Mr. Reagan
and Mrs. Thatcher that the two leaders
had discussed relations with the Soviet
Union at some length. He said they had
had a talk that was "theoretical and
theological" in nature on how to induce
Moscow to return to nuclear arms
talks.
The official said the two leaders both
felt Moscow was now "frustrated" be-
cause of failures in its economy and be-
cause of renewed willingness in the
West to rebuild its military.
On economic matters, Mrs. Thatcher
has let it be known that she is increas-
ingly concerned about high interest
rates and budget deficits in the United
States.
At a news conference last week, she
suggested she would raise these sub-
jects at the conference and also at her
separate meeting with Mr. Reagan
today. She told reporters that deficit
spending and high interest rates violate
the principles of "prudent banking."
A British official said tonight that at
the dinner with Mr. Reagan, Mrs.
Thatcher raised the economic issues
but that there was no intention to "put
the President in the docket" at the con-
ference on the deficit or other such
issues. He also said Mrs. Thatcher had
thanked the President for his com-
ments in Ireland this week denouncing
terrorism in Northern Ireland.
The Prime Minister also discussed
Central America with Mr. Reagan, ac-
cording to the officials, and counseled
"caution" on recent United States ac-
tions, in particular the mining of Nica-
raguan harbors by insurgents acting
with the assistance of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
Little Criticism Expected
In general, British officials and aides
to other participants at the meeting say
they do not expect criticism of Mr.
Reagan to be as strong at this confer-
ence as it has been in the past.
They say that Mr. Reagan long ago
proved himself adept at parrying diffi-
cult questioning about the subject by
asserting amiably that he is working
hard to bring interest rates and deficits
down and that in any case the world
economy has improved greatly in the
last few years.
· Administration aides said again
today that they expected very little
trouble from allies at the conference,
and indeed they view recent favorable
economic trends as vindicating Admin-
istration policies.
In another development today, Sec-
retary of State George P. Shultz mẹt
briefly here today with Defense Secre-
tary Moshe Arens of Israel. Larry
Speakes, the White House spokesman,
said they discussed the situation in the
Persian Gulf and Lebanon and other
matters.
Mr. Speakes and other officials said
that Mr. Shultz was to have met last
week with Mr. Arens in Washington but
that the meeting had to be put off be-
cause the Secretary was tied up with
other matters. The spokesman gave no
further details of the discussions.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM
26 JUNE 1984
WASHINGTON POST
6 June 1984
Pg. 18
Administration Hoping to Keep Pressure on Soviets
U.S. Seeks Allied Accord on Terrorism, Missiles
By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer
LONDON, June 5-The Reagan
administration, eager to obtain a
show of western unity and keep
pressure on the Soviets, is struggling
to convince U.S. allies to reaffirm
the basic goals of the Atlantic Alli-
ance and also condemn international
terrorism, according to U.S. and Eu-
ropean officials.
These officials predicted that the
six western industrial nations and
Japan, which meet here this week at
their annual economic summit,
would reaffirm the NATO commit-
ment to deploy intermediate-range
nuclear weapons in Europe in an
effort to convince the Soviets to re-
turn to nuclear arms talks.
But there was pessimism among
U.S. and British officials on whether
France and Italy would agree to pub-
lic condemnation of "state supported
terrorism." Officials say there is even
less unity on U.S. policy in Central
America, which President Reagan
views as an essential element of
U.S .- Soviet conflict.
Nevertheless, a senior U.S. official
said that Reagan intends to press his
views on Central America in private
meetings later this week with the
other government leaders.
This official, expressing growing
White House skepticism that Nic-
aragua is willing to halt its "gubver-
sion" in El Salvador and move to
peaceful resolution of differences
with the United States, said that the
primary accomplishment of Secre-
tary of State George P. Shultz's visit
to Managua Friday was to demon-
strate that the United States is will-
ing to talk to Nicaragua. The U.S.
official described the statement is-
sued by the Nicaraguan junta after
Shultz departed as "deserving of the
Pulitzer Prize in fiction."
The statement had emphasized
that Nicaragua is willing to discuss
U.S. security concerns, but insisted
that a third nation participate in
further meetings.
U.S. diplomats and State Depart-
ment officials initially reacted favor-
ably to the meeting and the commu-
nique, but officials traveling with
Reagan have been cautious about
the prospects for a breakthrough in
the negotiations. Today's remarks
were the toughest yet from a White
House official.
On the terrorism issue a senior
British official said tonight, "We
most certainly intend to raise the
issue of terrorism and have some
very specific ideas, especially when
they [the terrorists] operate under a
diplomatic cloak, but I'm not able to
say precisely what will come out of it
at the summit .... We're trying to
open up the whole international ap-
proach."
The official said he believed that
British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher would address the issue no
matter what the other nations did.
The senior U.S. official called
Thatcher "our ace in the hole,"
meaning that she could be relied
upon to make a statement even if
the other nations would not go
along.
"The ... president wants a full
discussion of terrorism, including
state-supported terrorism," the U.S.
official said. "Clearly not everyone is
prepared to go as far as we go."
The issue was discussed tonight
by Reagan and Thatcher at a private
meeting at 10 Downing St., but none
of the U.S. officials accompanying
Reagan, including national security
affairs adviser Robert C. McFarlane,
was present. White House sources
were unable to say whether any
agreement was reached.
U.S. officials say that even
Thatcher is less concerned than the
United States on the issue of "state-
supported terrorism" the phrase the
Reagan administration uses to de-
scribe international acts of violence
fostered by Libya or Iran.
The British, spurred by the killing
of a London policewoman who was
shot from the Libyan Embassy in
April, would like the summit to re-
affirm adherence to the 1961 Vienna
Convention governing the privileges
of diplomatic immunity. What they
especially want is to prevent the as-
signment of diplomats to western
nations who have been expelled from
other countries for unacceptable be-
havior.
A senior U.S. official said that he
expected, even if a public statement
is not issued, that the seven nations
would informally agree to a greater
exchange of intelligence information
and to the commitment of additional
financial resources to combat terror-
ism.
On April 17, in the wake of the
shooting at the Libyan Embassy
here, White House spokesman Larry
Speakes said, "Terrorism is a prob-
lem for all nations, and this govern-
ment will work as closely as possible
with governments-particularly oth-
er similarly threatened democra-
cies-to deal with it."
On April 26, the president sent a
package of four antiterrorism bills to
Congress that would make the tak-
ing of hostages a federal offense, out-
law airline sabotage, provide rewards
for information on terrorist activity
and prohibit the training and sup-
port of terrorists.
On another issue, U.S. officials
discounted a published report that
the United States was considering
sharing its strategic oil reserves with
other western nations because of a
threatened cutoff of oil supplies
from the Persian Gulf. A senior of-
ficial said that the only agreement
the seven nations have at this point
is that they would not go to the spot
market to obtain oil because this
would force a sharp increase in oil
prices.
Washington Post London corre-
spondent Michael Getler contrib-
uted to this report.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
BALTIMORE SUN
24 May 1984 Pg. D-1
Graduates told
of 'new strategy'
for terrorism
By Michael J. Clark
Anne Arundel Bureau of The Sun
ANNAPOLIS - A lesson gleaned from the
terrorist bombing that killed 241 Americans in
Beirut last October has led to a "new strategy"
of preemptive strikes against terrorist groups in
certain situations, the chief of naval operations
told a graduating class of 993 midshipmen yes-
terday.
Addressing the 134th graduating class at the
U.S. Naval Academy, Adm. James D. Watkins
said, "We cannot stand idly by and let any small
group of fanatics bend the will and break the
spirit of an entire nation. ... "
The four-star admiral, a 1949 academy grad-
uate who is the nation's top-ranking naval offi-
cer, said he helped devise a new strategy to
combat terrorists following the bombing in
Lebanon, and he came to the conclusion that
"there can be moral justification to preempt a
probable terrorist attack."
He cautioned that using military force
against terrorist sites where bombs are made or
against countries that supply materials and
money to terrorists should be "a last resort" af-
ter diplomatic initiatives and political and eco-
nomic sanctions are tried.
Before undertaking such a military attack,
he said, the United States must believe there is
"a reasonable hope of success" and "we must
foresee more good than evil as a result of our
actions."
Such a military action should have the goal of
deterring aggressors from taking other actions
against Americans, and "we should work to
make terrorist acts so counterproductive and
costly, or seem so costly, that potential perpe-
trators will think twice before conducting, or
threatening to conduct, terrorist acts," Admiral
Watkins said.
The graduation, staged on the football field
of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Memorial Stadi-
um, was the prelude "to the main event ahead
- that's the fleet," said Academy Superinten-
dent Rear Admiral Charles R. Larson.
Among the midshipmen graduating yester-
day before a crowd of 15,000 parents, friends
and admirers, 811 were commissioned as Navy
ensigns, 165 were sworn in as Marine Corps sec-
ond lieutenants, four will become Air Force sec-
ond lieutenants and seven foreign nationals will
become officers in their countries' navies. Six
graduates had physical disabilities which pre-
vented them from receiving a commission.
The cost to taxpayers to educate each gradu-
ating midshipman was $117,000, academy offi-
cials said. . ..
WASHINGTON TIMES
21 May 1984 Pg. 2
U.S. found
ill prepared
for terrorism
By Bob Poos
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Soviet Union's terrorism policy
will "play an ever increasing factor" in
Soviet-U.S. relations, and the United
States is ill-equipped to deal with it," a
retired senior Navy admiral states.
The Soviets' policies that result in
confrontations and terrorism, "have
remained remarkably stable over the
years," he said.
The Soviets employ guerrilla warfare
involving political or religious minor-
ities and the United States, said the offi.
cer, who spoke at a seminar of the
Hudson Institute on the condition that
he not be named.
The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuc-
hea (formerly Cambodia) and terrorist
tactics in Lebanon were instances in
which Soviet policy has been somewhat
effective, he said.
The invasion will permit the Soviets
to maintain a "high profile role in
Southeast Asia, which they have no
intention of relinquishing," he said.
Terrorist tactics in Lebanon were
ultimately successful in forcing the U.S.
military to retire from that country, he
said.
One region, the speaker contended, in
which the Soviets have only partly suc-
ceeded in establishing a presence is
Southern Africa. The admiral did not
say but it is general knowledge that
South Africa is responsible for keeping
the Soviets either out of or off balance
in that area.
The Kremlin has learned the wisdom
¡of "using surrogates or 'Paladins' as
jthey're now being called and will contin-
tually grow bolder in using them," he
predicted.
The United States must improve its
special counter-insurgency forces
"which have been neglected in the past"
and upgrade its capabilities in human
intelligence (HUMINT) gathering to
cope with guerrillas, he said.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
THE WASHINGTONIAN
JUNE 1984 Pages 93-181
Where Will Terrorists
Strike Next?
As the Concrete Barriers Go Up All Over Washington,
Terrorism Experts Say the Question No Longer Is
Will Terrorists Hit Washington, But When and Where
By Bob Reiss
W
ith mounting horror,
Larry Smith viewed the
destruction. Thirty
minutes earlier he had
been getting into
bed at his Alexandria
home when the phone rang. "There's
been a bombing at the Capitol," the
operator told Smith, the Senate's ser-
geant at arms. It was November 7,
1983.
Now, as he stood amid the rubble, he
saw the Capitol-normally a symbol of
solidity and permanence-as an "utter
mess.'
"I felt sick," he remembers. "I felt
like someone had bombed my own
home." The blast had exploded from
behind a seat in the hallway outside the
Senate chamber, shattering and blowing
off the doors of the Republican cloak-
room and the office of Senate Minority
Leader Robert Byrd 25 feet away. Debris
flew into the face of the marble bust of
Teddy Roosevelt. Glass and marble bits
slashed and shredded portraits of Daniel
Webster and John C. Calhoun. Chan-
delier glass sprayed Adlai Stevenson.
The explosion was so powerful that it
dispersed down three corridors, leaving
a 250-foot path of destruction. "Any-
thing that wasn't a wall gave," says
Smith. "On a busy day, this corridor is
so crowded it's hard to walk through.
Had we been in session, we would have
lost people, without question. People
would have been blinded by flying glass."
Only a few days earlier, Smith had
Bob Reiss is a widely published author whose
upcoming novel, Divine Assassin, concems
terrorism in Washington.
presented Majority Leader Howard Baker
and Minority Leader Robert Byrd with
a study concluding that security in the
Senate needed to be tightened. New
measures had been scheduled to be pre-
sented to party caucuses three days after
the explosion.
"I felt like I'd been waiting for it to
happen," Smith says, "but it was dif-
ficult to sell that to members of Congress
when nothing had happened yet."
Today the bombed corridor is closed
to visitors. Almost 30 more metal de-
tectors have been installed at the Capitol
and nearby congressional office build-
ings. Women's bags are searched con-
stantly. Color-coded passes are now re-
quired for people who work in the Cap-
itol-red or yellow for staffers and aides,
green for media, blue for lobbyists.
Bulletproof metal plates have been in-
stalled in the backs of the House mem-
bers' chairs. Concrete barriers seal the
parking lot. At night, after visitors have
left, Capitol police regularly stage mock
rescue attempts in the buildings.
But Larry Smith is still worried.
Standing before the blast site, where a
raised platform surrounds the damaged
wall like three sides of a coffin, he is
asked if he feels the new security pre-
cautions are adequate. He answers with
an unhappy shake of the head: "I have
a feeling it's going to happen again."
Smith is not alone. As the summer of
1984 approaches, legislators and law-en-
forcement authorities are occupied with
anti-terrorist preparations as never be-
fore. Security armies are assembling at
the sites of the Democratic and Repub-
lican National Conventions, as well as
at the Olympic Games in Los Angeles
and the World's Fair in New Orleans.
"Washington is a particularly good
target," says Dr. Yonah Alexander, anti-
terrorism expert and fellow at the
Georgetown Center for Strategic and In-
ternational Studies. "There is no ques-
tion that we will see more violence."
Says Michael Ledeen, a former spe-
cial adviser to Secretary of State Alex-
ander Haig and consultant on terrorism
to the Pentagon, "The question isn't
whether it will happen here. The ques-
tion is why it hasn't happened yet."
And so in ways both subtle and overt,
the expectation of terrorism incorporates
itself into the lives of Washingtonians at
all levels. The President issues a policy
directive calling for an "active defense
against terrorism," including rewards of
up to $500,000 for information on ter-
rorists, as well as the creation of FBI and
CIA paramilitary squads. Alabama Sen-
ator Jeremiah Denton introduces a bill
that would make terrorism a federal crime
punishable by death if innocent victims
are killed. A new 50-man FBI "hostage
squad" demonstrates anti-terrorist tac-
tics for reporters at the Quantico Marine
base. All four divisions of the armed
services train troops to "cope with ter-
rorist incidents within this country," says
a Pentagon spokesman.
More signs: The Army commissions
Dr. Robert Kupperman of the George-
town Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies to write a report on "low-
intensity conflict," which is what social
scientists call terrorism. EPA security
personnel request a talk on explosives.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM
26 JUNE 1984
and Lieutenant Jeff Altmire, who heads
the bomb squad at Fort McNair, sends
a staffer to pass out material entitled
"Letter and Parcel Bomb Recognition
Points." Chief James Powell of the Cap-
itol police speculates that someday an
iron fence may be necessary around the
Capitol-the last fence was torn down
in 1873. Pennsylvania Avenue is closed
during an evening rush hour when three
suitcases are spotted on the sidewalk near
the White House. Only clothing is found
inside.
The heightened awareness of terror-
ism is most noticeable at government
buildings, from the White House, Cap-
itol, and State Department, where con-
crete barriers have been erected to dis-
courage car-bomb attacks, to the
Pentagon, where tunnels under the build-
ing have been closed for security rea-
sons. Now it is rippling outward, touch-
ing the everyday lives of many more
Washingtonians.
Cab driver Tom Sahr complains, "I
used to hang around the Senate parking
lot and cruise for passengers. Now I can't
get in." Chris Vestal, a newsletter pub-
lisher who reports on the Hill, says,
"When I go to the Capitol, guards want
to see my purse every ten seconds." A
ten-year-old boy on the Washington-New
York train asks another passenger,
"You're from Washington? Will terror-
ists blow up the White House?" And
Judith St. Ledger-Roty, an attorney, re-
calls a recent day when she walked by
the Soviet Embassy on 16th Street, no-
ticed a man talking to a guard at the gate,
and thought about how easy it would be
for a terrorist to attack the building. "It
struck me," she says, "that suddenly
there were thoughts in my everyday rou-
tine that terrorists can and do exist in this
country."
"Terrorism begins with the perception
that it exists," says Yonah Alexander.
"If you think it's here, it's already al-
tering your life." Larry Smith agrees:
"The terrorists have had a degree of suc-
cess. They're forcing us to conduct our
lives differently."
As summer approaches, do Washing-
tonians occupy a twilight zone between
terrorism as a form of nightly television
entertainment and the real possibility of
an explosion at Metro Center?
Terrorists have existed globally for dec-
ades without launching wholesale as-
saults on Washington. Why the big con-
cern now?
The answer, experts say, lies in the
evolution of terrorism itself. No longer
a product of isolated attacks, terrorism
is now recognized as an outgrowth of the
last 30 years of superpower confronta-
tion. It is the warfare of the future. The
future is here.
that in the nuclear age, the superpowers
would avoid direct confrontation as too
catastrophic. Instead, the major powers
would support smaller countries in little
"proxy" wars around the world. Now
anti-terrorism experts fear the proxy wars
will be carried back to Washington in
the form of bombings and assassinations
by terrorists doing the bidding of their
governments.
The biggest concern of terrorist-
"The terrorists have had a
degree of success," says
Larry Smith, the Senate's
sergeant at arms. "They're
forcing us to conduct our
lives differently."
watchers in the US is no longer the
Weather Underground or other Ameri-
can radical groups, but pro-Khomeini
Iranians and pro-Qadaffi Libyans, many
of whom enter the country across the
Canadian border. Kupperman, as well as
sources at the FBI and local law-enforce-
ment agencies, confirms the presence of
large numbers of them in this country.
"For the first time," says Kupperman,
"the infrastructure is here that will sup-
port a terrorist operation. No terrorism
occurs without surveillance beforehand.
I'm talking about serious professional,
politically oriented groups that are well
financed. "The suicidal drivers are only
cannon fodder in these deals.
"My guess is you're going to see a
bomb against the State Department. As-
sassination attempts against individuals
are also likely," says Kupperman.
"In the nuclear age, the name of the
game is not missile against missile," adds
Yonah Alexander. "The name of the
game is acts of terror conducted by ded-
icated small groups that are supported by
governments."
The key phrase of the new terrorism
is "supported by governments." Says
Kupperman, co-author of Terrorism:
Threat, Reality, Response, "In the mid-
'70s and late '70s, there was a lot of
state-supported terrorism. For example,
the Soviets provided training, weapons,
and forged travel documents to terrorists.
Libya provided safe haven for the Pop-
ular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
and encouraged Carlos (the legendary
Venezuelan-born terrorist) to pull off op-
erations. In no case did the country di-
rectly manage the event.
"But today you have state-managed
For years, social scientists have said terrorism. Which means that a national-
level intelligence agency, the Syrian or
Iranian government, trains individuals,
designs and engineers a bomb, does the
counterintelligence work, executes an at-
tack, and lies back and denies it. You
can't deal with it in court, and you're
impotent to deal with it directly."
The first two Washingtonians to die
from state-managed terrorism were Or-
lando Letelier, the exiled Chilean de-
fense minister, and Ronni Moffitt, a co-
worker at the Institute of Policy Studies.
In 1976 they were murdered by a bomb,
later traced by the FBI to the Chilean
secret police. Four years later, during the
overthrow of the Shah of Iran, Ali Akbar
Tabatabai, an anti-Khomeini Iranian, was
gunned down outside his Bethesda home
by a man disguised as a postman. The
gunman escaped.
Asked if the United States also en-
gages in renegade warfare, Kupperman
responds, "Not as much as we used to,"
and criticizes the emasculation of the CIA
during the Carter administration. But
critics of the Reagan administration charge
that covert training and aid to the anti-
government contras in Nicaragua is as
much a form of state-supported terrorism
as Libya's backing of the PLO. They also
contend that the covert wars are out of
control and won't stop until the warring
parties agree to ban support for terrorists.
In the meantime, the renegade war con-
tinues to escalate, which means the risks
for the US are getting higher. Saul Lan-
dau, a fellow at the Institute for Policy
Studies and a friend of the murdered Le-
telier, explains: "When the US govern-
ment goes into the Middle East and the
guns of the New Jersey blow away a
village of Lebanese people or the CIA
bombs or mines harbors in Central
America, hitting at people who can't get
back at you, sometimes the only re-
sponse is terrorism," he says. "I con-
sider terrorism a terrible thing. But if you
operate a state as a terrorist entity and
wreak terror on other people, it is ulti-
mately logical that they're going to get
back at you the only way they can."
That's in line with a recent statement
by Iran's ambassador to the United Na-
tions, Said Rajaie Khorassani. When
asked if he thought Middle Eastern op-
ponents of US policy would resort to
terrorism in America, he said, "It de-
pends probably on how far you go."
The purpose of most terrorist acts,
however, is not retaliation for US foreign
policy. Terrorism is an effective weapon
for both pragmatic revolutionaries and
fanatics. It provokes criticism of a gov-
emment that can't protect its citizens from
it. It focuses world attention on issues
that otherwise might be ignored, partic-
ularly if it occurs in a city with the in-
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ternational visibility of Washington. It
can also legitimize, in some minds, the
terrorists' position.
Considering the devastating weapons
available, a small band of terrorists can
cause extensive death and destruction,
making them the great equalizer in con-
frontations between superpowers and
weaker nations. Because media attention
on terrorists is immediate and global, one
well-planned act can have tremendous
impact. And, points out Kupperman in
his report to the Army, there is the matter
of America's inexperience and relative
naiveté when it comes to coping with
professional terrorists.
"This nation, unlike others in the
Western alliance, has no internal con-
sensus on how to respond . . . and has
no common philosophical basis for ac-
cepting the high costs, in lives, mate-
rials, pride, and power, of occasional
failure in dealing with terrorism," he
writes. "We have no internationally rec-
ognized commitment to firm retributive
deterrence to such violence."
Asked what "no internal consensus on
how to respond" means, Kupperman cites
a lack of coordination and preparedness
among military and law-enforcement
agencies. To a foreign group aware of
these problems, the US becomes a more
attractive target.
A case in point: To combat the ter-
rorism of the Red Brigades, the Italian
government formed an anti-terrorist
squad, which in 1978 alone tracked down
and jailed thousands of suspected ter-
rorists. By comparison, it was only re-
cently that Ronald Reagan began push-
ing for the formation of the FBI and CIA
counter-terrorist squads, a proposal that
is likely to come under fire in Congress.
"Terrorists have not hit us yet because
they are afraid," says Pentagon consult-
ant Ledeen. "But [the US withdrawal
from Lebanon] will encourage them. They
will draw the conclusion that the best
way to get your way with the United
States is to kill a certain number of Amer-
icans, and after a while, the US does
what you want it to do."
In a city hit by terrorists, fear can quickly
spread outward to friends and co-work-
ers of victims. Saul Landau remembers
how his life changed in the fall of 1976.
Landau had arrived at work one Sep-
tember morning when his wife phoned.
She told him that on her way down Mas-
sachusetts Avenue, she had witnessed
the worst accident she had ever seen.
"The car was still smoking. There were
still flames, there was blood all over the
place, she told me," he recalls. "She
was so upset. I said, 'Well, I'm sorry.
That sounds terrible.' We hung up."
A few minutes later, Landau received
a call from the receptionist at the Institute
"My guess is you're going to see a bomb against the
State Department," says Dr. Robert Kupperman of the
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International
Studies. "Assassination attempts against individuals
are also likely."
PHOTOGRAPH BY RHODA BAER
for Policy Studies. What his wife had
seen was not an accident, but the after-
math of the murder of Landau's co-
workers. The late-model Chevelle in
which they were riding was blown up by
a radio-detonated bomb as the car reached
Sheridan Circle. Letelier's legs were
sheared off in the blast; Moffitt drowned
from blood dripping into her lungs.
In the days and months following the
killings, as the FBI's investigation pro-
ceeded, fear stalked the Institute. "I was
terrified," says Landau. "I learned to
live with fear.
"When I put my key in the ignition
sometimes, my hand trembled. I had to
use my left hand to steady my right. I
had the urge to check my car every day --
and my house. Everyone at the Institute
was terrified. If they had the audacity to
kill in the nation's capital, half a mile
from the White House, what wouldn't
they do?
"There were other Chileans in the
building-they were also exiles-in-
cluding Mrs. Letelier. Several people
urged the director to get the Chileans out
of the building. Some fellows left. One
said that when he signed up at the In-
stitute, it wasn't a death trip he had in
mind.
"I sat with my back to the wall looking
at people coming in," Landau continues.
"My sense of peripheral vision im-
proved. I'm not saying there was any
real danger. But we felt there was. What
the bombing told us was that anybody
could have been in the front seat with
Orlando. It happened to be Ronni Mof-
fitt. We had to understand that the mere
fact of associating with someone could
make you a victim of state terrorism."
Landau goes on. "There were threats,
letters and calls- 'You all deserve what
that Commie spy got.' Click. Like many
fellows at the Institute, I had dreams.
People chasing me. I elude all but one.
Or my house is surrounded, and I man-
age to figure out a way to escape, except
there's always that one person left.
"The worst dream was right after-
wards. It kept recurring. It was of Or-
lando as a ventriloquist's dummy. Sitting
on somebody's legs, flopping. Smiling
that dummy smile. Just the mouth open-
ing, but no words were coming out."
Eight years later, Landau no longer
has the dummy dream but says he oc-
casionally has the dream about people
chasing him.
Kirby Jones also learned to live with
fear. Today he's a public-relations man
at the World Bank, but in 1975 he was
starting Alamar Associates, a firm that
introduced American businesses to Cuba.
That was also the year he interviewed
Fidel Castro for CBS, helped set up
George McGovern's trip to Cuba, and
co-authored the book With Fidel. It was
also the year the death threats started.
"We're going to do to you what hap-
pened to Che Guevara," a voice would
say. Then the line would go dead.
Jones recalls how the FBI advised him
to start his car every day. "They told me
never to wash my car. If someone plants
a bomb on your car, they can't replace
the dirt. So if you have a dirty car, you
can more easily check it out at night and
in the morning.
"They said that when I start the car,
I should always have the doors open.
Many of the injuries come from con-
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
Terrorism
Continued from page 95
cussions. Open all the doors so the blast
would go out, they told me. Keep your
legs out of the car when you start it, if
you can. And when you're starting it,
put a briefcase between your chest and
the steering wheel.
"The threats made me nervous, but
there was nothing I could do about them.
I remember a photographer came to the
house for a magazine. I asked him not
to take pictures of my kids' faces. Or if
there was a knock at the door at night,
a neighbor coming over unexpectedly,
I'd worry about who it was."
The specter of terrorism extends beyond
its impact on individuals. It can change
the way a city lives. Michael Ledeen
remembers what it was like to live in
Rome during the Red Brigade's reign of
terror.
"Rome is a city built around outdoor
places. People gather in piazzas and talk
and drink coffee and play. The first thing
that happened was that people went in-
doors; the piazzas emptied out, mostly
in the evenings, but also during the day.
The second change was that an edge came
over the city. In normal times, Rome is
garrulous and friendly. But conversa-
tions became much shorter. You didn't
wander around the streets as much. Peo-
ple tended to go outside, do what they
had to do, and get in again. It lasted
several years, until the Red Brigade was
shut down."
I have my own images of how terror-
ism can affect a city. While researching
a novel on terrorism, I traveled to Italy
and Israel, two countries that are very
familiar with it. Three scenes stick in my
mind:
In Rome and Milan, soldiers with
submachine guns guarded government
buildings, synagogues, and a Greek Or-
thodox church. I noticed that the soldiers
kept their fingers on the triggers at all
times. But what struck me most was that
pedestrians seemed to pay no attention.
The scene was that normal.
In Jerusalem one afternoon, I sat on
a bus-station bench. Suddenly, I noticed
the passengers on my right scurrying away
from the bench. Then those on my left.
I looked up to see a soldier directing me
away, too. A police jeep roared into the
lot; the buses pulled away from the curb.
I asked the soldier what was going on,
and he pointed to a crumpled paper bag
eight feet behind me by a pay phone. It
was a plain brown paper bag, the kind
you carry sandwiches in. There had been
no bomb threat, but the mere presence
of an unclaimed paper bag cleared the
area. A half-eaten sandwich was found
inside.
The bus I used while in Jerusalem
was the Number 18 bus. It travels from
the student dormitories on the outskirts
of the city past the Yad Vashem mon-
ument to Jews killed in World War II,
through the downtown area and near the
expensive La Roma Hotel and the Old
City. Some of my relatives used this bus
to get to school; a friend working on a
book took it often while doing her re-
search. While riding the bus, I some-
You didn't wander around
the streets as much. People
tended to go outside, do
what they had to do, and
get in again.
times would imagine what would happen
if a bomb went off in it, particularly at
rush hour, when it was packed with shop-
pers, tourists, and schoolchildren. I vis-
ualized seats ripped from the floor, a
child's shoe lying on the street. One day
after I left Israel, terrorists blew up the
Number 18 bus.
In one 24-hour period at the beginning
of the recent Easter weekend, terrorist
bombings shook two Western capitals.
Here in Washington, a powerful explo-
sive placed under a couch tore apart the
officers' club at the Washington Navy
Yard. No one was injured in the blast,
which occurred shortly before 2 AM on
Good Friday. A previously unknown
group, calling itself the Guerrilla Re-
sistance Movement, said the bombing
was a protest against US policy in Cen-
tral America.
Several hours later, a bomb hidden in
a briefcase at London's busy Heathrow
Airport was detonated by a timer, injur-
ing 25 people, five of whom had to be
hospitalized. An anarchist group called
the Angry Brigade claimed credit for the
blast, but British police continue to in-
vestigate links to Libyan terrorists.
The bombings were indicative of the
levels of terrorism in the two cities. Lon-
don has been the site of indiscriminate
bombings, such as the one that rocked
Harrod's, the famous department store,
during the holiday shopping season last
year. But so far, Washington has been
spared the kind of wholesale violence
inflicted on other cities.
In addition to the Capitol bombing,
the FBI investigated four other terrorist
incidents in Washington last year, all of
which were directed against institutions
rather than individuals. A group calling
itself the Armed Resistance Unit took
credit for explosions at the National War
College at Fort McNair last April and at
a computer complex at the Navy Yard
last July. An unknown Philippine ter-
rorist group ignited two fire bombs near
the front of the Philippine Chancery. In
the fourth incident, the Jewish Defense
League claimed responsibility for a
bombing that caused minor damage at
the Aeroflot office here.
Some terrorism experts contend that
the threat from squads of professional
Middle Eastern terrorists is being ex-
aggerated, and statistics, at least, bear
them out. Of the 31 terrorist incidents
reported in the US last year, none were
attributed to Libyan or Iranian organi-
zations, according to the FBI. In fact,
two-thirds of them were linked by the
FBI to Latin American groups.
One expert who downplays the threat
from Middle Eastern terrorists is Neil
Koch, deputy assistant defense secre-
tary, who is in charge of the Pentagon
policy on terrorism. He points out that
despite what most people think, terror-
ism is not a mindless activity; it's a stra-
tegic weapon based on calculated deci-
sions. Government-sponsored terrorists,
he goes on, would have to have a
very powerful motivation to stage mur-
derous attacks in America and risk US
retaliation.
Other experts aren't as sure that an attack
on a Metro train or National Airport or
a department store is so implausible. That
is clearly the trend of terrorism. Briga-
dier General P. Neal Scheidel, chief of
the Air Force security police, recently
said that five years ago, 80 percent of
terrorist attacks were on property, and
20 percent were on people, "But now
it's 50-50." Professional terrorists, says
one law-enforcement official, know that
blowing up empty buildings will get at-
tention but that it is indiscriminate mur-
der that causes terror, and maybe a re-
examination of policy.
It is just that kind of terrorism that the
administration's counter-terrorist strat-
egy is aimed at. Reagan's policy direc-
tive, which will become a legislative pro-
posal, supports the principle of striking
at terrorists abroad and staging reprisal
raids in response to terrorism here or
against Americans overseas. It repre-
sents the first time the US has taken an
aggressive anti-terrorist stance as a mat-
ter of national policy. That, in turn, raises
the stakes in the renegade war. So law-
enforcement agencies, from the DC po-
lice to the Capitol police to the FBI,
continue to step up their anti-terrorist
training.
On March 9, FBI Director William
Webster unveiled the Bureau's new
"Hostage Rescue Team" at Quantico.
The squad, two years in the developing,
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
has trained with US military and Euro-
pean anti-terrorist forces. According to
Webster, it is designed to deal with "a
major-scale terrorist incident" and will
be standing by at the Summer Olympics,
the presidential nominating conventions,
and the World's Fair.
During the demonstration for report-
ers, agents in black jumpsuits acted out
scenarios. They slid down ropes from
helicopters to "rescue" hostages in a
mock bank. Marksmen with live bullets
"killed" cardboard terrorists at the far
end of a shooting range. It was a dem-
onstration of what the FBI calls "sur-
gical shooting," because sitting next to
the make-believe terrorists was Assistant
FBI Director Oliver Revell. In another
scenario, agents broke into "Tire City,"
a roofless, seven-room "house" made
of sand-filled tires. Once inside, they
shot more "terrorists" and rescued more
hostages.
Other preparations include "gam-
ing," the acting out of terrorist incidents.
"We have simulated hijackings," ex-
plains Wayne Gilbert, who is in charge
of the FBI's terrorism section. "We might
do it at night when planes are available.
United Airlines might say, 'You need a
DC-10? We have one sitting at Dulles
until ten tomorrow morning.""'
Members of the squad are presented
with different scenarios. In some, the
terrorists claim to have a nuclear explo-
sive. In others, an official of a big com-
pany or the government is held hostage.
Or the agents are told that there has been
an explosion.
"Sometimes the hostages are our own
people," says Gilbert. "Sometimes
they're from the military. Men and
women. We brief them ahead of time to
In some scenarios, the
terrorists claim to have a
nuclear explosive. In
others, an official is
held hostage.
tell them what to expect. They're going
to be treated badly; told when to go to
the bathroom. They may be fed inade-
quately or get lousy food. They'll be
harassed and shouted at. When there's a
rescue, they have to be prepared for ex-
plosions, gas, and firing.'
Were a terrorist incident to occur, the
command post would be Room 5005 in
the FBI Building, a quieter but no less
graphic embodiment of preparations in
the war on terrorists. It even looks like
a war room. Beneath clocks showing dif-
ferent time zones and across from maps
of Washington and local airports are the
two banks of desks of the Emergency
Operations Center. The upper tier would
be manned by the FBI's top people, such
as Webster, Revell, or Gilbert.
The semicircular banks have direct lines
to the White House, the US attorney gen-
eral's office. the Pentagon, the State De-
partment, and FBI field offices. There
are computers on which agents can call
up data on terrorist groups, plus police
monitors, television monitors, and a
glassed-in meeting room.
On a recent day, a prepared hijacking
log could be seen hanging on the wall.
Empty slots are to be filled in if a hi-
jacking occurs. The slots are labeled
"Scheduled route," "Air carrier,"
"Number of crew members," "Weap-
ons," and "Demands." There is one
other prepared log-it's for nuclear
extortion.
Nuclear extortion is a major concern of
the FBI. It has happened only once in
the US-in 1979, when an employee at
a nuclear plant in Wilmington, North
Carolina, threatened to release uranium
oxide into the atmosphere if he wasn't
given $100,000. He was arrested, but
law-enforcement officials realize the po-
tential for more incidents.
Playing a key role in any nuclear-ex-
tortion case would be a highly secretive
group called the Nuclear Emergency
Search Team (NEST). Technically under
the jurisdiction of the Department of En-
ergy, NEST is made up of energy-phys-
icists, explosive and electronic experts,
and other scientists and technicians. It
was NEST members who, during the 1976
bicentennial celebration, drove around
Washington in unmarked vans and
checked radiation levels at federal build-
ings. A year earlier, NEST personnel
dressed as businessmen conducted a ra-
diation search at the Union Oil Company
of California after a threat was received
there. The detection devices were hidden
in briefcases. In both cases, the team
found nothing.
In addition to the bicentennial inves-
tigations, NEST has been used twice to
check out nuclear threats in Washington.
In 1976 they investigated a van parked
outside the White House after someone
received a tip that it contained a nuclear
explosive. Inside they found a 50-gallon
oil drum holding a ticking recorder. And
in 1978 the team was called in when
someone sent a package containing a
brown substance to a congressional of-
fice with a note saying it was radioactive.
The substance was dirt.
Today, about 30 NEST experts work
out of Andrews Air Force Base. In the
event of a nuclear threat, they would be
contacted by the FBI and would have to
be ready to leave the base within two
hours.
Even before the November bombing,
Capitol police were staging their own
terrorist scenarios in the Capitol at night
when no tourists were around and Con-
gress wasn't in session. Although au-
thorities are reluctant to reveal details,
at least one of the simulated terrorist at-
tacks involved the seizure of the Senate
chamber. As part of their training, mem-
bers of the Emergency Response Team
practice traversing the Capitol with ropes
and swinging down on windows.
"They're expert shots with special
weapons," says Chief Powell. "They've
done a lot of training in Maryland, away
from the general public, to keep down
panic."
The biggest attempt to coordinate hos-
tage-situation tactics in Washington oc-
curred two years ago when the DC police
organized Operation Speelunk, built
around the takeover of a Metro train. In
this operation, an escaping bank robber
took hostages on a Metro train, but the
situation was similar to what it would be
in a terrorist takeover. "We were trying
to find out how well we could interface
all the agencies involved," says Lieu-
tenant George Bradford, who organized
the scenario. In addition to the DC po-
lice, the FBI, Secret Service, transit po-
lice, the telephone company, PEPCO,
the Department of Highways, and Metro
officials participated. The operation would
later serve as the model the various agen-
cies followed in December 1982, when
an anti-nuclear activist threatened to blow
up the Washington Monument. He was
killed during the incident.
The experts say that kind of coordi-
nation is crucial in dealing with urban
terrorism. Kupperman, in his report to
the Army, points out that "while ama-
teurs may continue to rely on the time-
tested tactics of terrorism like skyjack-
ing, the imaginative professional terror-
ist has a number of avenues open for
future attack:
"Attacks on the infrastructure of
metropolitan areas (electric or gas net-
works, communications, or computer fa-
cilities), with a level of disruption be-
yond the capabilities of the local police
or the National Guard.
"Threats to thousands of people with
agents of mass destruction such as nu-
clear explosives, chemical, biological,
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
"The media are a terrorist's
best friend. Terrorists are
the super-entertainers of
our time."
or radiological weapons.
"Subtle exploitation of contentious
political issues such as the anti-nuclear
and environmental movements."
At the heart of any anti-terrorism prep-
aration lies a dilemma: How do you bal-
ance security needs with the need to
maintain a free society?
"What we're doing here is a balancing
act," says Larry Smith, who, ironically,
is sitting beneath a portrait of Andrew
Jackson, the President who opened up
the White House to three miles of hand-
shaking visitors after his election. "This
building must be open to the public. It's
their building. They come to see their
legislature at work."
Already there has been backlash to the
security measures at the Capitol. Rep-
resentative Don Edwards of California,
The conflict between
security and freedom in
itself represents a victory
for terrorists.
chairman of the House Judiciary Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights, told
his staff to refuse to provide any infor-
mation other than name, employer, and
Social Security number in filling out ap-
plications for the new security passes.
He objected to requests that staffers also
reveal weight, color of hair and eyes,
and home address. Smith acknowledges
that there has been friction between Cap-
itol police officers and Senate staffers
over the regular checks for passes. "We
feel bad about it, angry," he says, noting
that some security measures have been
modified as a result of the complaints.
Says Steve Van Cleave, an Atlanta-
based security consultant for multina-
tional corporations, "In order to totally
defend against terrorism, you'd have to
hermetically seal the White House. When
you deal with terror, you deal with con-
centric circles of defense, alert zones,
something to cause a bomb to explode
in the perimeter."
"All the advantages lie with the at-
tacker in terrorism," he adds. "To de-
fend against it, you'd have to form an
environment that's totally unacceptable
to people in a free society."
The conflict between security and
freedom in itself represents a victory for
terrorists. Writes Ray Cline, former dep-
uty director for the CIA, "The first phase
in terrorism . . . tends to erect an invis-
ible barrier of noncooperation between
people and their government. It an-
nounces to a nation and the world that
war has been declared on the government
by shadowy and dangerous opposing
forces."
The media have their own role in all this.
In articles like this one, the media "lend
credence to a hypothetical situation." save
Peter Caram, former head of the Ter-
rorist Intelligence Planning Section of
the Port Authority of New York.
"Since terror is aimed at the media
and not the victim, success is always
defined in terms of media coverage,"
adds political scientist Raymond Tanter
of the University of Michigan. "And there
is no way in the West you could not have
media coverage because you're dealing
in a free society."
Walter Laqueur, chairman of the In-
ternational Research Council of the Cen-
ter for Strategic and International Stud-
ies, offers a more succinct appraisal: "The
media are a terrorist's best friend. Ter-
rorists are the super-entertainers of our
time."
Critics of press speculation about ter-
rorism in Washington point out that ter-
rorism has historically been cyclical. They
note that the Capitol was first bombed
in 1915, that the group that claimed re-
sponsibility for the recent Capitol bomb-
ing linked themselves in their commu-
niqué with Puerto Rican Nationalists who
tried to kill President Harry Truman on
November 1, 1950. And they generally
agree with Chief Powell of the Capitol
police, who says, "We aren't any more
concerned today about terrorism than we
were five years ago. We were always
concerned, and that concern hasn't
changed.'
But the nature of terrorism has changed.
And judging from the administration's
counter-terrorist strategy, our approach
to it is changing, too; now it is viewed
more as a form of warfare rather than as
street crime with political overtones. As
terrorism spreads worldwide, there is, in
the words of Ray Cline, "an increasing
lack of distinction between war and
peace."
And, says Dr. Kupperman, there may
be a greater danger. "Contemporary ter-
rorism has become a tactic of strategic
value .. . with large-scale conventional
or nuclear warfare the likely conse-
quence of failing to cope at the molecular
level of violence."
The freedom from terrorist attack that
Americans once enjoyed is believed to
be coming to an end. We need to learn
more about a war in which we are tar-
geted. Without information on the dan-
ger, there's no preparation. Without
preparation, there's deadly surprise.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL
9 May 1984
Pg. 8
Assassinations not forgotten
Security a fact of life in Washington
By WILLIAM JOHNSON
Globe and Mail Correspondent
WASHINGTON - The funereal
procession of assassinated presi-
dents -James Garfield, Abraham
Lincoln, William Mckinley, John
Kennedy - gives an immediacy
to security procedures in Wash-
ington that make them familiar
facts of everyday life.
To approach the White House,
domain of the President, or to
enter the Capitol, seat of the
Congress, one must walk through
a metal detector frame, and one's
briefcase, purse or bag must be
searched. A tape recorder must
be played for a security agent to
demonstrate it does not disguise a
bomb.
Most presidents in this century
have been the objects of assassi-
nation plots. Ronald Reagan was
three months into his presidency
when he was wounded by a
would-be assassin's bullet.
Last November, a bomb went
off during the night in a Senate
corridor. No one was injured, but
the property damage was exten-
sive. Since then, security proce-
dures at the Capitol have been
tightened further."
According to Deputy Chief
Harry Grevey of the Capitol Po-
lice Force, the number of en-
trances to the Capitol "were
reduced from nine to two. The
public is no longer permitted to
drive through the grounds -
access is allowed only by permit.
The flow of traffic in and around
the Capitol was rerouted, so it can
be better controlled. Separate
entrances were established for
employees and the general public
and the public is subjected to
metal detectors, X-rays and
searches of parcels and bags.
Most corridors are off-limits.
Journalists, employees and habit-
ual visitors, such as lobbyists,
must always display identifica-
tion cards, which include a pic-
ture. This is true of most govern-
ment office buildings in Washing-
ton.
Around the Capitol, the White
House, the State Department and
some other buildings, "flower
C
Dump trucks loaded with sand are parked near White House gate on earlier scare.
boxes" of whitewashed concrete
were installed so as to make it
difficult to crash onto the grounds
with a truck or car, possibly load-
ed with explosives. .
Asked yesterday about security
procedures for the White House, a
special agent in the Secret Ser-
vice's Office of Public Affairs
declined to describe any whatso-
ever. "If we discussed our proce-
dures, they wouldn't be effective
any more," he said.
But there have been published
reports that ground-to-air mis-
siles have been installed discreet-
ly around the White House to
protect it from possible air at-
tack. On the ground, marked or
unmarked cars and vans are
always parked on the streets
surrounding the White House.
Some of them contain German
Shepherd dogs, which will some-
times start to bark as one strolls
past.
Getting a highly coveted White
House press pass requires secur-
ity clearance by the Secret Ser-
vice that takes months and, ac-
cording to a press officer at the
State Department, costs the
Government $10,000 each time. A
foreign journalist also requires
also a security clearance by the
State Department at a similar
cost. According to the same press
officer, one police body will not
accept the security clearance of
the other.
Whenever the President - or
even a presidential candidate -
is travelling in public areas, the
Secret Service can be rough and
curt in ordering people not to
move, and closing off elevators
and corridors which will be pas-
sed by the person they are guard-
ing.
." In the age of terrorism, anyone
and everyone must be considered
a potential assassin.
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SPECIAL EDITION
-- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WASHINGTON POST
1 June 1984 Pg. 1C
Capitol Securely Greeting Tourists
By Alison Muscatine
Washington Post Staff Writer
Stricter security measures put in place at the
U.S. Capitol and congressional office buildings
after a bomb explosion last fall have slowed the
pace of the approximately 3 million people who
pass through them each year and caused cabdri-
vers to grumble, but there is general acceptance
of the inconvenience, according to security offi-
cials.
An intricate identification system now requires
journalists, lobbyists and staff members to wear
color-coded passes at all times and metal detec-
tors are in use at every entrance to the Capitol
and adjacent office buildings.
"The publicity is the biggest deterrent [against
attacks]," says Jack Russ, the sergeant at arms of
the U.S. House of Representatives, who oversees
security of the House side of the Capitol. "And
there has been so much publicity about it."
Harry Grevey, deputy chief of the 1,222-mem-
ber Capitol Hill police force, said there has been
no increase in the number of weapons confis-
cated since the tighter security took effect. About
125 weapons are confiscated each year, according
to security officials, who said most of the weap-
ons are taken from people who forget they are
carrying a gun.
Most tourists are first-time visitors to the Cap-
itol and are unaware that the security measures
are new.
Groups of high school students loaded down
with cameras can be seen patiently handing over
their wares to policemen as they pass through
metal detectors outside the House and Senate
galleries, where picture-taking has always been
forbidden.
Even at the main entrances of the Capitol,
tourists seem willing to oblige police requests to
search purses and pass through metal detectors.
"It doesn't bother me," said a man who came
from Pennsylvania for the Memorial Day week-
end with his family. "It's just like going through
the airport."
The 20,000-plus people whose government-re-
lated jobs take them to the Hill and the 4,000
journalists who cover them are complaining less,
according to police, about the inconvenience of
purse and briefcase inspection at every entrance
and the lines at the metal detectors, which have
grown with the advent of the tourist season.
"Overall I think it's working fairly well," says
Larry E. Smith, the Senate sergeant at arms.
"There are occasional problems but there is a
greater acceptance on the part of staff and lob-
byists."
The stiffer security adds about 15
minutes to what used to be an av-
erage 45-minute tour of the Capitol,
but most tourists have been very co-
operative, according to Tom Not-
tingham, the Capitol's chief of tour
guides. He said that tourism in the
Capitol has dropped by about 10,000
visitors a month, but the decrease is
not necessarily correlated to the de-
lays resulting from increased secu-
rity.
"Everybody is willing to conform
because they know it is something
that has to be done," Nottingham
said, adding that most tourists have
become accustomed to metal detec-
tors and bag searches in airports.
After the November bombing,
which caused $265,000 in damage
but no injuries, there were com-
plaints about police behaving aggres-
sively, occasionally even with mem-
bers of Congress.
Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan
(D-N.Y.) was confronted by a police
officer who raised his gun at him,
and Senate Majority Leader Howard
Baker (R-Tenn.) was prevented tem-
porarily from attending a GOP fund-
raising event in the Senate caucus
„room because a police officer did not
·recognize him.
"Generally, most senators have ac-
cepted our mistakes with a sense of
humor and have been supportive of
what we're trying to do," Smith said.
One congressional staff member
said last week that the biggest incon-
venience is that the new staff passes
are too large to fit in a wallet and
therefore "can't be used on weekends
as identification for cashing checks."
The increased security included
changing traffic patterns to direct
the flow away from the Capitol, and
requiring taxis to discharge passen-
gers at the Capitol's side entrances.
The taxi rules draw constant moans
from cab drivers, who are given no
time to linger and therefore lose
chances to pick up new passengers.
Concrete barriers, which serve as
flower pots and look similar to those
now placed at several entrances to
the White House, were installed to
prevent terrorists from trying to ram
the building with a truck bomb.
Bullet-proof metal was installed in
the backs of all chairs on the floor of
the chamber in the House of Rep-
resentatives.
Initially, the new security rules
limited reporters' access to members
of Congress outside the second-floor
chambers, but that was changed af-
ter complaints to the sergeants at
arms. Smith agreed to allow report-
ers in the corridor outside the Sen-
ate chamber, a favorite place. to
catch senators for comments after
they vote, for a 60-day trial period.
He said last week that the experi-
ment had been successful and he
sees no reason to discontinue it.
As for the Hill police, security of-
ficials say their training is adequate
protection against terrorists and po-
tential bombings. "We have one of
the best bomb units on the East
Coast," said one security official, ask-
ing not to be identified. "And we also
have a great hostage negotiation
team,"
A team of specially trained dogs is
used to sniff-search buildings for
bombs before major events.
Security at the Capitol also had
been increased following a 1971
bombing-again with no injuries. In
1975, a $4 million surveillance sys-
tem with 100 television cameras was
installed throughout the Capitol and
its subterranean walkways. At that
time X-ray machines were placed at
10 entrances and there was a rule
that briefcases had to be checked.
Hill deputy police chief Grevey
said that additional security mea-
sures are going to be put into effect,
but he would not disclose what they
are.
Despite the new measures, some
Hill veterans believe the system re-
lies more on symbolism and public-
ity than on the efficiency of metal
detectors and the identification pass-
es.
"Frankly, I think it's a joke," said
one
Virginia congressional staff
member who has worked on the Hill
since 1969. "I could think of 10 ways
to get into the building without a
pass if I really wanted to."
The staff aide said the main im-
provement resulting from the new
security system is that there are few-
er "crazies coming by our office." His
office is located near an entrance to
Independence Avenue where several
police officers and an X-ray machine
are now located.
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
DALLAS MORNING NEWS
19 May 1984 Pg. 33
Exercise in terror goes well
City drills to be ready for anything at GOP convention
By Mark Edgar
Staff Writer of The News
The terrorist, threatening to
disrupt the Republican National
Convention, drove a phony ambu-
lance into the City Hall plaza and
vowed to ignite a stash of dyna-
mite.
Police moved quickly to evacu-
ate the plaza, filled with 2,000 anti-
Reagan protesters trying to get
closer to the RNC site at the
nearby Convention Center.
Negotiations with the ambu-
lance driver, who bragged that he
had contaminated the water sup-
ply to the convention, lasted two
hours.
demands, and
The man failed to make clear
his
President
Reagan was never in danger. Fi-
nally, after talking to the FBI, the
man surrendered. Authorities
found that the convention water
had not been poisoned and that
the ambulance had not contained
explosives.
.
The Republican National Con-
vention escaped a violent attack
this time. But the episode with the
terrorist was a fake, anyway -
part of a drill Friday by the Dallas
Office of Emergency Prepared-
ness.
-
The city - in preparation to
the Republican convention Aug.
20-23 - conducted the three-hour
exercise with a slew of fake acci-
dents, including hazardous waste
spills, fires, traffic accidents and
even a snake bite.
Dubbed "Operation RNC," the
drill was aimed at putting Dallas
agencies through simulated emer-
gencies between 6 and 9 p.m. Aug.
23, as well as evaluating the suc-
cess of the city's emergency plans.
Operated out of the Emergency
Operations Center in the City Hall
basement, the drill included more
than 100-members of the police,
fire, health and other municipal
departments.
CONVENTION CITY '84
"The staff all performed in a su-
perb manner," Assistant City Man-
ager Levi Davis said.
Local reporters, although al-
lowed to view similar exercises in
past years, were excluded from
much of the exercise Friday for
"security reasons," Davis said.
About three dozen disaster
workers were stationed in the off-
ice, surrounded by the usual city
maps, phones, radios and weather
radar screens and the not-so-usual
signs saying, "THIS IS A DRILL."
John Pickett, coordinator of
the Office of Emergency Prepared-
ness, said the disaster office will
be on a state of "increased readi-
ness" around the clock during the
convention.
The Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency will provide
high-tech communications equip-
ment, and regional officials will
be on hand to assist in a major ac-
cident.
To give the scene authenticity,
the organizers set up a television
set that briefly broadcast news re-
ports by Ken Smith, executive pro-
ducer of CityCable .
Protesters seemed to bear the
brunt of the accidents in the first
30 minutes of the drill. The script
- part of which was read by
Smith in anchorman fashion - re-
ported that, beginning on the sec-
ond day of the convention, Tues-
day, Aug. 21, two dozen conven-
tion demonstrators camping at
Reverchon Park clashed with an-
gry residents. Six homeowners
and four protesters were arrested.
Davis said incidents with pro-
testers made up only a small part
of the beginning of the script.
Davis said the incidents were
played at as true emergencies but
none reached a crisis stage. No
one died during any of the fake
exercises.
But just to keep everyone off
guard, one of the emergency
workers in the basement office
suffered a heart attack during the
drill.
He, of course, is fine.
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
17 May 1984
Pg. 19D
Bomb scare interrupts drill
at nuclear plant in Wash.
United Press International
RICHLAND, Wash. - A bomb scare
occurred during a mock "unusual
event" drill yesterday at the Wash-
ington Public Power Supply System's
No. 2 nuclear plant, but the suspected
bomb - found taped to an empty
nitrogen tank - turned out to be
electrical putty, officials said.
The discovery of the substance had
prompted WPPSS to declare an "un-
usual event" in the middle of the
mock "unusual event," which was
called to test the ability of plant staff
and local, state and federal officials
to respond to an emergency situa-
tion.
WPPSS spokesman John Britton
said the Richland Police Depart-
ment's bomb squad had identified
the black substance as duct sealant,
or electricians' putty. "We don't
know how it got there or who put it
there," Britton said. "It's not some-
thing that's used on the outside of
these tanks. We're investigating."
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
CHICAGO SUN TIMES
21 May 1984 Pg. 7
Police HQ a terrorist pushover-Rice
The headquarters of the Chi-
cago Police Department is prob-
ably the least secure against ter-
rorists of any major police head-
quarters building in the nation.
That warning was sounded by
Police Supt. Fred Rice in letters
sent to Cook County Board
members Jan. 20.
Rice's letter asked that the
five Circuit Court branches in
the building be moved as part of
a plan to tighten security by
limiting public access to upper
floors. But after four months, he
has received no official reply
from the board despite the ur-
gent tone of his correspondence.
After obtaining a copy of the
letter from a County Board
source, we checked with Rice.
He confirmed he'd sent it and
had received no formal reply.
The letter notes, "As you may
be aware, the emergency com-
munication network for the City
of Chicago, i.e., its lifeline, the
911 [emergency phone] system,
is located in the James J. Rior-
dan Headquarters Building,
1121 S. State."
In the letter, Rice observed
Art Petacque &
Hugh Hough
that Chicago police are keeping
abreast of the terrorism problem
and the efforts of other depart-
ments to combat it. "In that
light," the letter says, "the Chi-
cago Police Department Head-
quarters facility is probably the
least secure facility of any de-
partment of a major city."
The letter says the primary
reason for the lack of security is
"public accessibility" to the
headquarters building due to the
presence of the courts.
Rice's letter says the head-
quarters building was checked
on a floor-by-floor basis by "se-
lected law enforcement adminis-
trators and individuals knowl-
edgeable in building manage-
ment." They recommended
removal of the courtrooms. That
recommendation was concurred
in by the department's own
Building and Safety Committee,
which included First Deputy
Supt. John J. Jemilo and Depu-
ty Supt.' Matt Rodriguez, the
committee chairman.
The letter was sent after Je-
milo and Rodriguez returned
from London, where they ex-
changed information on terror-
ism with Scotland Yard.
Rice sent them to Britain to
represent the department at the
funeral of two police officers
slain in a terrorist incident earli-
er this year.
FOOTNOTE: County Board
Finance Committee Chairman
John Stroger, reached yesterday,
reviewed the letter and said the
terrorism problem is so wide-
spread he will consider making
Rice's request a top priority.
The Review of the NEWS 16 May 1984
The Terrorist Threat to America
Washington, May 6 - Assistant
FBI Director Oliver B. Revell says
that the Bureau is actively investiga-
ting 19 U.S .- based groups suspected of
terrorist activities and is cooperating
with foreign intelligence and law en-
forcement agencies to monitor 15 to
25 other terrorist groups on the inter-
national scene. Noting the difficulty
in gauging the size of the terrorist
threat, Revell says that "most often
the groups are small, cellular, for se-
curity purposes .
Terrorist move-
ments are not mass movements . . . .
But the support apparatus can be ex-
tensive." He says that "the United
States is the most vulnerable . . .
country from the standpoint of size
and constitutional guarantees. Inter-
nationally, we're the target of more
than 40 percent of all terrorist activi-
ties." Robert Kupperman, a terrorism
expert at the Georgetown Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
agrees that "this nation is extremely
vulnerable, catastrophically vulner-
able, to even a small terrorist attack.
We are a nation of entwined networks
and have little redundancy. If you hit
three or four key components of the
electrical power system you can knock
out a section of the country for three
to four weeks. There are no replace-
ment parts . . . . There are similar
problems in natural gas delivery."
More Threats From Libya's Qaddafi
Tripoli, May 2 - Libyan dictator
Muammar Qaddafi threatens to hurt
the United States and Britain for
harboring opponents of his regime. At
a news conference, Qaddafi says
that Britain and the United States are
"harboring Libyan terrorists wanted
by Interpol. Wherever we can hurt
them, we shall hurt them. Every coun-
try has its sensitive spots." He accuses
Britain of planting the weapons and
spent shells found in a search of the
evacuated Libyan Embassy in London
and says that "this is barbarism that
has no precedent. There is no compari-
son between the behavior of Libya
and the behavior of the British, be-
cause we are civilized and they are
barbaric, as is America." Qaddafi al-
so says that he might increase aid to
Irish Republican Army terrorists, de-
claring that "if Britain is dealing with
masked terrorists and stray dogs who
have escaped from Libyan law, how
can we not be expected to meet honest
and honorable leaders of the IRA?"
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SPECIAL EDITION - - TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
NEW YORK TRIBUNE
17 May 1984 Pg. Bl
L
JAMES T. HACKETT
U.S. acts to combat
terrorism aimed at
Olympics, big events
T
here is a new fear in the
nation's capital - the fear
of terrorism in America.
The question nagging gov-
ernment officials is whether the
fear will become reality in 1984,
when four major events present
prime targets: the national polit-
ical conventions in Dallas and San
Francisco, the Los Angeles Olym-
pics and the New Orleans World's
Fair.
According to the FBI, much has
been done in recent years to bring
the problem of terrorism in the
United States under control. The
FBI has focused on those extremist
groups that have been active in the
United States, such as the Weather
Underground and its various suc-
cessor groups, pro-independence
Puerto Ricans, anti-Turkish Arme-
nians, Croatian nationalists, anti-
Russian Jewish
groups and
anti-Castro Cubans.
Thus far, the problem has been
far more serious abroad. There
FBI Director
William Webster
says the FBI and
local police forces
are getting
terrorism under
control.
James T. Hackett, a former For-
eign Service officer and acting
director of the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency early in
the Reagan administration, is edi-
tor of the Heritage Foundation's
National Security Record. This
article is excerpted from the publi-
cation's April issue.
have been no incidents here with a
large loss of life, and most domes-
tic terrorist activities have been
manageable. Testifying before a
subcommittee of the House Judi-
ciary Committee on Feb. 8, FBI
Director William Webster said the
FBI and local police forces are
getting terrorism under control.
He said the number of terrorist
attacks was down from 51 in 1982
to only 31 in 1983, and he reported
a drop in the activity of Armenian,
Croatian and Puerto Rican groups,
coinciding with a rise in convic-
tions for terrorism.
Efficiency claimed
Webster likes to present a pic-
ture of FBI efficiency. He
proclaims a reduction of terrorist
activities in the United States, the
readiness of the . FBI's new 50-
member Hostage Rescue Team and
the operation of a Terrorist
Research and Analytical Center
that tracks and assesses terrorist
activities by computer. But Capitol
Hill sources claim that the FBI
always reports everything under
control, while local police say the
sharing of information is often a
one-way street, with the FBI taking
their information while providing
them with little useful intelligence.
The local police also contest the
FBI's rosy description of declining
terrorism. They claim that FBI
statistics do not include a number
of explosions or other events that
cannot clearly be classified as ter-
rorism, but which the local police
believe should be included in that
category. The FBI considers such
criticism'inaccurate and unfair.
Critics claim that the FBI and
CIA were emasculated by a series
of demoralizing actions during the
Ford and Carter presidencies,
from which they have never fully
recovered. The main criticism is
directed against the so-called Levi
guidelines, issued in 1976 by Pres-
ident Ford's attorney general to
establish procedures for the FBI to
follow when conducting domestic
security investigations. This was
followed by the arrival in office of
the Carter administration, which
gave a higher priority to the protec-
tion of civil liberties than to the
protection of the public from for-
eign subversive activities.
All behind them
But now the FBI and CIA claim
that their difficult time after
Watergate and during the Carter
years is behind them. The Levi
guidelines were clarified early last
year by the issuance of new
guidelines by Attorney General
William French Smith. Under the
new guidelines, the FBI says its
Counter-intelligence Division is
actively conducting broad-scale
investigations and that the bureau
is doing its job effectively.
There is still concern among
FBI agents about the precedent set
when the government prosecuted
its own law enforcement officers.
But President Reagan acted early
in his administration to pardon the
convicted officials, and this went a
long way toward relieving that con-
cern. The FBI now contends that its
agents have nothing to fear if they
The Reagan
administration is
actively
encouraging
officers to
investigate and
pursue terrorists
and subversives.
follow the current guidelines.
Important though these actions
have been, more significant for U.S.
police and intelligence services is
the change in official atmosphere.
One senior intelligence officer says
it is clear to agents in the field that
the Reagan administration is
actively encouraging them to
investigate and pursue terrorists
and subversives, while the pre-
vious administration was so preoc-
cupied with civil liberties that it
acutally sought to constrain police
activities. Both the FBI and CIA
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
12 May 1984 Pg. 7
Hard Line Urged on Global Terrorism
By Kevin Leary
Robert M. Sayre, the man
in
charge
of President
Reagan's get-tough policy
against international terror-
ism, said in San Francisco yes-
terday that the United States
must act more aggressively
against terrorists or the prob-
lem will get even worse.
"What has become particularly
disturbing in the past year is the
extent to which states themselves
have begun to use their intelligence
services and other agencies of gov-
ernment to engage in terrorist activ-
ity," he told a Commonwealth Club
luncheon.
Sayre cited the Soviet Union,
Iran, Syria, North Korea, Libya and
Cuba as nations that use terrorism
as an instrument of international
policy.
He said those countries provide
training, arms and other direct and
indirect support to "a variety of na-
tional and insurgent and separatist
groups."
The soft-spoken, 60-year-old ca-
reer diplomat apologized to his audi-
ence of about 300 for talking about
the "down side of American foreign
affairs" but said the problem is get-
ting worse.
He blamed Syria and Iran for
three major bombings in the Middle
East last year, including the bomb-
ing of the Marine barracks in Beirut
and the destruction of the U.S. em-
bassies in Beirut and Kuwait.
"We have also been witness in
the past weeks to the practice of
terrorism by Libya against the peo-
ple of London," he said, referring to
the shooting at the Libyan Embassy
in which a police officer was slain
on April 17.
Sayre said the United States is
the target of 40 percent of terrorist
attacks. Last year, such violence
claimed the lives of 269 Americans,
including the 241 Marines in Beirut,
which he said was more than in all
the 15 preceding years.
Sayre said 52 percent of the at-
tacks against Americans were
aimed at diplomats, 6.5 percent at
other government officials, 22.5 per-
cent at military personnel and 16.9
percent at private businessmen. He
did not account for the remaining
attacks.
"There are other reasons why
the events of 1983 were disturbing,"
Sayre said. "The accent was on kill-
ing people. Such imprecise weapons
as vehicle bombs were used to pro-
duce large casualties."
Sayre was ambassador to Brazil
before 1982, when Reagan assigned
him the job of developing a count-
er-terrorist policy and of providing
security for U.S. personnel at 257
overseas posts. Sayre manages a
$100 million annual budget in his job
as director of the State Depart-
ment's Office for Combatting Ter-
rorism.
Sayre urged his listeners to sup-
port the Reagan administration's
anti-terrorist proposals, which in-
clude pre-emptive attacks and retal-
iatory action against foreign terror-
ists and $500,000 rewards for
information on acts of terrorism.
He said the hard line is neces-
sary because "we must demonstrate
that terrorism is not an effective
way to conduct relations and that
the price for such conduct is too
high."
U.S. ACTS ... Continued
claim they now have the support
and authority they need.
In an effort to reduce the risk of
international terrorism, to protect
American citizens and property
and ensure that the perpetrators of
terrorist attacks are brought to jus-
tice, the Inter-Agency Group on
Counter-Terrorism has proposed a
package of five bills that the White
House plans to submit to Congress.
The proposals are:
1. The Act for the Prevention
and Punishment of Hostage Tak-
ing. To amend the federal kidnap-
ping law to provide federal
jurisdiction over any kidnapping in
which a threat is made to kill,
injure or detain a victim to compel
third parties to do or abstain from
doing something.
2. The Act to Prohibit the
Training or Support of Terrorists.
To improve the ability of the Jus-
tice Department to prosecute indi-
viduals supporting, recruiting,
soliciting or training terrorists.
3. The Aircraft Sabotage Act.
This would tighten present law con-
cerning criminal acts relating to
aircraft sabotage or hijacking, to.
coincide with the International
Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation.'
4. The Terrorist Control Act. To
make it a violation of U.S. law to
conspire in the United States to
commit acts of terror abroad. This
would help the United States to
prevent the international terrorist
network from planning in. the
United States to conduct oper-
ations in other countries.
5. The Act to Provide Rewards
for Information Concerning Ter-
rorism. To authorize payment of.
rewards for information concern-
ing acts of terrorism either in the
United States or abroad.
There is general agreement that
these proposals do not go far
enough, and that the greatest need
is for improved intelligence, espe-
cially human intelligence, and
effective law enforcement coordi-
nation. Yet the critics have few
specific practical proposals. The
suggested legislation is at least a
move in the right direction.
More important is to give the
nation's intelligence and law
enforcement agencies the high-
level support and encouragement
they need to carry out their often
thankless duties effectively. Also,
the military services must be
encouraged to pay greater atten-
tion to the worldwide terrorist
threat and to recognize it as a new
form of warfare to be guarded
against and combatted on'a con-
tinuing basis.
The White House can increase
its support for this effort by issuing
guidance that makes unequivocal
the president's commitment to pro-
tect the American people from the
threat of terrorism and by direct-
ing federal agencies to take all
legal steps toward that end. Con-
gress can support the effort by
promptly considering and acting
favorably upon the White House
legislative proposals, while
assuring that proposal No. 4 does
not make it illegal to provide assis-
tance to the Afghan freedom
fighters or any other anti-
communist groups operating
abroad.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
SAN JOSE MERCURY
9 May 1984 Pg. 1
Soviets had chance to help plan security
By Maline Hazle
Staff Writer
LOS ANGELES - Top police
department officials said Tuesday
that the Soviet Union was invited
to review and participate in secu-
rity arrangements for the Summer
Olympic Games but that Soviet
officials ignored the overtures.
At one point last month, accord-
ing to Chief Daryl F. Gates, the
Soviets sent word they would meet
with LAPD representatives, but
police Cmdr. William Rathburn -
who is heading LAPD Olympic
security - waited four hours when
the Soviet delegation was in Los
Angeles and no one showed up to
meet with him.
"I would suggest that if indeed
they do believe there is some prob-
lem with security, they take me up
on my offer," Gates said at a news
conference held after the Soviet
boycott was announced.
"That cannot be the reason," he
said, "because security will indeed
be adequate."
Gates said the Soviets were
again invited to review security
plans in a letter carried by Los
Angeles Olympic Organizing Com-
mittee President Peter Ueberroth
to a meeting of the International
Olympic Committee in Lausanne,
Switzerland, two weeks ago.
In the letter, Gates wrote, "I
wish to personally invite any secu-
rity officials, particularly those
from the Soviet Union, to visit our
Olympic Planning Group and
review our entire security plan.
"We would, of course, be pleased
to answer any questions and enter-
tain any suggestions that might be
made by those officials after they
have reviewed our plan."
"There has been no follow-up
nor any response to the invitation,'
said Cmdr. William Booth, chief
LAPD press officer.
Booth said that Gates' invitation
is still open and that police offi-
cials hope Soviet officials will
change their minds.
The spokesman dismissed sug-
gestions that an anti-Soviet group
called Ban the Soviets Coalition
had any real effect on the Rus-
sians.
Daryl F. Gates
Open invitation
"As far as we're concerned,
they're a small group of people
exercising their First Amendment
rights," Booth said. "It's doubtful
that the mighty Soviet Union
would be intimidated by such a
small band."
The coalition 'itself took credit
for the boycott.
"We did something,"; said
Orange County author and adver-
tising man David W. Balsiger, "and
we did it without' government
endorsement ... when everyone
said we couldn't keep the Soviets
out."
Nearly every Soviet statement
expressing concern about the
Olympic arrangements in Los
Angeles mentioned the coalition or
its activities.
On Tuesday, the Soviet National
Olympic Committee (NOC) said
that "extremist organizations" in
this country, "openly aiming to.
create unbearable conditions for
the stay of the Soviet delegation
and for the performance by Soviet
athletes, have sharply stepped up
their activity, with direct conniv-
ance of the American authorities.".
A month ago, when the Ban the
Soviets Coalition announced plans
for Russian-language billboards
with advice to potential defectors
and information about 500 "safe
houses" throughout Los Angeles,
Soviet complaints reached a fever.
pitch.
The possibility that the coalition
could spark at least some defec-
tions was taken seriously. enough
by local enforcement agencies that
many officers were being given
special instruction for handling
defectors during the Garnes.
The special instruction is just
one aspect of what has been a
massive, five-year effort involving
dozens of federal, state and local
law enforcement agencies. During
the Olympics, more than 50 law
enforcement agencies - including
the FBI, the California Highway
Patrol and county sheriffs' depart-
ments - will be available con-
stantly.
Although events will be held
throughout Southern California,
most of the major events will be
held within the Los Angeles city
limits. In addition, both Olympic
villages fall within the LAPD's
jurisdiction.
The city of Los Angeles has a
$22 million contract with the
LAOOC to cover the city's Olym-
pic-related costs, with $15.7 million
of that earmarked for security.
That security effort, Booth said,
will rely on all 7,031 L.A. police
officers. "Days off, vacations - all
will be canceled," he said. "When
we talk numbers, we're talking the
entire LAPD."
With so many agencies involved,
a battle for control of security was
almost inevitable, and last month,
the LAPD and the FBI signed an
extraordinary document that
essentially gave local police pri-
mary responsibility for the ath-
letes' safety.
Both sides have been reluctant
to release the document's full text,
but as details emerge, it is clear
that the agreement is broad and
general, purposefully vague in cer-
tain regards and dependent almost
exclusively on the good will of the
two signatories.
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
LOS ANGELES TIMES
2 June 1984 Pg. B-1
INS Cites Terrorism Fear in
Probe of Yugoslav Smuggling
By LAURIE BECKLUND, Times Staff Writer
U.S. immigration officials said Friday that
they inaugurated a major undercover inves-
tigation into a Yugoslav alien-smuggling
ring last year partly because they were
concerned that the organization could have
been importing terrorists to the United
States for the Olympic Games in Los
Angeles.
They said they are now satisfied that
those fears were unfounded. But they are
still puzzled over the complicated ethnic
strife in Yugoslavia that may have helped
spur the illegal immigration.
"The up-front concern was that this
organization was to be used as a pipeline for
smuggling in aliens from the Eastern Bloc in
great numbers for terrorist purposes or
perhaps for political embarrassment during
the Olympics," said Mark Reed, assistant
regional U.S. Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service commissioner for anti-smug-
gling.
"But our worst fears did not pan out. We
have no reason to believe any of these
people is a direct threat to our security. We
do feel we shut off a very significant
pipeline of illegal alien smuggling."
Twenty-nine suspects have been indicted
in connection with the smuggling of Yugo-
slav nationals into the United States
through Mexico, officials announced in
press conferences in Chicago, San Diego and;
Los Angeles on Thursday.
They estimated that the ring brought in'
up to 175 aliens a month over the last 11/2.
years through two pipelines, one leading to'
Chicago and the other leading to New
Jersey.
At a press conference on Thursday,:
Harold Ezell, the Western regional commis-,
sioner for the immigration service, indicated;
that there were ulterior political motives:
behind the smuggling operation. Ezell'
charged that some of the smuggled aliens
were "promoting communism in our own'
country." He declined to elaborate or offer'
proof.
Brian Perryman, the immigration service;
supervisor of criminal anti-smuggling in-
vestigations in Chicago, said Friday that the:
original concern about Communist ; ties;
stemmed from the fact that four of the;
aliens smuggled into the United States were;
"avowed Marxists."
The immigration service conducted a
yearlong investigation into the smuggling
operation, which included the use of at least
·one undercover officer.
7."But we found absolutely no informa-
tion-and at no time did anybody in the
-ring indicate to our undercover peo-
"ple-that they were bringing these peo-
ple in for political reasons," Perryman
said.
"Most of the aliens brought into the
country appeared to be coming for
economic and personal reasons, accord-
ing to another immigration service offi-
cial, based in New Jersey, who asked not
-to be identified.
"A"He said many of those smuggled in had
been working in West Germany but
returned to Yugoslavia when they lost
their work permits during a German
.recession. Unable to find work in their
own country, they sought jobs in the
United States.
Almost all the aliens smuggled into the
United States were ethnic Albanian Mus-
lims who came from a part of Albania
that was added to Yugoslavia about 1913
as a result of the First Balkan War.
Albanians living in that part of Yugosla-
via have been protesting what they
·consider to be political repression by the
"Yugoslav government. Riots in the Alba- .
nian region in 1981 left nine dead and 600
jatled.
"Some of the strife has boiled over into
ethnic neighborhoods in the United
States, particularly in the Chicago area,
where one of the suspected smuggling
"ringleaders was located, immigration
-service officials said.
Oloman Selmani, 53, a restaurant own-
er identified by officials as an Albanian
Muslim and the ringleader of the Chicago
"operation, had three loaded firearms with
"him when arrested, Perryman said. Sev-
eral were armed.
' The New Jersey operation allegedly
was spearheaded by a Yugoslav emigre
named Dragisa Terzioski, 45, a natural-
ized citizen who once had his own
television show and frequently arranged
U.S. tours for Yugoslav cultural and
athletic groups. Officials claim that he
booked most of the illegal aliens' arrivals'
through his travel agency in Paterson,
N.J.
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
11 May 1984 Pg. 21
Whether foreign nations like it or
not, the FBI is making clear that offi-
cial bodyguards sent to protect ath-
letes at the Olympic Games will have
to sit on their hands. FBI chief Wil-
liam Webster says local or federal au-
thorities will handle any incidents.
WALL STREET JOURNAL
8 June 1984 Pg. 1
FEAR OF TERRORISM at the Summer
Olympics persists despite the Eastern-bloc
boycott. The FBI claims it is worried that
Moscow's KGB may somehow inspire vio-
lence during the games. G-men suspect that
the Russians may believe that would justify
their explanation for the boycott: that the
. U.S. couldn't protect athletes against at-
tack.
Most Wanted Jobs
"If you wanted anything in the Yugo-
slav community, he was the patron," the
New Jersey-based immigration service
official said. He said most of the aliens
who took advantage of the travel service
"are just hard-working people who
wanted jobs here." Investigators said
they are still uncertain whether Terzios-
ki, an ethnic Serbo-Croatian, was direct-
ly involved with the Chicago group.
None of the defendants nor their
attorneys could be reached for comment
Friday.
Terzioski's wife, a former actress,
denied in a brief telephone interview that
her husband had been involved in any
wrongdoing and charged that the immi-
gration service had misconstrued the
immigration of the Yugoslavs. She said
community members and family are
making contributions to pay his $1-mil-
lion bond.
"My husband never did anything to
anybody," she said. "If he did some
mistake, if he did something to help, it's
because of his crazy good heart, not
because he's criminal. . . . The relatives
come here, we sell the tickets to them.
That's all."
Asked about any political motives for
immigration to the United States, she
. said in broken English, "People come
because have one brother there, one
sister here, and they want, they desper-
ate, to have families together."
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
SOLDIER OF FORTUNE
July 1984 Pg. 30-35
SOF FEATURE
KILLING
FOR THE
GOLD
Olympiad '84: Ominous
Parallels to the
Munich Massacre
by Kevin E. Steele
Photos courtesy of AP/Wide World
(430 hrs., an hour before dawn. Dark-
ness clung like a cloak to the new
high-rise buildings that housed the Olym-
pic athletes. Eight men, dressed in athletic
garb and carrying athletic equipment
bags, easily scaled the 6.5-foot security
fence. Once on the other side, they quick-
ly shouldered the athletic bags that con-
tained the instruments of their trade -
Soviet assault rifles, handguns and gre-
nades - and hurried to meet their
appointment with destiny. Gold medals
meant nothing to them.
Twenty hours later a final body count
revealed 17 dead - among them 11
Israeli athletes. Five of the eight terrorists
were killed, along with one German
policeman. How did this atrocity occur,
and why was it allowed to happen?
This was the infamous "Munich Mas-
sacre," carried out by the Black Septem-
ber faction of the PLO during the 1972
summer Olympic Games in Munich, West
Germany. The televised drama that un-
folded that September day ranks with the
dark days of Dallas in 1963 as a vivid,
step-by-step portrayal of murder and
mayhem indelibly etched on our con-
sciousness.
Random and senseless acts of terror
continue to this day. The terrorists them-
selves are not important, nor are their
warped beliefs and perceptions of injus-
tice levied against their causes. It matters
not what breed of rabid dog bites, only the
pain and death that follow. The presence
of terror, and the means by which it is
inflicted on innocent citizens, should be all
that concern us.
Why is the Munich Massacre important
today, 12 years later? Haven't we learned
how to cope with terrorism? Or are we
victims of the complacency bred by the
successes at Entebbe, Mogadishu and
London? Certainly we know how to com-
bat these vile creatures who prey on inno-
cent civilians - or do we?
Los Angeles is about to host the 23rd
Summer Olympiad. What security pre-
cautions have been taken to safeguard
both the athletes and the spectators, and
have the Olympic organizers learned the
tragic lessons of Munich? Unfortunately, it
seems they haven't. Let's review the 1972
Olympics and the events that led up to the
slaughter at Furstenfeldbruck Airbase,
then compare these to the security
arrangements made for the L.A. Games.
The ominous parallels are all too evident.
The West Germans welcomed the
1972 Olympic Games as a chance to set
the record straight, and to exorcise the
specter raised by the 1936 Games hosted
by Adolph Hitler as a propaganda extra-
vaganza to prove the invincibility of the
Aryan race.
A new Olympic Village was constructed
in Munich (ironically the birthplace of
National Socialism) where the athletes
could live and compete in the spirit of
sportsmanship and harmony. Security
precautions were made, to include the
6.5-foot chain-link fence that ringed the
village perimeter. Checkpoints were
established at all village entrances, and the
original intent was to restrict entrance.
However, the press complained of these
"Gestapo" tactics, and the village was
opened for all. (Once again the general
press rears its ugly head.) The police pre-
sence was intentionally downplayed. to
prevent further references to German
"militarism." The responsibility for village
security was under the jurisdiction of the
Munich police, under the command of Dr.
Manfred Schreiber. An "easy and re-
laxed" atmosphere prevailed.
Eight PLO terrorists quickly infiltrated
this "easy and relaxed" atmosphere with
no difficulty as part of the 30,000-worker
contingent hired for the games. No back-
ground checks were made, and the Arabs
did not attempt to hide their national ori-
gins.
On the morning of 5 September, the
eight terrorists disguised as athletes met
no resistance scaling the relatively low
"security" fence. The building that
housed the Israeli team was not locked,
and when the murder team knocked on
the doors of the Israeli apartments they
were opened. Only when the barrels of
the Kalashnikovs were visible to the
Israelis did they expect the worst - and
by then it was too late.
Within hours the Munich police were
aware of the situation and had begun to
take action. Under the orders of Schrei-
ber, 600 policemen were alerted to cor-
don off the area wth armored personnel
carriers. A command center was estab-
lished a short distance from the Israeli
quarters, and Schreiber initiated the first
discussion with the terrorist leader. It is at
this point that the situation becomes in-
teresting, and ultimately tragic.
If a single blame can be leveled on the
handling of the Munich Massacre, it would
have to be placed directly upon the Ger-
man officials who allowed disorganization
to rule the day. In 1972, there was no
GSG-9 (although this debacle was directly
responsible for its formation), no SWAT,
no Delta Force. The responsibility for the
use of force to free the hostages rested on
the shoulders of not one but three indi-
viduals; their use of the decentralized
police/paramilitary apparatus became
their worst handicap.
Schreiber commanded the Munich
municipal police who initially took charge
of the situation as it unfolded. Later in the
day, Schreiber was supposedly supported
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
KILLING FOR THE GOLD. .. Continued
by units of the Bundeswehr under the
control of Bruno Merk, Bavarian interior
minister, and the Federal Border Police,
under the command of Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, Federal interior minister. The
ultimate failure of these units to success-
fully free the hostages rests on the fact that
no single individual commanded and,
rather than the typical German penchant
for organization, disorganization characte-
rized the remainder of the operation.
By late afternoon, the German author-
ities had decided that the terrorists would
not be allowed to leave Germay with their
hostages. The terrorists requested trans-
portation for themselves and the hostages
from the Olympic Village to the Munich
airport, where a waiting jet would carry
them to Cairo. The Germans granted the
terrorist request, then began preparing an
ambush for the terrorists.
During the day, intelligence reported
that five terrorists had carried out the
attack. Using this information, the Ger-
mans came up with a final plan they in-
tended to implement. A bus would enter
the Olympic Village and transport the ter-
rorists and hostages to a field adjoining the
village, where they would board two Bun-
deswehr choppers and be transported not
to Munich airport, but rather to Fursten-
feldbruck Airbase, some 20 miles outside
Munich.
At Furstenfeldbruck, a Luftwaffe base,
a Lufthansa 727 sat waiting. Unknown to
the terrorists, the 727 held no crew, for the
Germans did not intend to allow them to
board the jet alive.
Atop the tower at Furstenfeldbruck,
three German Border Police sharpshoo-
ters had taken up positions. Two addition-
al marksmen were positioned on the air-
field itself. Within 50 meters of the snipers'
positions, the choppers holding the terror-
ists and hostages would land, According
to the plan, the terrorists would be shot as
soon as they exited the choppers and
made their way to the waiting 727.
The sharpshooters were armed with
bolt-action sniping rifles equipped with
telescopic sights. Maximum range to their
intended targets would not exceed 40
meters. However, by the time prepara-
tions had been made, darkness had fallen
on the airbase, and the killing ground was
crisscrossed by eerie and confusing sha-
dows caused by the spotlights illuminating
the area.
At the last minute, Bundeswehr officials
offered the use of semiauto rifles equip-
ped with infrared sighting devices.
However, the police marksmen were not
trained in their use, and turned down the
offer. The stage had been set for the final
option.
At 2235 hrs., three choppers
approached Furstenfeldbruck and land-
ed. Two held the terrorists and hostages,
while the third contained police and nego-
tiators. By this time it was learned that the
original intelligence was in error. Eight ter-
rorists guarded the hostages - not five.
This placed the police sharpshooters in a
no-win situation, as it is tactically and prac-
tically impossible to simultaneously kill
eight terrorists with five bullets. In the in-
terim between firing the initial volley and
reloading, something was bound to go
wrong.
Four terrorists exited the choppers.
Two approached the waiting 727, and
two held the chopper pilots as shields.
Satisfied with the 727, the two terrorists
began walking back to the chopper. At this
point the fire command was given to the
sharpshooters. Inexplicably, only one
round reverberated around the tense air-
base, quickly followed by four more.
Two terrorists went down for the count
in the initial volley, with the remaining six
returning police fire. The nine hostages,
still within the chopper and mute to the
horror that surrounded them, were gun-
ned down where they sat. A terrorist tos-
sed a fragmentation grenade among the
contorted bodies in the chopper for good
measure. At the end of an hour-long fire
fight, three additional terrorists were kil-
led, and three eventually surrendered.
The Munich Massacre had become real-
ity.
The following scenario shows one
possible replaying of the Munich tragedy.
Los Angeles, July 1984: The catering
truck pulled up to the Olympic Village
entrance on the Westwood campus of
UCLA (University of California, Los
Angeles). At 0600 hrs., the caterers were
running an hour behind their routine
schedule for the 0700 breakfast serving.
As the truck stopped at the barricade, the
uniformed policeman on duty heaved his
middle-aged bulk from the chair in the
guard-shack and approached the open
window of the van.
The day promised to be a beauty. The
early-morning fog normal for this time of
year, hanging heavy and oppressive from
Santa Monica to downtown, was missing
- a warm Santa Ana wind had blown in
overnight from the Mojave, replacing low
clouds with brillant stars.
As the guard reached for the caterer's
extended I.D. card, a bleating BMW hom
on nearby Freeway 405 distracted his
attention: Six 9mm slugs chewed their
way through his thin uniform shirt and
buried themselves in his chest. As the
policeman slid to the pavement, the cater-
ing truck bolted through the barricade and
roared into the Olympic Village, making
directly for the apartments of the Turkish
team.
Jumping the sidewalk, the catering
truck screeched to a halt beside the fire
exit of the high-rise apartment building.
The door to the building was locked, but a
well-placed burst from the suppressed
MAC-10 quickly gained them entrance.
A startled security agent in the building
corridor reached instictively for the hol-
stered Beretta 92 under his jacket. Unfor-
tunately, his effort was rewarded with
another burst from the furious Ingram.
Five men entered the corridor behind
the submachine-gun-wielding point man.
Moving instantly to the pre-planned
target, the point man took up a position
beside the door of the Turkish suite, as a
second man moved into position in front
of the door. The point man squatted, wait-
ing for the door-breaker to employ the
cutdown 870 loaded with #000 Buck on
the twin door hinges. At this point, the
blast of the shotgun charges mattered lit-
tle. As the door slid from the wall, the two
men rushed in, quickly followed by their
four comrades.
The six-man Turkish team was rounded
up from their beds in moments. The
Armenian terrorist team had accom-
plished their first objective. At 0608 hrs., a
telephone call to the Olympic security
building assured the officials that the
Turks were being held hostage for crimes
committed against Armenia in 1917.
As in Munich, preparations have been
made to ensure the security of the L.A.
Olympiad. But unlike Munich, the '84
Games will be spread over an immense
area of Southern California, reaching over
200 miles from Santa Barbara to San
Diego. Security will be provided by an
army of uniformed and plainclothes
police, in excess of 17,000 individuals,
comprising over 100 different and over-
lapping jurisdictions.
Once again the question is asked,
"Who is in charge?"
At the present time, Olympic security is
being coordinated by the Los Angeles
Police Department, under its chief, Daryl
F. Gates. Actual day-to-day responsibility
has been passed on to Commander Wil-
liam Rathburn. The Olympic Committee
has also hired a former FBI agent as its
security coordinator, Edgar Best. On top
of these is William Webster, Director of the
FBI.
Webster and Gates have been trying for
quite some time to overcome the problem
of decentralized leadership. In a Los
Angeles Times article (6 January 1984),
Webster said that he ". .. had no doubt
that the FBI and the LAPD will resolve
their differences over which agency will
take the lead in responding to any terror-
ism within the city [read: LAPD's jurisdic-
tion] during the Olympics." Both Webster
and Gates have pledged to work together
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SPECIAL EDITION
-- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
Dutch troopers manning security
cordon around train held by South
Moluccan extremists cluster around
their APC, 31 May, some using
optical devices to view the train.
Accompanied by two South
Moluccan terrorists, negotiators Dr.
Hassan Tan (second from left) and
Mrs. Josina Soumokil (wearing light
scarf) leave hijacked train near
Glimmen, northern Netherlands, on
night of 4 June 1977. Negotiators
held lengthy talks with South
Moluccan separatists who kept 51
passengers hostage. Train was
hijacked 23 May on the line between
villages of Assen and Groningen.
DUTCH DOCTOR
It's night in one of the great cities of
Europe. The row houses in this once-
prosperous but now slightly seedy dis-
trict are bathed in harsh floodlights.
Access to the street is barred, and com-
bat-suited figures flit through the deep
shadows to take up firing positions.
Obviously, hostages have been taken.
But what of the actions that are
closed to public scrutiny? The key ele-
ments that usually ensure a satisfactory
ending to the siege? Who are the ex-
perts and advisers behind the scenes
who manipulate the terrorists and
make them receptive to negotiations?
One of the first men on the scene is
usually a middle-aged Dutchman. His
coming excites no comment among
the media gathered to witness the dra-
ma unfold. His photograph has never
been published, he doesn't give inter-
views, and his address is a closely
guarded secret. He, perhaps more
than any man alive, knows the mind of
the modern-day terrorist and the sinis-
ter men in the shadows who direct their
actions. Police and intelligence agen-
cies eagerly seek the advice of this
mild, bespectacled doctor of psycholo-
gy. His handling of the South Moluc-
can train and the Hague Embassy
sieges have given invaluable lessons to
the strike teams that battle the web of
international terror.
The scenario is distinctly different
from a siege in which a criminal has
taken hostages to try to escape retribu-
tion for some action. The political ter-
rorist takes hostages to get a message
across. He needs to legitimize his act
and so must talk, which opens the door
for a skillful negotiator to turn the
tables and give the advantage to the
security forces. The negotiator can also
mentally prepare the terrorists for the
violent intervention of the strike teams.
Among the first objectives of the
good doctor is the establishment of an
immediate dialogue. Without this no-
thing can be achieved. Before replying
to the terrorists' initial statements, he
must listen attentively. When respond-
ing, he must try to establish a basis of
complicity between the terrorists and
himself. He must never approve of
their actions, but still make it clear that
he and only he can help them obtain
some of their legitimate grievances.
Before the violent intervention of
the strike teams he must prepare the
terrorists psychologically and work to-
ward getting them to accept the idea
that every man has the right to be tired,
to be sick, that nobody can bear such
an enormous burden indefinitely. He
must try to get them to describe their
physical ailments, to erode their feeling
of invincibility and get them to sleep.
This restores their mental rhythms and
also creates favorable conditions for
the attack.
For the hostages, the two most
dangerous moments are the initial sei-
zure when the terrorists are fired by an
almost psychotic zeal and could mas-
sacre them without a moment's hesita-
tion; and when the captors' position
weakens and they are tempted to try
some violent act to regain the initiative.
It is at the latter stage that most lives are
lost.
The negotiator must use an almost
confidential tone to speak to the terror-
ists - almost like doctor to patient -
with no bluntness or the slightest hint
of threat. He must insist that the cap-
tors maintain discipline with the hos-
tages and ensure that they remain un-
hooded: Eye contact is crucial. A man
will kill someone whose eyes he can't
see.
The negotiator must ease the terror-
ists into a climate of submission by
establishing a routine, setting times for
meals ("Do you want chicken or ham-
burger?") and deluging them with
questions ("Leg or wing? Rare or well-
done? Mustard or ketchup?"). These
questions do not change the basic
situation, but take the terrorists' minds
off their obsession, put them back into
contact with outside reality and
weaken their will to resist. The doctor
suggests sending food in on china,
making the captors maintain standards
of hygiene ("Be sure to wash the plates
and utensils"). The terrorists are made
to realize that objects are breakable -
and also, unconsciously, that their hos-
tages are fragile.
The doctor vetoes sending in play-
ing cards or board games, to avoid
disaster should a terrorist lose to a hos-
tage. Instead, he recommends trying to
build up the leader and perhaps allow
him a small success to increase his
standing in the eyes of his men. He is
then less likely to resort to violent
means to regain authority or make a
point.
These are a few of the steps by
which the Dutch doctor manipulates
the terrorists to prepare them for the
end.
- Roger Ingram
JULY 84
SOLDIER OF FORTUNE 33
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
KILLING FOR THE GOLD ... Continued
toward a "common agreement." So far as
we know, none has been reached.
The FBI has also been hamstrung re-
cently in the area of preventive investiga-
tions. In a suit filed in Federal District
Court in Chicago by the ACLU and the
Alliance to End Repression (a front for the
U.S. Communist Party), Judge Susan
Getzendanner issued an injunction which
disallows implementation of new FBI
domestic security guidelines initiated by
Attorney General William French Smith in
1983. Under the new guidelines the FBI
would have been able to investigate indi-
viduals or groups who advocated criminal
activity or intent to commit a crime of
violence. The outcome is that the FBI can
investigate only committed crimes, not in-
dividuals planning to commit crimes.
Regarding security checks on workers
hired for the Games, the police are permit-
ted to instigate background checks, but
are not allowed to take workers' finger-
prints nor administer lie-detector tests.
In the event of an act of terrorism which
involves the taking of hostages. exactly
what would the response be? Well, we
have several options.
One is the use of the LAPD SWAT
Team. Another is the use of the L.A.
County Sheriff's Department SWAT
Team. Another is the use of the FBI
SWAT Team, and still another is the use of
the one-year-old, untested FBI Hostage
Rescue Team. Perhaps more "final op-
tions" than we need?
The police have been given the job of
Olympic security and terrorist-action re-
sponse over the military for a number of
reasons, all of which seem to evolve
around image rather than action. To
quote FBI Director William Webster (op.
cit.): "Because of the FBI's readiness,
there is no need for stationing a special
Army Commando team close to Los
Angeles during the Games." Webster
went on to state that the Army does not
concentrate on training that will allow the
saving of lives, and that the FBI team will
provide a " ... civilian response, not a
military response." Unfortunately, this
thinking echoes back to the Munich deba-
cle.
Unlike Munich, the Olympic Villages in
Los Angeles will be ringed with tight secur-
ity - at least in the beginning. What will
happen if the press complains again of
Gestapo tactics? The two villages in L.A.,
one on the UCLA campus and the other
on the USC (University of Southern Cali-
fornia) campus, will be surrounded by
high-security, alarm-wired and electroni-
cally monitored fences. Entrance check-
points will be guarded by armed police,
and athletes and press will be required to
show a special photo I.D. which features
an electronic bar code. Metal detectors
will be set up at the village gates and will
also be used at the entrances to all events.
At least L.A. will not be as "easy and
relaxed" as was Munich in '72.
However, even with the security pre-
cautions already under preparation, the
most glaring error that persists is the lack
of a centralized control over all security
forces.
The Olympic officials are convinced
that the proper response to terrorism is a
police response. But do the police have
the right background for the job? The
effectiveness of the LAPD SWAT team is
highly touted in law-enforcement circles
- but is it for their response to terrorist
activities, or for their response to drunk or
drugged-out husband/boyfriends who
threaten to kill their mates in a moment of
insanity?
Professional terrorists are not momen-
tarily insane. They are cold, ruthless killers
who practice their trade on an internation-
al front. They consider themselves sol-
diers and "freedom fighters" -- not cri-
minals.
While the LAPD SWAT team may be
good, I can only cite their performance
against one terrorist group - the Sym-
bionese Liberation Army in the famed
shootout of 17 May 1974. In that fiasco,
the SWAT team literally tore apart the
H&K MP5-toting agent runs to aid
two colleagues in subduing
revolver-armed "terrorist" and
securing "hostage" during FBI
training exercise geared toward the
possibility of terrorist attacks at the
Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.
house holding the terrorists with uncon-
trolled gunfire, finally bringing the siege to
an end with tear-gas cannisters that
ignited the home and created a blazing
inferno. None of the terrorists were cap-
tured alive. Is this what Webster terms a
"police response"?
What steps could we take to augment
current Olympic security plans? To start, a
centralized command must be estab-
lished. This centralized command should
be capable of dispatching the correct re-
sponse to any terrorist activity at a mo-
ment's notice. The commander should
not be affected by local politics, nor be
concerned with "public image." An im-
partial commander should be selected -
and all local forces should be subjugated
to his control. In short, the overall security
commander should come from the ranks
of the military - not the police. But then, I
suppose "image" is far more important
than innocent lives. *
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
SOLDIER OF FORTUNE July 1984 Pages 36-37
SOF FEATURE
TOOLS
OF TERROR
SOF's Guide
to Underground Weaponry
by Bill Guthrie
FEAR is the first weapon, but after that
guns are the tools by which terrorists
move nations and men to act against their
wills. Firearms of "liberation" organiza-
tions can be defined by necessity and taste
(simple weapons are best - since many of
the grunts in a terrorist "army" are qual-
ified more by zeal than by experience - and
certain weapons have emotional appeal) but
the guns found most often are the guns that
are available.
The distinctive banana-magazined out-
line of the Kalashnikov is the symbol of
revolution even to those who have no idea
what an AK-47 is.
Simple, rugged, relatively inexpensive
and manufactured from Egypt to China, the
AK may be the greatest small-arms contri-
butor to world destabilization.
Some analysts believe total production of
AKs and AK variants must be near 30 mil-
lion. The older USSR-made AK-47, the
newer AKM and the Chinese Type 56 are
most numerous in terrorist weapons caches,
but East German, Polish, Hungarian,
Romanian, Bulgarian, Yugoslavian, and
North Korean versions can be found.
M16s are valued by many armies for
mechanical simplicity, low recoil, accura-
cy, lightness, compactness and ease of
training. All of these characteristics make
them fine weapons for amateur and profes-
sional killers.
Colt claims that about five million M16s
have been made in the United States and by
licensees in the Philippines and South
Korea, but there may be political reasons for
not revealing a larger figure. Unofficial esti-
mates of total production are double official
figures. Our abandonment of about a mil-
lion M16s in Southeast Asia has made a
great contribution to the world terrorist
arsenal. Vietnam-issue ' 16s have been used
in terrorist acts and communist insurrec-
tions from neighboring Cambodia, Burma
and Thailand to Central America. The Irish
Republican Army has received M16s from
communist sympathizers, and IRA buyers
have been in Vietnam to purchase U.S .-
made arms and ammo from our old ene-
mies.
The first rifle issued to use the AK's
M1943 7.62x39mm cartridge was the SKS.
Strong and simple, production figures are
not available, but Pete Kokalis figures that
10 million must have been made. SKSs lack
selective-fire capability, and are relatively
unsuited to urban and jungle fighting. But
they were made in East Germany, Yugo-
slavia, the Soviet Union, China and North
Korea and are still found wherever com-
munists are killing people.
Some have called the U.S. M2 carbine
the original assault rifle. The M2 fired an
intermediate round, was light and compact
with 30-round magazines and it featured
selective fire. Official production figures
are in the 6,000,000 range and World War II
spread them over most of the globe. Semi-
auto M1s and full-auto M2 and M3 carbines
have been taken from basements and bodies
of terrorists from Ireland to Africa and from
Vietnam to South America.
Since terrorist organizations do not have
the same supply networks as an army, mem-
bers of the same group may have different
weapons. Czech vz.58 assault rifles are a
good example. The Model 58 is visually
similar but mechanically different from the
AK, and parts are not interchangeable. It
has the additional inconvenience of the
capability of being misassembled, with
potentially disastrous results.
Still, the weapon is robust, accurate, and
mainly well-designed. Since it is something
different, some people like it for that reason
alone. One of the terrorist cells of the
Japanese Red Army named itself for the
Czech rifle.
Submachine guns and machine pistols are
light, small and lethal. Many millions of
them have been made since World War I,
and by no means are all of them accounted
for by either Free World or communist
states that made them. All makes appear in
weapons captured from terrorists, from the
latest UZI to the oldest Thompson or the
most delapidated PPSh-41.
For power, compactness and shock
value, hardly anything short of C-4 beats the
MAC-10 in .45 ACP or 9mm Parabellum.
Expensive on the open market and virtually
non-rebuildable, the Ingram's high rate of
fire (1200 rpm in .45) and small size make
hit probability low at ranges beyond toe-to-
toe. All that aside, it is available with an
excellent Sionics silencer, is unbelievably
concealable, and is very hard to argue with
at very close ranges. Numbers are hard to
get, since covert services are the gov-
ernmental agencies that buy them and the
manufacturing history is Byzantine. But
they've been produced in some numbers for
the last 17 years, were originally cheaply
and easily available to civilian buyers, and
have been purchased by more than 20 gov-
ernments, including Yugoslavia.
The real sex-appeal weapon for enemies
of order is the Czech Skorpion machine
pistol. The Red Brigades of Italy are parti-
cularly fond of this 2.8-pound, 10.6-inch-
long, folding-wire-stocked select-fire
weapon. Available in .32 ACP (most com-
monly), .380 ACP, 9mm Makarov and
9mm Parabellum, the Skorpion is relatively
controllable, highly portable and reliable.
Originally designed as a police and vehicle-
crew weapon, Omnipol (the Czech sales
organization) has found good foreign mar-
kets, so the Skorpion is available all over
Africa and throughout much of Europe.
Common handguns are most popular for
terrorist operations. Pope John Paul II was
shot with a Browning Hi-Power 9mm, and
Walther auto-pistols are so popular (and
illegally available) in Europe the Red Bri-
gades have been nicknamed "P-38ers."
Compact .38 Special S&W revolvers are
also popular.
The world's terrorists have found other
means when they didn't have guns - plasti-
que in France in the '40s and industrial
dynamite in Peru today - but firearms re-
main their most important tools. Other
weapons, such as nuclear devices or toxins,
might be more ideally suited for terrorist
operations, but guns are compact, inexpen-
sive, require little training or experience for
basic use and are available all over the
world. The great numbers of military
weapons and the lack of control over disper-
sion in times of war define what firearms are
available to terrorists. But whatever guns
are found and wherever they are used, they
are implements of slavery in the hands of
terrorists as they are tools of freedom in the
hands of informed citizens. "
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
SOLDIER OF FORTUNE
July 1984 Pages 38-41
SOF FEATURE
DEATH
IN THE
AFTERNOON
Basque Separatists Wage Europe's
Longest War
Text & Photos by Adrian Wecer
THE young Basque terrorist walked
out of the apartment house on Cal-
le Reina Cristina, heading toward his
car parked a short distance away. He
froze in mid-stride, slapped a hand to
the side of his head - as if he had just
remembered something very important
-- and keeled over. He was dead be-
fore he hit the ground.
The bullet that killed him had been
fired by a fellow terrorist, an old friend
of his hidden in the lobby of the build-
ing he had just left. It punched through
a plate-glass panel on the exit door.
drilled into the back of his head, spun
around inside his skull a few times, and
finally came to rest deep within the
bloody mess that had once been his
brain.
It happened at 7:45 in the morning.
while dozens of people on their way to
work casually watched from doorways
and passing cars. Within seconds the
lifeless body was dragged off the street
into the back seat of a waiting auto-
mobile, which quickly drove off to dis-
pose of it at some unknown location.
But there was no need to hurry. None
of the witnesses would have dared call
the police to report the killing - not
this one, anyway. And even if someone
had, the authorities would certainly
have taken their sweet time about com-
ing out to investigate - if they decided
to come at all. Getting involved in a
settling of accounts between ETA gun-
men did not exactly rate high on their
list of choice duties.
The killing, which this reporter had
been invited to watch and photograph
from a nearby rooftop, took place
several months ago in the Basque pro-
vincial capital of San Sebastián. To be
sure, it was nothing more than murder,
plain and simple. But it was also the
single most important political develop-
ment in Spain's struggle against Basque
terrorism in the last 15 years. ETA had
gone to war against itself.
Earlier interviews with Basque politic-
al leaders and ETA militants - includ-
ing the two who later invited me to that
rooftop on Reina Cristina - provide us
with a fairly clear idea as to how this
situation came about.
According to these knowledgeable
sources, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA
Basque Country and Freedom), the
ruthless left-wing underground organiza-
tion that has been striving for Basque
independence from Spain through a
bloody campaign of terror launched in
the late '60s, had suffered a series of
political and military setbacks over the
past two years which have deprived it
of its leadership, eroded the vast popu-
lar support it once enjoyed, and invali-
dated any claim to a just political cause
it may have had.
The first of these setbacks occurred
early in 1982 when José Martin Sagar-
día, ETA's top leader and principal
strategist, was assassinated in a south-
ern French sanctuary during a cross-
border retaliatory raid conducted by
members of an obscure extreme-rightist
group known as El Batallón Vasco
Español (the Spanish Basque Batta-
lion). The subsequent capture and in-
carceration of his most trusted lieute-
nants by Spanish border police certainly
didn't help matters any. It quickly trans-
formed the organization from a highly
disciplined urban-guerrilla movement,
with brilliant military strategy and well-
defined political goals, into a disorga-
nized band of thugs desperately striking
out at any target of opportunity for
mere publicity value. Given this situa-
tion, the second major setback was as
predictable as it was unavoidable.
Horrified by the mindless slaughter
that since June 1982 has claimed the
lives of 14 military officers and more
than 150 innocent bystanders, the Bas-
que people began to deny ETA the un-
questioned support they once offered
so freely. The cities of Vitoria and Bil-
bao - alleged birthplace of ETA where
militants were once openly paraded
through the streets and hailed as heroes
- have since become staging areas for
massive rallies denouncing the depreda-
tions of this terrorist group. Recent out-
rages such as the killing of a baker (for
delivering bread to the families of
policemen during a strike). and the kid-
napping and cold-blooded execution of
an Army pharmaceutical officer (after
the government had already met their
outrageous demands for his safe re-
lease) triggered a nationwide protest the
likes of which had not been seen in
Spain since the outbreak of the Civil
War in 1936. Thousands of people
marched through the streets of every
major city in the country to denounce
the murders and to demand from the
government in Madrid nothing less than
the total extermination of these rabid
killers.
The third and potentially most
damaging setback was a decision by the
Madrid government to restore to the
Basque provinces the political auton-
omy revoked by Generalísimo Francis-
co Franco during the Civil War.
In 1937, the second year of the war,
Franco suppressed the self-governing
powers of Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and Ala-
va - the three provinces that presently
make up the Basque region. They were
officially proclaimed "punished pro-
vinces" for having fiercely resisted the
onslaught of his rebel armies. His
hatred for the Basques was so intense
that he even went so far as to forbid
them the use of their native language,
Eskuara. People were forbidden to
teach this ancient language, or even
speak it in the privacy of their own
homes. To ensure compliance, Franco's
political police often stopped Basque
families on the street and questioned
the children as to whether they had
heard their parents speaking anything
other than Spanish at home.
The Madrid decision to restore the
rights of the local Basque government
to levy and collect taxes, to establish its
own police force, and to finance
schools teaching the native language,
met the home-rule demands of the
moderate Basque Nationalist Party
(PNV) which for years had been trying
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
DEATH IN THE AFTERNOON. . . Cont'd
to undercut ETA and all other extrem-
ists who believe that political autonomy
can be had only through the warm bar-
rel of a gun.
From the time the decision was im-
plemented in 1982, ETA tried to show
that it had not been seriously hurt by
this or any other setback. More than
anything else, it tried to show that it
was still an armed political force that
had to be reckoned with. Indeed. the
ever-increasing number of indiscrimin-
ate killings attributed to the separatists
in recent months, and the appalling
savagery which has come to charac-
terize all their actions, certainly gave
that impression.
However, ETA defectors were telling
a totally different story regarding the
organization's strength and capabilities.
They described a terrorist organization
that had been forced to plan and direct
its "struggle for independence" from
the relative safety of a foreign sanctuary
due to the fear its "freedom fighters"
had of being turned in or even killed by
the very people whose cause they
claimed to champion. The organization
was so reduced in numbers by internal
strife and mass defections that their last
Asamblea - a kind of Revolutionary
Congress convened by the entire mem-
bership of ETA every few years in order
to discuss and evaluate past and future
strategies - was held in a sheepher-
der's shack high up in the Pyrenees.
Nothing larger was required, as only 47
militants showed up.
According to two former ETA gun-
men who attended that Asamblea. a
motion was presented to end hostilities
if and when the Madrid government
agreed to the following three condi-
tions: first, that all "forces of occupa-
tion" such as transit patrolmen, national
police, and all members of the Guardia
Civil that normally patrol and protect
Spain's foreign borders, be recalled
from the Basque region; second, that
the Madrid decision to restore self-
governing powers to the Basque pro-
vinces be amended in such a way as to
acknowledge the right of the Basque
people to eventually obtain their inde-
pendence and secede from the Spanish
Union; and third, that the neighboring
province of Navarre be acknowledged
as part of the future Basque nation.
"That last condition," remarked one
of the former gunmen, "was like the
Armed National Liberation Front of
Puerto Rico (FALN) promising to end
their campaign of terror bombings in
America if only the U.S. government
agreed to grant the islanders their inde-
pendence and recognized their right to
claim New York as part of the future is-
land nation."
Bay of
FRANCE
Biscay
San-
Toulouse.
Sebastian
ANDORRA
Bilbao A lava
Pamplona Navarra
ENEES
·Valladolid
Barcelona
SPAIN
terranean
se
·Madrid
BASQUE RESISTANCE
The history of Basque resistance to
incorporation by neighboring national
and ethnic groups is long and bloody.
The Song of Roland tells of a treacher-
ous attack on Charlemagne's rear-
guard at Roncesvalles by the Moorish
army. It's a fabrication designed to
save face for the French. Charle-
magne's rearguard got wiped out by
the Basques.
The Basques live in the Pyrenees in
the border regions of Spain and
France. Rejecting both cultures, they
hold to their own ancient ways.
Eskuara, their language, is unrelated to
any other European language. The
Basques probably represent the abor-
iginal population of Europe.
Basques have settled in the United
States, especially in sheepherding and
farming areas of the Northern Rocky
Mountain states.
Aside from their successes against
the Franks, the Basques also invaded
and occupied Gascony in the 6th cen-
tury, and have fought, usually enthu-
siastically, in every war in the area
since then, especially in the Spanish
Civil War and World War II.
Of the total number of militants in
attendance, the gunman recalled that
16 voiced their satisfaction with the
gains already made by the PNV moder-
ates and presented a counter-motion to
end the armed struggle throughout
Spain unconditionally. When their
proposal was rejected, the group turned
in their weapons and walked out.
Another 12 also quit the gathering
when their motion to abandon all
attempts at a negotiated settlement in
favor of escalating the violence was
shouted down. This group did not turn
in their weapons when they left. The
remaining members, unable to get a
consensus on their original motion, ad-
journed to their sanctuary in southern
France where they now spend their
time dodging cross-border raids by
Spanish secret police and trying to fi-
gure out what went wrong with the re-
volution.
It is known that the dozen pro-
violence extremists who quit the
Asamblea are responsible for the cur-
rent wave of indiscriminate killings
sweeping over Spain. It is also known
that their primary objective was, and
still is, to provoke the Madrid govern-
ment into declaring a state of national
emergency and ordering a full-scale
military intervention in the Basque pro-
vinces - a move that would discredit
PNV efforts and reunite the general
population behind their extremist cause.
They came close to doing just that a
couple of times - so close, in fact, that
by the end of 1983 they were publicly
proclaiming themselves rightful heirs to
ETA's name and cause. They had also
augmented their numbers by forging a
loose alliance with a group of free-lance
murderers who called themselves the
"Autonomous Commandos of the Re-
volution," the ones who actually carried
out the hits and placed the bombs.
"They are like a pack of wild dogs
that have been turned loose on the
streets of our cities," explained the gun-
man with obvious distaste. "Their
senseless acts have made a mockery of
our cause and have brought nothing
but shame and sorrow to our people.
Shooting an innocent man while his
children beg for mercy on television is
not what this struggle is all about.
"We don't really know who these
people are or what they stand for, but
we do know who holds their leash
. .
and we are going to stop them. That's
a promise."
Early the next morning, standing on
the roof of a building looking down on
Calle Reina Cristina, I saw that same
gunman fulfill the first part of his prom-
ise.
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Guipuzcoa

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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
LOS ANGELES TIMES
10 June 1984
U.S .- Mexico
Border Won't
Be Terrorists'
Escape Route
By MARJORIE MILLER, Times Staff Writer
SAN YSIDRO, Calif .- Mexican and American officials
are increasing law enforcement activities along the
U.S .- Mexico border in an effort to ensure that it does not
become a gateway for terrorists planning an attack.on
the Olympic Games.
On the Mexican side, Tijuana police have revampeda
plan to seal off that city in the event a terrorist should
attempt to flee south after an attack. Security agents
have asked the Baja California state attorney general for
permission to videotape all airport arrivals and 'to
review daily the names and nationalities of people
staying in Tijuana hotels.
On the U.S. side, Immigration and Naturalization
Service agents and San Diego police have intensified
training on terrorism and are paying closer attention to
the origin and travel routes of foreigners detained for
entering the country illegally.
On both sides of the border, police agencies are trying
to improve binational communications, setting up a hot
line between the San Diego and Tijuana police depart-
ments and installing two-way radios between the
Tijuana Police Department and the immigration service.
'Intend to Be Prepared'
"We have no evidence of any problems. We anticipate
no problems, but we intend to be prepared," said San
Diego Police Cmdr. Mike Rice, who is heading the
Olympic security operation in San Diego.
"We are looking into everything out of the ordinary,"
a San Diego police officer working on the binational
security effort concurred.
4
That means investigating talk of 1,000 Iranians who
were supposedly training south of Ensenada, word that
a Puerto Rican independence fighter was headed for
Tijuana and other such tips that arrive at police
headquarters via anonymous telephone calls and letters
None of those tips so far has proven valid, but the
intensified scrutiny has resulted in confiscation of some
firearms headed into Mexico.
World's Busiest Crossing
Trying to head off terrorists who might want to make
use of the border here is an ambitious undertaking.
Even on the calm days, the border is a maelstrom of
activity. Every month, 3 million people pass through the
San Ysidro Port of Entry, the busiest international
border crossing in the world.
Pg. 3
Thousands of others illegally cross the 8-mile-long
border between San Diego and Tijuana. They pass
through beaches, barbed wire, rugged hills and canyons,
and many, if not most, are undetected by immigration
agents.
"Our concern is that a terrorist group will use our
border to cross into the United States," said Roberto
Sanchez Osorio, a security consultant to the Tijuana
Police Department. "There is a big concern too about
what may happen if a terrorist group tries to use our
border as a door to escape, maybe with hostages."
Under Mexican law, Sanchez Osorio said, it is a federal
crime to enter Mexico after committing a crime, in
another country. So, if someone attacks the Games In
Los Angeles and flees to Mexico, the problem becomes
the responsibility of Mexican federal police. U.S. police
agencies, of course, may not operate in Mexico.
'Should terrorists head for the border, Mexican
customs agents would immediately begin to halt traffic
at the border, so it would back up into the United States.
Tijuana police say they could have all highway exits
from the city sealed within three minutes of notification,
„and then could blanket the hillside slums, downtown
„streets and beaches with patrols.
¿City and state police each will have an additional 15
patrol cars and 25 to 30 officers this summer who could
be used for such an emergency operation.
... But Sanchez Osorio noted that Tijuana is not a very
good escape route for a criminal because, "there is only
.one road out to Mexicali (east). To the south, past
Ensenada, it goes into the desert and vou don't want to
escape through the desert."
Collaboration is nothing new on the border, where
San Diego police have maintained communication
lines to Mexico for the last 50 years. The San Diego
Police Department, Sheriff's Department and California
Highway Patrol all have liaison officers who make daily
or weekly trips across the border to trade information
with Mexican police on everything from stolen cars to
fugitives.
So, much of the Olympic planning boils down to
strengthening these relationships and working together
more closely-such as trading telephone numbers they
never got around to exchanging before.
More formally, the agencies plan to install a direct line
between the San Diego intelligence unit and the Tijuana
Police Department, which will serve as a command
center for local, state and federal police in Mexico during
the Games. To complete the communications chain, San
Diego police and sheriff's deputies will have a security
post at Fairbanks Ranch, where one equestrian event is
scheduled, and representatives in Los Angeles at the
Olympics security coordinating center.
The Olympic security plan submitted to the Baja
California state attorney general calls for increased
surveillance along the south and eastern borders of the
state and at bus stations, according to Sanchez Osorio.
He said the attorney general has not made a decision yet
on the plan.
The plan recommends that police take greater notice
of the hotel guest lists that now are routinely submitted
to them each day. The lists show the names, nationali-
ties and previous destination of the guests.
Security Tightened
Police and customs officials say inspections already
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WALL STREET JOURNAL
12 June 1984
Pg. 34
Israeli Inquiry for Benefit of Terrorists, Not Moralists
By ERIC M. BREINDEL
It is now official that two of the four
Palestinian Arabs who hijacked a commer-
cial bus in Israel in early April were killed
after having been taken into custody unin-
jured-and not as a consequence of the
Israeli army's successful assault on the hi-
· jacked vehicle. This is a matter of special
concern to Israeli authorities for reasons
generally ignored by the Western press.
A month-long inquiry into the incident
by outside experts appointed by the Israeli
Ministry of Defense was prompted by jour-
nalists' photographs taken during and im-
mediately after an elite military com-
mando unit stormed the bus and rescued
the passengers.
The photographs, initially barred from
publication by Israeli military censors, ap-
pear to show at least one of the hijackers-
since identified by members of his own
family living in the Israeli-occupied Gaza
Strip-alive and seemingly unharmed after
the raid.
At the time of the incident Israeli mili-
tary spokesmen maintained that two of the
hijackers were killed during the assault
(as was one Israeli passenger). The other
two, authorities insisted, died en route to a
hospital of injuries sustained during the
commando operation.
According to the official inquiry, how-
ever, the two Palestinians who survived
the military action were taken to a nearby
field for immediate interrogation and evi-
dently beaten to death.
This disclosure, a direct result of Is-
rael's decision to allow newsmen and pho-
tographers to witness the culmination of
the hijacking incident, is a source of great
distress to Jerusalem. But not because Is-
rael may be excoriated for brutality to-
ward captured terrorists in the editorial
columns of leading dailies in Paris, Lon-
don, New York and Washington. The Is-
raeli government has far more immediate,
and practical, concerns.
Israel has long upheld two principles
with regard to terrorists and terrorist inci-
dents. One principle frequently touted is
Jerusalem's adamant and consistent re-
fusal to negotiate with terrorists.
The second, which is seldom discussed
or even noted, is Israel's willingness to al-
low terrorists who surrender before and es-
pecially during a terrorist operation to be
taken alive and remain alive.
There is no death penalty in Israel for
terrorists. And over time Israeli authori-
ties have concluded that unless terrorists
are offered an incentive to surrender they
are likely to behave like kamikazes and
seek to take with them as many of the
civilian "enemy" as possible.
The number of potential hijackers and
saboteurs who surrender in Israel immedi-
ately upon detection, events that take
place so frequently that they are scarcely
deemed worthy of press attention, indi-
cates that those who are meant to under-
stand Israel's willingness to spare their
lives do indeed grasp that fact.
Of course, should Israel again be con-
fronted, as it has been once in Lebanon,
and as has the U.S., by Shiite Moslem ter-
rorists who are willing to give up their
lives in order to ensure a successful opera-
tion, this "incentive" strategy will be of lit-
tle help. The reappearances on the interna-
tional scene of kamikazelike terrorists is
an important development in international
terrorism. But European-style terrorists,
the Red Brigades in Italy, for example, as
well as others, generally have proved to be
concerned with remaining alive. They
have tended to establish reasonably reli-,
able escape routes, to disguise their identi-
ties and, when necessary, to endeavor to
surrender unharmed.
Israel continues to be confronted with
terrorists of the old school on a steady
basis. Thus the present consternation in
Jerusalem turns not only on a deplorable
breakdown in discipline but also on anxiety
that terrorists and would-be terrorists-
rather than, say, the editors of the London
Times-understand that what happened in
the bus-hijacking case is an aberration.
The Israelis nurture no illusion that ter-
rorism suddenly will cease someday soon.
Thus for now and the foreseeable future it
remains important that those who under-
take to commit these murderous "politi-
cal" deeds are aware, if only in the dim
recesses of their minds, that even upon
detection or capture death is not their in-
evitable fate. Israel wants its terrorist ene-
mies to know that with surrender their
lives will be spared as a matter of tactics,
not morality.
Mr. Breindel is a Washington-based cor-
respondent for a Public Broadcasting Ser-
vice program.
BALTIMORE SUN
13 June 1984
Pg. 9
Professor linked to terrorism jailed
A university professor alleged to
have been behind much of the guer-
rilla violence in Italy in the 1970s
today was sentenced to 30 years in
jail on murder and other charges at
the end of a trial of 71 persons
here.
Toni Negri, a leftist political sci-
ence professor at Padua Universi-
ty, fled Italy last September after
being freed from jail because he
was elected to parliament as a dep-
uty of the small Radical Party. He
is believed to be in France.
The Rome court passed sentenc-
es totaling more than 500 years on
55 defendants on charges including
subversion, setting up an armed
band and illegal possession of
weapons.
ESCAPE ROUTE ... Continued
have tightened at the Tijuana airport, but that a
videotape would give them a record of the 1,000 to 1,500
passengers who use the airport each day. About 40
flights enter and leave the airport daily, 19 of them
commercial.
Police, customs and immigration service officials in
the United States say they also are trying to increase
awareness among their agents of potential terrorists.
Border Patrol agents in the Chula Vista Sector, where
43,000 illegal aliens are detained each month, are
beginning to interview some of those detainees more
closely than usual, looking for anyone who, in the words
of Alan Eliason, chief agent in charge of the Chula Vista
Sector, "might fit the role of a terrorist."
Despite the preparations, police and immigration
agents acknowledge that the United States is an easy
country to enter. Much of the 1,933-mile border with
Mexico is unfenced and easily penetrated.
"Obviously, if somebody wants to come into this.
country and do harm, they could probably do it
relatively easily," Campbell said. "All you can do is the
very best based on intelligence reports. You can't have
an informant next to every burglar and nobody I know is
standing next to a guy planning to blow up somebody."
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SPECIAL EDITION - - TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WASHINGTON POST
23 May 1984 Pg. 23E
JACK ANDERSON
Violent Leftists
Aim to Terrorize
Olympic Games
Intelligence reports warn that the
radical Puerto Rican revolutionary
group known by the dread letters
FALN has set up mobile camps
across the Mexican border to train
terrorists for attacks on the Summer
Olympic Games in Los Angeles.
Ominously, the reports also pre-
dict that the FALN's violent leader,
William Morales, will soon be re-
leased from a Mexican prison and
delivered into the custody of leftist
authorities in the Tijuana area.
That's as close to Los Angeles as he
could get to set up terrorist head-
quarters without crossing into U.S.
jurisdiction.
The Soviet grievances against the
Los Angeles Olympics, meanwhile,
will encourage the terrorists to strike
all the harder, U.S. intelligence
sources fear. The FALN is led by
hard-line Marxists who ape the Mos-
cow line and tend, in the way of
young revolutionaries, to translate
propaganda into violence.
This group is regarded by the FBI
as the No. 1 terrorist threat to the
United States, and Morales is this
nation's most wanted terrorist. Ac-
cording to an intelligence document,
"the FALN has been responsible for
over 150 terrorist bombings in the
U.S. since its founding in 1973
. .. . [It] has developed an extensive
terrorist network stretching across
the U.S. and into Mexico. Morales is
also developing links with insurgent
movements in Central America."
My associate Jon Lee Anderson
spent most of a day with Morales in
the maximum security wing of Re-
clusorio Norte, a model prison on
the outskirts of Mexico City.
Morales is a determined revolu-
tionary and Marxist zealot driven at
once by idealism and hatred, a
would-be usurper who justifies him-
self as the avenger of terrible wrongs.
Yet he's the mere boss of a small
gang who seeks to stir up a mass
following.
. "I am a member of a revolutionary
movement which is at war with the
United States government," he told
my reporter.
Morales, 34, a slim man with a
coffee-colored complexion, is shock-
ing to look at. His mouth, chin and
both hands were blown off in a
bomb explosion at an FALN bomb
factory in New York in 1978. He has
a single digit that passes for a finger
on each stump. It's all he needs, ap-
parently, to feed himself and attend
to his basic needs.
With these stumps, he escaped
from the fourth floor of a New York
prison hospital.
Morales' dramatic escape occurred
on May 21, 1979. He disappeared
into the underground and, according
to an intelligence report, "began op-
erating between Mexico and the
U.S." Police located his wife, Dylcia
Pagan Morales, in Chicago and
traced her incoming calls from Mex-
ico.
The FBI tipped off the Mexican
authorities that Morales was plotting
to bomb a U.S .- Mexican legislative
conference. This led to a shootout in
the city of Puebla on May 28, 1983.
Morales was captured after his com-
panion fell dead in a hail of bullets.
A police officer also died in the ex-
change.
Morales was sentenced to 89 years
in prison, which would keep him out
of circulation for a long time. But
Anderson found Morales confident
that he would soon be freed. Tele-
graphed my reporter: "U.S. lawmen,
who want Morales extradited, might
do well to worry that he could slip
from their clutches in Mexico,"
Not long after I received this re-
port, my associate Donald Goldberg
learned from intelligence reports
that, indeed, Morales is expected to
be handed over to leftist authorities
in Tijuana. They are expected to
give him free rein to direct the ter-
rorist training in clandestine camps
in northern Mexico.
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL
12 May 1984 Pg. 1
Terrorism
common:
Kaplan
By JEFF SALLOT
Globe and Mail Reporter
OTTAWA - Every international
terrorist group known is present in
Canada, Solicitor-General Robert
Kaplan said yesterday.
"I'm not saying their targets are
in Canada," he said, "but they
develop their activities and their
support for what they're doing in
Canada."
Those activities include procur-
ing arms, recruiting members and
raising money, Mr. Kaplan told
reporters.
The Irish Republican Army, the
Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion and the Red Brigades of Italy
are among the international terror-
ist groups that have operated in
Canada, Mr. Kaplan said.
A great increase in terrorist ac-
tivity - both international and
domestic - is responsible for the
rise last year in the number of
warrants issued under the Official
Secrets Act for national security
wiretaps, buggings and other inter-
ceptions of private communica-
tions, Mr. Kaplan said.
In a report to Parliament on
Thursday, Mr. Kaplan said that he
issued 525 warrants in 1983 for wire-
taps, hidden cameras and electron-
ic bugs in security cases - an 18
per cent increase from the previous
year.
"In a few cases, advance intelli-
gence gathered by electronic sur-
veillance permitted us to head off
some incidents in 1983," Mr. Kap-
lan said yesterday.
He said he couldn't recall the
exact figures on terrorist incidents,
but his office said later that there
were 18 terrorist incidents in Cana-
da in 1982 and 1983.
Among the incidents classified as
terrorist acts were the bombing of :
an electronics plant that manufac --
tures missile-guidance systems, the
bombing of a West Coast video
pornography store and the murder
of a Turkish diplomat.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
JACK ANDERSON
WASHINGTON POST 29 May 1984
An Interview
In Mexican Jail
With a Terrorist
This nation's most wanted terror-
ist, William (No Hands) Morales, is
directing a guerrilla war against the
United States from a Mexican prison
cell. Intelligence sources believe his
main target will be the Summer
Olympic Games in Los Angeles.
My associate Jon Lee Anderson
recently spent a day with Morales in
the "maximum security, highly dan-
gerous wing" of the Mexican prison
Reclusorio Norte.
Morales is a deceptively relaxed,
soft-spoken man-congenial in re-
pose, intense when animated-who
routinely can give orders for shoot-
ings and bombings.
He learned his combat tactics on
the streets of east Harlem, where he
grew up; he picked up his politics
from the radical movements of the
1960g.
Now 34, he has developed a smol-
dering hostility toward the society
that spawned him, an animus so
deep that he is willing to sacrifice his
life in a futile struggle against the
U.S. power structure.
Morales is startling to look at. His
chin and mouth were disfigured by a
bomb that blew up in his face six
years ago. The same accident left
him with two stumps for arms, each
with a single, grotesque finger, where
a hand should be.
The terrorist leader talked inces-
santly about "imperalist domination"
by the western world. Yet his lan-
guage was more street talk than
Marxist dialectic. He left no doubt
that he was more interested in ac-
tion than theory.
Police reports confirm that Mo-
rales has managed to find plenty of
action. As a leader of the Puerto Ri-
can radical group known as FALN,
he has been involved in shootouts
and bombings. He made a daring es-
cape in 1979 from a fourth-floor win-
dow of a New York prison hospital.
The FBI has warned any agents who .
may encounter him: "Morales should
be considered armed, dangerous and
an escape risk."
In an earlier report, I cited intel-
ligence warnings that the FALN has
set up mobile camps just across the
Mexican border to train terrorists
for attacks on the Los Angeles
Olympics and that Morales may be
delivered into the custody of leftist
authorities in the Tijuana area. This
would put him as close to Los An-
geles as he could get and still be in
Mexico.
Morales has been locked up for
killing a Mexican policeman in a gun
battle; other charges could keep him
behind bars the rest of his life. Yet
he seemed confident that he would
get out. He hinted to my reporter
Jon Lee Anderson that a political
deal might be in the works.
Anderson is the first reporter
cleared by the FALN to meet Mo-
rales.
The screening process was elab-
orate, beginning with a contact on
the U.S .- Mexican border. Anderson
had to make two trips to Mexico
City, where he was put in touch with
a Trotskyite politician.
Next he was cleared by a left-wing
activist who once ran for president
of Mexico. Finally, Anderson was
taken to the prison by a woman who
is one of Morales' lawyers.
FALN literature portrays Morales
as a "political prisoner." He said all
FALN members take an oath that, if
imprisoned, they will declare them-
selves political prisoners. This means
they can't request parole, which
would imply that their crimes were
nonpolitical.
Morales talked about his escape
from U.S. custody and his subse-
quent capture in Mexico. He was
approached, he said, by the U.S.
Embassy. "Can you believe," he de-
manded, "they asked to see me when
. I first got here and offered to help
me?" He was incredulous.
Footnote: Morales made it clear
that his agreement to see my report-
er did not mean he liked my column.
BALTIMORE SUN
7 June 1984 Pg. 4
'Journalist' is linked to Costa Rican blast
SAN JOSE, Costa Rica (AP) - The
mysterious "Danish journalist" who
vanished after a bomb explosion killed
three persons at a May 30 news confer-
ence was in Central America for two
months before the incident, Costa Rican
immigration sources said yesterday.
A Swedish journalist who met him
three weeks before the explosion told
police the man spoke "very bad Danish,
but very good Spanish."
The man called himself Per Anker
Hansen, said he was a Danish reporter
and was using a Danish passport.
The Danish consul general, Palle
Paaby, said yesterday, "We do not know
who he is." Mr. Paaby said the passport
had been stolen in 1980. The real Per
Anker Hansen told reporters in Copen-
hagen he has never been to Central
America.
Costa Rican authorities on Monday
issued an international arrest warrant
for him.
The bomb exploded shortly after
Eden Pastora, leader of a Nicaraguan
anti-Sandinista rebel group . here,
opened a news conference on May 30 at
a guerrilla camp in Nicaragua, just
across the San Juan River from Costa
Rica. Mr. Pastora was among more
than two dozen people injured.
The
Costa
Rican
immigration
sources, who asked to remain anony-
mous, said an incomplete computer rec-
ord showed that a man using the stolen
passport traveled by air between San
Jose and Mexico City, but does not show
whether he was going to or from Costa
Rica. The passport also showed that he
traveled to or from Honduras by air on
March 26 and went to Panama overland
on March 28.
It also showed that he, crossed into
Costa Rica by land at the Pena Blanca
checkpoint April 14 and crossed over to
Nicaragua via Pena Blanca on April 19.
3.6
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM
26 JUNE 1984
FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
May 1984 Pg. 18
CLIPPINGS
Diplomats & Terrorism
"Letters sent top Italian news organiza-
tions purporting to come from Red Bri-
gades guerrillas today threatened the life of
another U.S. diplomat in the aftermath of
last week's killing of Leamon R.
Hunt .... "The militarist wing of the Red
Brigades claims the assassination of the
dirty guarantor American general Leamon
R. Hunt .... The militarist wing has an-
other American diplomat in its sights.' "
Reuters, February 20
"[U.S. Consul General Robert O.
Hommel was shot and wounded yesterday
in the city of Strasbourg, and a little
known group calling itself the Armed Le-
banese Revolutionary Faction claimed re-
sponsibility. [He] was described as being
in satisfactory condition .... The group said
Mr. Homme was 'already well known for
his activities as a member of the CIA.' "
Baltimore Sun, March 27
"U.S. embassy officials said yesterday that
they had run into a dead end in the kidnap-
ing of diplomat William Buckley and now
are considering moving the remaining per-
sonnel to a Marine-guarded compound. A
Western diplomatic source who asked not
to be identified said, 'Last night, several
American civilian employees did, indeed,
move into the compound.' ... In Washing-
ton, the Reagan administration said it
contacted Lebanese officials and Syria for
help in finding Buckley, who was abduct-
ed at gunpoint Friday morning while leav-
ing his West Beirut aparment. Three gun-
men forced Buckly, 55, the first secretary
of the embassy's political section, into a car
in front of his house, not far from the U.S.
embassy, and sped off."
Philadelphia Inquirer, March 18
"Secretary of State Shultz called in a panel
of 23 experts and government officials yes-
terday for a private briefing on a topic that
has plagued the recent conduct of U.S.
diplomacy: international terrorism."
New York Daily News, March 25
"The U.S. embassy {in Beijing] has re-
ceived information indicating that Islamic
terrorists have targeted the diplomatic
mission here for a bombing attack like
those against the American embassy and
U.S. Marine billet in Beirut. The bomb-
ing of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait Decem-
ber 12 and a recent warning by the myste-
rious Islamic Jihad organization has
prompted tightened security measures at
American diplomatic missions all over the
world in the last week, including the Beij-
ing embassy, which an American diplomat
described as having 'the worst security of
any embassy in the world.' ... The informa-
tion indicated terrorists have also targeted
the U.S. embassy in Paris .... Islamic Ji-
had ... claimed responsibility for the Octo-
ber 23 suicide bombings in Beirut ... and
for the bombing of the U.S. embassy in
Beirut last April, which left 63 people
dead ....
"One embassy source, noting the Brit-
ish mission here has also taken security
measures such as parking a truck around
the clock behind the locked gates of their
compound, was puzzled why the Ameri-
cans maintain a truck blockade only at
night."
Jonathan Broder in the Chicago Tribune
January 3
"Western embassies in East Berlin tight-
ened security yesterday after six East Ger-
mans succeeded in leaving the country by
staging a weekend sit-in at the U.S. em-
bassy .... The U.S. embassy, which nor-
mally admits visitors to its library and con-
sular section without identity checks,
moved its receptionist into an outer lob-
by."
Baltimore Sun
January 24
"Secretary of State George Shultz said:
"The cruel fact of the matter is that terror-
ism works. We have to arrange things so
that it is a tactic that we are able to frus-
trate.' "
Omaha World-Herald
March 13
"Senior U.S. officials agree that the new
anti-terrorism policy should have three ba-
sic components: protective measures, such
as increased embassy security; better intel-
ligence about terrorist groups and their
operations; and more aggressive military
and covert-action measures that can deter
terrorists from attacking Americans."
David Ignatius in the Wall Street Journal
March 12
"It is time for the U.S. government to
move decisively to protect its embassy em-
ployees in the world's areas of turmoil.
Security provisions should be realistically
reviewed in these regions. Embassy staffs
should be reasonably pared to those per-
sons who are absolutely necessary. They
should live under adequate protection of
U.S. armed personnel ....
"Even in quiet areas U.S. diplomats and
other Americans need to be vigilant ... In
areas of turmoil, such as Beirut, it is essen-
tial not to be foolhardy. After the March
16 kidnaping, American diplomatic per-
sonnel living in civilian apartments were
moved to a secure area to be guarded by
American troops. They ought to have been
there all along. As pointed out by Arthur
Goldberg ... , the State Department argu-
ment that protection of U.S. diplomats is
the duty of the host government breaks
down in areas where there is no effective
government.
Christian Science Monitor, March 28
"Some embassies remain vulnerable. Only
a 10-foot high iron gate separates the steel-
and-glass U.S. embassy in Madrid from
the main street-a mere 10 yards from the
building. Missions in London, Vienna,
and the Hague are similarly vulnerable."
Washington Post, December 13
"In the late 1960s, with the contemporary
beginning of diplomatic kidnapping and
attempted assassinations, the United States
failed to establish a consistent policy
for dealing with terrorism. For example,
when our ambassador to Brazil, Charles
Burke Elbrick, was kidnapped in 1969,
the U.S. put pressure on the Brazilian gov-
ernment to accede to the terrorists' de-
mand. The Brazilians complied and the
ambassador was released unharmed .... In
1973, eight Palestinians of the Black Sep-
tember Organization seized the Saudi Ara-
bian embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, and
captured five U.S. citizens including our
ambassador. Then President Richard Nix-
on, in an answer to a press conference ques-
tion, declared that the United States 'will
not pay blackmail.' The immediate result
was the slaughter of the hostages."
The Bureaucrat, Winter 1983-84
"According to the information provided
by antiterrorist specialists, we may expect
stepped-up atttacks on American diplo-
mats and diplomatic facilities in the fu-
ture. Even as the United States takes steps
to safeguard its embassies, installing more
sophisticated surveillance and communi-
cations and tightening perimeter security,
terrorism has made a career in the Foreign
Service riskier than ever."
John B. Wolf in Worldview
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS
29 April 1984
Playing embassy chess
It appears that Libya's
leader, Moammar Khadafy,
doesn't have enough to do in
the day-by-day governing of
his country.
In any case, Khadafy has taken
up several exciting hobbies. One is .
attacking or otherwise alienating
other countries.
The French, Jordanian and U.S.
embassies in Tripoli have been at-
tacked and most recently the Brit-
ish Embassy has been subjected to
coercion.
The national territories of Chad,
Egypt and Sudan have been at-
tacked or threatened. Fourteen na-
tions have suspended normal rela-
tions with Libya since 1980.
Terrorism is another active pur-
suit of Khadafy's. About the same
time that he seized power by mili-
tary coup in Libya in 1989, interna-
tional terrorism was beginning to
bloom. Khadafy bankrolled several
major terrorist movements of both
right and left extremists.
.. Meanwhile, Khadafy retains the
initiative by pronouncing threats
that attain worldwide notice.
An example occurred last
month.
: After Libyan aircraft attacked
Omdurman, Sudan, the United
States deployed two Air Force
AWACS airborne control aircraft to
Egypt. That was done at the re-
quest of the Sudanese and the
Egyptians to assist in defending
against further air attacks. Kha-
dafy then threatened to shoot down
the AWACS.
Last week, he announced a new
program of expanded help to the
Irish Republican Army. That move
was related apparently to the re-
cent act of terrorism carried out
from the Libyan Embassy in Lon-
don. In turn, that caused the British
government to break relations with
Libya.
The British attempted to adhere
scrupulously to the norms of diplo-
matic behavior instead of breaking
into the Libyan Embassy and col-
laring the murderer.
The particular point of interna-
tional law involved is called "extra-
territoriality." In simpler terms,
Glen W.
Martin
that is the immunity of foreign dip-
lomatic people and real estate from
specified local laws.
That principle has been evolving
for many centuries and most re-
cently was elaborated in the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Rela-
tions in 1963.
The British decision to conform
in this instance created a furor
within their own government. It
probably was a wise move, never-
theless, because Khadafy could re-
taliate against the British Embassy
in Tripoli, with or without a pre-
text.
Beyond the trading of embassies,
as rooks in a chess game, there is a
mass hostage possibility on both
sides. There are reported to be
about 4,000 Libyans in Britain and
8,000 Britons in Libya.
There are also some hundreds of
Americans remaining in Libya.
They have not been harassed since
the U.S .- Libyan diplomatic break a
few years ago. Those British decid-
ing to stay in Libya have that ex-
ample in mind.
Let us assume that those condi-
tions change - Khadafy does
have, and seems to enjoy, the repu-
tation of being unpredictable. Sup-
pose the British citizens are
abused. What next? Remember the
Falklands.
First, it would be disadvanta-
geous for Khadafy to withstand
world opinion by interfering with
an organized mass evacuation of
the British residing in Libya. So
evacuation is one possibility.
Second, however, British exper-
tise in the Libyan oil fields would
be missed, at least temporarily un-
til some other country with petro-
leum expertise stepped in.
If events take that turn, the Brit-
ish undoubtedly would make an ur-
gent plea for U.S. help. Remember
the Falklands. The main argument
could be based on the importance
of barring the way against Soviet
incursions in Libya.
That brings up another possibil-
ity. Khadafy, at any time, could be
in touch with Moscow to lay the
groundwork for Soviet technicians
to replace the British.
Egypt's late president, Anwar
Sadat, considered Khadafy to be a
madman. On the other hand, Kha-
dafy is quite aware no doubt that it
is just as dangerous (although
more difficult) to grab a bear by
the tail as it is a tiger. Letting go
can be perilous.
Even so, the fact that it took the
Kremlin one week to announce its
position on the British-Libyan con-
frontation shows the probability of
some Soviet-Libyan consultation.
British military action against
Libya would be handicapped by So-
viet support of Khadafy. The pres-
ence of 8,000 British subjects would
also constrain British military op-
erations.
In this column a little more than
two years ago, a lesson from the
Iranian hostage crisis was cited:
"To avoid or reduce the likeli-
hood of losing American citizens to
hostile capture and thereby pre-
serve U.S. freedom of action, an
evacuation of Americans from a
foreign country (Libya) should be
carried out expeditiously. .. . "
That is a lesson the British
should ponder today.
Libya has the smallest military
establishment of any nation along
the North African coast, except for
Tunisia.
Why then, Khadafy's continuous
pushing, adventuring and threaten-
ing?
He has three aces up his sleeve.
Militarily, he has the largest com-
bat air force among those nations.
Economically, he has the basis
for profitable international trade,
i.e., products to export and money
to buy imports.
Politically, he has honed terror-
ism into a feared international
weapon of blackmail and deter-
rence.
(c) 1984, Gien W. Martin
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
NEW YORK POST
22 May 1984 Pg. 2
U.S. ON ALERT FOR
IRAN TERROR WAVE
By NILES LATHEM
and URI DAN
THE U.S. was on the
alert today for a new
wave of Iranian terror-
ist attacks on American
military and diplomatic
installations in the Mid-
dle East.
: White House sources
said the Iranians may
unleash another cam-
paign of hit-run violence
to keep the U.S. out of
the Persian Gulf war
that continues to men-
ace vital oil shipping
lanes to the west.
The Iranian' govern-
ment-controlled news-
paper Keyhan yester-
day warned President
Reagan that "the only
thing he would be able
to offer the voters" by
intervening "would be
the corpses of American
soldiers."
The paper also urged
Iran's air force to bomb
power stations in Ku-
wait and Saudi Arabia
to force them to stop
supporting Iraq.
These
threats
prompted Reagan to ask
King Fahd of Saudi Ara-
bia to let U.S. warplanes
use airfields in his coun-
try if necessary.
U.S. and Israeli intelli-
gence sources told The
Post . last night such
preparations were nec-
essary because Iran
may launch a series of
kamikaze
attacks
against Americans.
The sources predicted
Iran wants to create an-
other Lebanon crisis to
prevent the U.S. from
stepping into the Gulf
war ..
American military in-
stallations in the area
are on top alert status,
sources said.
U.S. and Israeli intelli-
gence officials also fear
that unless tensions ease
soon, Iran may escalate
its Persian Gulf attacks
to include Saudi and
Kuwaiti oil facilities.
Saudi Arabia and Ku-
wait are backing Iraq in
the war and have helped
the Iraqis ship their oil
after one of its major
port facilities on the
Persian Gulf was de-
stroyed by Iran.
-
One Mideast expert
told The Post last night
that there is deep con-
cern in the White House
that Iranian pilots may
begin attacking -. the
Saudi oil facilities in
Ras Tanura.
Officials say that the
air defense system there
"leaves much to be de-
sired" and that it would
take an Iranian pilot
only ten minutes to
reach targets on the
Persian Gulf coast.
As fears of an escalat-
ing confrontation grew,
Reagan sent an urgent
letter to Fahd, urging
him to allow the U.S. Air
Force to use Saudi air
bases.
Officials said a deci-
sion has been made by
the National Security
Council
to .
approve
plans to send in as many
as 150 F-15 fighters to a
major air base near
Dhahran, the oil center
of Eastern Saudi Ara-
bia, if the Iran-Iraq war
continues to spread.
The planes would be
flown by
American
pilots who would have
orders to engage in di-
rect combat with Ira-
nian planes over the
Gulf if they refuse to
heed warnings .to turn
away, sources told The
Post last night.
Senior U.S. officals
said that the White
House made its first
offer of assistance to
Saudi Arabia about four
months ago.
But the Saudi royal
family has repeatedly
refused to let the U.S.
use its bases because of
the anti-American senti-
ment in the Arab world.
The Saudis fear that
an overt U.S. presence in
the area would inflame
the numerous
Shiite
Moslem communities.
Similar fears have.
been expressed in other
Persian
Gulf states
which have large Shiite
and Palestinian com-
munities.
The Saudi government
declared over the week-
end that its air force
would handle any esca-
laton of Iranian attacks.
But Israeli and U.S.
military analysts be-
lieve that the Saudi air
force, for all its sophisti-
cated equipment, is no
match for Iran's fa-
natical pilots, who are
battle-trained and also
use sophisticated U.S.
equipment.
NEW YORK POST
28 May 1984 Pg. 4
BRITS BOOT
KHOMEINI
HIT SQUAD
BRITAIN has kicked out
four men believed to be
members of an Iranian
hit squad under orders
to kill opponents of the
Ayatollah
Ruhollah
Khomeini.
Scotland Yard was'
tipped off about the
killer team - an Ira-
nian, a Moroccan and
two Algerians - by a
high-ranking
Iranian
naval :officer
who
wanted to defect. '
"The men were de-
ported after the Home
Secretary was satisfied
that they were involved
in preparing acts of ter-
rorism and that their
presence here was not
conducive to the public
good,"
the
Sunday
Times quoted a Home
Office spokesman as
saying.
Post Foreign Desk
No direct government
comment was available
immediately.
"Four men suspected
of being members of an
Iranian hit squad have
been
deported from
Britain," the report said.
"It is believed that they
had been ordered to kill
anti-Khomeini
dissi-
dents in London."
The Times said Ali
Ghorbani Far, an Ira-
nian, and Abdel Majed
Chraibi, a Morrocan
with French identity
papers, were deported to
France on May 17.
On May 18, two Alge-
rians, Abdel Liad Djaffar
and Hafid Regradj, were
deported to Algeria.
The
Sunday Times
said Col. Vahab Zade-
gan, head of the naval
section at the Iranian
embassy in London, con-
tacted British intelli-
gence about the alleged
hit men in February.
Zadegan stayed on the
job until three weeks
ago and now has asked
the Home Office for
British residence, the
paper said.
"I am a nationalist, and
although I think the coun-
try [Iran] needs our help,
there is a time when you
cannot safeguard your
country by sacrificing
yourself," The Sunday
Times quoted Zadegan as
saying.
"It is better to stay
alive and follow your
conscience."
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WASHINGTON POST
19 May 1984 Pg. 4
Libyan Allegedly
Sought Hit Man
From FBI Agent
By Joe Pichirallo
Washington Post Staff Writer
A Libyan student arrested last
week on charges of purchasing pis-
tols equipped with illegal silencers
asked an undercover FBI agent to
supply professional hit men to "elim-
inate defectors," a federal prosecutor
said in court yesterday.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Carol
Amon also said that Bashir Ali
Baesho, 36, a University of Mary-
land graduate student, had been im-
plicated in efforts by Libyan govern-
ment officials to purchase parts for
C130 military cargo planes and had.
apparently been a middleman in an
attempt by Libya to buy 30,000 ma-
chine guns.
Amon said FBI agents found
copies of a C130 parts list last week
in Baesho's car and in the apartment
of Mathi Hitewesh, who was arrested
with Baesho. Amon also said Baesho
told an undercover FBI agent that
"he was interested in eliminating
defectors and asked [the agent] if he
could do a hit in Britain."
Baesho and Hitewesh, 37, a Lib-
yan graduate student at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, were arrested
on charges of participating in a plot
to purchase three .45-cal. pistols
equipped with silencers from an FBI
agent posing as an illegal arms deal-
er.
Baesho and Hitewesh pleaded not
guilty to weapons-related charges
yesterday in federal court in Brook-
lyn and were being held under a $10
million bond each.
Richard C. Shadyac, a Libyan
government attorney, said in an in-
terview that Baesho and Hitewesh
were charged only with weapons vi-
olations and that any other govern-
ment claims about their alleged ac-
tivities were "unsubstantiated."
Hitewesh, who has been in this
country since 1980, is a member of
the Libyan military, and the Libyan
WASHINGTON TIMES
1 JUNE 1984 Pg.6
Terrorism controls endorsed
MADRID - European justice ministers yesterday
backed a proposal by Britain for action against for-
eign diplomats who abuse their diplomatic immunity
and take part in terrorist activities in host countries.
The proposal was included in a general resolution
calling for cooperation against terrorism and orga-
nized crime that was approved by the ministers at the
end of a conference in Madrid organized by the 21-
nation Council of Europe. It recommended setting up
an ad hoc commission to urgently study the
problems of terrorism and organized crime.
Britain's Home Secretary Leon Brittan had specifi-
cally urged European nations to bar diplomats
expelled from other countries for links with terror-
ism.
NEW YORK NEWS
19 May 1984 Pg. 6
Can't close
borders to
Libyans: U.S.
By JOSEPH VOLZ
and BARBARA REHM
Washington
(News Bureau)-De-
spite Libya's announcement that it
would set up suicide squads to kill
Libyan dissidents overseas, the State
Department said yesterday it was not
possible at present to close U.S. bor-
ders to all Libyans.
One official stressed that Libyan
visa applications to travel to the Unit-
ed"States were examined "very close-
ly," but added:
"Those who qualify are getting
them. We are trying to be as prudent as
possible, but pretty significant num-
bers of Libyans are still coming into
government is prepared to post his
bail, Amoh said.
In another development yester-
day, the State Department con-
demned threats by the Libyan gov-
ernment Thursday that suicide
squads were being created to hunt
down and kill Libyan dissidents
abroad.
The U.S. government will "deal
vigorously" with any such acts in this
country, a department spokesman
said.
the United States."
Officially, 1,722 Libyans, mostly stu-
dents, were given visas to enter this
country last year.
U.S. intelligence reports in the past
have claimed that Col. Moammar Kha-
dafy was sending hit squads to this
country to kill American officials.
The FBI has not been able to pin
down the reports, and there have been
no attacks on American officials by
Libyans.
An. FBI official said that because
Libya "has been identified as a state
that sponsors and utilizes terrorism the
FBI actively has been investigating
terrorist activities .by Libyan-spon-
sored groups and will continue efforts
to discover these activities."
ACCORDING TO the official Libyan
press agency, JANA, the Libyan gov-
ernment is setting up hit squads to kill
dissidents overseas, presumably in-
cluding the United States and Western
Europe.
"The masses have decided to form
suicide commandos to chase traitors,
fugitives and stray dogs wherever they
are and liquidate them physically and
without any hesitation,". a dispatch
from Tripoli said.
. In an unusually strong response,
the State Department warned that the
-United States "is prepared "to deal
vigorously with any such acts in the
U.S."
The plan to eliminate opposition to
Khadafy followed last week's abortive
uprising when 20 armed guerrillas.
fought with Libyan troops in an appar-
ent attempt to assassinate Khadafy in
Tripoli,
" 'STATE DEPARTMENT spokesman"
John Hughes called the threats
"another indication that Khadafy is
prepared to use terrorism as an instru-
ment of Libyan policy, Khadafy has
long history of supporting such acts of-
internationaltefr
earned for
international
40
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WALL STREET JOURNAL 11 MAY 1984
Pg. 30
Qadhafi's Not Always to Blame
By JERROLD D. GREEN
And AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON
By attempting to demonize Muammar
Qadhafi are we not running the risk of
canonizing him? Without a doubt, Col. Qa-
dhafi, the unguided missile of the Middle
East, is an attractive devil. His record is
replete with involvement in international
terrorism, anti-U.S. agitation, and gross
disregard for the norms of acceptable be-
havior. His current outrage in London is
only the most recent example of Libya's
tendency to trample on the inviolable stan-
dards of accepted international diplomatic
practice.
Yet to allow the form and flavor of Col.
Qadhafi's actions to obscure their content
has proven to be a dangerous and self-de-
ceiving pitfall. Mr. Qadhafi may be a bad
actor, but he is a "normal" political actor
all the same. His goals are rational and
self-evident-the pursuit of the Libyan na-
tional interest at the expense of those
whom he views as his competitors. Given
Libya's splendid isolation, the list of these
competitors is very long indeed. The obvi-
ous ones include Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Iraq and Libya's immediate neighbors on
all sides-Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Algeria,
Niger and Chad.
But rather than directly challenging for-
midable states like Egypt, for example,
Col. Qadhafi astutely prefers to mount
challenges by proxy. To bomb Khartoum is
to indirectly bomb Cairo. But why pick on
the Sudan? Unlike many in Washington
who still attribute Middle East dust storms
to computers in Moscow, the colonel recog-
nizes the challenges confronted by Gaafar
el Nimeiri in his own backyard. Mr. Qad-
hafi does not create turmoil, he exploits it.
Sudan is a country rife with ethnic and re-
ligious cleavages-the north, largely Mus-
lim, and the south, predominately black
African and animist, subsist in an environ-
ment of active hostility and mistrust. Col.
Qadhafi's intervention may exacerbate the
existing situation, but it also threatens to
mask the very real contradictions that
plague the Sudan and countries like it in
the Third World. While the visitor to Khar-
toum is regaled with tales of Col. Qadhafi's
barbarous challenge to Sudanese sover-
eignty, this sovereignty is being much
more seriously eroded by the Sudanese
themselves.
Although the road to Omdurman is lit-
tered with sightseers eager to witness
bomb craters emplaced by a Libyan jet,
the South continues to fester and Islamici-
zation is blithely pursued, An Islamic pe-
nal code will not bring an end to insurrec-
tion in the South, nor will curtailment of
Libyan adventures. Rather, the situation
demands the same type of resolution that
has eluded the hapless Lebanese. Ethnic
problems are political. They are elusive
and frustrating. Looking for Libyan MiGs
is far easier than sharing political power.
But the stakes for which Gaafar el Nimeiri
Is playing demand genuine concessions
and negotiations rather than demon-mon-
gering and mythologizing. In a perverse
sort of way, Mr. Qadhafi may have done
:he West a favor by highlighting a tenuous
situation in the Sudan that will not go
away. The tragedy is that we may be so
incensed by the activities of this North Af-
rican colonel that we end up perceiving the
region in his terms rather than in a context
that realistically reflects the situation on
the ground.
Mr. Qadhafi's actions cannot be ig-
nored. Given the will, there are remedies
for the "Libyan problem," ranging from
heightening the country's diplomatic and
political isolation to curtailing purchases of
Libyan oil and restricting sales of irre-
placeable oil-extraction equipment. How-
ever, Col. Qadhafi's penchant for exploit-
ing existing social and political problems
should not so infuriate us that they make
Libya one of the centerpieces of American
foreign policy. This fear seems reasonably
realistic given the born-again prominence
of terrorism in U.S. foreign policy formula-
tion. That terrorism is never far from the
utterances of policy makers in Washington
reveals a sad tendency to substitute pot-
boiler plots for the real world that is much
more complicated than the terror-czar sce-
narios that seem to proliferate during elec-
toral campaigns.
Terrorism is a significant international
problem. But to elevate it to a position in
which it is a primary determinant of our
foreign policy benefits terrorists as much
as those who rail against them. At a time
when the American image in the Middle
East is a source of derision and even con-
tempt, it is doubly important that our pol-
icy reveals an interest in real problems
and concerns rather than chimerical ones.
Genuine problems like the plight of the
Palestinian people, the future of Lebanon,
the viability of Israel, the stability of Jor-
dan, the Gulf war and Afghanistan deserve
at least as much attention as the deadly
mischief of the isolated Muammar Qad-
hafi.
Messrs. Green and Norton are political
scientists at the University of Michigan
and the U.S. Military Academy, respec-
tively. Mr. Green recently returned from a
visit to the Sudan. The opinions expressed
are solely their own.
MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
13 May 1984
Libyan threat to
British expats
By our Diplomatic Staff
A LIBYAN newspaper, Green
March, organ of the country's revolu-
tionary committee, this week threat-
ened violent reprisals against British
people in Libya if the British au-
thorities did not release a number of
Libyan students being held in Lon-
don and Manchester on charges of
being involved in bomb attacks in
Britain against anti-Gadafy Libyans.
At the same time the official news
agency said that a terrorist gang
which it claimed had British Govern-
ment backing had been intercepted
after it had crossed the frontier into
Libya from Tunisia. Two members of
the gang were said to have been
captured and one killed,
Green March is normally more
hectic in tone than the other official
newspapers in Libya but the fact
that its pronouncements were given
international publicity by the official
news agency, Jana, seems to indicate
a hardening of position by Colonel
Gadafy, who at the time of the
Libyan Embassy siege in London
promised that the 8,000 British
people now in Libya would be
completely safe.
The newspaper said that "If Brit-
ish courts bring false charges against
Libyan students and tourists and
imprison them, it will make the
revolutionary committees react vio-
lently against English people resi-
dent in the Jamahiriya. If Libyan
tourists and . students studying in
Britain are not released, the British
Government will bear responsibility
for any act the revolutionary com-
mittees carry out against the
English."
Armed police guarded Manchester
magistrates' court last week when
three Libyans were remanded on
bombing charges and there were
similar precautions at Lambeth
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WALL STREET JOURNAL 17 May 1984 Pg. 35
Libya May Resume Killingsof Dissidents Overseas
By YOUSSEF M. IBRAHIM
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
TRIPOLI, Libya-Libya is threatening
to revive death-squad activity against dis-
sidents living in Western Europe and the
U.S., a prospect that is causing alarm
among Western diplomats and business ex-
ecutives here.
In announcements broadcast over state-
run radio and television over the past three
days, the Libyan government said it is pre-
paring to recruit and train assassination
teams to eliminate all opposition to the re-
gime of Libyan leader Muammar Qad-
hafi.
The resumption of such suicide squads,
after a three-year lull in attacks against
dissidents abroad,
appears to be aimed
partly at avenging
last week's fighting
between 20 armed
dissidents and Lib-
yan security forces
here in the Libyan
capital. The fighting
is believed to have
been the biggest
open rebellion in
Tripoli against the
Qadhafi
regime
Muammar Qadhafi
since it came to
power 15 years ago.
Libya's determination to resume death-
squad activity abroad threatens to worsen
an already difficult relationship with West-
ern governments doing business here.
Many West European nations continue to
resist calls by the Reagan administration
for a political and economic boycott of
Libya.
The U.S. itself may be vulnerable be-
cause, despite its boycott on Libyan oil im-
ports, American companies still produce
and market half of Libya's crude-oil out-
put, estimated at 1.1 million barrels a day.
In addition, European diplomats say there
are nearly 1,000 Americans living in Libya,
despite a Reagan administration ban on
travel there.
Libya has in the past resorted to the ar-
bitrary arrest of business executives living
here to force the release of Libyans ar-
rested abroad. This campaign of intimida-
tion is widely expected to be revived if
death-squad activity resumes and some of
the assassins are arrested overseas.
By all accounts, the severe reaction of
the Libyan government to last week's
fighting here is the most virulent cam-
paign in years against opponents of the
Qadhafi regime. Diplomats here believe
that the government fully intends to liqui-
date all opposition, including dissidents
who live in places such as Egypt and Su-
dan. The Libyan media also is openly call-
ing for the overthrow of Sudan's president,
Gaafarel Nimeiri, whom Libya accuses of
having helped train the dissidents involved
in last week's fighting in Tripoli.
Internal Opposition
U.S. officials in Washington said that
the fighting underscored what they consid-
ered to be growing internal opposition to
Col. Qadhafi. At the same time, Britain's
decision to sever diplomatic relations af-
ter a British policewoman was killed out-
side the Libyan Embassy in London indi-
cates Tripoli's increasing political · isola-
tion.
Yet Col. Qadhafi apparently isn't wor-
ried that Libya's image abroad might be
tarnished further by the revival of death
squads. "I don't think he cares at all about
world opinion," one Western diplomat here
said. "This is an armed challenge. (Last
week's fighting) has had too much atten-
tion here in Tripoli and he cannot let it go
at that."
Col. Qadhafi also doesn't appear to be
concerned that Western companies will
pull out of the country.
Western European executives continue
to populate Tripoli hotels because of lucra-
tive business opportunities here. Although
the country's oil revenue has plunged 50%
since 1980 because of the world oil glut and
lower production, Libya still has about $10
billion in revenue a year from oil. That is
more than enough to trigger competition
among Europeans to sell goods to this
country. Despite official antagonism to-
ward the West, Libya has shown a distinct
preference for buying Western goods and
food.
West European diplomats here said
they prefer to maintain relations with
Libya as long as possible. "We don't want
to push them to the edge as long as we can
help it," one ambassador said. He added
that unless there is flagrant resumption of
killing Libyans living in his country, his
government isn't prepared to heed the
Reagan administration's call for an eco-
nomic boycott.
"The Americans should practice what
they preach first," the ambassador said,
referring to the continued presence of
some U.S. oil companies here, including
Occidental Petroleum Co. of Los Angeles
and Marathon Oil Co., a unit of Pittsburgh-
based U.S. Steel Corp. Both Exxon Corp.
and Mobil Corp. have pulled out of Libya
in the past 21/2 years, although Mobil still is
attempting to obtain compensation for its
operations in the country from the Libyan
government.
Libya appears to be making a broader
more determined effort to train assassina-
tion squads than it did in 1980 and 1981,
when dozens of Libyan dissidents were
shot to death on the streets of London,
Rome, Paris and other European capitals.
Government broadcasts here described the
formation of "suicide incubators" to re-
cruit and train volunteers willing to die in
order to "exterminate the enemies of the
revolution abroad and confirm that Britain
and America will never be able to protect
(dissidents)."
Such suicide tactics have been used by
Iran and Syria, most notably in Beirut and
Kuwait last year.
Mobilizing Support
Public support in Libya for the death
squads has been mobilized through so-
called peoples congresses, which have
been held throughout the country to adopt
resolutions calling for the elimination of
Libyan dissidents abroad. The campaign
has reached such a frenzy that most nor-
mal activity has stopped-many markets
and other businesses have been closed-so
Libyans can attend the congresses.
The government also has launched a
media campaign detailing the alleged con-
spiracy that led to the fighting between
dissidents and government forces last
week. Libyan officials asserted that the 20
dissidents were funded and trained by the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and Brit-
ish security forces with the connivence of
Egypt, Sudan and "Arab reactionary re-
gimes" to destabilize Libya with a cam-
paign of bombing and armed assaults.
The alleged plot reportedly was uncov-
ered when three infiltrators were caught at
the Libyan-Tunisia border on May 6. One
of them confessed that they were supposed
to link up with a group of armed men holed
up in an apartment building in central
Tripoli. Security forces then raided the
building, and at least 12 of the dissidents
were killed.
LIBYAN THREAT ...
Continued
when two others were remanded on
charges of conspiracy to cause
explosions.
Two British people are already in
detention in Libya. No charges have
yet been brought against Mr Douglas
Leddingham, British Caledonian's
manager in Tripoli, and Mr John
Campbell, who works for an oil
company.
Scotland Yard is believed to be
close to naming the person suspected
of killing WPC Yvonne Fletcher, who
was shot from the Libyan People's
Bureau in London. Commander Bill
Hucklesby, head of the anti-terrorist
branch, was reported to be confident
that he would soon have enough
evidence to name the killer.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 28 May 1984 Pg. 5
Americans in Beirut threatened
From Inquirer Wire Services
BEIRUT, Lebanon - More guards
were posted at the American Univer-
sity here as foreign teachers and U.S.
Embassy workers were warned about
a kidnapping threat from a funda-
mentalist Muslim Shiite group,
sources said yesterday.
In eastern Lebanon, three Israeli
soldiers were killed and two were
wounded in an ambush of their vehi-
cle near the Syrian-Lebanese border.
The Israeli military command in Tel
Aviv said the killers fired machine
guns and rocket-propelled grenades
as the patrol approached the village
of Kamed el-Loz. The deaths brought
to 14 the number of Israeli soldiers
killed in Lebanon this year.
The threat to American University
faculty members came from an Irani-
an-allied group called Hezbollah, or
Party of God, and. was transmitted
from intelligence sources to the U.S.
Embassy, according to university
sources who asked not to be identi-
fied.
One said the communique from the
embassy indicated that the kidnap
operation was to be carried out by
guerrillas, some with explosives
wrapped around themselves, and "in
case these elements are hit by fire,
they and the people they have kid-
napped will be killed by the explo-
sion."
About 50 Americans and other
Westerners are employed at the uni-
versity.
U.S. Embassy spokesman John
Stewart said, "I can confirm that
there was an intelligence report that
there was some sort of threat"
against American University teach-
ers "and other Americans.".
Although no increased security ar-
rangements were noted at the U.S.
Embassy, which is already guarded
by 100 Marines, a professor said extra
guards were posted at faculty hous-
ing units on the American Universi-
ty campus.
He said that the embassy communi-
que said the kidnap operation was to
coincide with an "occasion of cele-
bration" and that faculty members
were advised against attending the
university's annual "field day" of
athletic contests on campus yester-
day.
The threat to Americans in Beirut
came at a time when many were
already concerned about security in
the mostly Muslim western sector of
the city. Since the area was taken
over by Muslim militias on Feb. 6,
four Americans have been kid-
napped.
Only American University engi-
neering professor Frank Regier has
been released. Still missing are Jer-
emy Levin, Beirut bureau chief for
Cable News Network; William Buck-
ley, a political officer at the embassy,
and the Rev. Benjamin Thomas Weir,
a Presbyterian minister.
Responsibility for the kidnappings
was claimed by Islamic Jihad, a shad-
owy Shiite Muslim movement that is
believed to have ties to Iran.
Hezbollah, with headquarters in
the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon,
supports Iran's spiritual leader, Aya-
tollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and has
militia units stationed along the
Green Line, which separates the
Muslim and Christian sections of
Beirut.
The ambush of Israeli troops, con-
firmed by the Israeli army, occurred
early yesterday near the Israeli-Syri-
an cease-fire line in the Bekaa Val-
ley.
Three soldiers were killed and two
Were wounded in the attack. It took
place in a region in which Israeli and
Syrian occupation troops are posi-
tioned less than a mile apart.
The soldiers were traveling in two
Jeeps when they were attacked south
of the town of Kamed el-Loz, 20 miles
southeast of Beirut, an Israeli gov-
ernment spokesman said in Tel Aviv.
Israeli forces occupying southern
Lebanon have come under repeated
attack since their invasion in June
1982 to drive Palestinian guerrillas
from Israel's northern border. Syria
has occupied northern and eastern
Lebanon since putting down the
1975-1976 Muslim-Christian civil war.
Yesterday's deaths brought to 14
the number of Israelis killed in Leba-
non this year and to 580 the number
killed since June 1982.
OMAHA WORLD HERALD
16 May 1984
DIPLOMATIC
#1984 Copley News Service
HOSTAGE
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
R. O.A. NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT
May 1984 Pages 11,12
The Ten Lessons of Lebanon
By O. H. Rechtschaffen
'n assessing U.S. involvement in
Lebanon the true significance is being
obscured by the political turmoil sur-
rounding the withdrawal of our Marines
from Beirut.
Stripped of political demagogy,
Lebanon is a classic example of what a re-
cent Pentagon study called warfare "on
the cheap." There are at least 10 lessons
to be learned from the Lebanese ex-
perience:
1. The slaughter of our Marines in
Beirut is directly attributable to our
underestimation of international
terrorism. Terrorism is not an abberation
but "a new kind of warfare." Most ter-
rorist attacks are planned, financed and
coordinated by communist and Islamic
governments as an instrument of national
policy. The new strain of terrorism is no
longer random, but carefully or-
chestrated. The Kamikaze-type assaults
demonstrated that the attackers worked
from detailed operational and intelligence
plans.
2. For the Soviet Union terrorism is a
low-risk operation that holds greater
promise of accomplishing their goal of
world domination than direct confronta-
tion. Syria has become a Soviet surrogate
and has apparently chosen the same path
as Cuba did 15 years ago. The Soviet
Union and radical Arab states have no in-
terest in a unified Lebanon unless that
country is under their complete domina-
tion. The ultimate outcome of this policy
is fragmentation and division. The
slaughter in Lebanon will not only con-
tinue but accelerate. The Christian
population is in mortal danger and is
already furning to Israel for protection.
3. Moderate Arab states do not dare to
come to an accommodation with Israel.
Professor O. Rechtschaffen
is professor and Chairman of
the Public Justice Depart-
meni at St. Mary's Univer-
sity in San Antonio. He was
Associate Professor of
Political Science at the Air
Force Academy when he
retired after 23 years in the
Air Force. This is his second
article for this report. He
wrote on terrorism in the last
issue.
Terrorist bomb destroyed most of U. S. embassy in Beirut. Official U. S. Marine Corps photo.
President Sadat of Eygpt was gunned
down. Jordan's King Hussein has been
repeatedly threatened with assassination
and war. Even Arafat has become a target
because Islamic radicals consider him
"too moderate." Terrorists have failed to
destroy Israel but have succeeded in im-
posing a reign of terror over the entire
Arab world.
Dr. Helms of the Brookings Institute
correctly points out that "the greatest fear
of the moderate Arab leaders is not that
Iran will attack the oil fields with
airplanes but that the Ayatollah Khomeini
will undermine their political legitimacy."
Radical countries such as Iran, Iraq,
Syria and Libya are intent at spreading
their particular strain of Islamic
extremism with fire and sword over the
entire region. The perception that these
countries could be persuaded to pursue
policies of moderation is wishful thinking
and dangerously illusionary.
4. Terrorism can be defeated as the
Israeli pre-emptive strike of 1982 clearly
demonstrated. As a result, the world's
most violent terrorist group, the PLO, is
in disarray. Unfortunately, misguided
Western nations in coordination with
leftist-oriented and communist govern-
ments coerced Israel into abandoning its
imminent victory over Soviet-supported
and Syrian-directed terrorism in Lebanon.
The lack of support for a country that was
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
TEN LESSONS OF LEBANON. .. Continued
American medical students greeted 82nd
Airborne sergeant with relief when troop
landed at Grenada to topple Soviet-backed
regime. Courtesy of Department of Defense
Still Photo Collection.
willing to sacrifice its soldiers to eradicate
the spectre of international terrorism in
Lebanon resulted in the dispatch of U.S.
Marines, with tragic results.
In an open letter to President Reagan
(The New York Times, February 27, 1983)
more than 130 retired generals and
admirals correctly noted that ". . . Israeli
ports and bases would be open instantly to
U.S. forces in the event of a serious
strategic threat to the Middle East. Israel
constitutes the only U.S. ally capable of
immediate parry to a serious thrust
against free world interests in this theater.
And, Israel's continued sharing of vital in-
telligence on Soviet operations constitutes
the other essential element of U.S. securi-
ty in the Middle East."
5. Terrorist tactics, as employed in
Lebanon, permit radical countries to
attack the free world in a manner if done
overtly, would ordinarily constitute war
and justify a military response under
international law. As a result the U.S.
must be prepared and willing to retaliate
by bombing vital targets of nations in-
volved in organizing terrorist outrages.
According to Washington sources the Ad-
ministration is now asking the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to find military answers to
terrorist attacks.
6. If the Beirut attacks are any indica-
tion, terrorists will be employing more
lethal weapons in the future inflicting
heavy casualties and causing massive
destruction. A recent Pentagon study
correctly points out that combating
terrorism "requires an active policy. A
reactive policy only forfeits the initiative
to the terrorists." No precautions,
regardless how elaborate, can assure com-
plete safety if terrorists are willing to die
for their cause. The best we can hope for
is to reduce the potential destructiveness
of terrorism.
-
RAPITO
la vite
GENTIALE NATO
G.LE BEERI F
A victim of terrorist kidnapping, Brigadier General James L. Dozier displays newspaper
announcing his release by Italian forces. Courtesy Department of Defense Still Photo
Collection.
7. Our experience in Lebanon is a dire
warning that the U.S. must adopt new
strategies and tactics to fight terrorism.
The pre-emptive strike in Grenada and
our support of counter-insurgency forces
in Cental America, Southeast Asia and
Africa are the beginning of a long overdue
change in U.S. policy.
8. The aborted Iranian rescue mission
and the debacle in Lebanon also raise
serious questions about the ability of the
United States to conduct successful
military missions. U.S. News and World
Report (Feb 27, 1984) charges that "a
confusing command structure
sometimes leaves everyone and no one
responsible for the success or failure of a
military operation." Newsweek (Feb 27,
1984) raises disturbing questions about the
"absence of decision making" in
Washington.
The United States must:
· Prepare "U.S. military forces to
defend against and counter terrorism."
(Pentagon Study, Dec. 1983)
. Streamline the military command
structure.
. Increase the authority of the chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order
to reduce and eventually eliminate in-
terservice rivalries in combat situations.
· Provide for a more integrated in-
telligence service.
9. Events since World War II - in
China, Korea, Vietnam and now Lebanon
- clearly demonstrate that American
military intervention will fail unless two
basic conditions prevail:
. The clear and unquivocal support
of Congress and the American people.
. A total commitment by the people of
the countries under attack. We cannot
and should not commit U.S. military per-
sonnel to fight the battles of other people
who themselves are unwilling to make
sacrifices and carry the major burden of
such conflicts.
The only exceptions would be in cases
where vital U.S. security interests are at
stake.
10. A major terrorist objective is to
create an atmosphere of chaos, confusion
and fear. Regardless how intense and
ruthless terrorism becomes, we must not
panic. If we do, terrorists will have
accomplished one of their major goals. In
many ways terrorists are weak and
vulnerable. Their defeats far outnumber
their victories. Many groups like the Red
Brigades, Baader-Meinhof, Turkish
terrorists, the PLO and others have been
weakened or neutralized. Terrorism
cannot destroy a powerful nation like the
U.S., but it may cause mass paranoia and
give rise to a siege mentality. The success
or failure of terrorism will be largely
determined by the willingness of the free
world to confront and combat it. A policy
of appeasement, as events in Lebanon
clearly demonstrated, will give impetus to
an acceleration of terrorism on world-
wide basis.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
Middle East Policy Survey
a confidential bi-weekly report from Washington and the Middle East
April 20, 1984
No. 102
"EXECUTIVE BRANCH
MOVING AGAINST IRAN
Two recent National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) signed by President Reagan
are seen as preparing the groundwork for a more confrontational US stance against Iran.
NSDD 138, which underscores the Administration's renewed concern about "state supported"
international terrorism is aimed at the two major practitioners of it, Iran and Libya,
according to senior Administration officials. While Libya's role in international
terrorism continues to be a source of major concern - as evidenced again this week by
events in London - it is potential Iranian direct and indirect aggression in the Gulf
arena that is of far greater concern to Administration policymakers.
Administration officials insist that NSDD 138 provides only an outline for a long-
term effort aimed at confronting the growing terrorism problem. As such, they argue
it should be viewed as separate and apart from attempts to counter Iranian military
moves in the Gulf. However, they admit since Iran looms large in both NSDD's, it is
a natural focal point of both. For example, the other earlier NSDD, which provides
the basis for enhanced US cooperation with Gulf states, contains specific reference
to the Administration's new anti-terrorist posture.
Moreover, it is the specter of possible military action against Iran that has
caused a number of State and Defense Department officials to dissent from both NSDDs.
"McFarlane and his people at the NSC are motivated by a desire for revenge against
Iran, " claims one State Department insider. Another argues, "They [ the NSC] are
looking for an excuse to take military action against Iran." In fact, according to
aides close to George Shultz, the Secretary of State firmly sides with McFarlane in
the latter's "get tough" approach with Iranian-backed terrorism. "I have no doubt that
if Iran launched a terrorist attack against a US facility, both Shultz and McFarlane
would recommend a military response, " says one Shultz aide.
This aide traces Shultz' "profound change in attitude" to last April's terrorist
bombing of the US embassy in Beirut. It was this attack more than the October bombing
of Marine headquarters that affected Shultz' outlook. However, Shultz was further
motivated when the French responded to the simultaneous attack on their military post
in Beirut while the US did nothing.
To drive the point home within the State Department, Shultz had Ambassador Robert
M. Sayre, Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, lecture a recent senior staff
meeting on the perils of state supported terrorism. At the same time, key State aides
began receiving daily terrorism reports which, according to Department insiders, mark
the first time US intelligence on world-wide terrorism has been brought together in
one place for their information. [Recent reports showing a direct link between Libyan
strongman Qaddafy and a series of terrorist attacks in Britain have caused some State
Department officials to question why London had not taken preemptive steps that could
have averted this week's siege. ]
Not surprisingly, these reports show preponderance of Middle East based terrorism.
According to informed sources, recent reports have begun to relay information on terrorist
training centers in Iran. This has buttressed the view already held by some State
Department officials that a direct military response to an Iranian terrorist attack
has become more likely.
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SPECIAL EDITION - - TERRORISM - - 26 JUNE 1984
LOS ANGELES TIMES 24 May 1984 Pg. 1
25 Indicted in Israeli Probe
of Jewish Terrorist Group
By NORMAN KEMPSTER, Times Staff Writer
JERUSALEM-Twenty-five Is-
raelis were indicted Wednesday on
charges of murder, attempted mur-
der, conspiracy to destroy religious
shrines and a variety of lesser
crimes resulting from a four-year
campaign to terrorize and intimi-
date Arabs.
The national prosecutor's office
filed the charges 27 days after police
made their first arrests of members
of a Jewish underground that oper-
ated primarily in the Israeli-occu-
pied West Bank of the Jordan River.
Six of the suspects were accused
of first-degree murder, which car-
ries a maximum penalty of life in
prison here. All 25 were charged
with belonging to a "terrorist or-
ganization," an offense usually in-
voked by Israeli authorities against
Arabs belonging to the Palestine
Liberation Organization.
The Jerusalem magistrate who
presided over the indictments re-
fused to lift a court order prohibiting
publication of the names of the
suspects. However, the group is
known to include several prominent
West Bank settlers and at least a
few high-ranking officers in the
Israeli army reserve.
-Rabbi Moshe Levinger, a leader
of the 17-year campaign for Jewish
settlement in the once all-Arab
West Bank city of Hebron, has been jailed since May 13
connection with the investigation. It was not known if
the: charismatic Levinger is among those formally
charged ..
The Justice Ministry announcement said the suspects
e charged with committing and conspiring to commit
Criminal acts with the aim of inflicting revenge on the
rob population and frightening it."
The case has touched off a bitter debate in Israel. Most
government officials and many Jewish settlement
leaders have condemned the actions of the under-
Anind. But other Israelis, including a deputy Speaker of
Knesset (Parliament) have argued that Jewish
attacks on Arabs are a proper response to PLO-spon-
spred terrorist assaults on Jews.
At least some of the accused have announced plans to
mi for the Knesset in the July 23 elections on a ticket
caled "The Underground" as a test of public sentiment.
Toe technique is reminiscent of one used frequently by
the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland.
"The murder charges resulted from a submachine-gun
and hand-grenade attack last summer on the campus of
the Islamic College in Hebron in which three students
were killed outright and 33 injured. One of the wounded
died later.
Other charges included planting bombs in the cars of
three elected mayors of West Bank cities on June 2,
1980. Two of the mayors were maimed, and an Israeli
policeman was blinded while trying to defuse the third
bamb. The Maariv newspaper quoted unnamed suspects
as. saying they had intended to attack three other
mayors but were unable to do so for a variety of reasons.
Targeting of Shrine and Mosque
Potentially the most serious charge is conspiracy to
blew up the Dome of the Rock shrine and Al Aqsa
Mesque on Jerusalem's Temple Mount. The site is
considered the third-holiest in Islam, and any attack on
it: surely would have produced a wave of violence
throughout Muslim countries.
The indictment accuses the suspects of stealing large
quantities of arms and explosives from the Israeli army
and storing them at various locations throughout the
country.
In the Maariv interview, published just hours before
the indictments were announced, the suspects said they
formed the underground because they did not believe
that the Israeli government was adequately protecting
Jewish settlers against Palestinian violence. The sus-
peets also said their activities were similar to the actions
ot Jewish organizations-including those once led by
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and former Prime
Minister Menachem Begin-that employed terrorist
tactics in the fight against the British occupiers of
Palestine before Israel achieved independence.
Some supporters of the suspects went even further.
At-a rally Tuesday, Deputy Knesset Speaker Meir
Cobren-Avidov said, "We have to tear out the eyes and
guts of the Arabs."
Speakers at the rally complained that the government
has not taken adequate measures against Arabs who
attack Jews, even though the rally was held one day
after an Israeli military court sentenced four young
Palestinians to life in prison and four others to terms of
between 10 and 25 years for the murder of Aharon
Gross, a 19-year-old Israeli religious student.
According to Wednesday's indictment, the suspects
intended to avenge the killing of Gross, who was
stabbed last summer in the Hebron marketplace, when
they shot up the college in Hebron.
In a speech to the Knesset this week, Shamir assailed
the underground as "a small group of people who were
tempted into taking this crooked path."
"The Israeli government, and it alone, is responsible
for Israel's security," Shamir said in rejecting the claim
that the underground acted to protect Jewish lives.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 30 May 1984 Pg. 8
Israeli guilty in bomb plot
United Press International
TEL AVIV - A member of an un-
derground Jewish terrorist network
pleaded guilty yesterday in the at-
tempted bombing of five' Arab buses
in East Jerusalem a month ago.
Israel Radio said Noam Yinon, 27, a
resident of the Keshet settlement on
the annexed Golan Heights, admitted
hauling explosives for the terrorists.
He had been charged initially with
attempted murder and sabotage.
The trials of 26 men also suspected
of being members of the under-
ground network were scheduled to
start June 17, according to Israel tele-
vision. Most of the charges involved .
a series of attacks against Palestin-
ians in the West Bank in the last four
years.
Yinon's trial was separated from
the others' after an apparent plea
bargain. He will be sentenced next
week.
In a related case, an Israeli newspa-
per disputed Defense Minister Moshe
Arens' statement that he had been
unaware of the fate of two Palestin-
ian bus hijackers who were beaten to
death last month while in captivity.
The tabloid Hadashot and its pho-
tographer, Alex' Levak, said Arens
and aides were on the scene when
the two Palestinians were led away
alive before their death during inter-
rogation.
"It can't be that they did not see
what I saw," said Levak, whose pho-
tographs, suppressed by the censor
for six weeks, broke open the case of
the two Palestinians' deaths.
Levak's photographs, including.
one of a captured hijacker being led
away alive, were published in Israel
yesterday for the first time. They
were taken the night of the hijack-
ing, April 12. Many foreign newspa-
pers, including The Inquirer, also
published the photographs.
A sequence of six of Levak's photo-
graphs showed wounded Israelis tak-
en off the bus, passengers leaving
the vehicle, Arens flanked by his
.party, and the captured hijacker.
Levak said he took the picture se-
ries in less than a minute standing
near the defense minister and his
aides at the place where Israeli
forces halted' the hijacking, outside
Deir El Balah in Gaza.
LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL 9 May 1984 P11
Jewish terrorists use arms
stolen from Israeli army
By MICHAEL WIDLANSKI
Cox News Service
JERUSALEM - The stealing
of high explosives, ammunition
and guns from the Israel army
has reached epidemic propor-
tions, according to Israeli offi-
cials, and this has been a major
factor in the recent wave of Jew-
ish terror aimed at Arab targets
around Jerusalem and the Israe-
li-ruled West Bank.
Much of the stolen arms and
ammunition, the officials said,
also finds its way to the Israeli
underworld where it often is
used in violent crimes such as
bank robberies and murders. In
addition, the officials said, part
of the stolen arsenal is sold to
Arabs - even those who mount
terrorism against Jews.
"They (Israeli criminals and
soldiers) do it without senti-
ments," said a police investigator
here. "They, even sell to Arabs,
and they don't think what the re-
sults will be."
Senior officials in the Israeli
police, the Ministry of Interior
and the defense community con-
firmed that "thousands" of guns
and hand grenades, plus "hun-
dreds" of pounds of explosives
had been stolen by Israeli sol-
diers since the beginning of Isra-
el's war in Lebanon in June 1982.
The officials said that stolen Is-
raeli army weapons played a
leading role in the attacks and
attempted attacks on Arab tar-
gets in recent months, including:
V The attempted bombing in
late April of several Arab buses
here.
The attempt earlier this
year to bomb the Islamic shrine
of the Mosque of the Dome of the
Rock on the Temple Mount.
The sniping at an Arab bus
in the West Bank town of Ramal -.
lah north of here.
Four different Jewish groups,
with differing levels of expertise,
operated independently in these
incidents, according to Israeli of-
ficials, but the group arrested
some two weeks ago operated at
the most sophisticated level.
"Security officials noted that
among the more than 20 people
arrested, there were a significant
number who either served in se-
lect Israeli army combat units or
as supply and engineering offi-
cers, thereby giving them easy
access to Israeli army weaponry.
Court orders have prohibited
the press from identifying those
arrested, but the suspects are
known to be leading members of
Jewish settlements in the West
Bank and Golan Heights, territor-
ies captured by Israel from the
attacking Jordanian and Syrian
armies in the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war.
"You wouldn't believe how
much ammunition and how many
guns are stolen from the army all
the time," said Shlomo Efrati, a
police investigator here.
"Every special investigatory
squad I've been in has found
large numbers of stolen weapons.
In the case of the shooting of the
Ramallah bus, they stole an M-16
(assault rifle) and filed off the
(serial) numbers.
"The army unit (from which
the rifle was stolen) hadn't done
an inventory in more than three
years," he said. "They didn't
even know it was missing."
Officials said that the war in
Lebanon had made access to Is-
raeli army weapons especially
easy.
"Wars cause the outflow and
use of arms," said Yaakov Mar-
kovitz, the director of the Bureau
of Police Affairs in the Ministry
of Interior.
"Since the IDF (Israel Defense
Forces, the army's official name)
is a citizen army with large re-
serves, there is easy entry to
arms supplies and even emergen-
cy stores," said Markovitz. He
added that much of the stolen
arms and explosives now find
their way not only to Jewish set-
tlers but to the Israeli under-
world and even to Arab terror-
ists.
"There's no scarcity of arms
for somebody who's willing to
pay, and there's always some-
body willing to sell," Markovitz
said.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
NEWSWEEK
11 June 1984 Pg. 52
ISRAEL
A Case of Terror for Terror
The photograph had been known to
newsmen in Israel for weeks, although
its publication was forbidden by the mili-
tary censor. The picture, taken before
dawn in the Gaza Strip, showed Israeli
security men leading away a dazed but
apparently uninjured Palestinian named
Majdi Abu Jumaa. The guards had cap-
tured him during an assault on a bus that
he and three other Arabs had hijacked.
Two of the hijackers died in the gunfire.
Abu Jumaa and another Palestinian sur-
vived. But a few hours later their
bodies were turned over to rela-
tives for burial. Israeli officials
maintained repeatedly that the
two men "died on the way to the
hospital." But a commission of
inquiry finally conceded that the
terrorists were murdered. Securi-
ty men led them into a nearby
field for questioning, beat them-
then bashed in their heads with a
blunt instrument.
The gruesome story came to
light last week when the Defense
Ministry, after an eight-day de-
lay, released a summary of the
investigators' findings. No sus-
pects were named in the heavily
expurgated version of the com-
mission report that was made
public. But Maj. Gen. Moshe
Bar-Kochba, head of the Army's
southern command, received an
official reprimand for failing to be
at the scene where the killings
occurred. Israeli Defense Minis-
ter Moshe Arens condemned the
bludgeonings as a "clear contra-
distinction to the basic rules and
norms incumbent on all, and especially on .
the security forces." He promised legal
action would be taken against "those sus-
pected 'of illegal acts or behavior."
Arens could eventually find his own
reputation damaged by the hijacker affair.
He was present when Israeli troops
stormed the bus before dawn on April 13,
killing a woman passenger and freeing 34
other Israelis who had been held hostage
throughout the night. Israeli Chief of Staff
Moshe Levy and two brigadier generals
were with him. Arens insisted that he had
left the scene without knowing that two of
the four hijackers had been beaten to
death. On Israeli television last week he
said that "neither the chief of staff nor I
was at the site when it happened. If we had
known we would not have had to wait for a
commission of inquiry in order to investi-
gate these events." But the Tel Aviv tab-
loid Hadashot disputed Arens's story. Ha-
dashot photographer Alex Levac-whose
picture of Abu Jumaa, suppressed by the
censor for six weeks, had broken open the
story-said he had been standing next to
Arens and his aides when he took the
photograph. "It can't be that they did not
see what I saw," Levac said.
Whatever the case, about an hour after
the assault on the bus, Arens told an Israeli
radio reporter that "two of the terrorists
were killed, and two others were cap-
tured." But for reasons that have never
been explained, the Israeli military censor
Censored photo of Majdi Abu Jumaa: Covering up
ALEX LEVAC-HADASHOT
held up the tape of the defense minister's
remarks, and the interview was never
broadcast. Instead, the Israeli Army
spokesman issued a statement saying that
the two had died "on the way to the
hospital"-implying that they had died of
wounds received during the rescue opera-
tion itself.
Hadashot had challenged that account
from the start. After the two hijackers who
had initially survived the commando as-
sault were buried, Hadashot reporters
showed Levac's photograph to the dead
men's relatives in the Gaza Strip. The
relatives confirmed that the man in the
picture was Majdi Abu Jumaa. The other
hijacker who had been captured alive was
his cousin, Subhi Abu Jumaa. Both were
18. The relatives said that both bodies
showed signs of severe beating. The Israeli
military censor refused to allow Hadashot
to print Levac's photograph of Majdi Abu
Jumaa (the ban was finally lifted last week,
but with the faces of the security men
blanked out) or the story confirming his
identity. But The New York Times broke
the censorship ban and described both the
photograph and the disturbing questions it
had raised about what really happened
during the capture of the hijacked bus.
Even then, Israeli officials tried to keep
the story bottled up. Arens urged Israeli
editors to play down foreign press reports
about the atrocity, on the ground they
might jeopardize the lives of Israeli prison-
ers held by Palestinian guerrillas. He did
not order an inquiry until 13 days after the
killings. When two prominent Knesset
deputies -- Yossi Sarid of the Labor Party
and Ehud Olmert of the Likud-demand-
ed an investigation, Arens finally asked
Meir Zorea, a reserve Army general, to
conduct one. But when Hadashot broke
censorship and reported Zorea's appoint-
ment, Arens ordered the censor to close
down Hadashot's printing plant for four
days, opened a police investigation against
Hadashot editor Yossi Klein and banned
distribution of the tabloid to Israeli mili-
tary units-the most severe punishment
ever meted out to an Israeli newspaper.
Polls: If the murders shocked sensitive
Israelis, the affair did not set off much
soul-searching. A straw poll in Tel Aviv-
the point of origin of the hijacked bus-
showed that 84 percent of those questioned
regarded the murder of the captured hi-
jackers as "acceptable." Only 10 percent
found the incident "serious and worri-
some," and a mere 6 percent thought it was
"against the law." A subsequent poll
among a broad segment of the populace
indicated that 65 percent of the Israeli
public saw no need for an investigation of
the killing of the two Arabs and that 57
percent did not believe the results of the
inquiry should have been made public.
The hard-line attitude revealed in those
soundings coincided with a growing public
backlash against the recent arrests of 27
Israelis accused of belonging to a "Jewish
terrorist underground." The alleged ex-
tremists have been charged with a number
of crimes against West Bank Palestinians,
including the 1980 booby-trapping of the
cars of three Arab mayors and a conspir-
acy to blow up the Dome of the Rock, one
of the most sacred shrines in Islam. But
last week Meir Cohen-Avidov, the contro-
versial deputy speaker of the Knesset,
voiced the sympathy that at least some
Israelis feel for the alleged Jewish terrorists
now on trial in Jerusalem. "My heart goes
out to the detainees," he said. "These boys
are the pride of Israel. They are the best."
That kind of extremist talk encourages
violations of the "basic rules and norms"
on which Israel has prided itself for so
long. Until the bludgeon murders of the
two hijackers, Israel was able to say that it
neither tortured nor executed terrorists
who surrendered. Now, Israelis have lost
that moral high ground.
ANGUS DEMING with MILAN J. KUBIC in Jerusalem
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SPECIAL EDITION
--
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
BALTIMORE NEWS AMERICAN
25 April 1984
Uncertainty is the best way
to terrorize the terrorist
By Marvin Leibstone
T
HE anti-terrorism direc-
tive sent by President
Reagan recently for im-
plementation by our dip-
lomats, spies and soldiers
is vigorous, but will it have much
impact?
The directive announces, in a
straightforward way, that the United
States will counter terrorism with
pre- and post-operational strikes
against perpetrators 'targeting
Americans. That is, we'll use stop-
'em-at-the-pass and an-eye-for-an-
eye measures.
The president thus has put the
world's 40-odd terrorist groups on no-
tice. He also said earlier this month
that America will take neccessary
military action to protect citizens
here and abroad.
However, the policy ignores basic
facts about terrorists.
For example, few care what any
nation's counter-terror policy might
be. Whether we train Green Berets,
double the guard or impose sanctions
makes little difference to those who
use terrorism as a political tool. More
than 500 Israeli counterattacks since
1970 have not stopped Palestinians
from detonating bombs in Jerusalem.
Terrorists, like guerrillas, believe
that as long as they can employ vio-
lence and scare their enemies into
diverting resources, they are winning
even if their side draws more casual-
ties. Central to terrorist thinking,
then, is faith in Syrian leader Hafez
Assad's notion that Western powers
are "short of breath. " Assad believes
he proved the point by sculpting a
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Leba-
non with a terrorism agenda.
The theory is hardly new. It has
roots in perceptions of America's de-
parture from Vietnam, of Jimmy
Carter's failed rescue mission in Iran,
of the indecision in Washington's cur-
rent Central America policy.
Not that we should put aside plans
to respond to terrorism with military
force. But we should have a better
understanding of how militancy af-
fects terrorists.
Many terrorists delight in having
industrial nations post security
guards everywhere and block struc-
tures with concertina wire. This is
propaganda for recruiting terrorists
and for convincing the non-aligned
that America is using Gestapo tactics.
And, now that the Reagan admin-
istration has, as Secretary of State
George Shultz explains, gone from a
passive to active anti-terrorist pos-
ture, perpetrators are likely to try
forcing our hand in ways that can
bring us much woe .:
Causing governments to overreact
militarily has been the most frequent
terrorist ploy since the French revolu-
tion.
In effect, the we-dare-you anti-,
terrorism policy invites trouble be-
cause it ups the ante. More precisely,
it fails to deter because one can't stop
terrorism by putting up warning
signs or applying spray as we do when
battling insects. Consider the chil-
dren and old men sent in waves by
Iran against Iraq or the suicide at-
tackers of embassies; they keep on
coming.
And absent from Mr. Reagan's
new policy of pre-emption and repri-
sal is the political climate present in,
for example, Israel. That country is at
war and hence has public support for
aggressive action. The Soviet Union
rarely experiences terrorism because
it does not have free public opinion to
hold back the most brutal counter-
force.
No democratic nation can operate
against the public will or sacrifice
ideals to put a stop to terrorism.
Therefore the Reagan administration
must continue to deal with the prob-
lem in more ways than a military
response: Neither non-military nor
military counter-terror action's
should be emphasized at the expense
of the other.
Prior to the 1979 takeover of our
embassy in Tehran, few acts were
perpetrated against
Americans,
mainly because Washington's anti-
terror policy was unclear: Perpetra-
tors had no idea what the response
might be and, shied away. Not many
terrorists will take a risk against an
unpredictable outcome.
Most studies of terrorism prove
that events are calculated to exact a
particular response. Hostage-takers
know in advance how long some na-
tions will negotiate before using force
against them.
Yet to suggest that no policy is the
best policy is unwise. Any formula
allowing for the widest range of non-
military as well as miltary choices
seems appropriate.
Another point to consider is that
organizations once purely terroristic
and now testing legitimate political
activity might, if convinced the Unit-
ed States intends to apply only mili-
tary pressure against them, de-em-
phasize the political and return to
pure terror.
Perhaps anti-terror policy should
evolve from assessments of whatever
terrible deed is being confronted at
the moment. Certain hostage-tak-
ings are answered best via a para-
trooper assault, others with lengthy
negotiation, some by silence.
But if terrorist acts are a form of
theater, and are started to obtain
responses predestined by policy, then
that policy is self-defeating. If you tell
an anti-social person you will slap
him if he slaps you first, you can count
on him slapping you. Keep him in the
dark about the consequences of slap-
ping and he may not slap anybody.
We do not owe terrorists the bene-
fit of our thinking. A policy that is
comprehensive and allows for any
and all sorts of reaction can boomer-
ang in our favor - by terrorizing the
terrorist with uncertainty.
· Marvin Leibstone writes fre-
quently for these pages on national
and foreign affairs.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
Exclusive Interview with Claire Sterling
HUMAN EVENTS
21 April 1984 Pgs. 10-15
Why Is the West Covering Up for Agca?
Q. Ms. Sterling, could you give us a
synopsis of the plot of your book?
A. The plot as I was able to unfold
it-independently of what the judge in
charge of this case in Italy, Judge
Martella was doing-is this: that a
young Turk in Istanbul, who was mov-
ing in the circles of a neo-Nazi, right-
wing terrorist group called the Gray
Wolves, was picked to be a professional
hit-man. He was picked by a unique
criminal band called the Turkish
Mafia, which operates out of Sofia,
Bulgaria, which, indeed, is under the
direct control and supervision of the
Bulgarian Secret Service.
Since the end of the '60s the Turkish
Mafia, using a Bulgarian state corpora-
tion called Kintex, has been smuggling
billions of dollars worth of weapons
and other contraband into Turkey and
the Middle East from Western Europe,
and heroin from Turkey and the Middle
East into Western Europe. Kintex 'is
also a branch of the Bulgarian Secret
Service.
The Turkish Mafia is the operating
force in the mechanism of this plot. It
used this Turk, Mehmet Ali Agca, who
had a right-wing image, and it used
other Turkish Gray Wolves, neo-Nazi
Gray Wolves, who were scattered
through Europe, to preserve and
enhance this right-wing image, so that
the attack on Pope John Paul II was
made to look like a right-wing terrorist
hit.
How did Agca become involved? He
escaped from a military prison after be-
ing jailed for the murder of an impor-
tant editor in Istanbul. His escape was
arranged by two Gray Wolves leaders
who were lieutenants of the Turkish
Mafia. These two lieutenants then pro-
cured the false documents, perfectly
counterfeited, which Agca used to
travel through Europe, and they then
got him over the Bulgarian border, got
his fake passport stamped with suitable
entry-exit stamps by the Bulgarian ser-
vices and got him installed in Sofia.
In Sofia he met with the two major
godfathers of the Mafia in the summer
of 1980. He spent the entire summer
there. One of them, Abuzer Ugurlu, is
presently on trial in Ankara and has
Rome-based author Claire Sterling has
written one of the most important books
of the year-probably, in fact, in many
years. Entitled The Time of the Assassins
(Holt Rinehart and Winston), it explores
in detail the plot behind the assassi-
nation attempt on the life of Pope John
Paul II in St. Peter's Square on May 13,
1981.
The Identity of the man who shot the
pope is well known by this time. He is
Mehmet Ali Agca, a young Turk who has
been described in much of the world's
press as a rightist Islamic fanatic.
Ms. Sterling has demonstrated, con-
vincingly, that he is no such thing-that,
in fact, this Image of Agca was based on
disinformation put out by the Soviet
KGB.
The real Agca, as Ms. Sterling shows,
was a highly intelligent mercenary
involved with the Turkish Mafia and,
through them, with the Bulgarlan secret
police. The Bulgarians, of course, are
totally beholden to the Soviet Union.
Thus, the circumstantial evidence is
great that the thread of the assassina-
tion plot leads ultimately to Moscow and
the headquarters of the KGB-whose
director at the time was none other than
Yuri Andropov, who shortly thereafter
became president of the Soviet Union.
The reluctance on the part of the
Western press and intelligence agencies
toface. the facts in the All case. con-
stitutes, in Ms. Sterling's view, a massive
cover-up almost as disquieting as the
plot itself.
Ms. Sterling was commissioned by the
Reader's Digest to investigate the
assassination plot against the pope, and
the Digest was extremely generous in its
terms, basically giving the author a com-
mission to get to the bottom of the mat-
ter, whatever the cost. Sterling was a
logical choice for such an assignment,
having been based in Rome for 31 years
and having already written a book, The
Terror Network, which documented the
rising tide of terrorism around the
world-and also the role played by the
Soviet Union in sponsoring It.
The Digest's faith in Ms. Sterling has
paid off in an extraordinary book,
thoroughly documented, riveting in style
and startling in Its conclusions-most
notably for placing the ultimate respon-
sibility for the shooting of the pope at the
door of the Kremlin. (Interestingly, Paul
Henze, a former analyst with Zbigniew
Brzezinski's National Security Council,
was commissioned by Reader's Digest to
conduct a parallel, fully independent in -.
vestigation of the case. His basic conclu-
sions were the same as Ms. Sterling's.)
On February 14, ironically, the day of
Yuri Andropov's funeral, Claire Sterling
recorded the following exclusive inter-
view for Human Events with James
Roberts, former director of the White
House Fellowships program.
now, just recently, admitted to having
met Agca there and given him money.
The other one, Bekir Celenk, was in
Western Europe when this case broke.
As soon as he heard that the Italian
judge had a warrant out for his arrest,
he fled to Sofia, where he is being
sheltered at present. He's the one who
was supposed to have offered Agca
$1.3 million to shoot the pope.
To summarize, Agca with the Gray
Wolves, representing the extreme right,
had the image of the right-wing ter-
rorist hit-man. The Wolves were being
run by this huge contraband ring, the
Turkish Mafia, unique in the world in
that it was really working for a Com-
munist state corporation under the
sponsorship of the Communist state of
Bulgaria. And the two godfathers of
this Turkish Mafia, each Sofia-based,
have in fact been working directly for
the Bulgarian Secret Service: Abuzer
Ugurlu, since 1954, when he was
recruited, and Bekir Celenk since the
middle '60s. All this is heavily
documented in the book.
That's as far as I go in recreating the
mechanism of the way the operation
was mounted. My conclusion is that the
Bulgarians would have had to have the
instructions for this attempted assas-
sination from the Soviet Union for
several reasons, not just as speculation.
First, because Bulgaria itself has no
evident motive to quarrel with Pope
John Paul II. The Bulgarians don't
have any problem like Solidarity; they
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
STERLING ... Continued
don't have a restless Catholic popu-
lation; they don't have any particular
bone of contention or any grievance
with the pope. On the other hand, they
do have 400 agents of the KGB sta-
tioned in Sofia in various branches of
their Secret Service, of whom 300 are
stationed in the department having to
do with Bulgarian espionage activities
outside of Bulgaria, and every
Bulgarian Embassy abroad has at least
one such agent that reports directly to
Moscow to the KGB.
So apart from any other consider-
ation or speculation, it really would
have been physically impossible for the
Bulgarians to have mounted this opera-
tion using at least three Bulgarian
agents directly who were running the
hit-man Agca in Rome unless the Rus-
sians had given them the instructions to
do this, which is my conclusion.
Now, apart from my own con-
clusion, I published much of this in an
article that I wrote in the Reader's
Digest, which came out at the end of
August-September 1982, and in
November 1982 the Italian magistrate
investigating this case arrested a
Bulgarian in Rome and issued arrest
warrants for two other Bulgarians who
had, by then, fled to Sofia, on charges
of direct complicity in this case. He also
arrested two Turks and issued arrest
warrants for two other Turks on
charges of direct complicity and one of
those two Turks was this godfather
Bekir Celenk who fled to Sofia where
he remains to this day.
I had been forming a chain of
circumstantial evidence that I had un-
covered in a long nine-month investi-
gation going through Turkey, West
Germany, Switzerland, Austria and so
on. Parallel to my own investigation
was an official judicial investigation in
Italy conducted by Judge Martella, in
which by November 1982, he had iden-
tified seven people outside of Agca who
were allegedly involved in the con-
spiracy. Four were Turks and three
were Bulgarian.
The judge has now completed a two-
year investigation. In mid-December he
turned over several thousand pages of
evidence to the state prosecutor in
Rome, the equivalent of the attorney
general's office, for review. The state
prosecutor any day now will probably
be issuing his formal recommendation
for trial for the Bulgarian and the two
Turks who are presently under arrest
and the other two Bulgarians and two
Turks who are wanted as accomplices.
CLAIRE STERLING
Then Judge Martella will have
another month to hear any appeals
from the Bulgarian's lawyers and then
he will make the final ruling for trial
and publish a thousand pages -
roughly - of a report presenting the
main evidence that he has gathered
which in his opinion justifies sending
these people to trial.
So what we have now is no longer
me, as a reporter, saying that there was
a Bulgarian connection in this case. It is
a very upright judge of stainless repu-
tation in Italy who, after two years of
investigation, will be sending these peo-
ple for trial on the charges that they
were all participating directly in the plot
to kill Pope John Paul.
Q. To say that there is not only a
Bulgarian connection but also a KGB
connection is a very grave allegation,
as I'm sure you are aware, because It
means that the trall goes directly to the
door of Yuri Andropov. Ironically
enough, we are conducting this Inter-
view on the day of his funeral. What
you're saying, by implication, is that he
really was responsible for ordering the
assassination attempt on the pope.
A. Well, yes. Of course, he was head
of the KGB when the attack was
ordered. I believe that actually it might
have been easier for the West to handle
this whole problem if the Establishment
in the West had concluded from the
start that he, alone, could not have in-
itiated a plan of such dimensions, that a
decision to assassinate someone as im-
portant as Pope John Paul, who heads
the Roman Catholic Church, about a
sixth of the human race, would have
had to be made by the Politburo,
headed at the time by Brezhnev, who
was dead by the time Andropov then
became the sensitive figure as the leader
of the Soviet Union, itself. And in that
case Andropov would have been a kind
of senior civil servant, you might say,
carrying out orders from the top.
I think that perhaps Western leaders
might have found it easier to deal with
what was coming out in this case if they
had put it that way from the start. Now
we have two dead Soviet leaders who
might make it easier for us in the West
to handle what is going to come out in
the courts.
The original order would have had to
emanate from Brezhnev himself, now
dead, and it would have had to then be
passed on for execution by Andropov,
now dead. So you might say there is a
relatively clean slate if we now find that
the Italian court declares these
Bulgarians guilty.
Any normal grown-up has to see that
it's really not possible for the
Bulgarians to have done this on their
own, unless the Russians had told them
to do it. And we can now say that all
right, the two main characters, the
main personalities in the Soviet Union
who would have borne the direct
responsibility for this, are now dead. So
let's start again in discussing this kind
of problem, of holding the Russians
accountable with whoever now is
leading the Soviet Union.
Q. So you wouldn't advocate any
punitive action on the part of the United
States?
A. No, I don't think we should try to
take punitive action. I think the impor-
tant thing is to first of all let the public
know what is known to the governs
ments of the West, not try to shield the
Russians from public view, which has
been done up until now, and not try to
persuade the public that this was the act
of a lone, crazy, gunman, a religious
fanatic. He is none of those things and
the court has already made that very
plain in Italy.
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
STERLING ... Continued
We should at least allow a degree of
public awareness of who was respon-
sible and then say, "Well, we hold you
publicly accountable," say that to the
Soviet Union, when all the evidence is
in. In which case, for one thing, the
public knowledge of this Russian ac-
countability is in itself a strong deter-
rent.
I don't believe that the Russians care
one thousandth of a per cent for
Western public opinion, but they do
have to take that into consideration. Up
till now the forms of surrogate warfare
that have been used by the Soviet Union
in attacking Western targets, primarily
by providing weapons and sanctuary
for terrorist groups carrying out such
assaults on the West since 1958, have
been concealed from public view as was
what was known about Soviet respon-
sibility in this regard. And that has
encouraged them I think to ever bolder
kinds of attack on the assumption that
they were going to continue to enjoy the
Western intelligence shield. I think the
important thing to do now is to take the
shield away, to remove it, and say from
now on we know about this and we will
be watching, and if you do this again we
will have to hold you accountable and
then we will have to see what form,
what position, we will take.
This will have to be part of our bar-
gaining package when we sit down with
you to talk about anything, to negotiate
anything. This is a form of warfare,
and therefore we have to negotiate a
peace settlement that can hold, under-
standing who the interlocutor is and
what form of warfare he is waging.
Q. Another serious conclusion that
you've drawn both In the book, and from
what you have just said, Is that Western
governments-the intelligence agen-
cies of various Western governments
including our own-from the very
outset of this incident tried to
downplay Bulgarlan-KGB connections
and to cover It up. Do you have some
documentation on that?
A. Yes. In my book, for example, I
cite six major articles that appeared in
the New York Times and the Los
Angeles Times in the four to five
months following Judge Martella's ar-
rest of the Bulgarian, Sergei Antonov,
in November 1982. In these articles,
unidentified but authoritative Western
intelligence analysts are quoted as say-
ing, first of all, that they suspected that
Judge Martella had been a victim of
disinformation planted on him to em-
barrass the Soviet Union. They were
saying that he couldn't be going on any
serious evidence, that he was being used
to frame the Soviet Union.
Now this was a pretty shocking alle-
gation at a time when nobody in the
West knew what evidence he had, and
because by law the Italian judge cannot
reveal his evidence until the investi-
gation is completed, Then we had the
usual Western intelligence sources in
London, in Bonn, in Washington and
so on, make the allegation that Judge
Martella had taken my article too
seriously in the Reader's Digest, that in
effect I had been telling Judge Martella
what to do-which really is about as
mindless as you can get.
Then we have a series of assertions
that Agca was a known crazy. For ex-
ample, this was stated by a source close
to the CIA in an article in the New York
Times, and the Los Angeles Times.
This was after the presiding judge at his
trial had said that he had shown
unusual psychic maturity and had un-
common gifts of mental equilibrium
and was entirely sane, and exception-
ally intelligent and so on.
So we had this information given
from this unidentified but authoritative
intelligence source in Washington say-
ing he was a known crazy, so unstable
that nobody would ever have hired him
because he was bound to be caught.
Then they would suggest, well maybe
he was working for the Bulgarians but
not for this reason. They did not hire
him to do this. He might have been do-
ing something else although they didn't
say what. Or maybe some Bulgarians
knew what he was going to do but
didn't stop him. They didn't instigate
him to do it, they didn't employ him to
do it. Or, if the Bulgarians did, for
some reason, let him do it, or knew that
he was doing this, the Russians didn't
know. And we continued to have this
up until the other day.
The Washington Post has just had a
series on terrorism which on the whole
is quite a good series, at least on the
Middle East terrorist scene, and at the
end they quote an unidentified but
authoritative State Department spokes-
man saying well, of course, it looks
now as if the Italian courts are going to
go to trial with this Bulgarian, which
suggests that there may be evidence that
will come out in this trial against the
Bulgarian, which will involve the
Bulgarians, but of course this doesn't
mean that the Russians will be in-
volved.
Well, you know, these are tales for
children. I don't know who, really, can
be deceived by this kind of inept effort
to shield the Russians from something
that anybody familiar with the struc-
ture of the dependent surrogate services
in Eastern Europe to the KGB would
just have to know is a fact.
Anybody in the State Department
would have to know that it is not possi-
ble to separate the Bulgarians from the
Russians in this connection. But this is
the effort being made. Don't ask me to
explain why. I don't really know the
reason. I don't understand it.
Q. What do you think is the real opin-
ion of the people in our government
who are most closely involved, who
have the most direct responsibility for
this matter? I'm speaking of Secretary
Shultz, Bud McFarlane of the National
Security Council and the President
himself. Do they believe the Russians
are involved, or do they not believe it?
A. Well, not a single member of this
Administration has conceded publicly
that there may be any possibility of a
Bulgarian connection-not one. This,
in part, I believe-now that I've spent
some time in Washington-can be
traced to the fact that they are very bad-
ly informed by their own people
abroad, by the intelligence-gathering
agencies abroad and by our embassies
abroad, who have simply not been tell-
ing them the ascertainable facts as any
reporter could have gotten them. This
has been furthered by reporting that is
inexplicable in some of our most impor-
tant press outlets and the media about
how this case is going.
On December 21, for example,
Judge Martella transferred this
Bulgarian from prison to house arrest.
Now the report that was issued by the
wire services going out to the Western
press said: Sergei Antonov has been
freed from prison. But the judge's com-
munique to the state news agency
ANSA said we cannot concede liberty
to Sergei Antonov because of the grav-
ity of the charges against him-the ex-
act opposite of what the wire services
had reported. And the judge said well,
you're simply transferring him to house
arrest for health reasons.
Well, under house arrest he's had an
armored tank stationed in front of
the building, he's had armed policemen
wearing bulletproof vests in the lobby
and guarding the front and back en-
trances, and every three hours a police
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
STERLING ... Continued
contingent goes into his room to see
that he is there. At the same time, the
day he was transferred to house arrest,
the state prosecutor reviewing the
evidence in this case appealed to an
emergency court, the Tribunal Liberty,
to have him put right back in prison on
the grounds that he might otherwise
escape or be murdered, and that the
gravity of the evidence against him
again required his presence in prison.
And, in the middle of January, on
the 13th of January, the Tribunal
Liberty ruled that he had to go back to
prison as a pre-trial precaution.
Now I keep in touch with Rome while
I'm here in the United States so I know
these things. But they have not been
published in the American press at all.
Apart from this one report that he'd
been freed from prison. And I have
discovered that truly, people genuinely
believe in Washington that this
Bulgarian has been freed, whereas the
opposite is the case: He is about to be
formally indicted and to have to stand
trial for direct complicity in this case.
So I think that one of the expla-
nations is that our government, our
Administration, has been extraor-
dinarily badly informed about what
anybody could have reported more ac-
curately who had looked at the as-
certainable facts in Rome. Apart from
that, I think there's been a deliberate
effort by certain sections of the govern-
ment not to take a public position that
would concede any possible
Bulgarian-Soviet connection because
they consider it a destabilizing factor in
the East-West power balance for the
public to know such things. They think
the public probably has a mental age of
12 and can't be trusted with knowledge
of this sort.
Q. You think this tacit premise you
are describing here explains the bad
reporting as well as the silence
emanating from the government?
A. I think the bad reporting has cer-
tainly been encouraged by the fact that
when a Washington-based reporter
who goes to a source he has known for
some time as a reliable intelligence
source, let's say, or a State Department
source, and says well, what's the inside
story, how do you all feel about this so-
called Bulgarian connection and he's
told by these people that it's a bunch of
nonsense -- well, obviously he would be
inclined to believe what he is being told.
He is not in a position to go himself
and investigate this case in Rome, and
what he's read so far doesn't encourage
him to believe very much in this connec-
tion, and he's told by the most authori-
tative sources who are commonly con-
sidered the most anti-Soviet sources
you could find in the United
States-the CIA, perhaps, or the
Defense Intelligence Agency, or the Na-
tional Security Council, or the State
Department-that in their opinion
there is no evidence for a Bulgarian
connection. So of course he's en-
couraged to report this case badly.
Q. But all of our major newspapers
and our networks have bureaus In the
major European capitals. Is this the
type of thing they are hearing there, as
well?
A. I'm afraid that's the case, yes. Cer-
tainly our embassy in Rome has not
contributed to a clarity of view in this
matter, so far. That's putting it kindly.
Q. How did you get interested in his
case? What made you decide to pursue
it?
A. I've been a political reporter in Ita-
ly for over 30 years and I've been
writing about terrorist problems,
especially since I wrote The Terror Net-
work in 1981, so I've been working on
terrorist problems, specializing since
1978.
In my book, The Terror Network, I
had a chapter on terrorism in Turkey
which I had studied firsthand at some
length in preparation for that book. I
had a general knowledge of that situ-
ation, so it was a natural for me to go
after a story like this. When it was clear
from the time the presiding judge at
Agca's trial in the summer of 1981
wrote in his written opinion that Agca
was not a loner, not a religious crank,
that he was perfectly sane and that he
was a professional assassin who had
been hired by a conspiratorial band, it
seemed to me that this was an extraor-
dinary, just a terrific, story for any
reporter to look at.
Q. Some of your critics, or at least
people who don't share your point of
view on this matter, have discussed
what they consider to be the contradic-
tions in the testimony of Agca. What do
you make of this?
A. You know, if you want to look for
contradictions in anybody's testimony
you can find them. In reality, when
Agca was first arrested after he shot the
pope, it was clear to the magistrates in-
terrogating him, as they have all told
me since that time, that he had been
coached in how to handle himself under
interrogation. His purpose was to did-
dle his interrogators, not to give them
any information, and in fact for a year
he did not give them any information;
he made no confession.
And so he was throwing out every
kind of wild statement in the
book-such as that he wanted to kill
the queen of England, and Simone Vial
of the Council of Europe, and he
discovered they were women and so he
decided against it.
I mean he said a lot of crazy things,
and he's not a crazy. We know he's not
a crazy. And the judges interrogating
him knew perfectly well he was not
crazy. But he was throwing out so many
different things that they could see no
clear leads in the case and that was his
purpose.
He only began to make a genuine
confession in May 1982, after he had
waited a full year for the Bulgarians to
get him out of prison somehow. Surely
he had the full expectation, he had had
their commitment that they would do
that, just as the Turkish Mafia had got-
ten him out of prison in Istanbul in
1979 on a murder charge because they
persuaded him to take the fall for that
murder and they promised to get him
out and they did get him out. And so he
assumed they were going to do it again,
but of course Italy is a different situ-
ation. He was in solitary confinement
as they could not get him out, so he
began to talk.
From the time he began to make a
confession in May, the judge waited
from May until the following Novem-
ber to make his first arrest of a
Bulgarian which means that the judge
spent that time finding corroboration
for Agca's confession. Agca had con-
fessed, had identified these three
Bulgarians from mugshots and said
they were his agents running him in
Rome, and since that time, since the
Bulgarian's arrest, four appeals have
been made by his lawyers for his provi-
sional release on the grounds of insuf-
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
REVIEW OF THE NEWS 9 May 1984 Pg. 53
From The Hopper
Pending legislation of special interest to
Americans alarmed about Big Government.
WHERE, from the congressional hop-
per, are some of the bills and Resolu-
tions of interest to Conservatives:
Terrorism (S. 2469, introduced on
March 22nd, referred to the Senate
Judiciary Committee). Incredible as
it may seem, terrorism as such is not a
crime in the United States. President
Reagan, in his State of the Union
address on January 25th, mentioned
the need for legislation to combat
terrorism. As an important first step
in that direction, Senator Jeremiah
Denton (R .- Alabama), Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Security and
Terrorism, has introduced S. 2469 to
make terrorism a federal crime and
give the F.B.I. primary investigative
jurisdiction over it.
The Denton bill defines "terror-
ism" as "the knowing use of force or
violence against any person or property
in violation of the criminal laws of
the United States or any State, terri-
tory, possession, or district, with the
intent to intimidate, coerce, or influ-
ence a government or person in fur-
therance of any political or ideologi-
cal objective." Individuals found
guilty of committing (or procuring the
commission of) a terrorist act would
face the death penalty (if the death
of anyone resulted from the act) or
imprisonment for not less than 20
years, or for life, or for life without
possibility of parole.
Those found guilty of attempting
to commit, or threatening to commit,
an act of terrorism would also face
stringent prison sentences, as well as
the death penalty should their actions
cause the death of another person.
The Denton bill is carefully
phrased to strike a balance between
the need to punish terrorists and to
Jeremiah Denton
offers bill to
combat terrorism.
protect the constitutional rights of all
Americans. The Senator is convinced
that it effectively "addresses a prob-
lem in our society that we must clearly
face and resolve as soon as possible.
Terrorists must be put on notice that
their activities are criminal and simply
will not be tolerated by law-abiding
Americans."
STERLING ... Continued
ficient evidence, and four times differ-
ent sections of the Italian courts have
found that the evidence against him was
strong enough to warrant his continued
retention. So Agca has told lies as
almost everybody does who starts out
as a professional killer and begins to
talk. You never get a straight story in 24
hours. Every judge who has handled
these people says the same thing.
Although he has surely told lies of one
kind or another since he began to con-
fess, the core of his confession has
evidently been considered by the Italian
judiciary as a whole involved in this
case to be sound enough to warrant go-
ing to trial.
Q. A couple of weeks ago Pope John
Pau! met with Agca In his cell. It was a
very dramatic meeting. Would you
speculate on what Agca might have
told the pope, and second, what Is the
view of the Vatican as to the possibility
of Agca being linked to the KGB In this
matter?
A. I don't really know what they
talked about. The pope said that was a
secret and it was going to remain a
secret and I think it will. But the pope
did say when he came out of that
meeting that he has full confidence in
this penitent, Agca, which really was
taken to mean in Italy that what he was
saying, in effect, was, "I believe Agca
is sincerely repentant." The impli-
`cation of that is that if he is sincerely
repentant, his confession to the judge
involving the Bulgarians has credibil-
ity. It doesn't necessarily mean that
every word he says is true, but that
essentially it has credibility.
This at a time when there is a tremen-
dous campaign going on conducted
along parallel lines by the Russians and
Bulgarians on the one hand and
Western spokesmen on the other hand
to deny Agca all credibility, and I think
that the pope was therefore giving him
strength.
Q. What is the view of the Vatican as
you understand It as to the culpability
of the KGB?
A. There are clearly divided views in
the Vatican, and understandably so.
There are many forces in the Vatican
that prefer not to have this case go any
further because of the enormous
complications it could have for them
with what is called the church's silenced
churches in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, where conditions have
always been very, very difficult for the
church to operate at all.
On the other hand, there are certainly
forces in the Vatican that believe that
justice must be pursued in this case,
that it should be left to the Italian
courts, that the courts should be free to
process this investigation to the end,
that it's morally unacceptable to do
otherwise.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
Victims of the 'dirty war
NEW STATESMAN
4 May 1984 Pages 8-10
Kidnap plots, assassination, forgery, lethal incompetence, even 'political' psychiatry . . . A
former Army intelligence office in Northern Ireland reveals the inside story of the Army's 'dirty
tricks' department in Ulster -- in the first of a series of reports by Duncan Campbell
A FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
who served in Northern Ireland in 1974 and
1975 has revealed details of 'dirty tricks' by the
Army in Ireland. Captain Fred Holroyd was an
intelligence specialist in Northern Ireland for
nearly two years. The details of his allegations
have been checked over six months. We have
spoken to eye-witnesses and others personally
involved in Holroyd's reports. These activities
range, says Holroyd, from the disreputable to
the entirely illegal - and were conducted on
both sides of the Irish border.
Since 1982, a special team from the Royal
Ulster Constabulary, led by Detective
Superintendent George Caskey, has been
investigating Holroyd's allegations of illegal
Army activities. Its report, a lengthy 900-page
dossier, was submitted earlier this year to
Northern Ireland's Director of Public
Prosecutions. Last month, the DPP delayed his
final decision on the report and asked the team
to carry out more extensive investigations of
some of the dozen or so cases that Holroyd has
submitted. Until the DPP announces his
decision on the cases concerned, neither the
RUC nor the Ministry of Defence are willing to
comment publicly on Holroyd's revelations.
But we have learned from Army sources that the
Defence Ministry last year ordered a special and
separate enquiry by its own security officials
into the 'dirty war' allegations.
As a Military Intelligence Officer in
Northern Ireland, Holroyd was on undercover
attachment to the RUC Special Branch office in
Portadown, west of Belfast. He worked in close
liaison with the headquarters of the Army's 3rd
Brigade, which was militarily responsible for
the highly dangerous territory along the
southern border - the 'bandit country' of
South Armagh.
Captain Holroyd himself ultimately became a
victim of the often bitter rivalry between
different parts of the security apparatus. Army
staff contrived to have him abruptly removed
from his post in May 1975, as an alleged
psychiatric casualty whose 'mental stability'
could be examined only in the safety and
security of a hospital in England - a slur which
was subsequently deleted from his official
record, but which has left him bitter about the
Army. He resigned his commission in 1976 and
joined the then Rhodesian Army.
Following his removal from Northern
Ireland, Holroyd repeatedly asked for an
investigation both of his own treatment and of
the methods employed by British intelligence
agents and officials in the North. Former Army
and police colleagues still hold Holroyd in high
esteem. In 1977, RUC Assistant Chief
Constable Charles Rogers - who was put in
charge of the RUC's anti-terrorist campaign
unquestionable loyalty,
devotion to duty that
one rarely finds today.
des
Andrew Wiard/Report
Fred Holroyd: his RUC chief says that his 'success record against terrorists has not been
equalled before or since'
following the 'Darkley Church' killings last
Christmas - wrote that Holroyd was a 'man of
unquestionable loyalty, outstanding courage
with a devotion to duty that one looks for but
rarely finds today'. In short, Holroyd was
determined, respected, and to many a hero.
SO WAS ANOTHER Army officer - Captain
Robert Nairac of the Special Air Services. In
1979, Nairac was posthumously awarded the
George Cross, two years after being kidnapped
and assassinated by the IRA while on under-
cover operations in South Armagh. In 1975
Nairac told Holroyd how he had carried out a
political assassination in the Irish Republic.
Assassination
Robert Nairac first arrived in Northern Ireland
early in 1974, with a troop of about 30 men from
the SAS Regiment's Hereford base. At the time,
the government was denying that the SAS were
in Northern Ireland at all - so they were
disguised as the 'Survey Troop' of the Royal
Captain Holroyd appeared on the Channel 4 programme,
Diverse Reports, on Wednesday. The programme was
researched and reported by Christopher Hird and Duncan
Campbell.
Engineers. They were based at Castledillon,
near Armagh, in a secluded country house and
estate that had previously been a sanatorium.
The SAS unit's commander was Captain
Julian A. Ball, who had joined the SAS from the
King's Own Scottish Borderers. Robert Nairac
from the elite Grenadier Guards, at first a
lieutenant, was his second-in-command. Nairac
was new to the SAS and Northern Ireland, but
had been specially trained by both the Army
and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) for
work in Ireland. Ball had already served
extensively in Belfast, winning a Military
Cross. A former Army officer who served with
Ball in Belfast has described him . as an
'irresponsible cowboy'.
According to the official ('Restricted')
manual on 'Counter-Revolutionary
Operations', the SAS's tasks included the 'infil-
tration of ... assassination parties .. . into
insurgent held areas', and 'liaison with ...
forces operating against the common enemy'.
Ball and Nairac visited intelligence officers in
the Armagh areas, including Holroyd in
Portadown, asking for suggestions of
worthwhile intelligence targets. They told
Holroyd that they were under the direct orders
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
VICTIMS OF THE 'DIRTY WAR' ... Continued
of SIS and army headquarters intelligence staff.
On 10 January 1975, in a remote mountain-
side farmhouse in County Monaghan, a mile
south of the Irish border, a leading republican,
John Francis Green, was murdered. Careful
planning and good intelligence was evident in
his killing, for he had only visited the farm at
short notice. The killers waited until Green was
alone and then burst in on him, emptying the
contents of two pistols into him.
Soon afterwards, Captain Nairac called
routinely on Holroyd at the Army's Mahon
Road camp in Portadown. The subject of
Green's death came up - Green, aged 27, a
local republican hero after an escape from
internment in Long Kesh in 1973, had by 1975
become the IRA commander in North Armagh.
After an SAS sergeant major left the room,
Nairac said that he had killed Green. When
Holroyd expressed disbelief, Nairac produced a
colour Polaroid of Green's bloodsoaked body,
taken soon after his death. Green was pictured
from the waist up, lying on his back. With some
reluctance, Nairac allowed Holroyd to keep the
picture. It remained in Holroyd's photo album
until 1982, when it was handed over to Super-
intendent Caskey of the RUC.
Who took the Polaroid picture is still a
mystery. Nairac implied that he had done so.
RUC detectives investigating the case
suggested to Captain Holroyd in 1983 that the
picture had been taken by the Irish Police. But a
very senior Garda source says that no Garda
officer in the area had either the equipment or
any official reason to take such a picture. He
said that the morning after the crime, a fully
equipped Garda photographic team travelled
up from Dublin, and took pictures using
standard (black and white) film.
Nairac told Holroyd that he and two other
men had done the killing. He then described in
detail how they had crossed the border during
the evening and driven down a country road.
Green was at first in the company of farmer
Gerry Carville - whose house had long been an
IRA 'safe house'. But the old farmer, said
Nairac, had left at a set time, known to the
killers. One man stayed with the car, while the
other two crept up a lane to the isolated farm
and watched Green through an uncurtained
window. They kicked down the door and shot
him repeatedly, emptying one of the guns into
his body as he lay dying.
Nairac's account of the killing, as provided to
Holroyd, is chillingly exact. Irish police investi-
gations produced reports of an unknown
vehicle in the area at the time of the killing - a
white Mercedes or Audi - which eyewitnesses
thought contained three men. Farmer Gerry
Carville has told us that for more than a month
he had left his farm at the same time each
evening to tend a neighbour's cow. In the last
month it has been revealed that, at the time,
there were two well-placed informers working
for British security inside IRA circles in the
nearby town of Castleblayney.
Garda investigation of the killing confirmed
many aspects of Nairac's account. The room in
which John Francis Green was shot was indeed
uncurtained at the time. The front door frame
was kicked in, and still bears the cracks.
Forensic experts, whose reports we have also
seen, later established that two guns were used
·to shoot Green; one is thought to be a Luger, the
other a Spanish-made Star automatic pistol ..
AT FIRST, the Garda in the Republic
suspected that other local IRA elements might
have killed Green. Green had recently been
asking questions about the proceeds of a series
of bank robberies in Northern Ireland. The
Royal Ulster Constabulary continues to put
forward a theory that Green was killed by a
deranged northern Protestant, called Elliott,
who believed that his brother had been killed on
Carville's farm - and who had come with a
second, unknown man to kill Carville, not
Green.
But we have established from a confidential
police source that the RUC obtained evidence
in 1975 conclusively linking the Green killing
to a series of notorious murders carried out by
persons closely linked to the Protestant
extremist paramilitary organisation, the Ulster
Volunteer Force. The link is the cartridges from
the Star automatic pistol found at the scene of
the killing. With the secret help of the Garda,
these were tested by a scientist attached to the
RUC forensic staff, Norman Tulip, and found
to be identical with cartridges left at the scene of
four sectarian murders, committed between
1973 and 1976. These included perhaps the
most notorious killing of the 1970s - the
slaughter in July 1975 of members of the
Catholic Miami Showband.
Robert Nairac, like many other army
personnel in Northern Ireland (including
Holroyd), obtained and sometimes carried
personal 'unattributable' weapons. The serial
numbers and firing characteristics of such guns
were not officially recorded. During the trial of
Nairac's killers in 1977, his then commanding
officer told the Dublin Court that a 'personal
pistol', apart from his official issue Browning
automatic, had been found in Nairac's room
after his death.
The Caskey Report, it is believed, does not
suggest that Holroyd is wrong in his
recollections, but quotes other Army officers
instead in an attempt to show that Nairac was a
braggard, inventing his participation in the
Green murder. Some RUC officers have also
tried to raise doubts as to whether Nairac was
ever a member of the SAS. Holroyd says that he
has come under intense pressure from the RUC
to withdraw his murder accusation against
Nairac. He refuses to do so.
Obtaining evidence affecting Nairac's story
has been difficult, because of the death or dis-
appearance of almost everyone involved.
Elliott, the RUC's supposed suspect, was
himself killed in 1979. Captain Ball left the
Army to become a British government security
adviser, and has since reportedly died in a traffic
accident. Nairac and Ball's SAS company
sergeant major is said by the RUC to be
'untraceable'. Craig Smellie, in 1974 the Secret
Service 'controller' at the Army HQ at Lisburn,
left to become SIS Chief of Station in Athens,
and has also since died. Nairac himself left the
SAS in 1976, but stayed on in Northern Ireland
as a military intelligence liaison officer in
Bessbrook and was killed in 1977. His death
means that the final story of the Green assassin-
ation may never be told. But the Army has a
clear case to answer.
Intelligence disaster
Another of Holroyd's accounts concerns a plan
to discover the IRA's major escape route from
Belfast for wounded and wanted men. The plan
went wrong, resulting in two, and possibly five,
deaths.
Sergeant Tony Poole of the Intelligence
Corps, who worked as a 'Field Intelligence
NCO' at the RUC station at Dungannon, set up
the plan in 1974 and explained it to Holroyd.
Poole planned to use a Catholic youth, who had
recently been questioned by the Army, as his
infiltrator. The hope was that he might finish
up at an IRA training camp in the Republic.
But Poole's choice of agent was ludicrous.
The operation quickly went wrong and his
operative, Columba McVeigh, a woolly-headed
17 year old, went to jail for four months. In
February 1975, an innocent Protestant man,
was killed almost certainly as a result of the
bungled operation. Three Catholics are
believed to have then been shot in turn in a 'tit
for tat' revenge killing.
During the summer of 1974, Poole told
Holroyd that McVeigh, was to be 'set up' on a
charge of possessing ammunition .; He would
carefully be allowed to avoid arrest and would
ask the IRA to get him out. Poole and his
colleagues were particularly keen to
compromise a priest, who was then working in a
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SPECIAL EDITION - - TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
VICTIMS OF THE 'DIRTY WAR' . . . Continued
small village nearby, and whom they suspected
was a key to the IRA escape route. Mcveigh
knew the priest concerned.
Poole's plan was to give the youth several
rounds of ammunition in a cigarette packet, to
put in a chest of drawers in his bedroom. Poole
was then to order an army raid on his house,
claiming 'a tipoff' from an informer. The Army
would think the find was genuine. Mcveigh's
parents have confirmed that the operation
began as Poole had planned it; an Army team
suddenly raided their house at 6 am one
morning in September 1974 - but Columba
escaped. His father saw the Army searchers go
straight to the bedroom drawer and announce as
they opened the cigarette packet that 'we've
found it'.
So McVeigh went on the run. But the
suspected priest refused to help him; and
another priest, unconnected with the IRA,
sheltered him briefly. Mcveigh then went to
the police station to ask Sergeant Poole for
further instructions, which surprised the
police, as he was supposed to be on the wanted
list. After a week spent openly in Dungannon,
he was arrested by an Army patrol.
He was charged with illegal possession of
ammunition and held in jail. In court, he
refused to recognise the court - the normal
stance of a member of the IRA. But the IRA
knew that Mcveigh had not joined. Inside
Crumlin Road Jail, he was beaten up by Pro-
visionals and accused of being a stool pigeon.
He confessed his involvement and agreed to
give the IRA complete details of his dealings
with the security forces and a list of names of
people working with them.
This information was sent out of Crumlin
Road in a coded letter. The Army specialists
decoded it and showed the list of names to
Holroyd. The list the IRA had obtained from
McVeigh was nonsense, fabricated in order to
escape further beating. At the head of the list of
Catholics supposed to be collaborating with the
British was a well respected local solicitor and
SDLP politician. At the top of the list of
Protestants was the Mcveigh family's
milkman, a Protestant who lived in the same
area as the family. We have also spoken to a
public figure in Dungannon, who saw the list
after it had been sent out. He confirmed that he
saw the same names as Holroyd.
COLUMBA MCVEIGH was given a sus-
pended sentence in January 1975 - completely
unprecedented for someone accused of terrorist
offences and who had implied membership of
the IRA. He went to Dublin with his brother to
live there, but suddenly disappeared ten
months later. He has never been heard of since.
Father Denis Faul, a leading spokesman for
Northern Ireland Catholics, who knows the
McVeigh family, says that by letting Columba
go free in this way, he was in effect being pro-
claimed an informer - even though he had been
quite unable to supply any information at all.
The suspended sentence, says Father Faul,
'condemned him to death'.
A month after Mcveigh was freed, on 11
February 1975, the 'milkman' on his list was
gunned down in a nearby village. The dead man
was not in fact the regular milkman, but his"
relief roundsman. Christopher Mein, a recently
married 29-year-old Protestant, had taken on
the round on his own for the first time that day.
He had no connection with any loyalist organi-
sation. Holroyd noted the milkman's death in
his notebook at the time, commenting that 'the
milkman in Pomeroy was head of Tony's man's
confession list . . . "mistaken identity"'.
As a result of this bungle, Sergeant Poole
became persona non grata at Dungannon police
station. So the Army created a new job for him
in a town 30 miles away. When Holroyd
revisited Northern Ireland in the summer of
1975, he says he was told that both Poole and
another Army intelligence man were being
posted home, because the RUC had begun
investigating what had really happened to
McVeigh. Sergeant Poole is still in the Army.
But the Ministry of Defence have refused
permission for journalists to talk to him about
the case - which is, like the other Holroyd
reports, under investigation by the police and
DPP.
Political psychiatry
Captain Holroyd claims that he has been the
victim of a campaign of vilification and what
amounts to 'political psychiatry' by the Army.
He has succeeded in getting the Army to
withdraw allegations by a senior officer of
'mental stress', which were originally used to
justify his removal from Northern Ireland. We
have established that this original slur was
based on false evidence used in Army records.
The mid-1970s, was a time, as both the
Ministry of Defence and the police now openly
acknowledge, of poor co-operation and co-
ordination between competitive intelligence
operations in Northern Ireland. With the Army
in effect unaccountable to civil authority, it was
also a time when the 'cowboys', keen to make a
name for themselves, flourished.
Holroyd's loyalty to the police and their
undercover agents made him an awkward
customer for some Army commanders.
Another source of friction was that he started
working directly for the Secret Intelligence
Service (MI6), whose controller was based at
Army headquarters, but whose activities were
kept a closely-guarded secret from the Army
staff. Holroyd worked with both SIS staff and
with the undercover SAS team, thus giving him
detailed knowledge of sensitive activities by the
security forces.
The last straw, so far as some in the Army
were concerned, was a secret trip Holroyd made
to Dublin in the spring of 1975. At the
invitation of a senior Garda officer, Assistant
Commissioner Garvey, Holroyd and some
RUC officers went to the Garda headquarters at
Phoenix Park, Dublin, to inspect materials
seized from an IRA bomb factory. Army
officers were officially supposed never to cross
the border without permission. Holroyd's
Army commander had told him not to go. But
intelligence staff at the Northern Ireland Army
HQ in Lisburn, says Holroyd, countermanded
this order.
Holroyd was removed from his post, without
warning, on 27 May 1975. The ostensible
reason given to him was that his wife (from
whom he is now divorced) had suddenly
complained that he had repeatedly threatened
her life and those of their children with a hdden
gun. Following this, his wife's doctor was
alleged to have told Army officers that, if the
Army didn't commit Captain Holroyd to
mental hospital, they would. Following these
alleged complaints, Holroyd was persuaded to-
undergo a brief examination at Musgrave Park
Hospital in Belfast. He was then ordered to
report to an Army Hospital at Netley,
Southampton.
Holroyd's account of these events is now
confirmed by the Ministry of Defence. An
MoD spokesman claimed to the New Statesman
earlier this year that Holroyd's wife and her
GP
were discussing whether he should be certified or
not . . . The Commanding Officer had no choice
in view of what was recommended to him by the
GP at the time . . .
But this version of events is completely denied
by both the ex-Mrs Holroyd, and by her GP -
and by Holroyd himself. Holroyd's ex-wife
says that she merely told another Army wife
that Holroyd was under too much strain in his
job and had wanted her to return with their
children to England for a month, to avoid
further pressure on their marriage. She had not
been threatened with a gun, but had merely told
his Army colleagues that he kept his
'unattributable' gun (in fact, merely a spare
barrel) in their house.
Released after a rest period at the Netley
Hospital, Holroyd was told that he could not
return to Northern Ireland. Instead, he was
offered a job of equal status in England. He
refused and appealed to the Army Board against
the confidential order which had sanctioned his
removal from Northern Ireland. He was told
that the Board decided
that his removal from appointment was justified
in the circumstances at the time, but that this
does not reflect adversely on his character or
ability . . .
The Board directed that 'any reference to his
mental condition shall be expunged'. The only
justification for his removal that then remained
was an allegation that he allegedly 'disobeyed
orders' by going on the secret mission to Dublin
- a serious disciplinary offence, if true, but one
for which no charges or court martial were
ever brought.
NEXT WEEK: Kidnap plots, death threats and
booby traps.
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
NEW STATESMAN
11 May 1984
Pages 12-14
DIRTY WAR PART II
Booby traps and
bank raids
Andrew Wiard/Report
Former army intelligence officer Fred Holroyd (see
above) reveals to Duncan Campbell more of the inside
story of British army 'dirty tricks' in Northern Ireland
FORMER INTELLIGENCE officer Captain
Fred ! lolroyd's revelations last week in the New
Statesman and on Channel 4 have provoked a
strong reaction from the Irish government. The
Irish Ambassador to Britain, Mr Noel Dorr,
said last week that 'It's simply not acceptable
that there should be security forces of any other
state operating within our jurisdiction'.
Ambassador Dorr, who appeared with Holroyd
on a breakfast television programme, pointed
out that it had only been a month since Irish
protests about undercover cross-border RUC
activity had been lodged in London.
Kidnap plots
On more than one occasion, Army officers in
Northern Ireland have arranged illegal kidnap
plots against people living in the Irish
Republic. Captain Holroyd was present when
Army staff officers arranged for one such
kidnap team to be paid £500 from secret
intelligence funds. His evidence implicates at
least four Army officers in a plan illegally to
kidnap suspects from the Irish Republic. Two
of the targets were Eamon McGurgan and
Seamus Grew both of whom lived in County
Monaghan and were on the local 'top ten' list of
IRA suspects.
The kidnap operations known to Holroyd
took place in March 1974. In December 1982,
he described the plots in detail to an
investigating team from the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, led by Superintendent George
Caskey. Caskey's report is now being studied
by the Northern Ireland Director of Public
Prosecutions. Until the DPP has announced his
decision, the Ministry of Defence is refusing to
comment on the kidnap charges, or to allow
officers to be interviewed.
Holroyd first heard from a military
intelligence colleague, Sergeant Tony Poole of
the Intelligence Corps, that two men from
Lisburn, both ex-boxers, had been hired to
kidnap Eamonn McGurgan, and bring him
across the border. The Army would arrange
with a Garda (Irish Police) contact for an area
around McGurgan's home in Castleblayney to
be 'frozen' - i.e. left completely unpoliced -
while the kidnap took place. Although the men
concerned were primarily willing to do the job
because of their Loyalist political sympathies,
they were to be paid £500 by the Army,
Holroyd learned. The kidnap victim would be
hit over the head, tied up with a sack over his
head and dumped at a prearranged spot on the
Northern Ireland side of the border. A party of
soldiers would then 'discover' the victim, and
arrest him.
But the McGurgan kidnap plan went wrong.
On the night the kidnappers set out, a
prominent Senator in the Dail (the Dublin
Parliament) was murdered in the same area. It
was no longer possible for the Army's Garda
contact to 'freeze' police operations. The
kidnappers were, reportedly, stopped at a
checkpoint by the Irish Army, and the
operation failed.
Another kidnap operation was mounted
about two weeks later, on 29 March 1974. The
targets this time were IRA suspect Seamus
Grew and Patrick McLoughlin, with whom
Grew lived in the border town of Monaghan.
The leader of the kidnap team hired by the
Army was Jimmy O'Hara, a Lisburn Protestant
and ex-boxer. Earlier this year, O'Hara
confirmed to us that he and two friends had
indeed been hired by an Army officer to kidnap
Grew. The officer supplied maps showing
Grew's house, details of his movements, official
surveillance photographs and a sketch plan to
show them where to dump Grew in Northern
Ireland after they had kidnapped him. All these
items were seized by the Garda after the three
were arrrested.
The three men were to receive £500 for their
trouble. O'Hara says that the Grew kidnap plot
was discussed twice at secret meetings with the
Army officer, the first of which was in the
Woodlands Hotel, Lisburn, close to where
O'Hara then lived. The second meeting took
place in Craigavon Area Hospital car park - a
short distance from the Army's 3rd Brigade
headquarters in Lurgan, where the kidnap plot
had been devised.
The Grew plot also went badly wrong. Two
of the three men were seen furtively reconnoit-
ering outside Grew's house and were arrested
after neighbours called the police. The third,
O'Hara himself, was arrested after he went to
the police station to demand their release,
having been wrongly advised by his Army
contact that all the Garda would be helpful.
(Indeed, an earlier kidnap plan suggested by the
Army to O'Hara had involved the use of a
British agent inside the Monaghan Garda, who
would arrange to have Grew brought in for
questioning. He would then be released at a
prearranged time, and kidnapped on his way
home.)
We have seen the statement which O'Hara
made to the Garda after his arrest. In it he
repeatedly referred to being given the job by an
'Army man' - whom he refused to identify.
O'Hara and his collaborators were each
sentenced to five years imprisonment in Dublin
in June 1974. On appeal, their sentences were
increased to seven years. The harsh sentences
reflected growing Irish judicial concern about
political kidnapping operations. The kidnap
strategy was abandoned, at least for a time, by
the Army - but may well have been revived in
1976, when Sean McKenna - the son of a
Newry man whom the British government were
found guilty of torturing in the first days of
internment - was abducted across the border
from the village of Edentubber, near Dundalk
in the Republic. He was arrested in the north,
having allegedly 'stumbled across the border
into a patrol' - according to an official Army
public relations statement.
Shortly before Jimmy O'Hara and his
colleagues were apprehended in Monaghan,
Captain Holroyd was working in the intelli-
gence 'cell' at 3rd Brigade Headquarters in
Lurgan. The staff in the 'cell' arranged, in his
presence, to have £500 for the kidnap operation
urgently collected from Army Headquarters in
Lisburn. The money had to be available in
Lurgan to pay the kidnappers.
The intelligence cell, which comprised the
Brigade's intelligence planners and analysts,
was then headed by Major David Delius, a
Royal Hussars officer with a brisk public school
manner. Major Delius is still in the Army, and
has not been permitted by the Ministry of
Defence to comment on the allegations against
him. Among his colleagues involved in the
kidnap plot were two other Captains, who
collated intelligence on the local Catholic and
Protestant communities, and Sergeant Poole,
the Brigade's 'Field Intelligence NCO'.
Jimmy O'Hara still refuses to identify the
Army officer who dealt with him, or the go-
between who introduced them. But he has
volunteered that he knows the name 'Poole'.
We have also discovered that Mr O'Hara is
related by marriage to Mr John Poland, a
sergeant in the Armagh RUC - who had been
in charge of Poole's activities on behalf of the
RUC Special Branch. O'Hara will not talk
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
BOOBY TRAPS AND BANK RAIDS. . . Continued
about other operations he may have carried out
for the Army or RUC. But he has confirmed
that there was more than one kidnap plan, and
that Eamonn McGurgan, as well as Seamus
Grew, 'may have been' a target.
The RUC's Caskey Report on Captain
Holroyd's allegations is believed to attempt to
dismiss the kidnap plot accusation. Last year,
Superintendent Caskey claimed to Captain
Holroyd that O'Hara had denied being paid by
the Army. But during last week's Diverse Report
(Channel 4) on the Holroyd revelations, Mr
O'Hara - blacked out to prevent his face being
seen - acknowledged that his orders had come
from the 'English' - as he had told the Garda in
1974.
Boobytraps
Fred Holroyd first heard about the 'Case of the
self-exploding motorcyclist', as intelligence
staff at the 3rd Brigade Headquarters called the
lethal results of a secret Army sabotage mission,
early in October 1974. Major Delius, the
Brigade's explosives expert, Captain Peter
Maynard, and other intelligence officers were
celebrating the case by passing round a large
sweet jar of white mints. They were, says
Holroyd, 'like public schoolboys playing James
Bond', celebrating in a 'tuck-room'
atmosphere.
Forty miles away near the border at Newry, a
35 year-old man had been blown to death on 5
October. Eugene McQuaid, a mechanic from
Newry, married with five children, had been
riding southwards on his motorcycle when it
suddenly exploded - distributing parts of the
motorbike and his body across the main
Dublin-Belfast road.
McQuaid was not believed either by intelli-
gence staff or his family to have belonged to the
IRA. But he was 'doing a turn' for a family
friend who was in the IRA, Holroyd says. On
his bike were strapped three home-made rocket
launchers, known to the Army as 'bombards',
and to the IRA as mobile mines. McQuaid is
believed to have agreed to pick up the bombards
from the Republic and bring them across the
border to Newry. (According to a secret Army
report on 'Future Terrorist Trends', which
leaked in 1979, the Provisional IRA had begun
using bombards to attack armoured vehicles in
September 1974. They could have a range of up
to 800 feet.)
The bombards were discovered by the British
Army. Rather than allowing the secret arms
cache to be seized by the Garda, however, the
Brigade staff had arranged for one of their team
to cross the border to examine and sabotage the
bombards. He sawed off safety pins inside the
rocket bodies, making them unsuitable and
likely to explode on rough handling. The aim of
this sabotage was another 'kill' against the IRA
- an 'own goal'.
After picking up the bombards, McQuaid
was (unknown to him) under surveillance. The
watchers may have expected him to be killed as
he loaded the rockets. But he set off towards
Newry - now a live bomb on a public road; and
a lethal hazard to the public as well as to himself.
A roadblock was set up to intercept him, with an
Army team kept well back from the area for its
own safety. On reaching the roadblock,
McQuaid turned and fled back towards the
Republic. At that point one of the sabotaged
bombards, fixed below his petrol tank,
exploded.
McQuaid died about 100 yards from
Donnelly's garage, just north of the border on
the main Belfast-Dublin road. An eyewitness at
this spot heard the explosion and came out of a
house in which he was working. McQuaid's
severed head, still in a motorcycle helmet, lay at
the foot of a tree, a small trickle of blood coming
from his nose. Other parts of his body and bike
were hanging from the tree, and scattered across
the pavement and a nearby field. Army officers
arrived on the scene extremely quickly,
confirming Holroyd's report that the check-
point had caused the motorcyclist to turn round
and try to retreat across the border. One officer
came up to the tree where McQuaid's head lay,
and picked up a handful of guts. 'That's an end
of another of you fucking bastards', he said.
The eye-witnesses evidence of the Army's
grim satisfaction at the incident confirms
Holroyd's recollections - as did the coroner's
report, which ascribed his death to the sudden
explosion of one of the rockets he was carrying.
The Army had in fact in effect summarily
executed Eugene McQuaid without trial,
recklessly putting many innocent lives at great
risk.
Sabotage and bank raids
Captain Holroyd frequently operated on behalf
of SIS, the Secret Intelligence Service. Holroyd
worked directly for Northern Ireland's SIS
chief, whose special department at Army HQ at
Lisburn is disguised as the 'Political
Secretariat'. At the time, it was headed by Craig
Smellie, who left in 1975 to run the SIS station
in Athens.
Soon after they first met, Smellie asked
Holroyd if he would be interested in robbing a
bank. He did not explain why - or where - SIS
might want banks robbed. Holroyd refused and
could only think, then or later, of two reasons
why SIS wanted banks robbed - either they
were short of money in their 'unattributable'
funds which they used to pay for agents and
secret operations; or the Littlejohn brothers,
who were then robbing banks in Eire and
working for British intelligence at the same
time, might have been thought to need closed
SIS supervision.
Holroyd, like other intelligence officers in the
province, periodically used 'unattributable'
funds for secret operations. They could be
released by a few senior officers at the Northern
Ireland Army HQ, including Smellie.
During 1974, Holroyd met Smellie at
Lisburn about once a month. From an agent in
the Provisional IRA, Holroyd and his Special
Branch colleagues learned that an active local
IRA man in Lurgan was planning to kill a
policeman the following Sunday. Holroyd
knew where the rifle and ammunition to be used
were hidden - inside a graveyard to the north
of the Kilwilkie housing estate in Lurgan, one
of the most dangerous Catholic 'hard areas' in
the county and virtually an Army 'no go' area.
Rather than removing the weapons, or
arresting anyone taking them, Smellie
suggested that he would arrange 'to give the
chap a bit of a surprise'. He asked Holroyd to
bring him the top bullets from the clip of
ammunition. He would arrange for the rounds
to be doctored. Holroyd and Sergeant Dearsley
retrieved the rounds and took them to Smellie.
Two days later, Holroyd collected the doctored
rounds. They had been filled with powerful
explosive, instead of normal powder. When the
trigger was pulled, the would-be-killer would
blow his own head off.
But this SIS plan was never put into effect.
The commander of the 3rd Brigade, Brigadier
Wallis-King, resented SIS operating independ-
ently in his area and forbade Holroyd to plant
the doctored bullets. So Holroyd and Dearsley
made a further secret trip into Kilwilkie, and
sabotaged the rifle's firing mechanism. The
doctored round stayed in Holroyd's office.
When Dearsley left Northern Ireland late in
1974, Fred Holroyd was asked by Smellie to
take over running his agents, both north and
south. Holroyd was specifically instructed to
pass the information from most of these agents
directly to SIS on special 'Military Intelligence
Source Reports'. In a series of specially made
tape recordings, Holroyd was briefed by
Dearsley about his new agents, how to contact
them, and their foibles and requirements. The
agents included three Gardai (Irish police), one
of whom had been allocated a code-name. One
of the more exotic of the agents also transferred
to Holroyd was a Catholic woman from Lurgan
who provided information on IRA activities in
return for sexual favours from the Army. Every
few weeks, on Holroyd's request, a sergeant
from the local army company would muster
volunteers from the unmarried men in his unit
to come and provide unusual service for Queen
and Country.
NEXT WEEK: Forgery, train derailment, death
threats, burglary, how the SAS really operate - and
how Protestant killers have been protected from justice.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
DIRTY WAR PART III
NEW STATESMAN
18 May 1984 Pg. 10-11
Terror tactics
Duncan Campbell with more revelations of 'dirty tricks' in Northern
Ireland from Fred Holroyd, former British army intelligence officer
THE IRISH government this week ordered an
investigation of the allegations by former
military intelligence officer Captain Fred
Holroyd of illegal activities in the Republic.
Foreign Affairs Minister Jim O'Keefe told the
Dail that the allegations made by Captain
Holroyd in the New Statesman were grave;
'they were being examined by the Garda
(police) authorities'. Mr O'Keefe added: 'We
have been assured by the British authorities that
the British government had no knowledge of
the events that took place'.
Members of the Dail have been particularly
concerned by accusations that Army officers
planned and paid for illegal kidnap operations
in the Republic in 1974; and murdered an IRA
suspect there in 1975 (NS 4 and 11 May).
Captain Holroyd has also alarmed Irish TDs
(MPs) by revealing that certain members of the
Irish Garda (police) were regarded as British
agents. One particularly fruitful source - a
detective in a border county - was known to the
Secret Intelligence Service as 'The Badger'. In
return for his help, 'The Badger' was supplied
with Special Branch and Army reports and
information about Protestant extremist
activities in the North.
Death threats
Early in 1974, a 'Liaison Intelligence NCO' in
the Army's 3rd Brigade in Northern Ireland,
then based in Lurgan, admitted to Captain
Holroyd that he had sent a 'death threat' letter
enclosing a bullet to a Republican activist.
The practice of security personnel sending
anonymous death threats was apparently
common. Captain Holroyd himself admits that
he sent such threat letters to Protestant
extremists in Portadown, hoping to inhibit
their activities. Holroyd now regrets this
behaviour - but the case we have investigated
and confirmed was far more serious. The target
was an innocent political activist, not a con-
victed terrorist and the bullet sent through the
post (itself an idiotically dangerous act) led
directly to charges being brought against an
innocent third party.
In May 1972, Mr Charles Sweeney, a civil
rights activist living in Craigavon, near Lurgan,
received the death threat letter. It contained a
live 0.32" round of ammunition - a type
seldom used by the Army. But Staff Sergeant
Bernard 'Bunny' Dearsley - the NCO
involved - could, as an undercover operative,
do not do near the security Forces
with this .. We're watich IN & you.
The bullit is our signature.
Provo RuLe
20 MAY
1972
MR. Charles Sweeny
1448
KAMbiyo : pus
156 MEaclow Book
wep
DIE!
Craigavon
..
Go Armagh
Death threat letter: sent by the army, enclosing a bullet, to Catholic civil rights activist.
Above: Captain Fred Holroyd, long-haired and bearded as undercover intelligence officer in
Portadown.
be specially issued with a small and easily
concealed Walther PPK pistol, which used
such specialist ammunition.
'Get out of the area and stay out', the letter
warned Sweeney, or 'the next bullet will not be
delivered in an envelope'. Although
purportedły signed by the Provisional IRA, it
stressed that Mr Sweeney's alleged offence was
provoking 'serious secterian (sic) conflict'.
The bullet was, rather surprisingly, dis-
coverd by the Post Office during letter sorting,
but was merely resealed with official tape and
delivered - bullet and all - to Charles
Sweeney. This strongly suggest official
complicity in allowing the live ammunition to
be passed on.
Terrified by the letter, Sweeney turned for
help to Mrs Bernadette O'Hagan of Lurgan. A
likeable and active local Republican, she was
the wife of Joe B. O'Hagan, then the quarter-
master of the Provisional IRA. Mrs O'Hagan
put the letter in a spare handbag. After
contacting her busband, she was able to assure
Sweeney that the IRA was not out to get him.
Sweeney was never threatened again, but in
1973 decided to leave Craigavon and return to
his previous home in Scotland.
In April 1974, Mrs O'Hagan's house was
raided and searched by the Army. The bullet
was found; and Mrs O'Hagan and her son
Kevin charged with illegal possession of
ammunition. The charges covered both the
0.32" round and rifle magazines, allegedly
found at the same time in the garden yard
(which appear to have been planted during the
search). The 0.32" round was still with the
threat letter in the resealed envelope. Mrs
O'Hagan and Kevin - then a student in
England, who despite his family connections
has never been suspected of joining the IRA -
were both remanded in custody. An appeal
court later freed them.
Soon after Mrs O'Hagan was arrested,
Holroyd was told by Dearsley that she was
being held on a false charge - and that he had
sent the threat letter on the instructions of the
Brigade intelligence staff.
The letter (see illustration) is still in the
possession of the RUC, who showed it to
Holroyd last May. He says he is 'positive' that
the threat note was written by Dearsley.
Holroyd was familar with Dearsley's hand-
writing - which was so bad that he wrote
infrequently. Holroyd often had to copy or
transcribe his written reports for him.
Sergeant Dearsley's widow confirms that
Dearsley, who died in 1977, seldom wrote, and
then only badly - but she is certain that the
writing in the letter is not her late husband's -
'unless he was trying to disguise it'. Unfortun-
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TERROR TACTICS ... Continued
ately, no samples of his writing have survived
for comparison. Holroyd stresses that Dearsley,
who was ill-rewarded by the Army for his
courageous service, was ill at ease when
accepting orders to carry out such 'dirty tricks'.
Forging and burglary
For at least two years, Army intelligence staff
systematically forged press passes, bearing the
name of plausible - yet fictitious - inter-
national press agencies. Journalists' lives were
directly put at risk by the secret operation.
A year ago, RUC detectives - who have now
sent a report to the Director of Public Pro-
secutions on all of Holroyd's allegations - told
him that the Ministry of Defence accepted this
allegation. But they claimed that the practice
had been stopped in March 1976, after
Northern Ireland Secretary Roy Mason
admitted to Parliament that Army public
relations officers had used such 'unauthorised'
cards. Holroyd's revelations now confirm what
many journalists suspected at the time - that
the use of forged press credentials was
widespread among undercover intelligence
staff. (Such Army forgery became so
widespread that in the autumn of 1975 the
Provisional IRA in South Armagh announced
that the safety of journalists in the area could no
longer be guaranteed.)
Holroyd first came across the forged
credentials in 1974, in a discussion with
Warrant Officer Eric Hollis, who worked in the
intelligence 'cell' at the Army's 3rd Brigade
headquarters in Lurgan. Hollis asked Holroyd
to assist him; how, he asked, did one spell 'inter-
national' in French. Hollis then showed
Holroyd his forgery project - a fake press card
for a Paris-based 'International Press
Federation' - which he was then assembling
using Letraset.
Hollis explained that other Army staff would
use it for undercover work. After he finished, it
would be 'printed up', and the cards then taken
to Northern Ireland Army headquarters at
Lisburn, where an encapsulating machine had
recently been installed. This, Hollis suggested,
would make the cards look convincing.
Questioned last year by RUC detectives,
Warrant Officer Hollis reportedly admitted
that he had been involved in forging press
cards. Their design had been based on an out-
of-date Spanish card which had fallen into
Army hands. But, said Detective
Superintendent George Caskey, heading the
RUC team, Hollis had blamed Holroyd for
suggesting the forgery idea in the first place.
The Ministry of Defence has refused to
comment, or allow officers to be interviewed,
pending a decision by the DPP.
The RUC also appears to have accepted
Holroyd's account of 'official' burglaries.
When the Army wanted to discover more about
the contents of a house under surveillance, they
called in the specialist services of an expert from
the Army Intelligence Centre at Ashford, Kent.
Here, an elite team of British government
burglars is based. During his own training at
Ashford, Holroyd was given an introductory
course in lock-picking and safe-blowing. His
tutor was Captain Lock (sic), whom Holroyd
later met on operations in Ireland. The lock-
picking course was held in a section of the
Ashford barracks, entered through a door made
up to resemble No 10, Downing Street.
Holroyd's account of the Intelligence
Centre's specialist burglary team is confirmed
by other, more senior former Army officers,
who have attended similar courses. One officer
who underwent an anti-terrorist training course
in the early 1970s, at Gosport, Hants (see NS 15
February 1980) was required to graduate by
carrying out a mock terrorist attack in the
Southampton area. His team planted a
simulated plastic explosive bomb inside a water
pumping station.
Captain Lock, the 'covert entry' specialist
whom Holroyd regularly encountered in
Lisburn, broke into both Protestant and
Catholic targets. One target house was by the
shore of Lough Neagh, where it was suspected
that IRA arms bound for Belfast arrived by
boat. Protestant targets included 'at least a
dozen' loyalist Orange Lodges. Assisted by a
Sergeant Drew Coid, a Special Branch
colleague of Holroyd, Lock's burglaries
enabled intelligence staff to discover the extent
of the Protestant arms caches in the Lodges.
The RUC team investigating Holroyd's
allegations has not denied that officially
approved burglars were employed in this way.
But they told Holroyd last May that Lock, now
retired from the Army, was secretly employed
overseas 'in the interests of national security'.
Train derailed
Early in the morning of 8 November 1974, Fred
Holroyd was present in Portadown police
The train, derailed by the army according to
Holroyd, on a bridge in a 'hard' Catholic area
of Portadown
station. Army and police officers were deciding
urgently how to deal with a hijacked train,
believed to be carrying a bomb. An Army team
decided recklessly to derail the train in
Portadown. If a bomb went off there, it would
do heavy damage to a small and tightly knit
Catholic district.
Two hours earlier, the Provisional IRA had
stopped the morning newspaper train between
Dublin and Belfast. They then set the
locomotive to run on maximum speed and
driverless into central Belfast. There was a
chance that the train - travelling at up to 100
mph - would derail in Portadown anyway, as it
entered the longest bend on the Dublin-Belfast
route.
Among those at the emergency meeting were
Sergeant Drew Coid of the Portadown Special
Branch - Holroyd's closest colleague - and
Captain Peter Maynard, the Army 3rd
Brigade's explosives expert, together with his
team. For some unexplained reason SAS
Captains Tony Ball and Robert Nairac were
also present, in plainclothes. Another Army
intelligence specialist, who served in the 3rd
Brigade area with Holroyd, says that in fact the
train was stopped before it reached Portadown
- and then restarted so that the SAS derailment
plot could be carried out.
Half an hour before the train was expected at
Portadown, all but Holroyd left for the railway
station. There signalman Robert Milne had a
private plan to stop the train by diverting it into
a siding. He was, however, ordered to leave his
signal cabin and did not see anything until the
final moment of derailment.
The driverless train entered the long
Portadown bend at speed, ran over the points
where Mr Milne had hoped to switch it to the
siding, successfully negotiated the bend - but
then, as it entered the straight section again,
suddenly came off the rails. It tumbled towards
the Obins Street houses and came to rest lying
on its side over a bridge known as 'The Tunnel'
connecting the Obins Street area with
Portadown's commercial district.
Captain Holroyd heard of the derailment
soon afterwards, when Sergeant Coid and
Captain Maynard returned to the police station.
They told him that they had deliberately blown
the train off the rails. Coid hoped that a near
disaster for the Catholic community of Obins
Street would deter us of train bombs in future.
"That'll teach them', said Coid. "They won't
send another train up here again. It the
Catholics who have suffered this time'.
Holroyd went to inspect the scene for
himself. By then the Army knew there was no
bomb on board. But the local community did
not know - and so, the southern end of the
Obins Street area was evacuated, allegedly for
'safety reasons'. In fact, a detailed covert house-
to-house search was carried, when the
occupants had gone. The searchers found IRA
and INLA flags, republican literature but no
weaponry.
Locals remember the train crash and
evacuation well. On the television news that
evening, Merlyn Rees, Northern Ireland
Secretary, was shown being briefed by the
Army on the progress of the evacuation.
During an interview with Captain Holroyd
last May, the RUC tacitly acknowledged the
deliberate derailment. They pointed out that no
one was injured - and that otherwise a bomb
might have gone off in Belfast. The RUC also
claimed that Captain Maynard denied taking
any part in deliberate derailment.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
Defense & Economy
World Report and Survey
Issue 20, 14 May 1984
No.899
ISSN: 0364-9008
WORLD:OT2
Page 1
PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: 1982
International terrorism continued as a seri-
ous problem in 1982. In particular, the
volatile situation in the Middle East, the
instability in Central America, and the in-
tensifying opposition to US and NATO
policies in Western Europe generated sig-
nificant terrorist activity. In many cases,
subnational groups seeking political
change were responsible. In addition,
some states-particularly in the Middle
East-continued to conduct or sponsor
terrorism as a means of achieving national
policy objectives. On the positive side,
major counterterrorism successes in Italy
and West Germany markedly reduced-at
least for the short term-both the capabili-
ties and the activities of two major leftist
West European terrorist groups-the Red
Brigades (BR) and the Red Army Faction
(RAF).
The Year in Brief
In 1982 we recorded 794 international
terrorist incidents,1 the second-highest an-
nual total since we began keeping records
in 1968.2 Nearly one-third of the total num-
ber of incidents, however, were threats
that for one reason or another were never
put into action. The number of actual
recorded terrorist attacks-bombings, kid-
napings, assassinations, hostage takings,
and the like-was 8 percent lower than the
previous year. In 1982, as in most years,
international terrorist actions against
Americans remained high, nearly equaling
the previous high recorded in 1978.
'Because of the nature of terrorism, many de-
tails involving international terrorist incidents in-
evitably escape our attention. Our data tend to
emphasize incidents involving US citizens and
facilities. For these reasons, the statistics in this
report should be regarded as approximations
chiefly useful in determining levels of magnitude
and configurations of activity.
2 The largest number of recorded incidents
(838) , which occurred in 1978, was dispropor-
tionately high because of the violence accompa-
nying the Iranian revolution and the deposal of
the Shah.
Types of Attacks. International terrorists
continued to utilize a wide variety of meth-
ods to achieve their goals, but bombings
were the most common, accounting for 42
percent of the total number of incidents
last year. The number of kidnapings in-
creased over the previous year, while the
number of hostage takings, armed attacks,
and assassinations declined. Even so, the
pattern of killings remained a serious prob-
lem. At least 140 people were killed last
year as a direct result of international
terrorist actions, bringing to more than
3,500 the total number killed since the
beginning of 1973.
Types of Victims. Diplomats were the
primary target, accounting for 54 percent
of all victims last year. This was largely
because of the continuing practice by cer-
tain states of sponsoring terrorist attacks
against official representatives of adver-
sary countries. Corporate officials-mostly
Americans in Latin America-and military
personnel accounted for another 31 per-
cent of the victims.
As in_past years US citizens were the
primary target of international terrorists. Of
the total number of incidents in 1982 in-
volving individuals, nearly half were against
US nationals (table 1). Other countries
whose citizens were often victims included
Turkey, Israel, France, Yugoslavia, and
West Germany. Less than 2 percent in-
volved Soviet nationals.
The 954 casualties produced by terrorist
incidents during 1982 were slightly fewer
than the 1,009 recorded in 1981, and
substantially fewer than the 1,709 record-
ed in 1980. The 140 recorded deaths is the
lowest figure for any year since 1973.
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Figure 1
International Terrorist Incidents, 1973-82
Number of incidents
Total incidents: 6,473
900
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1973
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
Table 1
International Terrorist Incidents Against
US Citizens and Property, 1973-82, by Type of Event
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total
Total
224
187
162
217
183
371
238
272
257
401
2,510
Kidnaping
22
14
23
9
6
8
8
9
9
7
115
Barricade-
3
2
1
2
2
0
6
6
1
3
26
hostage
Bombing
106
130
94
112
125
158
115
95
93
168
1,196
Armed attack
8
6
7
8
5
12
7
11
6
3
73
Hijacking
0
1
2
5
4
2
12
20
18
10
74
Assassination ·
4
2
8
14
6
7
9
14
15
8
87
Sniping
0
3
1
6
8
7
20
9
9
7
70
Threat, hoax
75
19
18
53
23
159
47
74
82
177
727
Other
6
10
8
8
4
18
12
34
24
18
142
· Includes attempts.
64
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Figure 2
Casualties Resulting From International Terrorist Attacks,
1973-82
Number of casualties
Total Casualties: 11,132
Number of wounded and killed
Total Killed: 3,509
1,800
1,200
1,600
1,000
1,400
1,200
800
1,000
600
800
600
400
400
200
200
0
1973 74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
0
1973 74
Table 2
Regional Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents
Against US Citizens and Property, 1982, by Type of Event
North
America
Latin
America
Western
Europe
USSR/
Eastern
Europe
Africa
Middle
East
Asia
Other
Total
Total
14
106
189
7
5
44
35
1
401
Kidnaping
0
1
0
0
1
3
2
0
7
Barricade-hostage
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
3
Bombing
4
32
115
2
2
4
9
0
168
Armed attack
0
1
1
0
0
1
Q
0
3
Hijacking
4
1
0
0
0
1
4
0
10
Assassination *
0
1
4
0
1
1
1
0
8
Sniping
2
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
7
Threat, hoax
40
59
60
4
1
31
18
0
177
Other
8
5
1
0
2
1
1
18
" Includes attempts.
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Figure 3
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Incidents,
1973-82
Total Incidents: 6,473
Others 275 (4.2%)
Prominent opinion leaders 221 (3.4%)-
1
Government officials 239 (3.7%)
Military 591 (9.1%)-
-Diplomats 2,551 (39.4%)
Private parties 1,162 (18.0%)
-Corporate officials 1,434 (22.2%)
Terrorist Groups. The number of groups
responsible for international terrorist inci-
dents has increased markedly since the
beginning of the 1970s. For example, only
61 groups claimed credit in 1970, as com-
pared with 125 in 1982.3 Although the
number of groups claiming credit for inci-
dents represent 75 different nationalities,
West Germans, Central Americans, Arme-
nians, and Palestinians were responsible
for the majority of incidents. The following
six groups perpetrated approximately 70
(roughly 18 percent) of the terrorist at-
tacks recorded in 1982, including numer-
ous bombings, assassinations (as well as
attempts), arson attacks, and other events
of high consequence:
· Revolutionary Cells (RZ). The largest
number of attacks in West Germany
were claimed by the RZ, an indigenous
leftist group composed of small semiau-
tonomous cells that links its terrorist ac-
tivities to both local and national issues,
such as the US and NATO presence in
' These numbers should be viewed with the
following in mind: some terrorist groups develop
cover names to avoid blame for particular ac-
tions; others use them to create the illusion of a
broader base of support; still others use special
names to commemorate an anniversary or hon-
or a fallen comrade. Occasionally, nongroup
members use special names to mislead authori-
ties. Not infrequently, several groups (or individ-
uals pretending to represent subnational
groups) claim credit for the same operation.
West Germany and the increasing anti-
nuclear sentiment evident there. In a
letter acknowledging its responsibility for
an explosive attack on the American
Memorial Library in West Berlin in April
1982, the RZ called for, among other
things, an end to US imperialism, a halt
in the construction of a new runway at
the Frankfurt airport, and nonintervention
in El Salvador.
. The Popular Revolutionary Forces-
Lorenzo Zelaya (FPR). The Marxist-
Leninist, "anti-imperialist" FPR is the
most active terrorist group in Honduras.
Its principal targets are foreign diplomat-
ic facilities and commercial interests. The
FPR claimed responsibility, for example,
for several bombings in August 1982,
which resulted in damage to US, UK, and
Salvadoran facilities in Honduras.
. The Armenian Secret Army for the
Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). This
pro-Soviet nationalist organization car-
ried out more international terrorist inci-
dents in 1982 than any other terrorist
group. ASALA claimed responsibility for
the assassination attempt in April 1982
on the commercial officer of the Turkish
Embassy in Ottawa. This attack was
typical of ASALA targeting, although the
group also attacks non-Turkish interests ..
in retaliation for the arrest of its
members.
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Figure 4
International Terrorist Incidents Against US
Citizens and Property, 1982
Number of incidents
Total Incidents: 401
By Type of Target
Other
Other US Government
Military
Business
Diplomats
0
50
100
150
200
By Type of Event
Armed attack .
Barricade-hostage
Kidnaping
Sniping
Assassinationª
Hijacking
Other
Bombing
Threat, hoax
0
50
100
.150
200
By Region
Other
Africa
USSR/Eastern Europe
North America
Asia
Middle East
Latin America
Western Europe
0
50
100
150
200
&includes attempts.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
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No.899-20
· Justice Commandos for the Armenian
Genocide (JCAG). This rightist Arme-
nian ultranationalist group targets only
Turkish interests. Its goals are similar to
those of ASALA. Apparently responsible
for the deaths of more than a dozen
Turkish officials in recent years, JCAG
claimed responsibility for the assassina-
tion in January 1982 of the Turkish Con-
sul General in Los Angeles.
· Black June Organization (BJO). Also
known as the Fatah Revolutionary Coun-
cil or the Abu Nidal Group (from the war
name of its leader) , this radical Palestin-
ian group is opposed to a negotiated
settlement with Israel and to the policies
espoused by Yasir Arafat and the moder-
ate Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO). The BJO receives support from
both Iraq and Syria. In addition to Israelis
and Jews, its targets have included ene-
mies of its patron governments as well as
moderate Palestinians and others who
have espoused diplomacy as a means
toward a Middle East settlement. The
BJO has been linked to the assassination
in September 1982 of the first secretary
of the Kuwaiti Embassy in Madrid, alleg-
edly in retaliation for the lack of active
support by Kuwait of Palestinian inter-
ests in Lebanon. The BJO was also
responsible for the June 1982 assassina-
tion attempt against Israel's Ambassador
to Great Britain,
· 15 May Organization. This rejectionist
Palestinian group, supported by Iraq,
conducts attacks mainly against Israeli
targets. It claimed responsibility for the
bombing of an Israeli-owned restaurant
in West Berlin in January 1982 that killed
one and wounded 24 others.
Regional Patterns
International terrorism has increasingly be-
come a global problem. Figures for 1982
confirm the trend toward a greater geo-
graphic spread: in 1973, 71 countries ex-
perienced terrorism; in 1982, 87 countries
were affected. Notwithstanding this trend,
some countries-especially totalitarian
states like the Soviet Union, China, and
Cuba-have remained relatively free of
terrorism, international and domestic. Con-
versely. in the Western democracies inter-
national terrorism is more widespread.
More than one-third of international terror-
ist incidents recorded in 1982 occurred in
four democratic countries: West Germany
(15 percent) , Italy (7 percent) , France
(7 percent) , and the United States (6
percent) . Not surprisingly, Western Europe
accounted for almost half (43 percent) of
the international terrorist incidents record-
ed. Latin America followed with 22 percent
and the Middle East with 15 percent.
Western Europe. The 343 international
terrorist incidents in Western Europe re-
corded in 1982 were far more than in any
previous year. A number of these incidents
were related to the spring 1982 visit of
President Reagan to several Western Euro-
pean nations. For example, a bomb plant-
ed by the ultraleftist French group Action
Directe exploded at the American School
in suburban Paris in early June, highlight-
ing its call for mass demonstrations against
the US Presidential visit. Several attacks
on US-owned commercial facilities in Italy
were also claimed by leftist groups protest-
ing the presidential visit.
The largest number of international terror-
ist attacks in Western Europe during 1982
occurred in West Germany, reflecting in-
creased militance on the part of both left-
wing and rightwing extremists. Major is-
sues exercising the West German terrorists
included West German participation in
NATO, NATO policies in the region (par-
ticularly nuclear policies) , and US support
of Israel. The RZ, a leftist group responsi-
ble for many of the attacks, deliberately
avoided causing casualties. By contrast,
the right-extremist Kexel-Hepp Group
targeted US servicemen and their depen-
dents; the group's bombs seriously injured
two US servicemen in December.
During 1982, as in past years, several
terrorist groups mounted attacks in
France. Some involved exceptional vio-
lence resulting in numerous deaths and
injuries. Two bomb explosions-one
aboard the Paris-Toulouse express train in
March and the other in a car on a Paris
street in April-together killed six people
and injured 87. A number of anti-Semitic
attacks occurred in Paris, including the
assassination in April of Yacov Barsiman-
tov, an Israeli diplomat, claimed by the
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May 1984
Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction
(LARF) , and a grenade and machinegun
attack in August against the Jo Golden-
berg restaurant and a nearby synagogue.
The latter killed six persons (including two
Americans) and injured 27 (including two
Americans) .
In Greece, the Revolutionary People's
Struggle (ELA) continued its campaign to
eliminate US presence there by carrying
out bombing attacks against US military
and commercial facilities and on vehicles
belonging to US service personnel. ELA
acknowledged responsibility for the deto-
nation in June 1982 of five explosive de-
vices in Athens in protest of the visit of US
Gen. Bernard Rogers, the NATO Supreme
Allied Commander Europe.
In Northern Ireland the militance of the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
and the Irish National Liberation Army
(INLA) is well known, although these or-
ganizations do not limit their operations to
Northern Ireland. In 1982, for example,
PIRA claimed credit for setting off bombs
in two London parks on 20 July. The first
exploded in an automobile as a detach-
ment of the Queen's household cavalry
passed by; the other detonated under a
bandstand occupied by a British military
band. Together the explosions killed 11
people and injured many more.
In Western Europe-indeed, in most parts
of the world-there are many more do-
mestic terrorist incidents than international
incidents each year. Groups involved in
international terrorism such as the RZ in
West Germany and the BR in Italy also
commit numerous domestic acts for each
one involving foreigners. Other groups en-
gage almost exclusively in domestic terror-
ism. In Spain, for example, terrorists asso-
ciated with the Marxist-Leninist separatist
movement, Basque Fatherland and Liberty
(ETA), for years have directed a cam-
paign of violence against Spanish Govern-
ment personnel and moderate Basques. In
France, authorities have their hands full
with the militant separatist movement, the
National Front for the Liberation of Corsica
(FLNC) .
Latin America. In 1982 we recorded 172
international terrorist incidents in Latin
America, the second-highest figure for this
region during the past 10 years. In Central
America the number remained roughly the
same as in 1981, while in South America it
increased by more than 16 percent.
International terrorism is only part of the
story in South America, where terrorist
activity is generally rural based and indige-
nous, seldom crossing national borders.
Among the most active of terrorist groups
in 1982 was the Colombian April 19 Move-
ment (M-19), an ardently nationalistic
group that espouses "scientific socialism."
Although many of its actions fall into the
category of domestic terrorism, it has often
targeted foreign nationals and facilities,
including those of the United States, In
March 1982 a grenade and a dynamite
bomb were thrown into the Salvadoran
Embassy compound by M-19 members
claiming solidarity with the leftist Salvador-
an Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) .
In Peru, the Maoist group Sendero Lumin-
oso (Shining Path) strives to facilitate the
Overthrow of the Peruvian Government
through an escalating campaign of rural
and urban violence, principally directed in
1982 against nonmilitary targets. Numer-
Ous attacks against a variety of domestic
targets, including government buildings,
communications towers, police posts, and
Civil Guards, were attributed to the Shining
Path in 1982. It also targets foreign facili-
ties and was held responsible for an explo-
sive attack in July 1982 against the US
Embassy in Lima.
In Central America, social, economic, and
political turmoil, exacerbated by a number
of regional concerns, continued to form the
backdrop for international and domestic
terrorism. In El Salvador and Guatemala,
for example, prolonged internal conflict is
still characterized by terrorism conducted
by leftist and rightist forces. As a byprod-
uct of the Sandinista revolution, Nicaragua
has provided safehaven and financial, lo-
gistic, and propaganda support to subver-
sive elements in El Salvador and Honduras
that conduct terrorist acts as part of their
repertoire.
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The policies of nations external to the
region also help shape the character of
terrorism in Central America. Cuba and the
Soviet Union continue to provide financial
and logistic support and training to leftist
forces in the area that conduct terrorist
activity. US policy and increased US pres-
ence in Central America are often cited as
justification for terrorist attacks. During the
hostage-barricade incident in the principal
commercial city of San Pedro Sula in Hon-
duras in September 1982, for example,
among other demands, the terrorists called
for the expulsion of US and other foreign
military advisers from Honduras.
Figure 6
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist
Incidents, 1973-82
Total Incidents: 6,473
Other 178 (2.7%)
USSR/Eastern Europe 82 (1.3%) - |
Africa 232 (3.6%)
Asia 330 (5.1%)
North America 606 (9.4%).
-- Western Europe 2,379
(36.8%)
Latin America 1,271 (19.6%)
-- Middle East 1,395 (21.6%)
Table 3
Regional Distribution of International Terrorist
Incidents, 1982, by Type of Event
North
America
Latin
America
Western
Europe
USSR/
Eastern
Europe
Africa
Middle
East
Asia
Pacific
Other
Total
Total
61
172
343
16
18
122
53
5
4
794
Kidnaping
0
12
1
0
5
10
3
0
0
31
Barricade-
0
7
10
0
0
1
0
0
0
18
hostage
Bombing
24
58
203
3
3
28
15
3
0
337
Armed attack
0
4
1
0
0
2
0
0
0
7
Hijacking
5
0
7
1
6
7
0
0
30
Assassination *
5
2
21
1
6
6
4
1
0
46
Sniping
2
7
6
0
0
6
0
0
1.
22
Threat, hoax
23
67
89
4
1
55
22
1
1
263
Other
3
10
12
1
2
8
2
0
2
40
OTUN
4
* Includes attempts.
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Middle East. According to our records,
122 international terrorist incidents took
place in 1982 in the Middle East. In addi-
tion, many terrorist incidents that took
place far from the Middle East-in West-
ern Europe, Latin America, and in North
America-were motivated by events in the
Middle East or conducted by operatives
from that region.
The Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestin-
ian issue spurred much of the terrorism,
and Israeli, US, and moderate Palestinian
interests were frequent victims. Numerous
other incidents, however, resulted from in-
traregional strife. The government of Syria,
for example, persisted in its terrorist cam-
paign against the oppositionist Muslim
Brotherhood, while Iran and Iraq ex-
changed terrorist attacks as part of their
protracted war.
Throughout 1982, mainstream Palestinians
in Al Fatah and other member groups of
the PLO continued to adhere to the mora-
torium on international terrorism imposed
by Chairman Yasir Arafat nearly a decade
ago. This moratorium was designed to give
Western diplomatic initiatives an opportu -.
nity to bear fruit. Extremist non-PLO terror-
ist groups such as Abu Nidal's BJO, how-
ever, have refused to comply with the ban
and have at times used terrorism to under-
mine Arafat's diplomatic initiatives. On
3 June 1982, a BJO operative tried to
assassinate the Israeli Ambassador in Lon-
don; Israel cited this incident as justifica-
tion for its invasion of Lebanon three days
later, allegedly to destroy the PLO infra-
structure. Following the incursion, Palestin-
ian extremists and their supporters around
the world retaliated with increased attacks
against moderate Arabs and US targets in:
the latter half of the year.
International Terrorist Reversals in
1982
.
There were some major counterterrorism
successes in 1982, particularly in Italy and
West Germany. Experts differ, however, as
to whether these successes by govern-
ment authorities represent actual diminu-
tion in the strength of the terrorist organi-
zations or merely temporary setbacks.
Italy. On 28 January, Italian authorities
rescued US Gen. James Dozier from a
safehouse in Padua. Dozier had been kid-
naped from his Verona apartment by Red
Brigades (BR) terrorists on 17 December
1981. The rescue was facilitated by infor-
mation garnered after a January 1982
counterterrorist raid in Rome in which po-
lice made 10 arrests and uncovered
ground-to-air missiles, bazookas, rocket-
propelled grenades, and documents.
Italian counterterrorism programs in 1982
were successful largely because of the
impact of legislation aimed at encouraging
terrorists to turn state's evidence. Antonio
Savasta, who had masterminded the kid-
naping of General Dozier, received a re-
duced sentence because he provided Ital-
ian police with key information. Many
"repentant" terrorists provided informa-
tion incriminating others and leading to the
discovery of safehouses, weapons caches,
documents, and evidence indicative of
planned future terrorist activities. By the
end of the year, Italian police had reported
the arrest of roughly 450 alleged BR and
allied group members, and the Italian press
had suggested that the terrorist recruit-
ment process in Italy had been weakened.
and that there was heightened suspicion
between "repentants" and those who re-
fused to cooperate with authorities.
West Germany. The Red Army Faction
(RAF), a leftist terrorist group responsible
for much of the violence that swept over
West Germany during the last decade, was
dealt a serious blow in 1982. In November,
German officials arrested three of the orga-
nization's leading members-Adelheid
Schulz, Brigitte Mohnhaupt, and Christian
Klar-in stakeouts of RAF caches near
Hamburg and Frankfurt. In addition to
these arrests, more than a dozen caches of
arms, documents, and supplies were un-
covered along with photographs and other
information identifying RAF members. Evi-
dence from the caches indicated that the
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group had been planning attacks on US
targets and West German politicians and
that the group was most probably respon-
sible for the assassination attempt on US
Gen. Alexander Haig in Brussels in June
1979-an assessment based on the dis-
covery of detailed plans for the operation
in one of the caches. These were the most
significant successes West German au-
thorities had enjoyed against the RAF
since the arrests in the early 1970s of the
organization's founders. That the RAF was
able to recover from the earlier blow is
otten cited as the chief reason it should not
be counted out now.
German authorities also made consider-
able progress in countering rightwing ter-
rorism last year. Police in Berlin confiscat-
ed guns, munitions, pamphlets, uniforms,
and other supplies from the homes of
suspected members of the German Work-
ers Youth, a successor group to the Peo-
ple's Socialist Movement that was out-
lawed in January 1982 because of its
neo-Nazi status. Officials stated that sus-
pected group members had participated in
maneuvers and apparently were forming a
paramilitary organization.
State-Supported International
Terrorism
In 1982 some countries continued to sup-
port international terrorist groups or en-
gage in terrorist attacks to influence poli-
cies of other countries, to establish or
strengthen regional or global influence,
and, in some cases, to eliminate or terror-
ize dissident exiles and nationals from ad-
versary countries. Since 1980 a large num-
ber of international terrorist attacks-
primarily assassinations-have been car-
ried out by and for governments. Such
attacks have proved to be an efficient
method of achieving limited goals with very
little repercussion.
Our records for the past decade list 140
terrorist incidents conducted directly by
national governments, but this figure al-
most certainly understates the importance
of state-sponsored terrorism. Nearly 90
percent of the incidents occurred in 1980.
1981, and 1982, and more than one-third
were assassinations or attempted assassi-
No.899-20
WORLD:OT2
Page 10
nations; this is nearly four times the per-
centage of assassinations among all non-
state-sponsored terrorist incidents for the
three-year period. Most of the targets of
these state-sponsored incidents were for-
eign diplomats and prominent leaders;
more than nine-tenths of the incidents oc-
curred in Western Europe and the Middle
East, and Middle Eastern terrorists were
responsible in more than 85 percent of the
cases.
Libya. Since the mid-1970s, support to
terrorist groups-including provision of
camps and other training facilities-has
been an important element of Libya's for-
eign policy under Qadhafi. Libya has been
linked by overwhelming evidence to terror-
ist attacks and assassinations in Western
Europe, the United States, and the Middle
East and is known to support terrorist
groups and liberation movements world-
wide. In March 1982 the United States
imposed an embargo on Libyan oil imports
and curbed high-technology exports to
Libya, citing Qadhafi's influence over inter-
national terrorism.
Last October, Qadhafi publicly threatened
violence against Libyan dissidents. Al-
though some of Qadhafi's past threats
against dissidents have been carried out
by assassination squads, we have seen no
evidence that Qadhafi's most recent threat
has been implemented.
Syria. As a major supporter of radical
Palestinian groups, Syria has provided
training, logistic support, and use of diplo-
matic facilities to groups willing to do its
bidding. Following the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon and the displacement of Palestin-
ians to Syria, Syria increased its influence
over Palestinian terrorist groups such as
the BJO. The Syrian Government has also
been implicated in efforts to eliminate op-
position elements abroad. After an April
1982 car bomb explosion in downtown
Paris in front of the offices of a pro-Iraqi
newspaper that had published a number of
anti-Syrian articles, the government of
France expelled two Syrian diplomats, and
ordered its Ambassador to Syria home for
consultations.
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Target: USA
While the total number of recorded ter-
rorist attacks worldwide declined from
the previous year, anti-US violence in-
creased in 1982. Excluding threats and
hoaxes-which were more than double
the 1981 figure-actual attacks against
Americans numbered roughly as many as
the previous high recorded in 1978.
Seven Americans were killed last year.
Of 224 recorded attacks against US citi-
zens and property about half were bomb-
ings in Western Europe. The number of
attacks involving US interests in West
Germany alone-primarily US military in-
stallations-was nearly twice the figure of
the previous year. Illustrative of the prob-
lem was the 1 June 1982 attack by the
Revolutionary Cells (RZ ) on a number of
US military and commercial facilities. The
headquarters of the US Army V Corps in
Frankfurt (a frequent terrorist target ) was
hit, as were the officers' clubs at US
bases in Hanau, Gelnhausen, and Bam-
berg. In Duesseldorf, RZ bombs caused
extensive damage to the lobby areas of
offices of the IBM and Control Data Cor-
porations.
The RZ and many other terrorist groups
cite "anti-imperialist" motives in striking
at US targets. The Lebanese Armed Rev-
olutionary Faction (LARF ) claimed re-
sponsibility for the assassination in Janu-
ary 1982 of assistant US military attache
Charles Ray in Paris, identifying him as
an "imperialist military representative."
In Spain, the First of October Group of
Anti-Fascist Resistance (GRAPO)
claimed credit in early August for explo-
sive attacks that occurred outside the
premises of a US bank in Madrid and a
US department store in Barcelona, citing
its "solidarity" with the Palestinian cause.
There are other reasons for the frequency
of attacks on US interests:
· US targets are numerous, varied, and
accessible in most of the countries
where terrorists are active.
· US policies are usually opposed and
often inimical to the goals and interests
of many terrorist groups.
· US support of the governments that
terrorist groups are trying to destabilize
or overthrow automatically puts Ameri-
cans in the enemy's camp.
The Soviet Union and East European Activities
Concerning Terrorism
The Soviet Union and its allies have provided training, arms, and other direct and
indirect support to a variety of national insurgent and separatist groups. Many of these
groups commit international terrorist attacks as part of their program of revolutionary
violence. Moreover, some of the individuals trained and equipped by the Soviets
make their way into strictly terrorist groups with little revolutionary history or potential.
Moscow continues to maintain close relations with and to furnish aid to governments
and organizations that directly support terrorist groups. In the Middle East, for
example, the Soviets sell large quantities of arms to Libya. The Soviets support
Palestinian groups that conduct terrorist operations. In Latin America, the Soviet
Union and Cuba appear to be pursuing a long-term coordinated campaign to
establish sympathetic Latin American regimes. Part of this campaign involves nurtur-
ing organizations and groups that use terrorism in their efforts to undermine existing
regimes. In other parts of the world, especially Africa, the Soviets have supported
guerrilla movements and national liberation organizations, such as the African
National Congress (ANC), that engage in terrorism.
According to press reports, Bulgaria and other East European countries sell large
amounts of military equipment to Third World governments-some of which support
international terrorism-and to private arms brokers. Some of this materiel is
eventually acquired by groups that commit terrorist acts.
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South Yemen. While the Government of
the People's Democratic Republic of Ye-
men has not participated directly in inter-
national terrorist attacks, it has supported
international terrorism since the late 1960s
by providing camps and other training
facilities for a number of leftist terrorist
groups. In an effort to improve relations
with neighboring moderate Arab states,
South Yemen did reduce its support in late
1982 to North Yemeni and Omani insur-
gent groups that had engaged in terrorist
activities in the past.
Iran. Consistent with its radical, anti-West-
ern policies, its zeal for Islamic fundamen-
talism, and its widespread employment of
terrorism within Iran itself, the Khomeini
regime supports terrorist groups such as
the Iraqi Islamic Revolutionary Council, a
Shiite oppositionist group responsible for
numerous bombings in Iraq. In a Novem-
ber 1982 press interview, Hojjat ol-Eslam
Mohammad Bager Hakim, spokesman of
the Iraqi islamic Revolutionary Supreme
Assembly, named Iran as one of its prima-
ry financial backers. Many anti-Khomeini
expatriates have alleged that the govern-
ment tries to silence them through the use
of death threats and similar terrorist
tactics.
Iraq. The Iraqi Government has reduced
support to non-Palestinian terrorists and
placed restrictions on many Palestinian
groups, thereby moving closer to the poli-
cies of its moderate Arab neighbors. How-
ever, in 1982 Iraq continued to provide a
base for Abu Nidal's BJO, and there were
strong allegations that it had rendered
support to the Palestinian 15 May
Organization.
Nicaragua. Nicaragua continues to sup-
port insurgent organizations in Central
America that use acts of terrorism to em-
barrass, intimidate, and destabilize govern-
ments of neighboring countries. It pro-
Soure: U.S. Department of State.
References:
Patterns of International Terrorism,
D&EWR, No.4657, WORLD 0-8, July 1981;
D&EWR, No.5156, WORLD OT1, 4 July 1983.
*
WORLD: 0T2
Page 12
vides, for example, considerable financial,
logistic, and material support and sanctu-
ary to Salvadoran rebels of the FMLN.
During a press conference in the spring of
1983, Efrain Duarte Salgado, leader of the
Honduran FPR, in detailing the extent of
foreign influence over his group, specifical-
ly cited financial support by the Nicara-
guan Government. In a statement to Costa
Rican authorities concerning the July 1982
bombing of the Sahsa Airlines office in San
Jose, the arrestee implicated three Nicara-
guan diplomats in planning the bombing-
perpetrated partly in retaliation for Hondu-
ran military assistance to El Salvador.
Cuba. In its efforts to promote armed
revolution by leftist forces in Latin Ameri-
ca, Cuba supports organizations and
groups that use terrorism to undermine
existing regimes. In cooperation with the
Soviets, the Cubans have facilitated the
movement of people and weapons into
Central and South America and have di-
rectly provided funding, training, arms,
safehaven, and advice to a wide variety of
guerrilla groups and individual terrorists.
Manuel Pineiro Losada, head of the Ameri-
ca Department of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party, reaffirmed Cuban
commitment to the revolutionary proc-
ess-including support for groups that use
terrorism-at the 1982 international theo-
retical conference. Pineiro stressed the
fundamental Marxist-Leninist principle of
the need "to destroy the repressive ma-
chinery of the state in order to achieve
complete control and replace it with a new
state:" To this end he identified the timely
use of arms as indispensable for the tri-
umph of any liberating revolution. The con-
flict in El Salvador was cited as an example
of a "creative revolutionary formula . . .
applied in the use of arms."
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
Terrorist Incidents
CHICAGO TRIBUNE
3 June 1984
Pg. 7
21 bombs trigger fears of more to come in Midwest
By Douglas Frantz
and Philip Wattley
THE DISCOVERY of 21 small
bombs in Illinois, Wisconsin and
Minnesota has prompted warnings
from federal and local authorities to
residents in eight Midwestern states
that more of the potentially lethal
devices might be planted.
So far, bombs have been dis-
covered in playgrounds, parking lots
and shopping centers. Six people
have suffered minor injuries, but
authorities said the devices could
cause serious harm.
The construction of the bombs has
varied. The three earliest were built
inside paper sacks, but the last 18
were more powerful bombs inside
pieces of steel pipe about 6 inches
long.
Some were designed to be trig-
gered when they were picked up;
others were set off by trip wires;
and still others had electric circuits
that would be completed when a
dollar bill was pulled out.
A BOMB FOUND in Chicago was a
bare steel pipe with a battery strap-
ped to the side, while bombs baited
with dollar bills in Milwaukee were
wrapped in plain brown paper.
All are believed by authorities to
be the work of a single person or a
group.
Most have been concealed in pub-
lic places, prompting authorities to
warn citizens, to be wary of any
suspicious package or object, from
an apparently empty sack to what
may look like a bag of money.
"If you see any suspicious object,
don't touch it, don't throw rocks at
it, don't do anything except call your
police department," said Peter
Mastin, the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms [ATF] agent
who is heading the federal investiga-
tion.
Mastin and other authorities said
they fear more bombs will be dis-
covered over the weekend, but they
have been unable to come up with a
suspect or a motive.
"We can't discount anything at
this time, and we have to follow
every lead, but we just don't have a
suspect," said Mastin. "What we've
got is a helluva mystery."
THE REMAINS of all 21 bombs
are being tested by the ATF labora-
tory in Rockville, Md., to determine'
.whether the bombs were made with
the same material.
The strongest evidence of a link
between the bombs is the virtually
identical notes attached to many of
the pipe bombs.
May 27 & 28:
6 bombs found
May 6:
1 sack bomb
discovered
MICH.
MINN.
St. Cloud Stillwater
St. Paul O
Chippewa Falls
S.D.
May 27:
1 bomb found
Eau
Claire
WIS.
.La Crosse
May 5:
2 sack bombs
explode; 4 hurt
Milwaukee
MICH.
May 25:
6 bombs found;
1 injured
Chicago
ILL.
IND.
NEB.
May 31 & June 1:
3 bombs found;
1 injured
May 31 & June 1:
Two bombs found
Chicago Tribune Map
The notes read: "Violence by your
North Central Gay Strike Force
against public and police oppres-
sion." Some notes also listed eight
states, which police believe are tar-
gets of the bomber or bombers: Illi-
nois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota and
South Dakota.
Police and members of the gay
community say they have never
heard of the "strike force," and
some speculated that the bombs may
be the work of an individual who is
strongly antigay.
"It is conceivable that this vio-
lence is aimed at turning people
away from the gay community and
its recent progress," said Richard
Wagner, cochairman of the Gover-
nor's Council for the Gay and Les-
bian Community in Wisconsin.
WAGNER AND others speculated
that the bombings may have started
in Wisconsin because of the state's'
progress toward insuring gay rights.
Federal authorities and police in
three states are piecing together a
trail of bombs and fear that appar-
ently started in Eau Claire, Wis.
On May 5, two paper sacks in the
small Wisconsin town exploded when
they were picked up, and four people
suffered slight injuries from flying
metal, said Inspector William Fesen-
maier of the Eau Claire police.
No notes were found with the Eau
Claire bombs or with a similar sack
bomb discovered the following day in
Chippewa Falls, Wis.
Mastin said the sack bombs are
considered part of the series, despite
their differences with pipe bombs.
discovered in the last nine days.
ON FRIDAY, May 25, six powerful.
pipe bombs were discovered in La
Crosse, Wis., including one hidden at
the base of a slide in a playground
and three with trip wires stretched
across alleys off downtown streets.
One man was slightly injured when
a bomb exploded as he opened the
rear door of a Catholic church, said
Michael Abraham, a La Crosse po-
lice detective. The other bombs were
found by police before they went off.
The first notes claiming responsi-
bility were found in La Crosse. Abra-
ham said three bombs were accom-
panied by hand-scrawled notes in
black ink that said the bombs were
the work of the "North Central Gay.
Strike Force."
The pipe bombs were about 6 inch-
es long and 1/2-inch in diameter and
loaded with gunpowder, screws and
nails. All were set to be triggered by
trip wires.
ON SUNDAY, May 27, a cautious
passerby saw what he believed was
a trip wire hidden in some brush in
Stillwater, Minn. He set off the bomb
by throwing a rock at the wire, a
tactic that authorities warn is dan-
gerous.
Later Sunday and early Monday,
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TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
NEWSWEEK
11 June 1984 Pg. 38
The Midwest Hunts a Bomber
W
hen she saw the crisp dollar bill on the
ground in the Milwaukee Civic Cen-
ter Plaza last week, Jill Binon, 22, quite
logically bent to pick it up. The bill was
attached to a paper bag wrapped around a
cylindrical object-and turned out to be the
cruel bait for a pipe bomb. Binon was lucky.
The bomb misfired-flashing out like a
rocket instead of exploding in a burst of
shrapnel-and she suffered only minor fa-
Midwest in one week, and it was only by
luck that nobody had been seriously hurt.
Several of the bombs came with notes
signed by the "North Central Gay Strike
Force Against Public and Police Oppres-
sion," an unknown group. Some gay leaders
speculated that the bombs may be the work
of antigay elements, though police pointed
out that none of the cities where bombs have
been discovered has experienced any recent
gay-rights debates or dis-
turbances. In La Crosse,
Wis., where six bombs
were found, Police Chief
William Reynolds said
he was convinced that
all of the devices were
the product of one
"spineless" loner. The
loner apparently wanted
to cause pain. Spraying
metal screws when ex-
ploded, the bombs were
designed to hurt people
rather than property.
One of the La Crosse
bombs, discovered be-
fore it exploded, was
planted at the bottom of
a slide in a children's
STEVE PYLE-AP
playground.
Gathering bomb shards in Milwaukee: A 'spineless' loner?
cial burns and a mild concussion. But the
bomber was not through trying.
Hours later police found a second bomb
near The Milwaukee Journal building. Soon
after, two more were found in Chicago, one
in a downtown parking lot and another in a
stairwell of the Standard Oil Building. In-
cluding devices recently discovered in Wis-
consin and Minnesota, that brought the
total to 18 pipe bombs found across the
The police worried that more explosions
seemed likely. Some notes indicated that
the bomber also planned to strike random-
ly in Iowa, Michigan and Indiana. As in-
vestigators studied evidence confirming
that the bombs were all made by one per-
son, local authorities grew concerned that
serious injuries would occur unless they
turned up some solid leads soon. Last week
there were still no witnesses-or suspects.
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER
2 June 1984 Pg. 5
Another
bomb jolts
Vegas Strip
Associated Press
LAS VEGAS, Nev. - A bomb. ex-
ploded early yesterday in a parking
lot on the Las Vegas Strip, police said,
as a hotel strike entered its third
month with growing dissension
among thousands of pickets.
Officers said that the explosion,
the latest in a series of bombings,
occurred at 2:15 a.m. in the valet
parking area near the front of the
Frontier Hotel. Two cars were dam-
aged, but no injuries were reported.
Minutes after the explosion, a call-
er told an operator at Centel Tele-
phone Co. that he had blown up the
Frontier and that entertainers Sieg-
fried and Roy would be the next
targets, police said. The popular illu-
sionists resumed their show at the
Frontier on Thursday night while
100 strikers chanted and threatened
to reveal the pair's trade secrets.
The explosion was the latest in a
series of bombings since the strike
began April 1. In April a bomb caused
$20,000 damage to a swimming pool
at the MGM Grand Hotel. On Sunday
a bomb detonated at the Tropicana
Hotel, damaging nine cars. Also, a
rash of smoke and stink bombs was
set off during the Memorial Day holi-
day.
21 BOMBS ...
Continued
six more bombs were discovered in
St. Cloud, Minn. The first was found
by a security guard in a shopping
center, and a search of public areas
turned up five more pipe bombs. St.
Cloud police also found notes men-
tioning the "gay strike force."
At a press conference in St. Paul
on Wednesday, authorities used a
model bomb to demonstrate how eas-
ily the devices could be set off by a
trip wire.
But the next bombs used a differ-
ent device for detonation-money.
At 8 a.m. Thursday, a city worker
picking up trash near the museum in
Milwaukee's Civic Center Plaza no-
ticed an object wrapped in paper
with a dollar bill sticking out the.
end. As she pulled off the money, the
object exploded.
The worker, Jill Binon, suffered
minor burns. The object-a 6-inch
piece of steel pipe shot 25 feet and
embedded in a tree. Nearby, authori-
ties found another note attributing
the bomb to "the gay strike force.
Two more bombs baited with money
were discovered on Thursday and
Friday by police.
"OBVIOUSLY, IN my opinion,
these bombs are all the work of
some deranged person," said Ru-
dolph Will, deputy inspector of the
Milwaukee Police Department.
The drama moved to Chicago later
Thursday when an attendant at a
parking lot at 111 W. Wacker Dr .:
found a 6-inch piece of pipe with a
battery taped to it about 11:30 a.m.
He picked it up and tossed it aside,
thinking it was trash.
But after he told his boss about the
battery, police were called and dis-
covered that the pipe was another
sophisticated bomb packed with ex-
plosives and metal objects ..
"I guess I'm pretty lucky to have
my fingers left," said the attendant,
David Hanson, 20.
A similar bomb was discovered
about 1 a.m. Friday in the stairwell
between the 53d and 54th floors of
the Standard Oil Building at 200 E.
Randolph St. A note found near the
Standard Oil bomb and one found
later Friday in the parking lot on
Wacker contained the same message
as earlier notes.
LIKE THE Milwaukee dollar-bill
bombs, the devices in Chicago were
set to be detonated if a clip were
removed to complete the electrical
circuit. The Chicago bombs were
packed with a low-grade explosive
'and metal objects. They were de-
scribed as "shotgun bombs" because
one end of the pipe was capped to
force the metal to blow out the other
end.
Federal experts said capping both
ends would create a more dangerous
bomb because the force of the explo-
sion would be concentrated and the
shrapnel would fly in all directions.
76
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SPECIAL EDITION -
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
LOS ANGELES TIMES
30 May 1984 Pg. 1
U.S. Suspects
Soviets Ordered
Envoy Beaten
By ROBERT GILLETTE,
Times Staff Writer
MOSCOW-An American diplo-
mat was attacked and beaten by
several unidentified men in Lenin-
grad last month in an assault that
U.S. officials believe was organized
by Soviet authorities in an atmos-
phere of increasingly cold relations
with the United States.
The diplomat, Ronald A. Harms,
was not seriously injured in the
attack, which was said to have
occurred April 17. According to
sources familiar with the incident,
the State Department and the U.S.
Embassy vigorously protested to
Soviet officials in Washington and
Moscow. The assault on the diplo-
mat was not publicly disclosed.
According to the sources, who
asked not to be identified, the
incident occurred as Harms, one of a
dozen American diplomats serving
in the U.S. Consulate in Leningrad,
left a restaurant where he had met
with a Soviet acquaintance ..
Several unidentified men in civil-
ian clothes were said to have sur-
rounded the 35-year-old diplomat
ont the sidewalk, beating him in
plain view of passers-by. Harms
immediately hailed a uniformed po-
lice officer to report the attack, but
the officer is said to have shown
little interest.
According to the sources, the
police officer asked Harms whether
he had struck back at his assailants.
When told he had not, the officer
replied, "It's a good thing you
didn't."
A spokesman for the U.S. Embas-
sy in Moscow confirmed that details
of the account were "substantially
correct," but he declined to elabo-
rate, saying that "we felt it would
not be appropriate to go public with
this incident." Harms could not be
reached for comment.
Harms has served since October,
1982, at the consulate in Leningrad,
where his duties include the sensi-
tive-and, to the Soviets, unwel-
come-task of following human
rights issues. Both Harms and his
wife, Norma, hold the rank of consul
in Leningrad, the country's sec-
ond-largest city and the only U.S.
outpost in the Soviet Union outside
of Moscow.
The assault is believed to be the
first such attack here on an Ameri-
can diplomat since 1981, when Dan-
iel Fried, a vice-consul in Lenin-
grad. was beaten in one of the city's
subway stations.
Fried was also assigned to the
.human rights post in Leningrad. In
the official Soviet view, Westerners
who maintain contacts with reli-
gious or political dissidents in the
Soviet Union do so for the purpose
of fomenting subversion and elicit-
ing "slander" of the Soviet system.
Western diplomats note that in
the relative isolation of Leningrad,
400 miles north of Moscow, Soviet
police and KGB agents have long
operated with a freer hand against
the small community of foreign
diplomats. Surveillance of diplomats
and the occasional traveling corre-
spondent is more intense and obvi-
ous in Leningrad than Moscow, and
instances of petty harassment-
from police detention to minor van-
dalism of foreign cars-tend to be
more frequent.
Last August, the Soviets expelled
a vice consul at the U.S. Consulate
in Leningrad after accusing him of
spying. A month later, State De-
partment spokesman Alan Romberg
disclosed that the United States had
protested what he called the "phys-
ical maltreatment" of the diplomat,
Lon David Augustenborg, and his
wife Denise, before their expulsion.
Romberg did not elaborate.
The Soviet Union regularly and
publicly protests incidents involv-
ing its own diplomats in the United
States, invariably branding them as
terrorism perpetrated by American
authorities. Last Feb. 24, the official
Tass news agency said, three sticks
of dynamite were thrown into the
housing compound of the Soviet
mission to the United Nations in
New York, destroying one car and
damaging two others.
Attributing the attack to the
Jewish Defense League, Tass said
the State Department had ignored a
telephone warning and "in so doing
actually connives at the perpetra-
tion of such acts of terrorism."
The assault on the U.S. diplomat
in Leningrad occurred amid in-
creasingly shrill press attacks on
the United States, punctuated earli-
er this month by the Olympic
boycott, as Moscow has turned a
cold shoulder on overtures from the
Reagan Administration for renewed
talks on nuclear arms control.
Three American diplomats in
Moscow who follow human rights
NEW YORK TIMES
31 May 1984 Pg. 10
U.S. ASSAILS SOVIET
ON ENVOY ASSAULT
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, May 30 - The State
Department has filed a formal protest
with the Soviet Union about an assault
on an American diplomat in Leningrad
by several young men last month, offi-
cials of the department said today.
The officials said a "strong protest"
was lodged in both Washington and
Moscow over the April 17 attack on
Ronald Harms, a United States Consul
in Leningrad.
John Hughes, the State Department
spokesman, said Mr. Harms was
punched by a group of unidentified as-
sailants after leaving a restaurant in
downtown Leningrad.
Mr. Hughes said the protests over the
April 17 incident were not publicized
because the State Department has a
"standard practice" against doing so
in order to protect the security of the
diplomats involved.
There has been no Soviet response to
the protest nor has there been any sign
that those responsible were apprehend-
ed, a State Department official said.
The State Department says it does
not know why Mr. Harms was assault-
ed, but one official remarked: "You
have to assume when a diplomat is
roughed up there's some official con-
nection. It's otherwise such an orderly
society."
"There was no skin broken and no
bruises," he said, "but he was physi-
cally mishandled and that's outra-
geous."
Last year a vice consul in Leningrad
was expelled from the Soviet Union
after being charged with spying. The
United States later publicly protested
the physical mistreatment of the vice
consul, Lon David Augustenborg, and
his wife, Denise.
That incident occurred less than two
weeks after a Soviet fighter shot down
a South Korean airliner in September.
It also came on the heels of the expul-
sion, on charges of espionage, of more
than 100 Russians from Western coun-
triės.
cases were accused recently of
being CIA agents. And last Friday's
edition of Red Star, the armed
forces newspaper, accused seven
American, British and Canadian
military attaches of photographing
industrial installations in Leningrad
and penetrating deep into zones
closed to foreigners.
No action appears to have been
taken against any of the diplomats,
however.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WASHINGTON POST
6 June 1984 Pg.21
Israeli Attache Shot
By Gunmen From Car
In Suburb of Cairo
CAIRO, June 5 (AP)-Unidentified assailants
in a speeding car opened fire on an Israeli diplo-
mat in a Cairo suburb Monday night, wounding
him in the hand and shoulder, an Israeli Embassy
spokesman said today. .
It was the first known attack on an Israeli in
Egypt since the two countries signed a peace trea-
ty in 1979 and exchanged diplomats in 1980.
Spokesman Isaac Bar-Moshe said Zvi Kedar, an
administrative attache in his late 30s, underwent
surgery for fractured bones in his left hand and
was in good condition. His left shoulder was
grazed by a bullet, Bar-Moshe added, describing
the injuries as "minor."
Bar-Moshe said that Kedar was shot at after he
stepped from his car outside his home in the
southern suburb of Maadi, a residential area in-
habited by diplomats about 10 miles south of the
Egyptian capital.
"The shots came from a speeding car," Bar-
Moshe said. "Apparently there was more than one
person in the car. It was an ambush."
An employee at the Cairo office of the official
Soviet news agency Tass told the Associated Press
that a typewritten Arabic statement signed "The
Revolution of Egypt" and containing threats
against Israeli diplomats in Egypt was delivered to
the office Tuesday morning.
The statement made no specific mention of
Monday's shooting, said the Tass employee, who
spoke on condition he not be identified. The ex-
istence of The Revolution of Egypt organization
has not been'reported before.
There has never been any major organized op-
position in Egypt to its peace treaty with Israel.
However, some groups, including a number of law-
yers and Moslem fundamentalists, have de -.
nounced it.
Egypt is the only Arab country to have signed a
peace treaty with Israel, but relations soured after
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in'1982.
WASHINGTON POST
24 May 1984 Pg. 37
Nine Bombs Explode
In Two Colombian Cities
BOGOTA, Colombia, May 23
(AP)-Nine bombs aimed at
U.S. and Honduran targets ex-
ploded in Bogota and Cali, kil-
ling two people and injuring 11,
police said today. A breakaway
leftist guerrilla group reportedly
claimed responsibility.
Two bombs exploded near the
U.S. Embassy, and a car bomb
heard five miles away exploded
200 feet from the U.S. ambas-
sador's residence. Neither build-
ing was damaged.
A hard-line group that broke
away earlier this year from the
Revolutionary Armed Forces
claimed responsibility for the
bombings in a telephone call to
the Bogota daily El Bogotano,
according to the paper's news
editor, Henry Holguin.
He said a woman caller claim-
ing to be a member of the break-
away group said: "Honduras is
cooperating with the United
States in the destabilization of
the Sandinista government of
Nicaragua."
The main faction of the Rev-
`olutionary Armed Forces has
agreed to a one-year truce with
government security forces start-
ing next Monday.
All casualties occurred in one
incident, when a bomb exploded
late yesterday afternoon in the
downtown offices of the Hondu-
ran airline SAHSA, police said in
a communique. The two dead
and three of the injured were
among a group of young people
that brought the bomb into the
office, office manager Rafael
Olivo said.
NEW YORK POST
18 May 1984 Pg. 17
Cops probing
bomb factory
POLICE in New Jersey
are checking to see if a
bomb factory discov-
ered . Wednesday night
in Morris Plains is
linked to any terrorist
organization,
The cache, which in-
cluded "a large quantity"
of black powder, a home-
made flame thrower,
blow guns with darts, and
instructions for making
bombs, was discovered
when police raided a
house at 24 Maple Av.
Morris County Prosecu-
.tor Lee Trumbull said.
raiders also found stolen
goods including two
stereos, telephone equip-)
ment and an air purifier
in the house owned by
Mr. and Mrs. Eugene
Whitonis. They were
charged with receiving
stolen property.
Two juveniles, 14 and
17, were arrested on the
same charge.
N. Y. NEWS
6 June 1984
2 terrorize consulate
Vancouver, B.C .- Two' saber-wielding
Sikhs burst into the Indian consulate in
Vancouver and ransacked offices.
"Police said the men, brandishing two-
foot-long curved ceremonial swords,
smashed a glass door, several pictures
and some furniture before they were
arrested, The men, upset over the use of
troops against Sikh militants in the In-
dian state of Punjab, gave up without a
struggle.
NEW YORK POST
28 May 1984 Pg. 4
- New peril for
Beirut Yanks -
BEIRUT (UPI) - Americans in Beirut are under,
new threat of death or kidnaping by terrorists, in-
telligence reports indicated yesterday.
Jon Stewart, a spokesman for the U.S. Embassy
in Beirut, confirmed the reports.
"Through normal intelligence channels, we
learned somebody had the intention of taking ter-
rorist actions against the American University of
Beirut, the embassy, and Americans in general,"
Stewart said.
More guards were posted at the American Uni-
versity as teachers and embassy workers were
warned about a kidnaping threat from a funda-
mentalist Shiite Moslem group.
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SPECIAL EDITION --
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
BOOKS
WASHINGTON POST
1 June 1984 Pg. B-4
Terrorism
Of Words
Reviewed by
Oliver Banks
The reviewer, a New York art
consultant, is the author of two
mystery novels, "The Rembrandt
Panel" and "The Caravaggio Obses-
sion."
The year is 1977, the place is
Rome, and the title of Michael Mew-
shaw's new novel, "The Year of the
Gun," is borrowed from journalists'
apt description of the chaotic period
Book World
YEAR OF THE GUN.
By Michael Mewshaw
(Atheneum. 273 pp. $14.95)
when the Red Brigades made urban
terrorism a serious (even deadly) as-
pect of Italian life. David Rayborne, a
young American expatriate and the
hero of Mewshaw's tense and rather
bleak thriller, mocks the phrase, calling
it the "Year of the Fun" instead. The
reader is aware that Rayborne's flip-
pancy is a serious mistake long before
Rayborne himself does.
Rayborne is a journalist who man-
ages to eke out a marginal existence
working for an expatriate newspaper.
Realizing that he needs more money
simply to survive, he allows himself to
be pressured into writing a book about
the Red Brigades-"from the inside."
Conning his American agent into a
belief that he has important sources in
the Red Brigades, Rayborne accepts a
hefty advance on the premise that he
can infiltrate a terrorist cell. In reality,
what he intends to write is a literary
hoax, a totally fictional account based
on other published accounts as well as
his own invention. Even before Ray-
borne "invents" the kidnaping of the
CONTINUED NEXT PAGE
RUSI
March 1984
The complexities of terrorism
The War Against Terrorism By Neil C. Livingstone
(Lexington Books/Gower, Aldershot, 1983) £19.50, 291
pages
Neil Livingstone is an unabashed Republican and has
written a rum-tum-tum Republican book. Not for him the
"moralistic binge" of the Carter Administration, staffed
by "singularly guileless and untutored . . . appointees"
furthermore he laments that despite Reagan's strong
rhetoric, at the end of his first year in office little in the
way of substantive policy dealing with the problem of
terrorism had emerged. So, a 14 point programme
provides the book's conclusion. Among the proposals is
the revitalisation of the CIA with a paramilitary capability,
: linkage in negotiations with the Soviets so as to reduce
terrorist violence, the overthrow of Colonel Qaddafi, as
the financier of more than 40 terrorist groups ranging from
the PFLP to the IRA, the addition of a covert dimension
to anti-terrorist strike units and the payment of a £250,000
bounty by any US embassy for terrorists named by US
intelligence as having contributed to the death of US
representatives.
Mr Livingstone understands that the USSR views terror-
ism as a low cost strategy for achieving geopolitical goals,
he does not see that the USA is making similar experi-
ments in central America. The problem of containment is
not as simple as he makes out. Nor are the origins of the
phenomenon, nor indeed the reasons for escalation. It is
simply not true to say that PIRA has become a doctrinaire
Marxist organisation, whose leaders travel frequently to
the USSR, receive arms and training from Libya, Cuba
and the PFLP and who maintain effective links with the
Soviet KGB and the Cuban DGI. When speaking more
generally, Livingstone can also be read mistakenly. For
instance kidnapping is not a principal source of finance for
terrorists, although in some few cases it has been, nor do
terrorist groups generally traffic in drugs and they are
certainly not responsible for their appearance in Spain.
Attempts to generalise often lead the author into mislead-
ing assertions which are half truths: the fact is that
terrorism is too complex a phenomenon on which to
generalise.
Further chapters deal with the terrorist profile, where
no common traits between different groups can be
discerned; the media connection, where stiff sanctions for
journalists who abuse a strict professional code are
recommended; hijacking; weaponry, where nothing extra-
vagant is predicted; and targets.
Part two is concerned with the war against terrorism,
both from the point of view of the state and the private
sector. There is an alphabetical bibliography and an index.
The author is president of the Institute for Subnational
Conflict and Director for Terrorism and Low-Level
Warfare at the American Security Council.
PETER JANKE
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
TERRORISM OF WORDS
. Continued
Italian President Aldo Moro, the read-
er is conscious that fact and fiction are
bound to intersect in Mewshaw's story,
with violent and tragic results.
Other than the "invented" book, Da-
vid Rayborne has several real connec-
tions to terrorists. Part of the reason he
has fled to Italy, in fact, is to recover
from a tragic affair of several years
earlier, in which a women he lived with
was killed in a bomb explosion. Only
after her death did Rayborne become
aware that the woman he knew as
"Elizabeth Anderson" led a second life
as an urban guerrilla named Darlene
Spaulding, who was using Rayborne's
articles to send coded messages.
A second connection is an Italian
friend, Italo Bianchi, a sociologist who
teaches at the University of Rome. Un-
known to Rayborne, Bianchi is in fact
a member of a Red Brigades cell. Hav-
ing been forced by the brigades to be-
tray a close friend, Bianchi remains a
member of the cell under extreme du-
ress; as they point out to him, "no one
quits." Rayborne knows no more about
Bianchi's clandestine relationship to
terrorists than he knew earlier about
Darlene Spaulding's, and thus he be-'
comes vulnerable a second time. The-
matic echoes and parallels, frequently
intended ironically, are important as-
pects of Mewshaw's literary technique.
One of two women in Rayborne's
life is Stephane von Essen, a young
Frenchwoman separated from her Ital-
ian husband. Although Rayborne does
not live with them, Stephane, her son
Marc, and the American journalist
have a quasi-domestic relationship, and
Mewshaw's evocation of this ménage is
touching and lyrical. The other woman,
Alison Lopez, is a news photographer
with an instinct for danger. Coming to
Italy . from war-torn Beirut, Alison
forms her own obsession about infil-
trating the Italian terrorists. Convinced
that David Rayborne can help her
make this connection, she pursues and
seduces him. Alison and Stephane are
antitheses: where Stephane is a calm,
nurturing presence, Alison is wild, car-
nal and has an almost erotic fascina-
tion with violence. Awakened by a se-
ries of explosions one night, Alison is
enraged rather than relieved to discov-
er that they are harmless fireworks
FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
May 1984 Pg. 9
Perspectives On Terrorism. Edited by
Lawrence Freedman and Yonah Alexander.
Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1983.
This collection of scholarly papers and
monographs on the subject of terrorism
flows from a series of conferences held over
the past two decades under the auspices of
the University of Chicago's Institute of So-
cial and Behavioral Pathology. Divided
into four main sections (psychological di-
mensions of terrorism, the terrorist in pro-
file, hostage-taking and its aftermath, and
responding to terrorism), it represents a
convenient summation of scholarly
thought on this subject. It is not for the
layman or the idly curious, but is yet an-
other useful reference work for those with
policymaking responsibilities.
As in many other books of this type,
there is serious and enlightening thought
mixed with the semi-comic. For example,
the pedant's love of arcane language occa-
sionally emerges: Freedman discusses ter-
rorism under the general construct of "po-
listaraxia." There is the ever present Clive
Aston, whose fondness for statistical anal-
ysis leads him to attempt to explain terror-
ism with the help of the bell curve. Not
surprisingly, the contribution by Anthony
Quainton, former head of State's Office of
Combatting Terrorism, is among the most
interesting and for the most part is written
in English.
While the academic community has in-
deed contributed to the study and policy-
making aspects of terrorism and its cure (or
at least its control) one wishes that more
people with "hands on" experience in the
field were allowed into the inner temple.
Until that happy event occurs, the aca-
demic contribution to this important and
troublesome subject will remain peripher-
al.
-MICHAEL F. SPEERS
instead of artillery shells.
Mewshaw is very successful in
projecting a sense of danger. He is also
superb in his depiction of Rome itself.
Since he has lived there for a number
of years, he writes about the city with
an easy familiarity. Likewise, the po-
litical situation and the aura of malev-
olence that spread over the Eternal
City during that dark period are won-
derfully evoked. As Mewshaw turns
the screws of his plot, Rome itself al-
most becomes another character, an
unseen but palpable presence.
"Year of the Gun" is an excellent
story-tightly written, exciting and
fast-paced. As a portrait of modern
Italy and its discontents, it can be com-
pared with the work of such writers as
Alberto Moravia.
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SPECIAL EDITION
- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
USA TODAY 5 June 1984 Pg. 2B
Book on counterterrorists draws flak
In the early 1970s, Michael
Korda, editor in chief of Simon
& Schuster Inc., complained
that he was "suffering from an
overdose of anonymity." He
sought remedy in writing books
and articles.
Now, a rash of publicity sur-
rounding the controversial
publication of Vengeance: The
True Story of an Israeli
Counter-terrorist Team, should
cure Korda once and for all.
Korda, who personally
bought George Jonas' Ven-
geance for Simon & Schuster, is
at the eye of the storm over
whether the book is the factual
account it claims to be.
Vengeance centers on a man
known only as Avner who al-
legedly led an Israeli team of
counterterrorists in a plot to
hunt down and kill the Arab
terrorists responsible for plan-
ning the massacre of 11 Israeli
athletes at the Munich Olym-
pics in 1972.
Rinker Buck, the reporter
who took the story to Simon &
Schuster, told The Wall Street
Journal that Avner's counter-
terrorist story could not be sub-
stantiated.
Buck said he became "com-
pletely convinced it was a
fraud" and quit the project.
But, says Korda, "Buck sim-
ply did not do his homework.
... The only question is, 'Is
Avner the man who headed the
team?' And to that there sim-
ply isn't an answer."
Korda openly admits, how-
ever, that controversy never
hurt book sales and that he ex-
pects Vengeance to go into a
second printing.
"You have to publish what
you think you should publish,
and this is a story worth tell-
ing," he says.
AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
March-April 1984 Pg. 113
The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of
an Effective Strategy by Dr. William Regis Farnell
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, 142 pages. $20.00
This excellent book is probably the best account available
on how the U.S. government has institutionally responded
to the growing problem of terrorism. As the reader readil:
discovers, doing something about terrorism is far more diffi-
cult than understanding or explaining it. Dr. William Far-
rell seeks to determine to what extent the lack of a US
antiterrorist strategy is due to the structure and functions of
existing U.S. governmental agencies. He begins by discuss.
ing the challenge policymakers face in simply defining the
nature and scope of terrorism. Perceptions of what terrorism
is or is not are manifold. Of particular interest to readers is a
chapter that examines the legal, political, and sociologica!
concerns of military involvement in terrorist incidents.
Despite its intractable nature, governments must deal
with terrorism. However, responding actively to terrorism:
can induce a host of concerns, external and internal. !!
government bureaucracies (particularly in democratic socie.
ties, In the U.S. government. meeting the terrorist threat can
involve over 30 government agencies, raising jurisdictiona:
disputes over who is authorized to do what. This problem :s
exacerbated by the fact that terrorism is not a primary
responsibility of any agency. Consequently. antiterrorist
measures do not compete well for talent and resources
within the government or the individual agencies. U.S. anti-
tenorist effort within the bureaucracy is maintained for the
most part because some officials recognize terrorism as a
worldwide threat and because the United States is involved
episodicalh in terrorist incidents.
Di. Farrell has done an outstanding job of tracking down
and documenting the interdepartmental process by which
U.S. policy is formulated and implemented. He identifies
the major organizational players and delineates their ant !-
terrorist responsibilities. He also shows that there are majo:
obstacles inherent in the structure of the policymaking pro-
cess and the established functions of the participating agen.
cies which make the future emergence of such a strategy
unlikely. This prognosis appears confirmed by the present
administration, which has publicly given the problem of
terrorism high priority but has not made any substantive
changes to the existing interdepartmental structure.
The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism is for the
serious reader. There are no dramatic descriptions of terror-
ist exploits or international intrigue. Instead. the author has
painstakingly researched the "process" and noted its capa-
bilities and limitations. While the book tends to focus on the
U.S. bureaucratic structure. many of the challenges and
difficulties apply to bureacracies in general. For those in
government who are a part of this interdepartmental struc -
ture. this work is a must.
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Porter. U'SAF
Washington, D C.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
EDITORIALS
FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM
8 May 1984
Computer on guard
Instant information can be a help in securing
the United States' borders and in providing se-
curity against terrorism.
And that's why the new Department of Justice
international data processing center in Dallas is
good news .. .
From all sides, the public - and the federal
government - hears that the danger of terror-
ists expanding their anti-American or anti-what-
ever activities into the United States is real and is
increasing. Any reasonable precaution against
this, any preventive medicine. is merely pru-
dent.
The Dallas center. serving 700 terminals of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, will en-
able quicker checks of persons attempting to
enter the country than are currently possible
through paperwork.
Used properly. the computerized system
should enable federal authorities to screen out
foreign criminals, potential terrorists and those
who for one reason or another are not eligible to
enter the United States.
Madness abounds in the world today, and
America is an inviting target. There are enough
homegrown criminals and potential terrorists
without letting in those from abroad. If the com-
puter system makes it more difficult for terror-
ists to enter, if it saves one life or prevents one
terrorist act. if it keeps even a few international
criminals from plying their trade here, it will be
worthwhile.
If, as is already being done through contract
agreements with three states, the computer sys-
tem keeps undocumented alien workers - ille-
gal immigrants - from defrauding state welfare
systems, it will be paying for itself.
Legal immigrants and legitimate, peaceful vis-
itors to these shores should have nothing to fear
from the computer information center. Indeed,
in cases of emergency, they might even be
helped by it.
And using the most modern technology to
'sereen out the others is merely an additional tool
to protect U.S. citizensand foreigners with legiti-
mate business here. whether it be sightseeing or
commerce or taking in the Olympic Games, from
harm.
It is like an electronic border guard, and, un-
fortunately. we need all the guarding wecan get.
ALBANY, N. Y. KNICKERBOCKER NEWS
14 May 1984
Another view: Subversives
From the Daily Jowan, Iowa City :
& In its effort to combat terrorism, the Reagan
adminstration
. recently submitted legislation to
Congress to deal with some proposed solutions. One of
them allows the secretary of state to determine which
countries and groups are to be considered terrorist;
Congress is to pass legislation providing stiff jail terms
for anyone convicted of dealing with the groups so
Hamed.
That is a terrible idea, open to gross abuse. In the past,
When for example the attorney general placed groups on
the subversive list, the abuse has been flagrant. Church
groups, women's groups and civil rights groups found
themselves labeled as subversive because they opposed
the administration's policy at that time.
Being put on the list meant that CIA and FBI files were
opened on the groups and members of the groups. It
meant surveillance and sometime wiretaps.
This new law is open to similar abuse. There is nothing
to prevent an administration from labeling an unpopular
state or group as terrorist and then jailing those who
support such a group.
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SPECIAL EDITION
TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
WALL STREET JOURNAL
12 June 1984
To Tell the Truth
"The imposing rise of Solidarity in
Poland in the summer of 1980 and con-
sequent social convulsions constituted
a most acute crisis for the socialist
states of Eastern Europe. ... In
some secret place, where every secret
is wrapped in another secret, some
political figure of great power took
note of this most grave situation and,
mindful of the vital needs of the East-
ern bloc, decided it was necessary to
kill Pope Wojtyla."
This statement by Italian State
Prosecutor Antonio Albano is the first
official suggestion that the Soviet Un-
ion ordered the 1981 assassination at-
tempt on the Pope-Italians know
which nation Churchill described as
"a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside
an enigma." Mr. Albano is entirely
explicit in saying the plot was hatched
and paid for by "the Bulgarian secret
services," and has requested the in-
dictment and trial of nine people-
three Bulgarian spies, five members
of the Sofia-linked Turkish mafia and
Mehmet Ali Agca, the hit man now in
Italian custody. Sergei Antonov, one
of the Bulgarians, also is in Italian
hands.
The prosecutor's 78-page report
was leaked to free-lance investigative
reporter Claire Sterling; the New
York Times decided to play her dis-
patch on page one of its Sunday edi-
tion, jumping inside for 5,000 words or
so. The story has been a difficult one
for the Times. In March 1983 it pub-
lished a previous lengthy article by
Nicholas Gage supporting the Bulgar-
ian connection. But CIA sources
tended to shoot down this connection.
A New York Times reporter last Octo-
ber concluded that "the Antonov case
appears as one of deprivation of lib-
erty on the accusation of a single wit-
ness of doubtful character, an assas-
sin convicted of murder in Turkey and
attempted murder of the Pope and of
uncertain emotional stability to boot."
Yesterday columnist William Safire
remarked that, "From the start, this
story was minimized and ridiculed by
1
our C.I.A.," and he calls for an inves-
tigation by the Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board.
The Times certainly vindicated its
coverage with this latest dispatch, but
there remains an issue of why it has
taken so long for the press to shake
this story loose. In fact, some of our
colleagues went all out to declare An-
tonov innocent. When Antonov was
temporarily released from prison for
health reasons, the Guardian of Lon-
don opined that the Bulgarian connec-
tion had lost its "penultimate shred of
credibility." Even the Associated
Press in Rome has been quick to
quote Antonov's lawyers predicting
his imminent release. Those of us who
ran with the story, these columns and
the Reader's Digest, where Mrs. Ster-
ling first published, have been written
off as not reliably mainstream. The
plot was detailed in Mrs. Sterling's
book "The Time of the Assassins" as
well as Paul Henze's "The Plot to Kill
the Pope," but these books were
greeted with skeptical to scoffing re-
views.
Now comes Mr. Albano's report
with convincing detail and confirming
the darkest theorles. The Bulgarian
Embassy, for example, had actually
arranged for a sealed truck to spirit
trigger man Agca away without risk-
ing customs checks, but the plan went
awry when Agca was caught after one
of his accomplices failed to set off a
diversionary bomb after the shooting.
As for corroborating Agca's testimony
implicating the Bulgarians, Mr. Al-
bano reports that Agca knew the un-
listed telephone number of one of the
Bulgarian agents (despite Bulgarian
claims the number didn't exist), knew
that another collected miniature bot-
tles, and described a small wart on
the chin of the third. Most interest-
ingly, the account is woven through
with references to the Turkish mafia
and the right-wing Turkish terror-
ists, the Grey Wolves-both groups en-
joyed close relationships with the
Eastern secret services. The Soviets
obviously don't demand ideological
commitment from their terrorists,
just terror.
The Safire notion that the real
problem was less the press than the
CIA and other officials gets plenty of
support from Mrs. Sterling. She was
strongly urged, even threatened, by
the U.S. Embassy in Rome to drop the
investigation that resulted in her orig-
inal 1982 Reader's Digest article. The
West German police told her she was
foolish. She suspects an intentional
cover-up by Western governments of
the Bulgarian connection. In the end,
the story was rooted out by a brave
Italian judiciary; during parts of the
process Judge Martella's house has
been guarded by tanks.
If the reason the story was slow to
come out was official hesitancy, what
can the press do about it? For one
thing, reporters badly burned on this
story can go back to their sources in
places like Langley and 2201 C Street,
and ask what the heck was going on,
why Soviet behavior should be off-lim-
its from the truth. For another, they
can revise the knee-jerk response that
dismisses allegations of grotesque So-
viet behavior. We note that the Times
and the Washington Post also recently
have revised their attitudes toward
the expert sources telling them "yel-
low rain" was merely bee feces. In
both cases, we're sure, the horror of
the crime and the evilness it pins on
the Soviets were just too much.
Accepting the Pope plot as true
carries with it an entire view of the
nature of the Soviet empire, and it is
this view that many in government, in
the press and elsewhere have been
hesitant to face. But while it's not
easy to say how to deal with Soviet
lawlessness, the problem can't be
faced until we agree it's there. We
seem to be much closer to agreement
now than a week ago, thanks to the
Times, to Claire Sterling and to the
Italian judiciary.
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SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 26 JUNE 1984
THE NATION
28 April 1984
Terrorism 138
P
resident Reagan's contribution to statecraft has
been to make public policy of what used to be
secret suggestion. He stripped the cover from covert
war and entered aid to the Nicaraguan contras as
a line item in the Congressional budget. He wanted to con-
vert the shadowy C.I.A. system of subversion and propa-
ganda into a proud executive operation, Project Democ-
racy. Far from denying U.S. intentions to destabilize foreign
regimes, he announced a campaign to bring the Sandinista
government to its knees. It was not long ago that similar ac-
tions by another President became part of impeachment
proceedings.
In an order signed April 3, Reagan gave state-sponsored
terrorism the force of law, where once it was hardly whis-
pered about in White House corridors. National Security
Decision Directive 138 will allow U.S. government opera-
tives to take what Secretary of State Shultz calls "preventive
or pre-emptive action" against foreign terrorist threats.
Although the President has revealed no specifics on what
the program might entail, he will soon ask Congress to
authorize large sums to finance it. According to an Admin-
istration source, the White House has at least one thing in
mind: a bulging bribery account, from which inform-
ers will be paid huge rewards-perhaps $500,000-for the
juiciest tips.
Whether called state terrorism or pre-emptive action, the
kinds of operations the directive sanctions will be ruthless,
arbitrary and dangerous. If an eager tipster tells a NATO in-
telligence officer that a demonstration against a missile site
in West Germany could become violent, will American sol-
diers be sent to round up leaders of the peace movement or
ransack their offices-or worse? If an obscure political fac-
tion or religious sect "threatens" to attack U.S. soldiers in
some Middle Eastern country, will Phantoms be dispatched to
bomb the nearest targets of opportunity? or the capital of
an unfriendly country? If the uncontrollable leader of a hos-
tile regime brags that he will crush the American devils, will
he find cyanide in his soup or itchy powder in his caftan?
A White House source told reporters that Reagan would
honor his 1981 executive order prohibiting U.S. government
officials from carrying out assassinations, but what about
attempts by agents of American clients and proxies? Israel's
Mossad, South Korea's K.C.I.A., Chile's DINA and the
Salvadoran death squads are all funded and supplied direct-
ly or indirectly by the United States, and all are adept at
capers that Reagan might find distasteful.
What constitutes an international terrorist act, after all?
And when does it threaten American interests? A bomb in
an ambassador's automobile may be a clear-cut case of ter-
rorism, but an attack by a guerrilla army against a U.S.
military mission is an act of war. Salvadoran officials call
the rebel forces arrayed against them terrorists, the same
name Israeli leaders give to their Palestinian foes. One
man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter.
The fact is that Reagan's order will give the legitimacy of
policy to activities that are already on the menu of subter-
fuge and secrecy. It will not stop terrorism, for if ever a pro-
gram was part of the problem rather than the solution, this
is it. State-sanctioned terrorism creates the climate of
violence in which freelance terrorism thrives. The brutality
in El Salvador, the massacre of peasants in Guatemala, the
occupation of the West Bank-such strategies make the
responses they provoke seem feeble by comparison. Direc-
tive 138 dodges that issue, and profoundly misses the point.
Like Directive 138, the 1976 resolutions creating Con-
gressional Intelligence Committees were supposed to legiti-
mize secret U.S. operations by making them into publicly
scrutinized and sanctioned policy. But while Reagan's ex-
ecutive order is deceptive from the start, the resolutions
were passed with the best liberal intentions of averting na-
tional moral and political disasters. Unfortunately, in just
a few years the oversight function of those committees has
eroded, and they mostly ratify and mediate the activities
they ought to prohibit.
The betrayal of the Intelligence Committees' origins
makes Daniel Patrick Moynihan's resignation from -the
vice-chairmanship of the Senate Intelligence Committee a
futile gesture. The Senator says that the C.I.A.'s delay in
notifying the committee of the mining of Nicaraguan ports
destroyed the necessary trust between his panel and the
agency. But the deeper issue is Moynihan's concept of his
duty. We do not need representatives who collaborate with
the national security apparatus; we require elected officials
who will control it.
For Moynihan, the problem with the Administration's
Central America policy is one of communication. He has no
beef with the general proposition of a terrorist campaign
against the Sandinista government. He voted-as recently
as April 5-to give $21 million to the C.I.A. forces engaged
in murder, torture and the destruction of civilian communi-
ties in Nicaragua. He knows better than most members of
Congress that the government's claim merely to be "inter-
dicting" men and matériel en route to El Salvador is non-
sense. An American naval flotilla in the Gulf of Fonseca
and the U.S .- Honduran military forces surely don't need
the help of the contras to do that. Moynihan just wants a
little more respect.
The Intelligence Committees of both houses could blow
the lid off Reagan's Central America adventures if they had
a mind to, but they have not put much of a crimp in the war
effort. What have they learned about the contra seizure of
San Juan del Norte? The forces in that southern town on the
Atlantic coast are said to be made up of right-wing Cu-
ban exiles supplied with Israeli arms. No word yet from
Moynihan on that subject. Now that he's off the committee,
he need say nothing. And that may have been the Senator's
purpose all along.
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